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CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY

RECONCILED WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF MODERN BIBLICAL LEARNING;

A THEOLOGICAL ESSAY,

WITH CRITICAL AND CONTROVERSIAL SUPPLEMENTS.

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BY

JOHN WILLIAM DONALDSON, D.D.,

LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

FIDEM ET QUOD FACIT THEOLOGUM

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

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TO THE HONOURABLE

STUART ALEXANDER DONALDSON, ESQ.,

COLONIAL TREASURER OF NEW SOUTH WALES, ETC. ETC. ETC.

My Dear Stuart,

I have ventured to gratify my own feelings by inscribing this Work with the name of one of my nearest relatives and most intimate friends. That you will agree with me in all the details of my argument, I have no right to assume; but it is probable that you will not dissent from my general principles, which are those of the most intelligent and enlightened men in this country; and you, at all events, will give me full credit for a sincere wish to serve the great cause of religious truth.

Ever your affectionate Brother,

J. W. DONALDSON.

PREFACE.

THE object of this book is the most important that could be proposed to a Christian divine in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is to make the evidences of our religion independent of all those objections which have been successfully urged by its opponents; to show that the faith, which is to render us happy here and hereafter, does not rest on the floating clouds of human dogmas, opinions, assumptions, and superstitions, but stands fixed on the granite basis of inherent truth and historical certainty.

In undertaking this work, I have been instigated mainly by a strong conviction that some such attempt is absolutely necessary at the present time. It appears to me to be imperatively demanded that some one, who has adequately studied the subject, should come forward, like Aaron, to take his stand between the living and the dead, and, by an offering of reconciliation, to stay the plague of unbelief, which has for some time followed in the train of a dishonest Bibliolatry. Although the respectable middle classes of this country too generally lean upon a textual authority, and are unwilling to

be roused from their torpid acquiescence in the conventional and external representatives of their religion, there are at this moment among them, and in the classes above and below them, many thousands of sincere and intelligent men, who would fain be theoretically orthodox in the faith, which is practically the guide of their conduct, but are perplexed or repelled by finding that it is made responsible for propositions which are manifestly untrue. For the sake of these and others who find a perpetual stumbling-block in the popular misrepresentations of Christian orthodoxy, I have undertaken to show that our religion is not an effete or superannuated system; that it is as true now as when it was first preached; that, in fact, its worst enemies are those anachronists who would tell us that it has no truth except so far as it is presented under certain forms of speech or modes of thought, with which the intelligence of the present day can have no sympathy; that, on the contrary, every detail of sound doctrine may be defended on the broad and solid basis of modern learning, common sense, and personal godliness.

It will be observed that, in its outward form, this work is a continuous essay, supplemented by a number of special disquisitions on certain important subjects, which are necessarily connected with the general argument, but could not have been discussed in the text without an interruption to the regular progress of the reasoning. The considerations, which have led to the adoption of this arrangement, were suggested chiefly by a regard for the convenience of the reader, who may now, if he pleases, confine his attention in the first instance to the essay itself, which is printed in a

larger type, and otherwise adapted for a rapid and unbroken perusal. Although every Appendix is directly connected with the chapter to which it belongs, they may all be regarded, if any one chooses to do so, as independent papers or articles on the subjects to which they refer. They are described in the title-page as critical and controversial; and though the subjects may seem to be here and there of merely transient interest,—questions of the present day, in fact,—it must be remembered that such questions have, in many cases, been the starting-point in investigations of lasting importance. In theological literature, one of our most valuable books, the *Ecclesiastical Polity* of Richard Hooker, originated in a controversy between the two preachers of the Temple. And in philology, there is not a more instructive or epochal treatise than Bentley's reply to Boyle and his coadjutors.[1] If I had lived in the days of Plato, I should, no doubt, have introduced those, from whose views I dissent, as interlocutors in a series of dialogues; but as I happen to live in the days of leading articles and reviews, I have adopted a mode of criticism in accordance with the spirit of the age.

And here I must direct the reader's attention to a distinction, which seems to me to have no slight importance, and which I have endeavoured to indicate in the wording of my title-page. This book is essentially controversial, but it does not engage in *theological* or *dogmatic* controversy. On the contrary, it is, from first to last, a protest against theological warfare and dogmatic intolerance. It is designed to serve

[1] Æschines has remarked with great truth (c. *Timarch.* § 2). αἱ γὰρ ἴδιαι ἔχθραι πολλὰ πάνυ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπανορθοῦνται.

as an argument for reconciliation, not as a fresh aggravation of discrepancies. It insists on the importance of that, in which all religious men are agreed, and on the triviality of those particulars, on which the best Christians may consent to differ. In these pages there is no approximation to doctrinal party-spirit or sectarian polemics. I have no wish to interfere with any man, whether within or without the National Church, who serves God according to his own conscience, and is willing to concede to others the liberty which he claims for himself. And yet it is one of the objects of this treatise to expose the conduct and to confute the opinions of those who represent themselves as the most religious men in this country. Now if any one maintains that there is an inconsistency in this, he has fallen, consciously or unconsciously, into a very old fallacy. The ancient logicians used to maintain that he who predicates non-entity is thereby involved in a predication of existence. Just in the same way some persons may endeavour to show that an attempt to expose and protest against theological dogmatism and intolerance, is itself an act of intolerance and dogmatism. If so, the man who brings an action for libel is a slanderer, the advocate of liberty is a tyrant, and every Protestant is a persecutor. No one can wish more sincerely than I do, that there was no necessity for the censures which I have been obliged to bestow on certain professors of Christianity in this country. But the aggressive attitude which Bibliolatry has assumed towards all those who dare to think for themselves, has left no choice in this matter for any one who would claim for himself and others the privileges of educated man-

hood and the rights of intellectual freedom; and, in my own particular case, the duty of self-defence and vindication is added to the more general obligations of a conscientious regard for the truth, and for the interests of religion. If any of my readers think that the evils, with which I have had to deal, might have been treated with a gentler hand, they can hardly know the full extent and atrocity of the anti-christian manifestations, which I have felt myself called upon to denounce and condemn. When there is not only undisguised malignity instead of Christian love, but shameful dishonesty instead of literary candour, it would be a dereliction of duty to speak with reserve or qualification. As the old dramatist says, "It is not the part of a skilful leech to utter incantations in a plaintive tone over a disease that requires the knife." The Author of our religion, who exemplified the love which He enjoined, inveighed, in no measured terms, against the Scribes and Pharisees, who represented the selfish intolerance of those days; and the same plainness of speech must always be used whenever religious zeal is made a cloak for maliciousness. I know, however, that there are good men in every denomination of Christians, and many Bibliolaters have escaped the evil influences of the party to which they outwardly belong. With those whose faith, whether rational or superstitious, exhibits its practical working in the love which fulfilleth the law, I have no controversy in the following pages; and if a single word of mine has given pain to any sincere and pious and charitable believer, whatever may be his ignorance or prejudices, I heartily regret it, and would gladly blot it out, provided this

could be done without a sacrifice of the truths which I have feebly endeavoured to advocate. I can lay my hand upon my heart, and declare that I regard with unfeigned toleration every opinion which I deem erroneous, except those which find their necessary expression in acts of unchristian malevolence.

If I were careful about the judgments of my contemporaries, or actuated by the usual motives of literary men, I should be sufficiently sustained by the knowledge that I have been true to the spirit of my own Church, and by the profound conviction that, with the growth of knowledge on these subjects, an increasing number of Anglican divines will appreciate the principles which I have assumed, and adopt the conclusions at which I have arrived. And to show that I do not merely flatter myself by a reliance on my own judgment, I will quote some words addressed to me in a letter a few years ago by a dignitary of our Church, who has no superior in literary eminence, and who was, at that time, personally a stranger to me. "The day must come," he wrote, "when, if the Church of England refuses to stand on the ground of sound scholarship, if she will repudiate the aid of those who, like yourself, know the progress of the rest of Europe on such subjects, she will be liable to a most dangerous conflict, in which she will hardly escape being worsted." But I am not careful about men's judgments on these matters, or solicitous to obtain their approbation. I know that we must all look forward to a day when an inquiry will be made by our only Master respecting the use of every talent and opportunity committed to us, and that it will be

of little avail to have won the applause of fallible men like ourselves, if we cannot gain the testimony that "we have been faithful in a few things." I have been permitted to attain a mature age, and, during the greater part of my life, I have been enabled to occupy myself with the studies and pursuits best calculated to prepare and qualify me for the task which the present work has imposed on me. While, then, it is the simple result of my sense of religious responsibility, I shall not look back on my labours as fruitlessly bestowed, if I can convince only two or three unbelievers, or half-believers, that our faith does not rest on the erroneous assumptions to which their reason objects; if I can wean only two or three sincere but mistaken Christians from the fatal dogmatism, which checks the growth of heavenly graces in their souls. In this hope, and in the full confidence of an honest heart, I commend my work, with all its imperfections, to Him, who alone can accept or reject the labours of His servants—to whom alone they stand or fall.

J. W. D.

CAMBRIDGE,
31*st December*, 1856.

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ERRATA.

Page	97,	line	18 bott.	*for*	"Gospel"	*read*	"Gospels."
„	117,		ult.	„	"Gospel"	„	"Gospels."
„	146,	„	4 bott.	„	"1836"	„	"1856."
„	„	„	3 „	„	"δαίμων"	„	"δαίμων."
„	153,	„	10 „	„	"Testament"	„	"Testaments."
„	172,	„	4 „	„	"Cyril, *Hierosol.*"	„	"Cyril-Hierosol."
„	176,	„	8 „	„	"Scriptures"	„	"Scripture."
„	192,	„	24	„	"Gospel"	„	"Gospels."
„	242,	„	16	„	"practises"	„	"practices."
„	„	„	21	„	"*Jeshuran*"	„	"*Jeshurun*."
„	243,	„	13	„	"erkannt"	„	"erkannt,".
„	251,	„	17 bott.	„	"them"	„	"them."
„	„	„	13 „	„	"Tübugen"	„	"Tübingen."
„	„	„	10 „	„	"Testament"	„	"Testament history."
„	266,	„	2 „	„	"Ναξαρέτ"	„	"Ναζαρέτ."
„	318,	„	1	„	"know,"	„	"know;".
„	348,	„	14	„	"Testament"	„	"Testaments."

CHAPTER I.

THE ADVOCATE OF CHRISTIANITY.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

We are accustomed and encouraged to speak of Christianity as engaged in perpetual warfare. The Church is described as militant here upon earth, and all those who are admitted by baptism to a participation in the New Covenant are enrolled as soldiers, and sent forth to fight against the powers of evil under the banner of their Redeemer. Every Christian, as an individual, is thus pledged to contend with "the fleshly lusts which war against the soul"[1]; and the Church, as a body, no less than the members of which it is composed, must strive perpetually "to overcome the world"[2]: that is, not only to resist its absorbing and converting tendencies, but to bring it, as fully and as speedily as possible, under the domination of the Gospel, and thus to hasten the coming of the time when it may be truly said that "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ."[3]

Although the very terms of this phraseology imply that

[1] 1 Peter, ii. 11. [2] 1 John, v, 4. [3] Rev. xi. 15.

Christianity is opposed to that which is professedly and outwardly alienated from it, or inherently and essentially at variance with its principles, we find practically that the great battle-field of the disciples of Jesus is the Church itself, and the combatants those who sincerely believe themselves to be true followers of the Redeemer. When we talk of polemical theology or the warfare of religious controversy, we do not allude to hostilities carried on between belief and infidelity, but to the unceasing conflicts between the different manifestations of religious dogmatism. We are like the last defenders of the visible Temple of God, who were fighting to the knife in the streets of Jerusalem, while Titus and his legions were thundering at the gates. Not only now, but in every age since the first beginning of our religion, an anxiety to uphold some particular opinions respecting Christian doctrine, or a wish to tyrannize over the consciences of other men, has taken the place of our true vocation as the soldiers of Jesus,—as those who have solemnly undertaken to fight against the sin which is within themselves, and against the open infidelity which is dominant in the world without them.

In this mistaken view of our duties as Christian warriors, we overlook all that is essential to our position as reasonable creatures and as believers in a revealed religion. On the one hand, we ignore the prescriptive conditions of our composite nature, namely, the opposition between flesh and spirit,—between the merely animal, which is of the earth, earthy, and the mental and moral qualities, which distinguish us from all other living creatures and claim a celestial origin,—and the perpetual conflict, which philosophy and religion proclaim, with united voice, to be the inevitable destiny and the primary duty of the reasonable being as such.[1] And, in regard to the special revelations of

[1] *See* Appendix I.

Christianity, we forget that, if "the Captain of our salvation was made perfect through suffering"[1]; if he was obliged to strip off from himself the principalities and powers—the potent lords of sin, which rule in our members—and to triumph over them by an internal conflict, and a victory over self[2]; if he was content to advocate his own cause only by the example of patient endurance, which appeals from the world's tribunal to "Him that judgeth righteously."[3]; we, who are but common soldiers, can have no other rule either for the discipline of our hearts or for the defence of our faith. Neglecting these fundamental principles, we act as if our business here was not to learn the will of God, in order that we may endeavour to perform it, but to scrutinize the opinions of our fellow-men, in order that we may contradict and condemn them; and thus, instead of doing our own work, as children of light, we spend our time in doing the world's work, as persecutors of those who endeavour most sincerely to carry their faith into practice.

The tendency to substitute dogma for duty, to become zealous adherents of some factious party, instead of patient followers of Christ, to echo the words of others, instead of consulting the whispers of our own conscience, and having confidence towards God because our own heart does not condemn us,[4] is all the more dangerous, because it springs from the carnal selfishness inherent in our nature, which it is the main object of Christianity to control, if not to eradicate. We all find it so much more easy to adopt zealously some formula of external religion, and to uphold and propagate it at the expense of our neighbours, than to carry on a constant struggle with our own evil inclinations, to aim at improvement, which seems to become less attainable the more we appreciate its necessity, and to

[1] Heb. ii. 10. [2] Col. ii. 15. [3] 1 Peter, ii. 3. [4] 1 John, iii. 21.

practise the perpetual discipline of self-distrust and self-denial. It gratifies our vanity to hear on all sides the voice of assent, encouragement, and commendation; and it is a happy diversion to be able to forget the beam, which would otherwise be painfully sensible, while we magnify the mote, which, as we fancy, obstructs the vision of others. And yet, in all this, our leader is but Antichrist arrayed in the royal robes of Immanuel; we are but rebels dressed in the livery of fictitious loyalty; and we are using the name of Jesus, while we are breaking his laws and endeavouring to overthrow his kingdom in this world.

It is highly needful, then, that timid and zealous believers should be told from time to time what it is that the advocate of Christianity is called upon to maintain, and what principles ought to regulate our defence of the faith. They will thus be reminded that the legitimate object of religious apologetics is religion itself, and not the opinions of men about religion; and that the defence of Christianity does not consist in the propagation or overthrow of any doctrinal system current among believers; for whether they belong to orthodoxy or heterodoxy, opinions are but opinions still, types of the inevitable diversities of thought on those subjects, which do not fall within the scope of scientific demonstration. And a proper examination will relieve many sincere men from the prevalent inability to distinguish between the friends and the enemies of revealed truth, and enable them to see that the true advocate of Christianity is he who recommends the teaching of the Gospel by exhibiting in his own life the triumph of love and purity and heavenly wisdom over the selfishness and concupiscence and worldly folly of the unregenerate heart; and who, whenever the need arises for an open conflict with infidelity, can uphold the facts of revelation without violating the laws of Christian charity, or implicating himself in the conscious maintenance of errors and

falsehoods:[1] but that he, on the other hand, is not the friend but the enemy of the Christian religion, who falsifies his profession by an impure and selfish life, or by an intolerant and persecuting dogmatism; and who, in the maintenance of his own distinctive opinions, makes Christianity responsible for the fictions of ignorance and for the sophistries of conscious falsehood, to the discredit of the truth in the judgment of honest and intelligent

[1] The proper functions of the Christian, as far as relates to the conversion of his erring brethren, are well described in a passage which has not been sufficiently understood and applied. We learn from 2 Tim ii. 23—26, that the "servant of the Lord" is not to be found in the arena of polemical theology, but that he is the gentle and patient "fisher of men," who rescues his brethren from the deadly sleep of a carnal life, which is the snare of the devil, and arouses them to a proper sense of the light and truth of the Gospel. The words are: Τὰς δὲ μωρὰς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ζητήσεις παραιτοῦ, εἰδὼς, ὅτι γεννῶσιν μάχας· δοῦλον δὲ Κυρίου οὐ δεῖ μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤπιον εἶναι πρὸς πάντας, διδακτικόν, ἀνεξίκακον, ἐν πραΰτητι παιδεύοντα τοὺς ἀντιδιατιθεμένους· μήποτε δώῃ αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς μετάνοιαν εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἀνανήψωσιν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου παγίδος, ἐζωγρημένοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου θέλημα, *i.e.*, "Deprecate foolish and shallow speculations, knowing that they engender contentions (or polemics); now the servant of the Lord ought not to engage in contentions, but he should be gentle to all, anxious to give information, tolerant of calumny, instructing those opposed to him with meekness, with the hope that God may give them repentance unto an acknowledgment of the truth, and that they may be awakened from the drowsy sleep in which they have been entrapped by the tempter, and may be rescued by the fisher of men, and led to do the Lord's will." It is clear that ἐζωγρημένοι must be interpreted in the same reference as the promise to Peter (Luke, v. 10): ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνθρώπους ἔσῃ ζωγρῶν, which is the only other passage in the New Testament, where the word occurs. We see from Matth. iv. 19, Mark, i. 17, that a Minister of Christ ζωγρεῖ ἀνθρώπους, because he is ἁλιεὺς ἀνθρώπων, *i.e.*, because he takes the unconverted from the deep waters of destruction and places them in the church as in an ark of safety (*cf.* Acts, ii. 40, 47, 1 Peter, iii. 20). The verb ἀνανήφω should properly imply a return to sobriety after a drunken stupor, but in this passage it refers to the state of darkness and sleep, as a type of death, in which the unconverted are considered to lie, until they are aroused to the light and life of the Gospel (*see* 1 Thess. v. 4, 10, which is the *locus classicus*, and *cf.* Ephes. v. 14, Romans, xiii. 11, 12). That "the foolish and shallow speculations, which engender contentions," include the usual subjects of religious controversy, is sufficiently clear from the nature of the case; and that the same caution is applicable to the literal interpretation of mythologies, to which the Bibliolater attaches so much importance, follows from the very similar passage in 1 Tim. iv. 7: τοὺς δὲ βεβήλους καὶ γραώδεις μύθους παραιτοῦ. γύμναζε δὲ σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, *i.e.*, "Deprecate the irreligious and oldwifish mythologies, and practise yourself in piety," compared with 1 Tim. i. 4: μηδὲ προσέχειν μύθοις καὶ γενεαλογίαις ἀπεράντοις, αἵτινες ζητήσεις παρέχουσιν μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκονομίαν Θεοῦ τὴν ἐν πίστει. "not to attend to endless mythologies and genealogies, which cause controversies rather than the ministration of religious faith." (*cf.* Tit. i. 14.)

men, and to the subversion of the faith in the minds of the weak and uneducated.

Influenced by these general considerations, we have undertaken to show at length, in the following pages, that the proper functions of the advocate of Christianity are those which we have briefly described; that conservatism, or the maintenance of established views and principles, has its laws and objects, its limitations and conditions, when it represents the apologetics of Christianity, no less than when it professes to uphold an existing constitution in Church and State; that this true conservatism presumes a timely relinquishment of the untenable; that there are two dogmas most especially rejected by learning and common sense, so that by their maintenance the conservatism of orthodoxy is signally imperilled in these latter days; and that Christian orthodoxy in general, and our national orthodoxy in particular, are the same now as they were when Jesus accepted with a blessing the confession made by Peter, or when John gave the original definition of Antichrist.

Before, however, we pass to a detailed discussion of this most important subject, it seems desirable that we should examine as closely as possible the metaphorical language in which Scripture depicts the armour and the enemies of the Christian warrior. We reserve for subsequent discussion all questions connected with the authority of Holy Writ. But assuming that it is authoritative with those to whom we are now more especially addressing ourselves, we appeal with especial confidence to its figurative phraseology, as containing the most primitive expression of the lessons which we are to derive from it. For it cannot be denied that some of the greatest truths of revelation are wrapt up in allegories, which, like the hieroglyphics of ancient Egypt, present at once the most durable records of facts, and, when properly understood, the most significant

representations of ideas. This is notoriously the case with regard to those parables to which our Lord confined the main part of his direct and popular teaching. And we shall see that the figurative language—which St. Paul derived from the Old Testament and applied to the condition of Christians engaged in that perpetual struggle with enemies within, which is included in the general name of temptations or trials—is fraught with the deepest instruction for all those who will really use the proper key to this casket of truths, concealed only from the careless and profane. That, in circumstantial narratives, a certain variety of statement is quite compatible with general accuracy, is well known to all who have examined the evidences of history. That didactic teaching is not always transmitted without any alteration of form or substance, is shown by the manner in which the Sermon on the Mount, given as a whole by St. Matthew, is represented only by detached fragments in St. Luke's history. But a figurative picture or description contains in its own coherency and completeness a permanent guarantee for the accuracy with which it has been preserved and transmitted; and here, if at all, we find the very words of inspired teaching.

This preliminary examination will enable us to establish the following most important propositions:—

(*a*) That the real battle-field of the soldier of Christ is his own heart; his real enemies, the lusts which war in his members.

(*b*) That in regard to the conquest or conversion of the world, the Christian champion must vindicate his cause by his conduct.

(*c*) That the weapon of the Christian warrior is the sword of the Spirit, or the Word of God in its naked essentials, and not the scabbard of human opinions, by which it is concealed.

(*a*) We find that St. Paul's descriptions[1] of the panoply to be borne by the militant Christian, presume, if we may so express ourselves, a double function of defence; the one having reference to an internal conflict for ever going on within the believer's heart, the other belonging to the occasional combats to which he is challenged by the outward enemies of his faith. The true soldier of Jesus Christ is not only furnished with the means of protecting his own heart from the assaults of the sin which reigns in his members; he has not only the breastplate of righteousness, otherwise described as consisting of faith and love,—that is, of faith working by love;—he has not only a girdle of truth about his loins, the foundations of the gospel of peace for his feet, and the helmet of hope for his head; but he

[1] Ephes. vi. 11, 17, 1 Thess. v. 8., Rom. xiii. 12, 2 Cor. vi. 7. Although the first of these passages contains the most minute description, the others are perhaps more precise in their application of the figures. For example, the Epistle to the Thessalonians tells us, what we should not have learned from Ephesians alone, that the helmet of *salvation* means the Christian grace of *hope*, while the breastplate of *righteousness* includes the two other graces of *faith* and *charity* (1 Cor. xiii. 13); and we are thus enabled to throw a new light on Isaiah lix. 16, 17, to which, in all probability, the passage in the Ephesians directly refers. For the Hebrew words צדקה and ישעה or תשועה, which are constantly used by Isaiah in a sort of synonymous parallelism, are expressly employed to denote the two functions of the Messiah, who, in the passage just quoted, is described as having put on "*righteousness* (צדקה) as a breastplate, and *salvation* (ישועה) as a helmet;" and in another not less remarkable passage, the intercessor declares himself (Isaiah lxiii. 1) as "he that speaks of *righteousness* (צדקה), and is mighty to *save*" (להושיע). Nay more, it is worthy of remark, that these two words contain the roots of the two names *Jesus* or "Saviour," and "the just" or "righteous man," by which title our Saviour was especially known. And, in this way, it is interesting to see how the ideas of *righteousness*, *faith*, and *salvation* are brought together in the passage which tells us that the name of the Redeemer shall be called *Jehóváh Tsidqénú*, "the Lord our righteousness" (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6). Now if, as we learn from St. Paul, *righteousness* consists of *faith* and *love*, and salvation is represented in this world by an assured *hope* of the future to all the *righteous*, we see plainly how all hangs together in the person of our Lord, who was our *Saviour* by his acts, *i.e.* mighty to save, and a preacher of *righteousness*, which he also exemplified (Isaiah, lxiii. 1). While, then, the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the apostle to the Thessalonians, give us the helmet and breastplate as the essential parts of our protective armour, we find in the girdle of spiritual *truth* which holds all together (John, xvi. 13), and in the ἑτοιμασία or *foundation* of the gospel of peace, by virtue of which we build our house on a rock (Matth. vii. 24, compared with Matth. xvi. 18), the confirmations and

has, besides and above all these, the Word of God, as a spiritual sword to conquer his outward adversaries, and the shield of faith—that is, the means of an outward vindication of revealed truth—with which he may give a reason for the hope that is in him, when questioned by gainsayers, or, if necessary, bestride and defend a wounded and fallen brother, and encourage him to renewed efforts in the good fight.

With regard to the protection of our own heart in its internal battle with sin, and in its resistance to the outward attacks of unbelief, it is obvious, from the terms used to designate it, that the gifts and graces which constitute this panoply, and make us secure from the inward solicitations of our carnal nature and from outward attacks on our faith, spring from that regeneration of the heart without which we could not have faith at all. And here we are introduced to another class of metaphors. Grace is described as strengthening food as well as protecting

supports which we require; and in the *shield* of advocacy and in the *sword* of the Spirit, the means of protecting others and overthrowing the human opponents of religion. With regard to the enemies with whom we have to do battle on our own account, we should certainly infer, from a first view of the passage in the Epistle to the Ephesians, that our enemies were evil spirits, supposed, on the Babylonian hypothesis, to be separate and external existences, inhabiting the realms of darkness. But we learn from the Epistle to the Romans (*l. c.*) that the *armour of light*, which we are to put on, is the Lord Jesus Christ; and that the *works of darkness*, which we are to put off, are the fulfilment of the lusts of the flesh (*cf.* Coloss. ii. 11). We wrestle then with our own evil propensities, which are classified and described as the world, the flesh, and the devil. And when the Epistle to the Ephesians declares that our struggle is not against blood and flesh (πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα), we must remember that this phrase does not imply the propensities of our own nature, but the concrete or external world in its present state. The phrase occurs in three other passages of the New Testament: once in Matth. xvi. 17, where our Lord tells Peter that *blood and flesh* had not revealed his faith in the Son of God: again in 1 Cor. xv. 50, where the Apostle says that *blood and flesh* cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven; and lastly in Galat. i. 16, where St. Paul says that he did not communicate with *blood and flesh* on the subject of the commission given him by express revelation (*cf.* Sir. xiv. 18, xvii. 31). All these passages show that the phrase "we wrestle *not* with blood and flesh," so far from giving an external existence to our spiritual enemies, expressly states that they do not belong to the outer world, but to our inner spiritual existence. That this is the meaning is clear from the important passage in the Epistle to the Colossians, which is fully discussed in the text and in the disquisition appended to this chapter.

armour; and thus it is forcibly said by the Apostle Paul,[1] that the Divine righteousness is, by means of faith in Jesus Christ, poured *into* and put *upon* all who believe. These metaphors are interchangeable as expressing the same effects; for the believer not only feeds on the flesh of Christ, the bread which came down from heaven, and drinks of his blood, the outpouring of the everlasting vine, but also derives from the same source the

[1] Rom. iii. 22: δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. The true force of this passage was first shown by the Rev. J. T. Goodsir, in a privately printed "Statement laid before a committee of the Presbytery of St. Andrew's" (Edinburgh, 1850), p. 61. "There is recorded in Matth. ix. 17, Mark, ii. 22, Luke, v. 37, and with most evident carefulness by each of the Evangelists, a conversation of our Lord with some of the disciples of John and with certain Pharisees, containing a prediction of what changes would be produced on the religious services of men under the gospel dispensation, which sheds a light on my subject, the least valuable part of which is the grammatical, important though that be. In the passages which record this conversation, we find that, in speaking of the wine, it is described as being poured εἰς τοὺς ἀσκούς, and of the cloth as being sewed ἐπὶ ἱμάτιον (Luke, v. 36). The force of the εἰς and ἐπὶ is here most beautifully illustrated; and when it is considered what subject our Lord was describing when he uttered the saying or parable just quoted—when it is borne in mind what by *wine*, on the one hand, is symbolized, and what by a *garment* on the other, then I think that the full meaning of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ must appear. It can be nothing else than that righteousness of God spoken of in Matth. vi. 33, and Rom. xiv. 17; that righteousness of God *within* and *upon* the subjects of the kingdom of God; that righteousness of God required in that kingdom which is within man, and the least subject of which is greater than John the Baptist; that righteousness of God exceeding the boasted formal righteousness of scribes and Pharisees, and without which 'no man can enter into the kingdom of God' (Matth. v. 20)." It is worthy of remark, that the ideas of superposition and infusion are often interchanged in speaking of the gifts of the Spirit. Thus in Isaiah, xlii. 1, we have: נתתי רוחי עליו "I have *given* or *put* my spirit upon him;" and xliv. 3: אצק רוחי על זרעך, "I will *pour* my spirit upon thy seed;" and that these ideas run into one another is shown by the preposition על "upon," which is used in both passages, whereas we have in Ezekiel, xxxvi, 27: ואת רוחי אתן בקרבכם, "I will *put* my spirit *within* you." Indeed, J. Grimm has shown, in the "Transactions of the Royal Academy of Berlin," for 1848, that the idea of *giving* in general is often intimately connected with that of *pouring*. Thus *schenken* means to "pour out," as well as "to make a present;" and our word "give," *gehen*, is traceable to the same origin as χέω – χέFω, "to pour forth." The Greek idea of inspiration was also mixed up of the two notions external action and internal filling: comp. Æschyl. Suppl. 43: ἐξ ἐπιπνοίας Ζηνὸς ἔφαψιν, with Prom. 874: ἐπαφῶν ἀταρβεῖ χειρὶ καὶ θιγὼν μόνον, and Pind. Ol. v. viii. 70: ἐνέπνευσεν μένος γήραος ἀντίπαλον. In the New Testament, the constant occurrence of the phrase "full of the Holy Ghost" (πλήρης πνεύματος ἁγίου), points rather to the latter mode of viewing an inspired gift.

wedding-garment of righteousness, the fine linen, pure and white, which is the righteousness of saints, and the real armour of the soul. The simple and necessary force of the language shows that this interchange of metaphors can only be justified by the fact, that, in either case—both as food and as a garment, or armour fitting closely to the body—the righteousness of faith is considered as belonging to the individual believer, and as limited to his use. It is appropriated to him who feeds on it or wears it close to his heart. It is strength and safety to himself—not to others also. What then would be the use of such armour of the soul and such internal support, and what would be the significance of these figures, if the battle-field and the enemies were not internal also? Faith and love, truth and peace and hope, whether they are poured into us or put upon us, must be the soul's defence against some foes which attack it in the inner citadel of our being. And all Scripture tells us that sin and death are the results of a successful warfare carried on by the flesh against the spirit of man.[1]

That our blessed Lord's conflict on our behalf was carried on within the bounds of his own double nature; that he found the powerful enemies, which he subdued for us, in the human weakness which he condescended to assume, is proved by a most distinct and explicit passage in St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians, which, though properly understood by the Syriac translator, and by Origen, Hilary, Augustine, and other early Fathers, has been misinterpreted with perverse consistency by every modern expositor. The Apostle first tells us[2] that the Father has delivered us from the power of darkness (ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ σκότους) and transferred us to the sovereignty of the Son of his love, *in whom* (ἐν ᾧ) we have redemption; and that Jesus was the exemplar of all creation (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως), for that all things

[1] See Appendix I. [2] Col. i. 12, *sqq.*

heavenly and earthly, visible and invisible, including among the latter the principalities and powers of permitted or possible evil (*ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι*), were created potentially *in Him* (*ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη*); and that, by thus combining the divine and the human, our Lord was enabled to be the medium of reconciliation or atonement between the things of earth and heaven. He then declares in the following chapter,[1] that we, as Christians, derive the fulness of Godhead, or a complete participation of divine grace, from Him who is the head of all principality and power, that is, of all the functions and faculties of our lower nature[2] (*ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας*). Thus, as he expresses it, we are fulfilled *in Him* (*ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι*), because *in Him also* (*ἐν ᾧ καὶ*) we have been circumcised in an immaterial sense (*περιτομῇ ἀχειροποιήτῳ*), in the putting off (*ἀπεκδύσει*) the body of the sins of the flesh in Christ's circumcision, that is, when he thus excided sin. And that there may be no chance of mistaking his meaning, he adds that Christ blotted out the condemnation, to which our fleshly uncircumcision was liable, and nailed it to his cross; and that, by thus stripping from himself, by a public martyrdom, the principalities and powers of our lower nature (*ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας*), he gave an open proof, a manifest exhibition, of his victory over death and

[1] Col. ii. 10, *sqq.*

[2] The sense, in which Christ is said to be the head of that which stands in a certain opposition to his spiritual and divine personality, may be gathered from the other passages in St. Paul where the same designation is applied to Him. Thus we constantly read that Christ, whose spirit animates the Church, is its head, and the Church is His body (Col. i. 18; Eph. i. 22. 23, iv. 15, 16, v. 30; 1 Cor. xii. 12); it is stated that this relation of headship is also borne by the husband as compared with the wife (Eph. v. 23); and the same is declared in regard to the subordination of the human to the divine in Christ himself. "I would have you know," says St. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 3), "that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God." We can have no difficulty therefore in understanding that Christ is the head of all principality and power, on the supposition that these are special terms representing the functions of our lower nature.

the grave, and triumphed over them on his cross before the wondering eyes of Jewish priests and Roman soldiers.[1]

Nothing can be more explicit and consistent than this statement; and its metaphorical phraseology is in strict accordance with the passage in the Epistle to the Ephesians, which describes figuratively the contest which all true believers have to encounter. There the Apostle says, that "our wrestling is not against blood and flesh," *i.e.*, not against living men, "but against principalities and powers (*ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι*), against the world-rulers of this life's darkness or sin, against the spiritualities of wickedness in heavenly things.[2] And there is not the least reason to doubt that the most learned of the Fathers, Clement of Alexandria, has rightly interpreted this pictorial exhibition of the inward fight between the spirit and the flesh, in the following instructive words:—"The contest involving all kinds of weapons (*τὸ παγκράτιον τὸ πάμμαχον*), is not against blood and flesh, but against the spiritual powers of innate passions, which work by means of our carnalities."[3]

If, then, we would desire to be "buried with Christ in baptism," and "to be risen with him through faith in the operation of God who hath raised him from the dead," we

[1] That *ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παῤῥησίᾳ* (v. 15) refers to the publicity of the real crucifixion is clear from the fact that *ἐν παῤῥησίᾳ* is opposed to *ἐν κρύπτῳ* as a synonym of *φανερῶς*; *cf.* John, vii. 4, 10; and for the publicity of the crucifixion, see John, xix. 20. It must be allowed that a great exuberance of metaphors, like that in which St. Paul indulges here and elsewhere, does not allow the comparison to go on all fours. But when it is objected that the vanquished enemies of Christ are "led in open triumph," and that "the heathen victors did not display their own cast off garments in their triumphal processions," it is forgotten that the ancient Romans did not war with enemies who took the field or formed a hostile array in their own limbs and fought against their souls (James, iv. 1, 1 Peter, ii. 11); and when it is asserted that "it would be a clear blasphemy to say that our Lord was clothed with active and powerful fleshly lusts till the hour of his crucifixion," it is overlooked, that, according to one of his chief apostles, Jesus "himself carried up our sins in his own body to the cross" (1 Peter, ii. 24). A full discussion of the passage in the Colossians, with reference to the criticism and controversy on the subject, will be found in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

[2] Eph. vi. 12. [3] Strom. vii. p. 839, Potter.

must, like Him, submit to this circumcision, not effected by hands; we must, like Him, put off this "body of death,"[1] this *scelerata pulpa*[2] or "flesh of sin,"[3] this "muddy vesture of decay," which "doth so grossly close us in"[4]; we must, in imitation of Him, "crucify the flesh with its passions and lusts"[5]; and this must be done so "openly" that the world may see and understand the completeness of the Christian's triumph, and may cling with us to the faith that "when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, death is swallowed up in victory."[6]

It is clear from all this that our first and main duty as soldiers of Christ is to conquer the sin which reigns in our members; to cut off and cast away the impurities of the flesh; to triumph over those powers which tyrannize over our will and enslave our affections. It is clear that the armour of grace, which is offered to us, is intended for our defence in this conflict, which, in the first instance, concerns ourselves only. It is clear that the battle-field is our own secret heart, and that we celebrate our triumph only by exhibiting in our conduct the victory we have obtained, and the mastery we have secured over our own passions and lusts. That this victory of faith is a victory of life and conduct, and not of intellectual assent to certain propositions, is shown not only by the figurative language of St. Paul, but also by the express declarations of our Lord himself. He has told us[7] that "if any man will do the will of God, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God;" in other words, that as faith is religiousness of the heart and life, our perceptions of the divine origin of what we believe will be strengthened by our

[1] Rom. vii. 24. [2] Pers. ii. 63. [3] Rom. viii. 3.
[4] Shakspere's 'Merchant of Venice,' v. i.
[5] Gal. v. 24. [6] 1 Cor. xv. 54. [7] John vii. 17.

acting in accordance with those precepts which we accept as coming from God: and he concluded his Sermon on the Mount with the emphatic assurance that, by carrying our faith into practice, we should so strengthen the foundations of our religious convictions that all the storms of persecution and temptation would fail to shake the edifice: "Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not, for it was founded on a rock."[1] Whereas those, who hear the words of Christ without doing them, are likened in the same passage to the fools who built their house on the fleeting sands, to be swept away by the first onset of the storm. An Apostle, who had lived in intimate intercourse with his Lord and Master, has told us that "he that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself;[2] and this self-acting criterion can have no reality, unless the belief is carried into practice. The "preparation or foundation[3] of the Gospel of Peace" can be nothing but "the faith which worketh by love"[4]—for "there is no peace, saith my God, for the wicked."[5] It is a solemn truth for all preachers and hearers, that it is not the loud profession of allegiance, or an eager desire to rebuke what seems to us the little faith of our brethren, which will serve the false prophet in the great day of reckoning. Internal tranquillity and real assurance of belief come only from the consciousness of a godly and benevolent life. We may depend upon it that religious irritability springs from an imperfect faith, which rests only on the sandy basis of hypothesis and dogma. There is no

[1] Matth. vii. 25. [2] 1 John v. 10.
[3] Eph. vi. 15. It is well known that ἑτοιμασία translates the Hebrew מכן, Ezra, ii. 68.; Ps. lxxxix. 15, which implies a firm foundation.
[4] Gal. v. 6. [5] Isaiah xlviii. 22; lvii. 21.

fear for the religious stability of those who live religiously, and with whom faith and obedience are necessarily co-ordinate and correlative. They need no theories of an infallible literature, or an infallible Church, for with them Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Let us once secure the victory over the principalities and powers of our unregenerate nature, let the spirit triumph over the flesh, let love control selfishness, and there will never be wanting the witness from within to assure us that our doctrine is from God. For if we understand by faith the practical principle of religiousness, which finds its expression not in words but in actions, we shall assent heartily to Augustine's statement that "faith is to believe what as yet you see not; of which faith the reward is to see what you believe."[1]

(*b*) It was not without reason that St. Paul distinguished between the *shield* of faith, which should quench the fiery darts of evil, and the *breastplate* of faith and love, that is, of Christian righteousness, which sat close to the heart and protected it, even when the shield was not held forth for its defence. But he attributes them both to the same faith; and, in point of fact, they cannot be disjoined; the wearer of the breastplate must be also a bearer of the shield. Although it is the first duty of Christ's disciple to work out his own salvation, to make his own calling and election sure, man does not live for himself alone, and least of all in his relations with that religion which rests on the abnegation of selfishness and on the union of brethren.[2]

[1] Sermon xliii. *cf.* Clem. Al. Strom. I. p. 338, Potter.

[2] The superiority of the relative principle to the personal and individual has been well shown by Mr. Wilson in the sixth of his 'Bampton Lectures,' especially with reference to the imitation of Christ's sacrifice. "Here too," he says (p. 202), "most properly belongs that other text of St. Paul (Col. i. 24), 'I fill up in my body that which is lacking of the sufferings of Christ,' τὰ ὑστερήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, that is, that which Christ, the great self-sacrificer, left behind for me to do, in the way of suffering or self-denial, not for my own sake, not even for my own eternal interests, but for the advancement of His kingdom."

And it is by being Christians in the true sense of the word that we are enabled to make converts to Christianity; it is by having conquered the principalities and powers, which reigned within ourselves, that we are empowered, as a Church, that is, as a company or army of Christians, to overcome the principalities and powers which rule in the unbelieving world; and we bear on our arm the shield of faith, at once the outward ensign of our profession and the instrument of shelter and defence. Standing ourselves on the firm footing or foundation (ἑτοιμασία) of the gospel of peace, we can have no other principles for the edification or building up (οἰκοδομία) of our brethren. And from whatever point of view we regard the subject, we must come to the conclusion that Christian conduct is the best justification of the Christian's cause.

This conclusion, however, is not merely a natural result from our own reasonings on the subject. Our Lord himself, in his most solemn address, has expressly given us this general rule of action. "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven."[1] And St. Peter, in applying this precept, passes directly from our victory, in the internal conflict with our passions, to this example of righteousness which is to convince and convert the world. "Dearly beloved," he says,[2] "I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims—as sojourners in a world which is not your abiding city—abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul, keeping your behaviour comely among the gentiles, that, wherein they malign you as evil-doers, they may, from the beauty of your conduct, by merely beholding it, glorify God when the time of his visitation (*i.e.*, of their conversion) shall arrive." The connexion between the innocency or personal righteousness of Christians, and that wisdom or prudence, by

[1] Matth. v. 16. [2] 1 Peter, ii. 11, 12.

which they are to recommend their cause to an unbelieving world, is farther enforced in the Rabbinical saying, which our Lord appropriated when he gave his Apostles a significant warning, that, in preaching the Gospel to carnal and selfish men, they would have to encounter the most rancorous opposition and animosity[1]—"Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore *wise* (*φρόνιμοι*) as serpents, and *harmless* or *pure* (*ἀκέραιοι*) as doves." He is here alluding to what the Jewish doctors used to say of the Israelites in general: "They are wise as serpents in their dealings with the gentiles, but pure as doves in their faith towards God."[2] That this injunction did not apply exclusively to the Apostles, as the first ministers of our religion, but was intended as a caution for Christians in all ages, is clear from the universality and permanence of the state of things which it describes, and from the manner in which the Apostles themselves transfer this warning to their own converts and disciples. Not they alone, but all Christians, to the end of time, have undertaken, as such, to go forth into a world at variance with their religion, unwilling to receive its precepts, anxious to misunder-

[1] Matth. x. 16.

[2] "Shir hashirim rabba," fol. 15, 3. Although the adjective *φρόνιμος* used in St. Matthew's text is the same as that which the LXX. employs to render עָרוּם in Gen. iii. 1, it is not to be imagined that either the Jewish doctors predicated of their countrymen the diabolical subtlety attributed to the serpent in the old Hebrew allegory, or that our Lord recommended any such subtlety to his disciples. There is no doubt that some of the ancients regarded the snake tribe as cunning and mischievous; and the later Jews, who were accustomed to the fables of the Persians, discovered a sort of Ahriman in the serpent of Paradise (Wisdom, ii. 24; Rev. xii. 9, 20; Targ. Jon. on Gen. iii. 6). But we are convinced that the original reading was not עָרוּם but עָרוֹם, the word which occurs in the context; and that the other reading, with the Septuagint version, flowed from the view which the Jews took of the matter in and after the Exile. At any rate, it appears from the very passage in which Aristotle attributes bad qualities to the serpent tribe, that *φρόνιμος* expresses cautious prudence rather than malice; and this, no doubt, was the quality predicated of the Jews and recommended to Christians, as it was also one predicable of most serpents, which generally shrink from provoking their enemies. Aristotle says (Hist. Anim. i. 1, 32), speaking of the characteristics (*ἤθος*) of animals: *τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρᾶα κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δειλά, οἷον ἔλαφος δασύπους, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα καὶ ἐπίβουλα οἷον οἱ ὄφεις.*

stand the motives, and to misrepresent the conduct of its most sincere and earnest professors. All Christians therefore must be prepared to cultivate a wisdom and cautious discretion, which are innocent, pure, and harmless,—not only harmless from the spirit of love, which belongs to all Christianity, but harmless to the cause which we advocate. This is what St. Paul means when he says[1]: "Be children in malice or harmfulness, but be perfect or full-grown in wisdom or understanding"; and with reference to the effect which this conduct would produce on the world, he exhorts his disciples to do all things without murmurings or disputings, in order that they may be "blameless and *harmless* or *pure* (*ἀκέραιοι*), the irreproachable sons of God in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation"; and he adds: "among these shine as lights in the world."[2]

Here, then, we come back to Christ's general exhortation in the Sermon on the Mount; and we see that, when he bids his disciples to let their light shine before men, and to be both harmless and wise, the intended application of his words is one and the same, and that they may be blended, as St. Paul has blended them, in one sentence, warning us to take care lest the way of truth should be evil spoken of through our faults and follies.[3] Hence, too, we understand the practical bearing of our Lord's brief but emphatic assertion that "wisdom is justified of her children."[4] And we see that, as heavenly wisdom is heavenly light, we best justify the wisdom of which we are professedly the children, when we "walk as children of light."[5] It is by this preaching, as it were, to the eyes of the world that disciples are won to Christ. The bright halo of light, which pictorial fancy places over the head of the ecclesiastical saint, is not more discernible than the sheen of holiness which plays about

[1] 1 Cor. xiv. 20. [2] Phil. ii. 15.
[3] 2 Peter, ii. 2. [4] Matth. xi. 19; Luke, vii. 35. [5] Eph. v. 8.

the truly good Christian, as he walks the tangled path of his every-day life with unaffected piety and unostentatious benevolence. And while he is thus wise in regard to his own eternal happiness, his wisdom must be harmless also in regard to the promotion of the cause which he is anxious to recommend from an unfeigned love for the souls of other men. That all sincere Christians do not succeed in justifying by their conduct the wisdom of which they are the adopted children; that, on the contrary, many, by the outward exhibition of their carnal weakness, bring great discredit on the cause which they have espoused, and afford the world an easy triumph over their own foolishness, no one who knows the past or present state of Christianity will be prepared to deny. That we may not lose ourselves in vague generalities, let us consider three special forms of mistaken Christianity; and let us show, in each case, how wisdom is not justified of her children.

I. Wisdom is *not* justified of her children when they place their chief reliance on a minute observance of religious rites and ceremonies. Christianity was destined for all countries and for all ages, and, by the nature of the case, rejects all that is special, formal, local, and transitory. It would seem, therefore, a strange justification of Christianity, if, when it began by setting itself free from all the burdensome ordinances which encrusted the inspired nucleus of Judaism, we were now to confine our religion, not only to devotional worship, which is the necessary complement of faith in this imperfect state of probation, but even to ceremonial mummeries of dress and symbolical action, many of which were suggested by the pageants of heathendom, and which are all, in themselves, matters of perfect indifference.[1] Copes

[1] It is said of an English clergyman in the 17th century—"As to church ceremonies, as things indifferent, he was indiffering, never admiring them nor judging them otherwise than Calvin did, for *tolerabiles ineptias*."—(Life of Matthew Robinson, edited by Mayor, p. 74).

and chasubles, altar-cloths and lighted candles, genuflections and obeisances, are, with many, the indispensable conditions of a comforting profession of faith; and, as if to recommend this retrogression to the practices of Jews and Pagans, we are invited to believe that the continual practice of outward devotion will be the only employment of the blessed company of just men made perfect, who encircle the glories of the heavenly throne! Under any circumstances, it must be somewhat unprofitable to speculate on the possible occupation of those whose hopes are turned into everlasting fruition. We might, if we were so disposed, indulge in Platonic reveries respecting the soul's continued progress after death; we might gladden our poetic fancy with visions of perpetual light, of never-ceasing harmony, of perfect emancipation from all passions and all suffering, of love for ever gushing from the soul, and undying as the amaranthine garlands which festoon the avenues of that celestial Paradise. All this we might imagine, and it would be neither more nor less idle than other fancies. But to recommend to Christians, emancipated as they are from the trammels of carnal ordinances, that they should devote their lives here to ceremonial rites, on the ground that this will be their sole employment hereafter, is quite as preposterous as it would be to recommend an elaborate attention to our outward vestments on the plea that our bodies after the resurrection will be decked out with a glory far surpassing that of earth. Worship is but the external attire of our religious sentiments. It is the less necessary in proportion as we are more spiritual, and must become of no avail in that future state when we see, not as now, through a glass darkly, but face to face; when faith and hope will abide no longer, because their functions will be superfluous; and when charity alone will survive, as the last fruit and final exponent of Christian perfection.

II. Wisdom is *not* justified of her children when they make

religion to consist in voluntary hardships—such as fasting and penance. In one sense it is true that the life of the genuine Christian must be a perpetual Lent. Not only in the springtide, but throughout the year, so long as he is a member of the militant Church, he must endeavour to use such abstinence that, his flesh being subdued to the spirit, he may be able to obey the godly motions of his heavenly monitor. But he would neither obey our Lord's precepts, nor would he act up to the spirit of our religion, if he thought that by stated performances of periodical self-denial—if a change of diet can be called by such a name,—he will do that which is well-pleasing to God on its own account, or secure the welfare of his soul. "Let no man," says the Apostle,[1] "judge you in meat or in drink"; and it was in regard to a censure passed upon him for not engaging in stated fasts, that our Lord declared that "wisdom is justified of her children." Let those who feel that they are more than matched in the struggle of flesh and spirit, which is going on within them,—let those who find it hard to say "no" to sinful inclinations, and who, while their heart is willing, feel the weakness of their carnal nature,—let such, in private, and not to be seen of men, practise such discipline as they believe to be most efficacious: but as far as eating and drinking are concerned, we cannot imagine any principle of action applicable to the case of a reasonable and civilized Christian beyond this rule —that he should at all times feel ashamed to eat or drink more than his health and constitution require, and that he should feel equally ashamed at any time to eat or drink less than he requires, in the belief that he will please God by such a contemptuous disregard of the law of self-preservation.[2]

[1] Col. ii. 16.

[2] Dr. Whichcot has stated the case with his usual felicity.—"In eating and drinking, let a man do nothing contrary to the health of the body,

III. Wisdom is *not* justified of her children when they exhibit their religion in a peevish and morose austerity. We shall best see this, if we revert to the figure in accordance with which the children of *wisdom* are described as children of *light*. Now, light is essentially cheerful; sour and petulant tempers for ever dwell in gloom of their own creating. Christianity, which manifests itself, wherever it has a genuine existence, in peace, joy, hope, and love, can have no fellowship with that sodden and comfortless heart which welcomes all merriment with a growl of disapprobation. And yet to many, to very many, of those who believe themselves to be the only true children of heavenly wisdom, all unconstrained cheerfulness appears as something near akin to a guilty disregard of religion. Those who have read history are aware that this was essentially the characteristic of the so-called Puritans of the 17th century. They regarded all recreations as sinful. To their fierce and sullen temper the most harmless diversions were tinged with criminality, and they were never contented except when they were thoroughly miserable themselves, and utterly offensive to all around them. Unfortunately the race is by no means extinct. We still find in this country, and even in our own Church, many who mistake a stupid disregard of all that is beautiful, cheerful, and attractive for a purely spiritual frame of mind, and who confuse between the wayward fretfulness of their own melancholic disposition and the solemn influences of an ever-present fear of God. Let those who have seen how such persons spend the Sunday tell us whether wisdom is justified of her children. Truly one might say, that with many of them religion was another name for bad temper; and it would not be a new case in the history of self-deception, if those who were unable to contend successfully with

nothing to indispose it, as a mansion and instrument of the soul; nothing to the dishonour of himself, as a rational being, the image of God."

a physical infirmity were to gratify their conceit by promoting it to the rank of a spiritual influence. While it is quite certain that this assumption of Puritanical and Pharisaical austerity produces a malignant effect on the religious tendencies of all who are brought within its reach, the true children of wisdom are still more impressed with a sense of the injury which it inflicts on the moral character of the young.[1] Experience tells us that many of the worst profligates, and many of those who have grown up with an unalterable distaste for religion, have belonged to families in which Christianity has appeared only under the form of a morose melancholy. The young are naturally cheerful, and their very instincts tell them that mirth cannot be always sinful; and if, as too often happens, they discern the slightest hypocrisy or even inconsistency behind the gloomy veil of Pharisaical sanctity, their faith is weakened, perhaps expelled for ever. A religion, the first Author of which mingled freely in the social festivities of his age and country, is not falsified by those who indulge in innocent amusements suited to their position and circumstances. The entertainments of fashionable life may involve much that is objectionable on its own account. Late hours, and all that approaches to reckless dissipation, would be censured even by a heathen moralist; and the Polemos of Athens had to dread the rebukes of Xenocrates.

[1] The author of the "Essay on Church Parties," (reprinted from the *Edinburgh Review*, for October, 1853), has made some good remarks on the mischief of this Sabbatarian strictness. "Thousands," he says (p. 24), "are alienated from piety, by associating it from the earliest childhood with a day of gloom and restriction, imposed upon them by arbitrary force." Nothing could well be more short-sighted than the recent efforts of the Puritanical party to prevent the performance of even sacred music in the public parks on Sunday afternoon. Their success will probably tend to widen the breach between those who are already distinguished as the religious and irreligious public respectively. It is to be hoped that rational godliness will in the end prevail over Pharisaical bigotry, and that we shall at all events escape the infliction of such Sunday-keeping as we have in Edinburgh and Glasgow, where the prohibition of all innocent amusements leads to a frightful increase of sottishness and debauchery.

But even the excitements of a London ball-room are more wholesome and less prejudicial than those of Exeter Hall, and a good novel is more instructive than an absurd treatise on prophecy. Religion suffers from every form of needless austerity and enthusiastic extravagance. And if, in private life, the faith of a child is shaken by the interferences to which we have referred, a still greater risk is incurred when the Puritanical party undertake to treat the whole population of a great city like a set of naughty children, who must not indulge in any recreation on the first day of the week. The Jews themselves allowed a Sabbath-day's journey; and there is no evidence to show that they denied themselves any of the innocent enjoyments of life on their weekly festival. And if the operatives of Manchester and the shopkeepers of London are not to be permitted to escape from smoking factories and narrow courts, and to listen to public performances of even sacred music on their day of rest, the folly of the party which would impose the arbitrary restriction will soon be proved by a reaction against religion itself.

From all this it is quite clear that the shield of faith, with which we ward off the fiery darts of evil, whether aimed at ourselves or others, in fact, the outward arm of defence, which the Christian soldier wears in his conflicts with the world, is compacted of the same faith as his breastplate; it is the faith which works by love; it is the faith which springs from light and leads to wisdom. In other words, the Christian's conduct, or his obedience to the religion which he professes, is both the only protection for his own heart and the chief recommendation of his religion in the eyes of other men; and his defalcations in love or in wisdom tend, however little he may desire it, to injure the cause which he professes to maintain.

(*c*) In addition to all the defensive armour, which he had specified, St. Paul exhorts the Christian warrior to take "the

sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God." It is needless to adduce a multitude of passages from sacred or profane writers, in which the tongue or the utterances of speech are compared to a weapon with its metal-edge or point.[1] The power of penetrating into the soul of the listener, which spoken words exercise, fully justifies the figure; and if we are to describe, in military language, a weapon or instrument, by which Christianity would, as it were, take the offensive, and penetrate into the strongholds and citadels of sin and unbelief, we could hardly fail to say of the Word of God or Gospel as preached in the world, that it is "living and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the separation of soul and spirit (*i.e.* of the natural and religious life of man), and of joints and marrow, and discriminating all the thoughts and intents of the heart."[2] The instrument, however, to which such power is attributed, is of divine origin. It is the word of God, and not the word of man. It belongs to him who gave the message, and not to the messenger. It is not some merely human blade, dishonestly, foolishly, or ignorantly substituted; nor is it the human scabbard, in which the divine weapon is encased, and in which it hangs idle and useless, until drawn forth for active combat. It must be the Spirit's own sword, naked and sharp and free from the rust of ages. It must be the Word as it was originally delivered to the saints; it must be the veritable revelation from God to man, which was consistent and harmonious, whether preached by Moses under the inspiration of God, or by God himself in the person of Jesus Christ. And we must not substitute for this or combine with it as a necessary adjunct, either the ritual and formal system of the Jews, or the traditionary dogmatism of the Christian Church.

[1] See the author's note on Pindar, Ol. vi. 82. [2] Hebr. iv. 12.

On a former occasion,[1] we have endeavoured to show that there are only two forms, modes, or manifestations, under which religion is possible. The first is the religion of those who are impatient of the exactions of conscience, and wearied with the duty of continued watchfulness and self-restraint; who being unable, however, to get rid of their religious instinct, and having an undefined fear of the future, create for themselves, or eagerly adopt, some system of outward observances, and place upon a stereotyped set of opinions, or upon a visible church and priesthood, the responsibilities which belong to themselves. The other manifestation is the religion of those who feel that worship is merely food for the love of God and man; who are assured that there is no way of getting rid of duties and responsibilities; who are convinced that contrivances for deadening the conscience, and substitutes for the performance of obligations, can find no favour in the sight of the righteous Judge, to whose sentence they refer all their doings; and who firmly believe that a conquest of self is the only means by which we can become godlike here, and hope to live with God hereafter. The former is the religion *ab extra*, and its rule is: *credo firmiter, pecco fortiter.* The latter is the religion *ab intra*, and its rule is: *credo quam maxime, pecco quam minime.* The history of revelation is the history of what God has done for the establishment of the second manifestation of human religiousness,—the religion of the heart, which rests on the personal faith and conscience of the worshipper; and for the discouragement of the former mode of religion—the religion of forms and opinions, which is but a human approximation to the true worship of God. The religion which Moses preached, as we derive his doctrines from Deuteronomy—the only book which professes to be from his pen—is emphatically a religion of the

[1] "Protestant Toleration." London, 1850.

heart;[1] and the same was the character of the religion taught by the great prophets.[2] And after it had become gradually overlaid and incrusted with the sacerdotal dogmas and ceremonies of the Jews, Jesus Christ again threw aside the scabbard, and exhibited the sword of the Spirit in its naked brightness, going back to the great commandments, which enjoined the love of God and man, and on which hang all the law and the prophets; and rejecting, as not only worthless but mischievous, the ordinances, which his countrymen had learned to regard as divine and essential. But the tendency to substitute a religion of forms, for the religion of the heart and conscience, was not eradicated by the establishment of Christianity. From the first days of the Church, the religion *ab extra* began its encroachments, and continued to draw strength and nourishment from the depraved instincts of our fallen nature, until both the East and West had established forms of dogmatism and discipline more carnal and more tyrannical even than those maintained and enforced by the scribes and Pharisees, whom our Lord so severely rebuked. How difficult it is for the true religion of the heart and conscience to struggle effectually with the carnal ingredients, which check its growth in the soul, is shown most clearly by the fact, that, even after England had, by at least two efforts, shaken off the Roman Catholic system of outward forms and positive dogmas, and even after the Protestantism of this country had combined itself with political and literary freedom, the same tyranny of external religion re-asserted itself; and at the present moment, and nominally within the Church, the true faith, or genuine Christianity, is struggling for existence in this land under the oppression of antagonistic partizans, who are equally intolerant, and equally resolved to recognise nothing

[1] Deut. x. 16. [2] See *e. g.* Jer. iv. 4.

as Christianity, which does not lean on some narrow ordinances of positive and tangible import.

It is the great business of the genuine Christian, the true soldier of Christ—who is neither more nor less than the manly and honest Protestant—to draw forth the sword of the Spirit from its scabbard; to exhibit the Word of God, or the revelation from God to man, in its naked strength and beauty and simplicity—as a rule of life, not as a Shibboleth of dogmas; and while by his conduct he shows that he is one of the children of light, he must take care that his weapon be bright and flashing also; that the word of preaching and teaching, by which he penetrates to the soul and spirit of his hearers, be of the genuine metal and temper; otherwise he will not win souls to Christ; otherwise he will but add new professors to that religion from without, which belongs to the flesh rather than to the spirit, which is classed with the kingdoms of this world and not included in the kingdom of God, or the blessed company of all faithful people.

The Church of England, although beset on both sides by the clamorous advocates of some form of infallibility, has never been entirely without those true champions of Christianity, who fight for Christ with the genuine weapon of the revealed Word, and refuse to take instead of it or along with it a dull and latten blade of human manufacture. Even in the seventeenth century, when Prelatism and Puritanism had between them set up the most rancorous hatred and uncompromising dogmatism, instead of the Gospel of Love and Peace, there was found at least one man, who could claim for the Anglican communion a broad and indestructible basis of essential truth, necessary morality, and universal benevolence.[1] Dr. Benjamin Whichcot was the head,

[1] See a paper by the writer of these pages in *Fraser's Magazine* for October, 1851, entitled "Dr. Whichcot and Bishop Butler."

and perhaps the founder, of a school of liberal conservatives, on whom the bigots of the day bestowed the name of *Latitudinarians*, and who are now called the *Broad Church*, but who are really the true champions of the Christian Orthodoxy of England, as they were in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Their characteristics, and the influence which they exercised on their own generation, are thus described by Bishop Burnet:

"If a new set of men had not appeared of another stamp, the Church had quite lost her esteem over the nation. They were generally of Cambridge, formed under some divines, the chief of whom were Drs. Whichcot, Cudworth, Wilkins, Moore, and Worthington. All these, and those who were formed under them, studied to examine farther into the nature of things than had been done formerly. They declared against superstition on the one hand, and enthusiasm on the other. They loved the constitution of the Church and the Liturgy, and could well live under them; but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form. They wished that things might have been carried with more moderation. And they continued to keep up a good correspondence with those who differed from them in opinion, and allowed greater freedom both in philosophy and divinity, from whence they were called 'the men of latitude.' And upon this, men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers fastened on them the name of *Latitudinarians*. They read Episcopius much. And the making out the reasons of things being the main part of their studies, their enemies called them *Socinians*. They were all very zealous against Popery. And so, they becoming soon very considerable, the Papists set themselves against them to decry them as *Atheists*, *Deists*, or, at least, *Socinians*. And now that the main principle of religion was struck at by Hobbes and his followers, the Papists acted upon this a very strange part. They went even so far into the argu-

ment for Atheism, as to publish many books, in which they affirmed that there was no certain proof of the Christian religion, unless it was taken from the authority of the Church as infallible. This was such a delivering up of the cause, that it raised in all good men a very high indignation at Popery,—that party showing that they chose to make men, who would not turn Papists, become Atheists, rather than believe Christianity on any other ground than infallibility."

The manner, in which the head of this school of sober and rational believers fell back upon the essentials of Christian morality, will be best shown by a few citations from the aphorisms in which Dr. Whichcot's doctrines have been most satisfactorily preserved: "We worship God best, when we resemble him most. The first act of religion is to know what is true of God; the second act is to express it in our lives. Religion is not a system of doctrines, an observance of modes, a heat of affections, a form of words, a spirit of censoriousness. Religion is unity and love; therefore it is not religion that makes separation and disaffection. Christ's design was to rid the world of idolatry, to discharge the burthen of ceremonies, and to advance the divine life of man. Those who have not the temper of religion, are not competent judges of the things of religion. We may maintain the unity of verity in point of faith, and unity of charity in point of communion, notwithstanding all differences in point of apprehension. Men's apprehensions are often nearer than their expressions; they may mean the same thing when they seem not to say the same thing. God has set up two lights to enlighten us in our way; the light of reason, which is the light of His creation; and the light of Scripture, which is an after-revelation from Him. Let us make use of these two lights, and suffer neither to be put out. He that useth his reason doth acknowledge God. What has not

reason in it, if held out for religion, is man's superstition: it is not religion of God's making."

These extracts, taken almost promiscuously from the extensive collection of Dr. Whichcot's aphorisms, contain the germs of a complete system of individual and personal religiousness, resting on the essential truths of revelation, deduced from Scripture by the free use of the reason. He saw plainly that our religion does not consist in a system of doctrines, but in a rule of life, and that we best serve God by working out the spirit of the Gospel. He saw that the Church of England must be *catholique à gros grain*,[1] that she must be dogmatical only in regard to vital or essential matters, else she could not be the church of the majority. And in the true spirit of Protestantism, he insisted on liberty and charity, feeling that the religion, which rests on the supremacy of the individual conscience, claims for all its professors a perfect freedom of judgment; and that the system, which finds the fulfilment of the divine law in doing unto others as we would they should do unto us, can allow no zeal to temper the toleration which charity enjoins.

If, then, we would really use the sword of the Spirit as the instrument of conversion, we must first of all be spiritual ourselves. In this way alone can we distinguish between the word of God and the word of man; for spiritual things are spiritually discerned.[2] In this way alone can we get to the truth which is invincible, and escape the false opinion which is liable to overthrow. In this way alone can we attain to the knowledge which marks the true Church, as distinguished from the

[1] This excellent phrase and its explanation are given in the "Ducatiana," p. 476: "Cela peut signifier catholique guéri des superstitions les plus grossières. Le chapelet . . . . est composé de *gros* et de *petits grains*. Les *gros* servent à dire le *Pater* . . . et les *petits* sont pour les *Ave*. . . Ainsi le catholique à gros grain est celui dont les oraisons s'adressent à Dieu, et qui laisse les *Ave* à dire aux superstitieux."

[2] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

ignorance which characterises paganism, and the dogmatism which engenders heresies.[1] The sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, does not consist in the tradition of men, or the visible elements of writing, which lead to fixed and dogmatic ordinances;[2] those who would use it must be ministers not of the letter which killeth, but of the spirit which giveth life.[3] As Jesus himself declared:[4] "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I have spoken unto you, they are spirit and they are life." And as St. Paul says:[5] "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." But we cannot get either life or liberty from the weak and slavish elements of literal dogmatism;[6] we can then only grasp the

[1] ἀνίκητος ἡ ἀλήθεια, ψευδοδοξία δὲ καταλύεται. Clement of Alexandria (Strom. vi. p. 780; Potter).—The same learned Father says (Strom. vii. p. 894; Potter): τριῶν οὐσῶν διαθέσεων τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀγνοίας, οἰήσεως, ἐπιστήμης, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ, τὰ ἔθνη, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἡ Ἐκκλησία ἡ ἀληθής. οἱ δὲ ἐν οἰήσει οἱ κατὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις: *i.e.* "As there are three conditions of the soul, *ignorance*, *opinion*, and *science*, those who are in *ignorance* are the heathen, those who depend on *science* constitute the true Church, and those who are slaves to *opinion* are divided among the different heresies."

[2] Col. ii. 8, 20—22. [3] 2 Cor. iii. 6. [4] John, vi. 63. [5] 2 Cor. iii. 17.

[6] An examination of the passages cited in the text, will show clearly that our Lord—and St. Paul, as the expositor of his meaning—fully recognised the distinction between the letter of Scripture and its spirit; and indicated that, whereas the latter alone was the Word of God, the former was merely its worldly, visible, carnal, corporeal, and tangible vehicle. This, in a word, is the sacramental character of Scripture; and in this, no less than in the sacraments of the Church, we must be careful to distinguish between the outward visible sign and the inward spiritual grace. The Church of Rome confounds the sign with the thing signified in the Lord's Supper; but the Puritan makes a similar mistake in regard to Scripture, and substitutes an infallible text for an infallible revelation of spiritual truths. As we have indicated above, both Papists and Puritans assert a religion *ab extra*, a religion resting on beggarly elements, for that religion which is spirit and life. Now Jesus says (John vi. 63): τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ ζωοποιοῦν, ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν. Τὰ ῥήματα ἃ ἐγὼ λαλῶ ὑμῖν πνεῦμά ἐστιν καὶ ζωή ἐστιν. The immediate reference of these words is to the sacrament of his body and blood; but they are equally applicable to his doctrine couched in words, and to his own nature as a compound of the divine spirit and human flesh. With regard to the latter, St. Peter says (iii. 18) that he was θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι. With regard to the former, St. Paul says (2 Cor. iii. 6): τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ. And no scholar can fail to see the exact accordance of the doctrine in these three passages. But in the other passages quoted from the Epistles to the Colossians and Galatians, St. Paul expressly designates the scriptures of the Jews, and the traditions and dogmas

vital truths of God's revelation, when we descend to those essential verities, which the Jewish and Christian dispensations, being both divine, must have had in common, and when we appropriate them to ourselves by a conformity of heart and life, of faith and practice.

We see, then, that the Christian's first duty is to conquer the sinful tendencies of his own carnal nature, because religious life consists in a triumph of the spirit over the flesh. Until he has done this, he is not qualified or competent to wage war with the unbelieving world, or to win souls to Christ. He must recommend his cause by his conduct; the shield of his faith must be compacted of the materials of Christian righteousness. And if he is to gain a spiritual victory, his weapon must be the genuine sword of the Spirit; it must be the simple revelation from God to man, and not those forms of human dogmatism by which it is encumbered and rendered ineffectual; or even the mere letter of the written word, in which it is included and contained. For as Christ himself was God and man, as every man is a compound of spirit and flesh, so Scripture exhibits both the letter which killeth and the spirit which giveth life; both the weak and beggarly elements of human tradition and the Word of God, or the revelation of true religion.

which they contained, as *worldly elements* (τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου), and intimates that, in Christ, his disciples have died to all these things, and risen to the spiritual law of liberty. The word στοιχεῖον is used in good authors to signify either the elements of which the visible world is composed; or the letters as elements of written words; or the simple sounds of the voice, as the first elements of spoken language. As St. Paul adds the explanatory genitive τοῦ κόσμου (Gal. iv. 3; Col. ii. 8, 20), it is clear that he means something temporary and tangible. As he couples these elements with human traditions (ἡ παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, Col. iv. 8), and ordinances (δόγματα, Col. ii. 14, 20; *cf.* Acts xvi. 4: παρεδίδουν αὐτοῖς φυλάσσειν τὰ δόγματα), he manifestly opposes them to divine revelation. As he calls them weak and beggarly elements (ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχά: Gal. iv. 9) he clearly distinguishes them from the strength and riches of divine grace. As he attributes to them an enslaving power (Gal. iv. 3), he obviously intends the deadening and debasing and profitless letter, as contrasted with that vivifying spirit, which is a pledge and earnest of freedom (2 Cor. iii. 17).

In thus endeavouring to show that the Christian advocate's competency depends on his personal religiousness and spiritual wisdom, we have appealed to texts of Scripture, and especially to those which, being couched in figurative language, have been transmitted with the additional safeguard of a peculiar phraseology. But the same results might have been deduced from the general tenor of Gospel teaching. The poet has said, with great point and energy—

> "For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight:
> His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

Whatever criticisms may be passed upon this sentiment by the vehement upholders of particular opinions in theology, it cannot be denied that, supposing it to be said of one who is already a Christian,[1] it is in accordance with the general spirit and with the very letter of the Bible. Guided by this criterion, we can have no hesitation in saying that Christianity is a rule of life, and not a set of speculative opinions. Accordingly, those points in which all religious men agree, must be more essential to religion than the questions in which they differ, and which are generally made the most of by those who are least conspicuous for practical holiness and Christian charity. This being the case, we not only nurture our own spiritual life, and encourage the faith of others, by acting in obedience to the laws of practical Christianity; but also, by contending only or mainly for those principles in which all good Christians are agreed, we wield the unsheathed Sword of the Spirit, and find the whole body of believers ranged on one side and forming one line of battle. By thinking men, in Protestant England, this assertion of the real unity of all believers, in that which is essential to their spiritual

[1] This proviso removes this sentiment of Pope ("Essay on Man," 3rd Epist. *ad fin.*) from the class of opinions condemned in our XVIII. Article. It is strange that Dr. Hey did not see this.

life, has been put forward from time to time as a principle of toleration and an argument of strength. It was maintained in the seventeenth century by John Milton. "It is written," he says, "that the coat of our Saviour was without seam; whence some would infer that there should be no division in the Church of Christ. It should be so indeed; yet seams in the same cloth neither hurt the garment nor misbecome it; and not only seams but schisms will be while men are fallible. But if they who dissent in matters not essential to belief, while the common adversary is in the field, shall stand jarring and pelting at one another, they will be soon routed and subdued. To save ourselves therefore and resist the common enemy, it concerns us mainly to agree within ourselves, that with joint forces we may not only hold our own but get ground." And in another passage he remarks—"The Gospel faithfully preached, the desolate parishes visited and duly fed, loiterers thrown out, wolves driven from the fold, had been a better confutation of Popery and the Mass than whole hecatontomes of controversies, and all this careering with spear in rest and thundering on the steel-cap of Baronius and Bellarmine." To the same effect we may quote the words recently addressed by a Bampton Lecturer to the University of Oxford[1]—"The unity of moral disposition and of moral purpose, which has in fact made all sincere followers of Christ one, in all times and in all churches, has and does and will traverse their differences—not as a generalization from them—without superseding or tending directly to supersede their several creeds and special constitutions, unless it be when they are essentially exclusive or damnatory. But this unity must itself be founded on some faith,—some faith common to all Christians,—some faith capable of being received, without difference, by all

[1] Wilson's "Bampton Lectures," pp. 278—280.

men. For, in making the identity of their disposition and purpose, rather than their dogmatic faith, than their historical faith, than their feelings, than the supernatural influences in which they believe, than their worship, or than their formal virtue, the true Catholic characteristic—this moral purpose, wherever permanent, must imply an habitual will. Wherever there is habitual will, there is fixed faith and conviction,—fixed faith and conviction of some good within reach. It is a fixed faith in the supremacy and victory of good over evil. By this faith disciples in all ages have wrestled confidently with the evil within; have stood, when enabled to stand, believing that He, which had begun the good work in them, would confirm it unto the day of the Lord Jesus Christ. By this Apostles and apostolic men have removed mountains, have struggled with and overcome adversaries, have resisted unto death; because, with them, this faith is not only in the victory of good over evil, but that they are appointed instruments to the winning of it."

We conclude, therefore, that the genuine advocate of Christianity, the true champion of the Church, can only be found in the ranks of those who have come forth victorious from the ordeal of an internal conflict; who undertake to defend and propagate, in the name of Christ, only that religion from within in which their own peace and happiness consist, and in which all good men must find the common ground of a sincere and cordial union and agreement; and who win over souls to Christ by "walking as children of light," and so leading men, who "see their good works on earth," to glorify their Father which is in heaven.

APPENDIX I.

(CHAP. I. PP. 4, 13, 15.)

ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN REVEALED RELIGION AND THE NATURAL AND MORAL HISTORY OF MAN.

ALTHOUGH our belief in the personal existence of God and the personal immortality of man is not instinctive; although this belief, in all that gives it a special character, is necessarily derived from revelation, it is not the less true that, if we omit the idea of personality in either case, if we speak only of the existence of God and man's immortality, we may seek for these truths in the evidences of natural reason. And in any case, religion, to be accepted at all, must accommodate itself to man's nature, must recommend itself to his reason, and must concur in its promises with his antecedent expectations. Besides, we cannot maintain that which is peculiar to the Christian religion, as the one formal manifestation of divine truth, without reverting to that which is involved in the general definition of all religion. And in order to do this we must be able to apprehend what it is that makes man, as such, essentially a religious being. Accordingly, the whole inquiry respecting religion will resolve itself into an analysis of the opposition between the moral and natural history of man; between that which is peculiar to himself, and that which he has in common with other animated beings. In this way, alone, can we see why man, who exists in the present, raises his thoughts to the absent and the future; why, subjected here to all the conditions of sin and pain, of

decay and death, he still connects himself with an expected existence, in which these clogs and incumbrances will no longer impede and confine him.

The important inquiry, which we propose to discuss very briefly, involves three successive questions.

1. What is an animal?
2. What is man as one of the animal kingdom?
3. What is man above and beyond that which he owes to his rank in animated nature?

1. In answering the first of these questions, we will accept the theory of Lorenz Oken, not because we adopt the materialistic conclusions of that great naturalist, but because the concession of that theory will give an *à fortiori* value and strength to our own argument.

Natural history properly includes a scientific account of all visible nature; but it is practically confined to a discussion of the separate or separable objects on the surface of this planet. These objects are divided into three great kingdoms—the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal; to which three distinct sciences correspond—mineralogy, botany, and zoology. We may distinguish the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal with reference either to their structure or to their functions.

(*a*) When we speak of their structure, we mean the primary elements of which they are composed. To adopt the common nomenclature,—there are four primary elements: earth, water, air, and fire or æther.

If earth is combined with only one of the other three, the result of this binary combination is a mineral. If earth is combined with both water and air the result of this ternary combination is a vegetable. If earth is combined with all three of the other elements, the result of this quaternary or exhaustive combination is an animal.

(*b*) When we speak of the functions of the three classes of natural objects, we mean what they are capable or incapable of doing.

The mineral is dead or inorganic, and has no activity, save in magnetism and crystallization.

The vegetable lives, grows, and propagates its species, but does not move spontaneously.

The animal does all this, and moves also.

Without entering into the details of the ingenious theory, by which Oken explains the relation between the structure and the functions of the three different classes of things which constitute the objects of natural history, and without criticising the facts and principles which form the basis of his speculations, we will briefly state his views respecting the animal, considered as a further development of the mineral and vegetable.

While we find that a binary combination of the elements in the mineral does not produce life, we see, when we pass on to organic bodies, that the plant not only consists of earthy particles capable of reduction to carbon by the action of fire, and contains water in a fluid state, but also is full of passages or spiracles for the air, which penetrates the whole body, and electrifies and oxydizes the substance just as it does in the atmosphere. So that we have here earth, air, and water, in juxtaposition, but retaining properly their respective functions. The result of their combined agency we call life, which is, indeed, a sort of galvanism. As, however, the plant does not go about to seek its nutriment, but remains passive on the earth on which it lives, it is not an agent, but only a recipient of imposed conditions.

In order that the organic body may move as well as live, we must add to the earth, water, air, and the fourth element which, for want of a better name, we call æther. For a self-moving body must have all three parts of the æther, according to Oken's view of its nature: it must have (1) weight, *i.e.*, a centre of gravity, which makes it independent of the surface of the planet; (2) heat, especially expansion and contraction, or independent movement in all its parts; (3) light, which gives activity to the system of movement, and refers the whole body to a centre. A body thus constituted by a quaternary combination, or complete union of all the elements, is called an animal. It has an earth-organ in the blood, a water-organ in the intestinal canal, an air-organ in the lungs or gills; and three organs for the ætherial element, namely, bones for weight, muscles for heat or movement, and the nerves, and especially the eye, for light, *i.e.* for the stimulation of movement. And thus we have in the animal a separate organic structure, which has not only a distinct existence, but also the means, in combination with its own kind, of propagating its species; whereas the plant

is not only attached to the soil, on which it lives, but is in most cases limited to itself for the means of fecundity.

Thus, according to Oken's theory, the three domains of natural history present in their structure a regular development from a combination of two elements up to a combination of four, which, as it were, carries all nature in itself; and, in their functions, a progress from the negation of motion to perfect motion. For the mineral has no faculty of motion, either within or without; the plant has internal motion, consisting of life and growth; and the animal has not only this internal motion, but also external motion; it not only has circulation and growth, but also a spontaneous movement of its organs.

It appears from this view of the matter, that the animal is only a further development of the same sort of combinations as those which produce the mineral and the vegetable—that they are all three of the earth, earthy;—made up of the visible and tangible materials of which this planet is composed.

And now comes our great question—what is man? How does he stand related to this system of successive developments? Is he only an animal, or is he something more? Can he be described and defined by natural history alone? or, would not the main part of his definition and description be omitted, if we confined ourselves to his apparent place in the animal kingdom?

2. In order that we may come to a satisfactory solution, let us inquire what is the natural history of man? What is he merely as a member of the animal kingdom?

We may concede, without the least hesitation, that, whatever man is besides, he includes a development of the structural organization which is found in all the highest classes of animals. As far as he lives, and moves, and feeds, and grows, and propagates his species, he is a member of the animal kingdom. His nervous system is more fully organized, and his brain is much larger and more active. But, although the principle of motion is the same in kind, there are, nevertheless, even in the outward frame of man, peculiarities not to be found in any other member of animated creation. The essential and organic difference between man and beast, so far as the limbs are concerned, consists in the soles and hands of the former. No other animal has this diversity of structure. The free agency of man depends on this difference between his two pairs of limbs.

Among beasts, both fore and hind feet are employed in carrying the body; but in man, the hinder limbs, with their feet, carry the whole body through every diversity of movement; and the body carries the hands, which thus obtain a free play, and are consequently enabled to perform every variety of employment, without at the same time impeding the actions of the body. In this consists all the mechanical power of man—his ability to increase his agency by the use of tools and instruments. If we suppose that apes have an advantage in four hands instead of two, we must remember that our advantage consists not in the number, but in the diversity of our organs. Unable to walk on his hinder pair of hands, the quadrumanous animal is reduced by this augmentation to the rank of a scrambler or climber. The position of his face and forehead, which enables man, while walking upright, to look around, before, and above himself, is a consequence of an enlargement of his cranium corresponding to that of his brain, of which we shall speak by and by. It is this which gave him his distinctive title in the language of the Greeks—ἄνθρωπος, "he that looks upwards;"[1] and which the Roman poet has described in his striking line:

"Os homini sublime dedit cœlumque tueri."

If, however, man had no advantage beyond that of his physical conformation, we should assign him a place in mere zoology. He would constitute a higher species by himself, but would still stand on a footing of parallelism with other animals. Besides, he would not be able to make a full use of his other endowments and physical advantages, if he had not something within him to guide and direct his energies. And this brings us to our remaining inquiry.

3. What is man above and beyond that which he owes to his rank in animated nature? What is the true definition of man?

That which distinguishes man from all other animals is what we call, in common language, a reasonable soul: and he has, as the coördinate and necessary result of this, the faculty of speech. The true definition of man is that "he is the only reasonable and speaking animal." This definition not only draws a distinction between man and beast, but also overrules all attempts to divide mankind into separate species. As a class, man is not

[1] See Lobeck, Paralipomena, pp. 118, 142.

only separate or solitary, but is one within himself. We not only reject all brotherhood with other animals, but we claim brotherhood with all men (see "New Cratylus," p. 59, 2nd edition). Now, as there are great physical differences among men, this separation and this unity must be attributed to the fact that man's essential definition depends upon his moral, not upon his physical characteristics. Consequently, man is what he is, by virtue of that which distinguishes him from all other members of the animal kingdom—his faculty of reasoning, and, consequently, of speaking.

To maintain the proposition that man is the only reasoning and speaking animal, we must be prepared to defend two propositions. 1. All men have reason and speech. 2. No animal, except man, has reason and speech.

1. *All men have reason and speech.*

If we take the most debased and degraded of human beings—for instance, the Bosjemen and Australian aborigines—we find that they can not only speak, but that they can remember and describe. Indeed, we have seen in the former race some remarkable exhibitions of dramatic representations; and nothing of this kind is found in lower animals.

When our attention is directed to the case of infants or idiots, we must remember that these are instances in which the animal is not a completed or unimpaired receptacle of the rational faculty. It does not dwell there for want of an adequate abode. The same remark applies in a lesser degree to the case of those who are unable to speak in consequence of some physical infirmity. In the highest degree, however, an imperfect development of the reason in man is only the same in the individual case, as it was with the whole world before the creation of our species, or in uninhabited deserts now. For animal life, as we have seen, is but a combination of the elements of space, and the reason is something distinct or superadded.

The manner in which the reason seems to depend on structural development in the case of the infant, and, still more, of the idiot, leads to the inquiry suggested by the phrenological theory. The proper answer to this solves all the difficulties suggested by the two former cases—of degraded or imperfect humanity. The error into which people generally fall is that of confusing between the cause and the effect. Craniological struc-

ture is the effect, not the cause, of intellectual culture and civilization. This has been shown by an enormous induction in the case of national or large and long-continued families of men; and even in the case of individuals, it has been observed that particular studies tend to produce a corresponding enlargement of the frontal structure. We knew one case of an eminent mathematician, who ascertained by regular admeasurement that his organs of perception, most particularly engaged in his studies, gradually increased in distinct prominence. It is also known that children inherit more or less the craniological forms of their parents; and some persons have thought that the mother transmits to the sons and the father to his daughters the more striking peculiarities of their mental and moral characters respectively. Consequently, the intellectual results of the characters formed by habit and study are continuous and not limited to a single life. That this is independent of the effects of climatology is shown by a very large induction in the case of the Anglo-Americans, who, although their physiognomy is affected, like that of the native Indians, by the loss of fat in the cellular substance and other effects of the climate, retain in full vigour the mental and moral energies of their British ancestors. From these and a number of other considerations, which might be adduced, we infer that in man the tenement of organic life is moulded at its nervous centre by the tenant and his heirs, and that the godlike dwells with the human in proportion as the human is fitted for its reception.

2. *No animals, except man, have reason or speech.*

If we really consider the meaning of the word, we must allow at once that speech does not consist merely in words spoken, but presumes a corresponding act of the mind, which we call abstraction, or the power of framing general names and predications. Where there is no evidence of the existence of this sort of speech, there is no evidence of the indwelling of reason; for speech, in the proper sense of the term, is an endowment necessarily co-ordinate with reason. The merest baby, which has the full use of its faculties, seems to abstract and begin to generalize; but the most sagacious brute can only understand, fancy, and associate. It is necessary that we should carefully distinguish reason, imagination, and inference, from understanding, fancy, and association, if we would clearly perceive how the former belong to man only, while he shares the latter with lower animals.

Understanding deals only with facts, learned immediately from the senses; reason ascends to principles, which, to it, are as certain as any facts for which there is the evidence of the senses. Fancy frames pictures of single objects from the suggestive presence or recollection of that which is seen by the bodily eye; imagination combines these fragments of fancy into coherent groups and detailed compositions, which are pleasing, because they are possible, even when they are most felt to be unreal. Association merely connects certain objects or actions with others which always or generally accompany or follow them; but inference recognises a necessity of sequence, even when there is a long chain of intermediate or connecting ideas. Thus all animals may be said to understand and know what to eat, drink, and avoid; but man alone can investigate the principles of nutriment and poison; he alone can distinguish between the gluten, starch, and fat, which contribute to our sustenance, and the allyle,[1] with which we season our food; and he alone can prepare for his use a compound or artificial diet. The dog may dream of his pursuit of game, or the horse may fancy that there is dangerous life in a heap of stones or the trunk of a tree; but it is only man who can create a consistent and lengthened detail of dreamy fiction, or can suffer from the effects of continuous delusion. The pointer may associate the work which he has to perform and the corrections which enforced it; or the horse may learn by habit that a certain turn in the road leads to his stable; but it is only man who can form systems resting on necessary inferences and supported by demonstrations which all men can appreciate. With regard to speech, it is idle to say that beasts would speak if they had the power of articulation; for many birds can frame syllabic sounds, and yet cannot discourse, or say, as the expression of their own thoughts and wishes, what they are taught to say by imitation. If it even seems to be otherwise, as when the parrot says, "Give polly a bit!" this is the result of association, quite as much as when the lap-dog stands up to beg for a scrap. The learned pigs, trained horses, and performing elephants, which are exhibited, are merely taught by similar associations to do a certain limited range of performances, and they never originate anything analogous to that which they are so labo-

[1] See "Johnston's Chemistry of Common Life," vol. ii., p. 270.

riously taught to execute. And when we talk of training or educating the pointer and the retriever, we merely mean that, without reasoning about it, they are made to understand that, under certain circumstances, they are to do certain things not unconnected with their natural instincts. They are only instruments or tools, not independent agents; and it is a favourite phrase with sportsmen, that "hounds have no right to think!" No amount of education will produce an effect even on the cranial development of a lower animal, though in man this effect is not only producible, but even transmissible to his offspring.

But the distinction between man and beast is not limited to the intellectual qualities of the former. The divine or non-animal element in man is shown far more by his moral attributes. It is man only who has a conscience, a sense of right and wrong, an approving and disapproving faculty, a conviction of his own responsibility. It is man only who can systematically control the impulses of his lower nature; who, in his highest development as an individual, cultivates virtue and discourages vice; and who, in the best forms of that political society and civilization which he alone is qualified to conceive and carry out, makes laws and rules for the subjugation and control of rude passion and brutal selfishness. Even in regard to those impulses, which are necessarily common to man and the inferior animals, we observe that his moral and intellectual qualities, where they are allowed their full play, exercise an absolute pre-eminence and authority, and make man most unlike the beasts of the field even in those functions which are most essentially bestial. For instance, in regard to the propagation of his species, man is the only true monogamist. In proportion as his moral instincts are duly cultivated, he regards "casual fruition" [1] as morally wrong and abhorrent to his higher nature. It is he alone who understands and enjoys the happiness which springs from the mutual

[1] Milton, from whom this phrase is borrowed, expresses very happily the strictly human character of monogamy ("Paradise Lost," iv. 750):

"Hail, wedded love, mysterious law, true source
Of human offspring, sole propriety
In Paradise of all things common else.
By thee adulterous lust was driven from men
Among the bestial herds to range; by thee
Founded in reason, loyal, just, and pure,
Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son, and brother, first were known."

affection of a family. The relations of husband and wife, father and child, brother and sister, are appreciated by all good and civilized men; but the lower animals know nothing of this beyond the temporary and instinctive duties of the breeding season. The sire and dam and young of this year will be strangers and rivals when a few months have passed away.

In addition to these reasons for distinguishing between man and beast, we must take into account our own irresistible conviction of the independence of our moral and intellectual being. We have here an argument of the same kind with that which proves to us the reality of the external world and its opposition to ourselves. Man's distinctive personality, with all its results, depends upon his self-consciousness; and this self-consciousness tells him that his soul is not bound down by the conditions of animal life. The *à priori* argument for the immortality of the soul consists in an impression or instinctive belief, which confirms itself whenever it is really awakened in the mind. Antecedently to the discoveries of revelation, reflecting men would acquiesce in the conclusion suggested by Jean Paul—that it is not and cannot be the final destination of the essential part of man to be implicated in the sufferings and casualties of his merely animal nature;[1] and as it is a consequence of this feeling that man regards himself as belonging really to another world, he is essentially a religious being; and long before the conversion of the heathen, religious societies were formed, in which the bond of union was some hope, more or less vague, of a future life. Greek philosophers could teach that the body was but the outward dress of the soul, to be worn in this world as a mere attire, and to be cast off and left behind when its present use was at an end, when it was worn out and no longer available. And poets could tell us, that the drunkard stifles, and the profligate sensualist enslaves, his reason, and that an unlimited indulgence in carnal desires sinks man to the level of the beasts that perish, by the tale of Circe's cup of pleasure, which transformed into bestial shapes the men that drank of it.

If we now pass from purely human reasonings on the opposition between the natural and moral history of man, to the revelation of Scripture on this subject, we shall see that the

[1] "Der Kampaner Thal," "Werke," vol. xl., pp. 67, foll. The remarks in pp. 62, 63, appear to us eminently beautiful.

same lesson is conveyed from the first to the last page of the Bible; that the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and the reference of sin and death to the predominant influences of the former, while the latter is represented as divine in itself, and calculated to raise our whole nature to a personal immortality, is, as it were, the key-note of the Old as well as the New Testament, the main element in that harmony which binds together the earlier and later, the Jewish and Christian systems of revealed truth.[1]

The book of Genesis states that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and man became a living soul" (Gen. ii. 7); and this is the opposition between the material and the spiritual in the composite structure of man, to which we have been led by the theory of Oken, and by our own reasonings. In the same way the Creator is described as "the God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numb. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16); and a similar opposition between the divine origin of the spirit and the dissoluble substance of the flesh is assumed in Isaiah's expression (xxxi. 3): "the Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit." Hence the flesh is the cause both of sin and of death, regarded as the termination of the spirit's limited sojourn in its mortal tenement. In the book of Genesis (vi. 3) Jehovah is made to say: "My spirit shall not always preside in man, because of their sin, that is, the flesh." In other words, the sinfulness of the flesh makes it unable or disqualified to serve as an enduring tenement of the divine spirit.[2] There is a perpetual opposition between these two elements in the composite nature of man. If the flesh gains the mastery, the spirit, being vanquished, flees away—morally by the triumph of sin; physically by the triumph of death. If, on the other hand, the spirit asserts its supremacy, the flesh is led captive—morally, by the triumph of religious faith; physically, by the resurrection and consequent immortality of the body and soul. The view thus briefly expressed in the sixth chapter of Genesis is fully developed in the New Testament, and especially in the

[1] This subject is fully discussed in "Jashar," pp. 41—73; 347, 348.

[2] There is great force in the expression *salsurata pulpa* used by Persius (ii. 63). It is quite the Biblical σάρξ.

writings of St. Paul,[1] and it seems likely that St. James, in an important passage (iv. 5), really refers to the text of Genesis; for we ought to read: *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπὶ πόθῳ* [*legitur ἐπιποθεῖ*] *τὸ πνεῦμα οὐ* [*legitur ὃ*] *κατῴκησεν ἐν ἡμῖν*. He is speaking of "the pleasures or lusts which *make war* [*στρατεύονται*] in our members" (ver. 1); and he goes on to refer to the operations of carnal selfishness—concupiscence, envy, war, battle, murder, (v. 2); "ye adulterers," he adds (v. 4, 5), "know ye not that to love the world is to hate God? or think ye that the Scripture says with no meaning (*κενῶς*): it was from enmity against lust that the spirit did not dwell in us?" In precisely the same way, St. Paul says (Gal. v. 16 *sqq.*): "Walk in the spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh; for the flesh lusteth against (*ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ*) the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these things are opposed to one another, so that the will is not free." And after enumerating the works of the flesh and the spirit respectively, he adds: "the disciples of Christ have crucified the flesh with its passions and lusts" (*σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις*.)

As the flesh is that which binds man down to the present life and to this lower world, we find that *κόσμος* or "the present order of things," is often substituted for *σάρξ*, "the flesh." Thus, as St. Paul has, in the passage just quoted, spoken of the flesh as necessarily crucified by those who are really Christ's, so in the next chapter (Gal. vi. 14) he says: "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by means of whom (or which) the world is crucified to me (*ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται*) and I to the world." And in the Epistle to Titus, ii. 12, the lusts of the flesh are called *κοσμικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* or "worldly lusts." Hence St. James, in the passage just quoted (iv. 4), says that the love of the world is hatred of God (*ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν*). And in precisely the same way St. John warns us (1 John, ii. 15): "Love not the world neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world the love of the Father is not in him." And having mentioned the lust of the flesh (*ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός*) as one of those things that are in the world, he opposes the transient

[1] See Tholuck's "Erneute Untersuchung über *σὰρξ* als Quelle der Sünde." "Theol. Stud. u. Krit." 1855, pp. 477 *sqq.*

nature of the world and its lust (ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ) to the immortality of those who do the will of God. According to the same Apostle, this world, which loves darkness or sin rather than light or spiritual illumination (John, iii. 19), is the source of temptation, and is ὁ πονηρός, "the wicked one or tempter." Thus, in the passage just quoted (1 John, ii. 13, 14), he says twice: "Ye have conquered the wicked one" (νενικήκατε τὸν πονηρόν); in the same Epistle (v. 4) he says: "Every thing that is born of God conquers the world" (νικᾷ τὸν κόσμον); and again (18, 19): "We know that whosoever is born of God sinneth not; but he that is begotten of God keepeth (τηρεῖ) himself, and the wicked one (ὁ πονηρός) toucheth him not. We know that we are of God, and that the whole world lieth in the wicked one" (ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται). And in the same way as we are taught to pray in the Lord's prayer, "lead us not into temptation (εἰς πειρασμόν), but deliver us from the evil one" (ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ), Jesus himself, according to St. John (xvii. 15), prays for us: "I do not ask that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them (τηρήσῃς) from the evil one" (ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ). With similar reference to the Lord's prayer, the writer of 2 Peter, ii. 9, substitutes ῥύεσθαι ἐκ πειρασμοῦ for ῥύεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. And it may be laid down that temptation, the world, and the evil one are commutable terms; and the lust of the flesh, as the predominant principle in the world, as the tendency to a selfish regard for the present life only, is justly called "the ruler of this world" (ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων, John, xiv. 30), and the passions are "the world-rulers of the darkness or sin of this life" (κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ σκότους [τοῦ αἰῶνος] τούτου, Eph. vi. 12). In the same sense, and with reference perhaps to the material elements of which our lower nature is composed, we are told "to mortify our members which are upon the earth" (τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, Col. iii. 5), where the νέκρωσις, or mortification of that which is earthly, is a putting off of the old man (Col. iii. 9), by a sort of circumcision (Col. ii. 11) or crucifixion of the flesh, following the example of the νέκρωσις, to which Jesus himself submitted (2 Cor. iv. 10). And it is in reference to this that St. Peter says (1 Peter, iv. 1): "He who has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin" (ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκὶ πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας) *cf.* Rom. vi. 7. Hence the Fathers explain the φρόνημα σαρκὸς

as γεώδης διανοίας ὁρμή, "an earthly impulse of the mind"; to be in the flesh is γηίνως ζῆν, "to live in an earthly sense" (Œc. *ad Rom.* viii. 13); and the flesh itself is called ἡ πονηρὰ προαίρεσις, ὁ λογισμὸς ὁ γεώδης, "the wicked will, the earthly thought" (Chrys. *ad Gal.* v. 16). Specially, with reference to those passionate impulses in which the selfishness of the flesh finds its expression, the heart is regarded as the source of temptation and sin both in the Old Testament and in the New. Thus in the book of Genesis we read (vi. 5) that "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil every day"; and again (viii. 21) that "the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." The book of Proverbs mentions (vi. 18), among the things which the Lord hates, "an heart that deviseth wicked imaginations." And the prophet Jeremiah says (xvii. 9) that "in every man the heart is crooked and desperately wicked," where the predicate "*hâqôv*," "crooked," is tacitly opposed to *jâshâr*, "straight," just as *jâshâr* is opposed to the word rendered "imagination" of the heart in Ecclesiastes vii. 29: "God made man *jâshâr*, straight, (as opposed to crooked); but they devised (*i.e.* in their hearts) many imaginations or inventions." In accordance with all this, our Lord says emphatically (Mark, vii. 21—23): "From within, out of the heart of men, proceed wicked wranglings, fornications, murders, (and other sins which he enumerates); all these evil things (πάντα ταῦτα τὰ πονηρά) proceed from within and defile a man."

But the flesh, the world, and the heart are not only the causes of sin, which is their moral triumph; they are also the causes of death, which is their physical triumph over the soul; and when St. Peter says (1 Pet. i. 11): "dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, inasmuch as they make war against the soul" (ἀπέχεσθε τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἵτινες στρατεύονται κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς), he refers, no doubt, to the mortality and destruction, which are the fruits of carnal selfishness: for we are strangers and pilgrims with reference to the transient nature of our sojourn in this world. In the same way St. Paul says (Rom. viii. 6): "the affection of the flesh is death, but the affection of the spirit is life and peace." Thus also he says (Gal. vi. 8): "he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption (φθοράν); but he

that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting (*ζωὴν αἰώνιον*)." Similarly, the author of 2 Peter i. 4, says: "that ye may be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption (*φθοράν*), which is in the world through lust." And as the book of Genesis says figuratively that the Spirit of God refused to preside continually in man on account of the sin which is in the flesh, St. Paul declares distinctly (Rom. v. 12) that "by means of one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." Conversely, in proportion as the lusts which wage war against the soul are defeated in the battle which rages within, in the same proportion the Spirit of God returns to preside within us, until the corruptible puts on incorruption, and the mortal puts on immortality; when death is robbed of its sting, which is sin, and swallowed up in a perpetual victory over the grave (1 Cor. xv. 53—57). When this triumph of the spirit over the flesh is complete, the terrestrial fabric, which is represented as our vestment or tabernacle, has superinduced upon it a garment of spiritual life, and its mortality is absorbed or swallowed up in a new spiritual existence (2 Cor. v. 1—5).

This, then, is distinctly the doctrine of the whole body of Scripture, and revealed religion fully confirms what we learn from philosophy, that there is an opposition between the two ingredients of the composite nature of man; between man as merely an animal, and man as a spiritual being; between the terrene and the heavenly which are combined in his double life. "I know," says the Apostle (Rom. vii. 18), "that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." But man is not only flesh; and while in his body he carries about him the germs of sin and death, in his spirit he bears at least a susceptibility for righteousness and immortality. This prevailing doctrine of Scripture did not escape either the Jews, who read the Old Testament before the coming of Christ, or the Fathers, who studied the New Testament. The author of the fourth book of Maccabees says (4 Macc. vii. 18): "as many as take thought for piety with their whole heart, these alone are able to conquer the passions of the flesh." (*ὅσοι εὐσεβείας προνοοῦσιν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας, οὗτοι μόνοι δύνανται κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν*). Chrysostom (*ad Rom.* vii. 18) says: "the corruptibility of the flesh does not possess a freedom from

passion, consequently, it is not perfect, complete, and sinless" (*τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς φθαρτὸν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀπαθές, οὐδὲ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἀνενδεὲς καὶ ἀναμάρτητον*). Cyril of Alexandria, commenting on the same passage, writes: "the appetites which carry us off to everything, and the sins of a life of pleasure, have the flesh for their fountain-head, and make war against the spirit," (*αἱ ὀρέξεις αἱ πρὸς πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκομίζουσαι καὶ τῆς φιληδόνου ζωῆς τὰ ἐγκλήματα πηγὴν ἔχουσι τὴν σάρκα καὶ καταστρατεύονται τοῦ πνεύματος*). And Theodore of Mopsuestia says on the 14th verse: "fleshly is equivalent to mortal, and on this account having much inclination to sin," (*σαρκικὸς ἀντὶ τοῦ θνητὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν περὶ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔχων ῥοπήν*). And again on the 18th verse: "as far as relates to the flesh, since the nature which it has is mortal, none of those things which contribute to virtue are practicable: for our mortal condition induces us to aim only at the present, and from our eagerness for these things, sins are engendered" (*ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ σαρκὶ θνητὴν ἐχούσῃ τὴν φύσιν, οὐδὲν τῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν συντελούντων πραχθῆναι δύναται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ θνητότης τῶν παρόντων ἐφίεσθαι μόνον ἡμᾶς παρασκευάζει, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδῆς ἁμαρτήματα τίκτεται*).

According to the true interpretation,—of which the writer of these pages claims the discovery,—the third chapter of Genesis, which has been regarded theologically as the chief authority for all that we know of the origin and nature of sin, is merely a Jehovistic or peculiarly Israelitish—and, to a certain extent, local and temporary—view of the subject which we have been considering under its cosmopolitan and everlasting aspects. To an Israelite, living in the golden age of theocratic discipline, meditating on the principles and rules of life, which separated his own race from the rest of the world, and contemplating the characteristic sins against religion and morality, by which the conterminous nations were disgraced and ruined, it must have appeared that sin and death were not merely functions or results of the flesh in general, but specially inherent in the gross fornication and idolatry involved in the phallic worship of Baal-peor, which met him on all sides with its revolting symbols and bestial practices. It is a natural tendency that we should contemplate abstract and general questions from the point of view suggested by our own age and country, and, as it

were, substitute the example for the rule. As, therefore, the idolatry of Baal-peor was the form of apostasy from Jehovah, which was selected as an object of special prohibition, it was almost inevitable that the concrete would take the place of the abstract, and that the specific form would serve as a starting-point for all general denunciations of moral and religious guilt. That the worship of Baal-peor or Priapus really led to flagrant immorality, is well known to every reader of the book of Numbers; and it was quite reasonable that the Phallic emblem of generation and life, which was sometimes represented as a serpent, should be regarded in its nudity as *a* source, or *the* source of temptation. What, then, could be more natural than that a Jew, who was taught to regard with special abhorrence the idolatrous fornication of Baal-peor, should seek in some analogous primeval sin for the cause of the painful necessities of circumcision and childbirth; and for the explanation of the lot of labour, which was especially entailed on the fathers of families? The more strictly we scrutinise the peculiar phraseology of the Hebrew text, the more convinced we must be that this is the intended meaning of this obviously figurative narration.[1] Nor is its truthfulness confined to the case of the Jews, or its warning to the specific sinfulness of phallic idolatry. It must always remain true that sexual abuse is the most bestial and pernicious form of carnal lust, and therefore the most opposed to the due supremacy of our higher or spiritual nature. Clement of Alexandria, referring to 1 Cor. vii. 1, 2, 5, says that the Apostle's warning does not refer to the case of those who confine themselves to the legitimate objects of marriage, but

[1] See "Jashar," pp. 45–56. To the criticisms and interpretations there proposed, we adhere with undiminished confidence. We add the following hints for the consideration of those who are capable of appreciating an exegetical argument. The plea for the punctuation ערום (above, p. 20) seems to us irrefragable, because this word is used *emphatically*, both in ii. 25, and in iii. 10, 11, and because *mik kôl* must mean "in all" both here, and in v. 14, and in Jerem. xvii. 9. For the reference of such a statement to the conceptions of a pastoral nation like the Jews, we might refer to Theocritus and Longus. One of our opponents, the Mr. Perowne mentioned below, who is a Lecturer on Hebrew (!!) has the effrontery to say that we are guilty of "a strange inconsistency," when we write וֹ for וּ here, but refuse to change שילה into שלה, because this reading "involves too great an alteration in the Masorethic punctuation." As we said nothing about the punctuation in this latter case, but referred, of course, to the inserted letter *jod*, the Hebrew Lecturer must be convicted either of ignorance or of misrepresentation.

to those who go beyond this, "lest the enemy by blowing hard should turn the surging billows of appetite to pleasures which do not belong to us" (*ἵνα μὴ πολὺ ἐπιπνεύσας* [*legitur ἐπινεύσας*] *ὁ δι' ἐναντίας ἐκκυμήνῃ τὴν ὄρεξιν εἰς ἀλλοτρίας ἡδονάς*); and the same Father well observed that it is the fornicator and adulterer who is truly bestialized (*ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐκθηριοῦται*, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. p. 558, Potter). The allegory in Genesis iii. connects the general sinfulness of lust with the special sinfulness of disobedience to the divine law. The Jews were directly forbidden to imitate the idolatrous wickedness of their neighbours; and the warning commandment not only rendered sin more inexcusable, but added to the carnal concupiscence, which degrades the spiritual nature of man, the carnal arrogance, by which he shakes off his allegiance to the divine rule and makes a god of himself. This feeling of impious autonomy is referred to in the narrative itself (Gen. iii. 5); and the most learned of the Christian Fathers and the most profound of the Scholastic Theologians have seen that the root of sin is two-fold—inclination to carnal lust, and disobedience, or the proud disallowance of God's authority. Clement of Alexandria says (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, p. 86, Potter): "The first man sported freely in the garden of delights, and was subjected to pleasure: for the serpent allegorically denotes pleasure. So the boy was seduced by pleasure, and the grown-up man by disobedience." Similarly, Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Rom. vii. 7, says (fol. 27, Paris, 1541): "Concupiscentia de qua hic loquitur est generale malum, non communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causalitatis. Nec est contrarium quod habetur Eccle. xxx. Initium omnis peccati superbia. Nam superbia est initium peccati ex parte aversionis. Concupiscentia autem est principium peccatorum, ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile."

The great fact, by which religion illustrates this essential opposition between the carnal and spiritual components of human nature, is that of the Incarnation and Atonement. By assuming our flesh with all its liabilities, and triumphing over the temptations inherent in our lower nature, the Word subdued and reconciled to God not only the tendency to carnal lust, but also the tendency to carnal disobedience. Thus Clement of Alexandria says, in the passage just quoted, that "whereas man, originally

free, was found bound in sins, the Lord was willing to make him free again from those bonds; and being imprisoned in the flesh, with this he vanquished the Serpent and enslaved the tyrant, death, and exhibited that very man who was in the fetters of destruction free with open hands. The Lord died, and man rose up again; and he who fell from Paradise receives Heaven as a greater reward of obedience." This is the consistent doctrine of the Apostles, who represent the victory of Christ over sin and death, as a triumph of the Spirit over the flesh, of the divine over the merely animal element in the nature of man. St. Paul says (Rom. i. 3, 4) that Jesus Christ, "who was born of the seed of David according to his flesh (*κατὰ σάρκα*), was declared to be the Son of God with power according to the spirit of holiness by the resurrection from the dead" (*ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν*). In the same way St. Peter says (1 Peter iii. 19) that Jesus Christ "was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit." It was this successful contest with his lower nature which constituted his sinlessness. If there had been no passion, no liability to temptation in his lower nature, if, in fact, he had not been man, as we are men, there could have been no contest, and consequently there would have been no victory, and no example or encouragement for us to hope to obtain the resurrection and a similar exaltation of our nature. But it is expressly stated that he had our nature with its liability to sin and its subjection to the condemnation of the law. St. Paul says (Gal. iv. 4): "When the fulness of time had come, God sent forth his Son born of a woman, and so born under the law, in order that he might redeem those who were under the law." Again he says more fully (Rom. viii. 2, 4): "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has liberated me from the law of sin and death; for when the law was incompetent from its carnal weakness (*ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός*), God by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*), and as a sacrifice for sin, condemned the sin in the flesh, in order that the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us who walk not according to the flesh but according to the spirit." In this assumption of our flesh, with its liability to sin, which made it obnoxious to the law, consisted the reconciliation or atonement between the human and divine, which was the result of the self-sacrifice of Jesus. God "reconciled us to him-

self through Christ," because "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor. v. 18, 19). "He made him, who—in his divine nature—had not known sin, to be sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in him" (*ibid*, v. 21). For although "Christ did no sin," he "carried up our sins in his body to the cross, in order that we being free from sin might live in righteousness and be healed by the blow inflicted on him" (1 Peter, ii. 22, 24). In this way he stripped off from himself the powers of sin and darkness, the natural sinfulness and mortality of human flesh, and triumphed over it on his cross (Col. ii. 15); and it was only by his sufferings that he was made perfect (Hebr. ii. 10). Until this triumph was effected, and his human nature thereby transformed and exalted (Phil. ii. 20), he was in all respects like his brother men (Hebr. ii. 17, 18), and was able to sympathise with our weakness, because, although actually sinless, he was tempted in all respects as we are (Hebr. iv. 15). Nor does St. Paul hesitate to make a direct contrast between the original fall of man and the triumph and exaltation of Christ; and from this contrast to derive the great duty of imitating Christ, to which St. Peter also refers (1 Peter, ii. 21). He says (Phil. ii. 5 *sqq.*): "Endeavour to imitate the temper and spirit of our blessed Lord, who, although he was from the first (ὑπάρχων) in the form of God, nevertheless did not think that the being equal with God was an object of eager desire (ἁρπαγμόν); but, on the contrary, emptied himself of his attributes, and became not only a man but a slave, and even submitted to the slavish death of crucifixion." It is easy to recognise in these words a reference to the account of the Fall of Man as given in the Book of Genesis. The inducement to transgress, to which our first parents yielded, is there represented not only as fruit hanging on a tree, an ἁρπαγμός, a thing worth catching at, a prize to be eagerly sought after, an object of longing to the eyes, and "to be desired to make one wise" (Gen. iii. 6); but also as calculated to make those who partook of it to be "as God, knowing good and evil" (iii. 5). The first man then, being made in the image of God, did think it a matter worth catching at "to be equal with God"; and, in consequence of this precipitate attempt at self-exaltation, was deprived of his privileges and banished from the presence of God. The Redeemer, on the other hand, being from the first (ὑπάρχων) in the form and substance and nature of God, being the bright-

ness of his glory and the express image of his person (Hebr. i. 3), did not snatch at superhuman immunity from obedience and suffering, but, divesting himself of his divine privileges, obtained for his human nature a perpetual exaltation to the highest place in heaven.

But by far the most important and distinct of all the passages in which St. Paul states his view of the double nature of Christ, and of his relation to the double nature of man, is that in the Epistle to the Colossians, which was much better understood by the early Fathers of the Church than it has been even by the most learned of modern commentators. And it will ever be a subject of just pride and rejoicing to the author of these pages that he has been permitted to revive the true interpretation of a passage which leads of itself to the overthrow of the most fatal of conventional errors in regard to the person and office of our Saviour.[1]

A general interpretation of the passage is given in the text. We shall here vindicate our exegesis by a more detailed examination of the original Greek, and shall take this opportunity of exposing some of the dishonest subterfuges by which an attempt has been made to bolster up the authorized mistranslation of St. Paul's words.

It would carry us too far from our immediate object if we

[1] Although all the German expositors have failed to discover the true signification of this passage, we have learned, since writing the above, that one of them has at all events avoided the obvious error respecting the voice of ἀπεκδυσάμενος. In his book entitled "der Schriftbeweis," vol. i. p. 305, Dr. Hofmann of Erlangen writes as follows:—"That here not Christ, but, as in the previous sentences, God is the subject, is now the universal opinion—Baur only excepted. Just as universally are people agreed in contenting themselves with the assurance that the middle ἀπεκδύεσθαι may be used with an accusative of the person in the sense 'to strip off or despoil.' That this is false, and that ἀπεκδύεσθαι here bears the same meaning as in iii. 9, or as ἀπέκδυσις in ii. 11, needs only to be suggested; it needs no proof." But although Dr. Hofmann thus clearly perceives the meaning of the participle, he is led by the German notion, that God is the subject, into a most fantastic explanation of the context. He says—"God has put off from himself the powers, which ruled in the heathen world, which hung round him like a covering, and concealed him from the heathen. By showing Himself to the heathen in unveiled brightness, He exhibited in open triumph, before the eyes of all, those powers of heathendom, which could no longer withdraw Him from their eyes, in their true character, as gods who are yet no gods, who therefore could not withstand Him, but must yield to him the field of battle." As we have shown in the text that the nominative in agreement with ἀπεκδυσάμενος is not θεός, but Χριστός, we will not waste a word in refuting this fantastic interpretation.

inquired how far St. Paul's conceptions were effected by the phraseology which he had learned in the school of Gamaliel, and how far that Rabbi, like the other Jewish teachers, had adopted the Babylonian and Persian dualism, which during and after the Exile exerted no little influence on Hebrew literature. It will be sufficient, in examining the passages in the Epistle to the Colossians, to investigate the meaning of the Greek words, illustrated as they are by the context of the Epistle, and by the interpretations of the oldest commentators.

St. Paul's views respecting the pre-existence of the Son of God, and his relation to the double nature of man (Col. i. 12—23; ii. 9—15), are in strict accordance with St. John's statement respecting the *Logos* (i. 1—5; 8—14; 16—18). Both Apostles have adopted the phraseology, which speaks of the opposing realms of light and darkness, and which, in the hands of the Manichæans, connected itself with a most pernicious dualism. It is clear, however, that with these early teachers of Christianity, no dualism is implied in the phraseology, beyond that opposition of spirit to matter which we have already discussed. The doctrine, which they inculcate, is simply this: The Father, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen or can see, has become appreciable, in the creation of this universe, and in all his dealings with it, through or by means of his only begotten Son. In this personal manifestation, he existed before all time, and so contained within himself, *potentially*, all that subsequently came into being. The Son, therefore is not only the image or representative of the invisible God (*εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, Col. i. 15), but also the prelude of all creation (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*);[1] *in*

[1] It is to be observed that, although the word *πρωτότοκος* or *πρωτοτόκος* occurs in the classical writers, its usage by St. Paul in Col. i. 15, 18, differs not only from the classical but even from that in other passages of the New Testament. George Choeroboscus (*Epimerismi in Psalmos*, page 167, ed. Gaisford), has rightly said: *τί διαφέρει πρωτότοκος καὶ πρωτοτόκος; πρωτότοκος μὲν γάρ ἐστι ὁ πρῶτος γεννηθείς· πρωτοτόκος δὲ ἡ πρώτη γεννήσασα.* The first of these senses it bears in all the other passages in the New Testament, and in Anthol. Pal. ix. 213: the second in the classical authors, *e.g.* in Hom. Il. xvii. 5; Plat. Theætet, p. 151 c.; Theocr. v. 27. But in the Colossians it must mean "born before all the creation," for the Word was the instrument of creation; and "raised before all from the dead." We have an analogy for this in the adjective *πρωτόπλους*, "going to sea before all other ships" (*i.e.* the Argo), Eurip. Andr. 865; *πρωτοπόρος*, "going before the rest of the army"; *πρωτόῤῥυτος*, "flowing first," etc.

him, as the statue is in the marble (Aristot. Metaphys. viii. 6), all creation existed, *potentially* (v. 16); *through* him, as the instrument (δι' αὐτοῦ), and *for* him, as the object (εἰς αὐτόν), all things were made (*ib.*); and he is the antecedent and founder of all things (v. 17). Thus much for his pre-existence and agency in the creation of the world (*cf.* John i. 3, 10, 18; v. 37; vi. 46; xiv. 8, 9. Heb. i. 9. Philo i. p. 162). In the same way, it is stated that, in his incarnation, he was the head of his body, the Church, the exemplar of bodily resurrection (πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν v. 18); because the whole Godhead deigned to dwell in him in a bodily form (v. 19; *cf.* ii. 9). Consequently, he was able in himself to reconcile the divine with the human, by a self-denial, or circumcision, of the latter (v. 20, ii. 11). And all, who unite themselves with him by faith and baptism, partake of his divinity, and triumph like him over death and sin (ii. 10—15).

In this statement, we are chiefly concerned with the explanation of what Christ did after his incarnation, and what we are called upon to do in imitation of him. Not only did all the fullness (πλήρωμα) of Godhead dwell in him in a bodily form (σωματικῶς), but, having previously contained within himself the opposing powers of good and evil (*cf.* Is. xlv. 7), he was enabled, by his self-sacrifice, to cut off the influences of the flesh, as by a circumcision, virtually but not materially performed; and so to triumph over the potent lords of sin who rule in the members of man. In this way the perpetual liberation of the divine and immortal from the trammels of the merely human and perishable body was secured by him, and in him for all his true followers. In the phraseology used by the Apostle, both here and in other passages (1 Tim. i. 3, 4; iv. 1, *sq.*; vi. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 16. Tit. iii. 9. Ephes. i. 23; iii. 19), we cannot fail to recognise an allusion to the Gnostic theories, which, even in these early days, had begun to influence the Church. And in all probability, St. Paul used the language of his opponents, with a controversial reference, and not in their sense, but in one in which he thought it more correctly applicable.[1] According to

[1] It seems that St. Paul's contemporary, Simon Magus, first adopted the idea that ἀρχαὶ and ἐξουσίαι constituted an order of inferior and malignant spirits. Epiphanius (*adv. Hær.* p. 58, B.C.) says of Simon Magus: ὀνόματα δέ τινα ὁ αὐτὸς ὑποτίθεται ἀρχῶν τε καὶ ἐξουσιῶν. οὐρανοὺς δὲ διαφόρους φησὶ καθ' ἕκασ-

the Gnostics, the Father of Light, who was called the Depth (*βύθος*) from his unfathomable divinity, dwelt in the ever-illumined region, which they called Fullness (*πλήρωμα*), because he occupied it. According to St. Paul and St. John, this latter name is more appropriate to the Deity himself. For though, in the Ephesians (i. 23), the Church is called "the fullness (*πλήρωμα*) of him that filleth all in all," in other passages (Eph. iii. 19; iv. 13. John i. 16), as in that before us, this word denotes that which fills, rather than that which is filled. Similarly, the word *αἰών*, "an age or period of the life of man," which the Gnostics personified and understood to mean "eternal beings," is used by St. Paul, in the chapter before us, in its proper and classical sense; for he speaks of "the mystery which was hidden from ages (*ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων*) and from generations (*i.e.* from previous periods), but is now made manifest to the saints." We may conclude, therefore, that in speaking of the powers of light and darkness, which were personified by the Jewish teachers of his time, as they were personified afterwards by the Manichæans, and had been previously personified by the Persians and Babylonians, he throws aside the false and literal, and adopts the true and figurative sense of the expressions, according to their real value in the Greek language. It might be difficult enough to arrive at the actual opinions entertained by the Jewish contemporaries of St. Paul, to which he covertly alludes in the passage before us. But the writings, which bear the name of Dionysius the Arcopagite (Acts xvii. 34), and which probably contain the Neo-platonic mysticism of the fifth century, give an arrangement of the heavenly hierarchy, which may have been derived, more or less directly, from the Jewish schools. This author recognises three orders in the spirits of heaven, and in these assigns very arbitrary places to the four terms in St. Paul's list. First he places the thrones (*θρόνοι*), cherubim, and seraphim. Secondly, the dominions (*κυριότητες*),

τον δὲ στερέωμα καὶ οὐρανὸν δονάμεις τινὰς ὑφηγεῖται καὶ ὀνόματα βαρβαρικὰ τούτοις ἐκτίθεται. μὴ ἄλλως δὲ δύνασθαι σώζεσθαί τινα εἰ μή τι ἂν μάθοι ταύτην τὴν μυσταγωγίαν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας θυσίας τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων διὰ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐξουσιῶν προσφερειν· εἶναί τε τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦτον ἀπὸ ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐξουσιῶν φησι τῆς κακίας ἐν ἐλαττώματι κατεσκευασμένον. He adds: *καὶ οὕτως ἄρχεται τῶν Γνωστικῶν καλουμένων ἡ ἀρχή.* So that a superficial and confident divine was not justified in telling the University of Oxford that there was no Gnosticism till the reign of Hadrian.

virtues (δυνάμεις), powers (ἐξουσίαι). Thirdly, the principalities (ἀρχαί), archangels, angels (Dionys. Areop. *de hierarchia cœlesti*, c. vi. *sqq.*). It is clear, from what this author says (c. vii.), that he places the thrones in the same rank with the cherubim and seraphim, because in the Jewish Scriptures these representatives of the elements are the throne or chariot of God. And, for similar reasons derived from the name, he finds a classification for the other six species. But all these are, according to Dionysius, good or heavenly spirits. And Milton recognises a similar order in the hierarchy of hell. An examination, however, of St. Paul's language, in regard both to its primitive meaning, and to the interpretations of the glossographers, will show that he opposed the thrones and dominions, as indicating the ministers of light, to the principalities and powers, which denote the functions of darkness; and that what with the Gnostic was a real personification, was with him merely a figure of speech.

The context of verse 16 gives us a regular distribution or arrangement of the things created in the Son. They are

All things

in heaven and on the earth

visible and invisible

a. thrones *a*. principalities
b. dominions *b*. powers.

The four things mentioned in the last place are, therefore, two classes of terrene but invisible functions; that is, in the language of those whose opinions the Apostle wished to controvert, the spiritual powers which work for good in the outer world and in the heart of man, and the spiritual powers which work for evil in the elements and in our lower nature. This division of the four terms into two pairs, is not only implied in the context, but shown also (*a*) by the meaning of the words themselves; (*b*) by Phavorinus' explanation of the two former; and (*c*) by St. Paul's distinctive use of the two latter. For (*a*) θρόνος, "a throne," implies the lofty seat of a king or a god, who was a suzerain or sovereign to inferior potentates; but ἀρχή, especially in the plural, might imply delegated authority:

see Æsch. Prom. 228 *seq.*: *ὅπως τάχιστα τὸν πατρῷον ἐς θρόνον καθέζετ', εὐθὺς δαίμοσιν νέμει γέρα ἄλλοισιν ἄλλα καὶ διεστοιχίζετο ἀρχήν.* In precisely the same way, *κυριότης* denotes primary, principal, self-contained authority; but *ἐξουσία* implies permission, licence, allowance derived from some higher power. And as *κυριότης* stands higher than *δύναμις* in Ephes. i. 21, we find *ἐξουσία* described as something conferred and received (Matt. ix. 8; x. 1; xxi. 24, etc.; Mark, xiii. 34), and an inferior officer is described as being *ὑπὸ ἐξουσίαν* (Matt. viii. 9). In Ephes. ii. 2, *ἐξουσία* is subordinated even to *ἀρχή*; for we have *ὁ ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας*. According to this, the powers of good are described as acting with immediate authority, and independently; while evil is merely permitted and allowed to exercise a derived and delegated influence. And this seems to be both the true and the Scriptural view of the matter (see Luke, xxii. 53; John, xix. 11). (*b*) That the *θρόνοι* and *κυριότητες* represent the powers of good, is farther shown by the glosses of Phavorinus, who, though a modern scholar, must be considered as representing, in many cases, an old traditionary interpretation. He says: *κυριότητές εἰσι δυνάμεις ἅγιαι, λειτουργικαὶ κύριου*, "dominions are sacred powers, ministers to the Lord;" and: *θρόνοι· δυνάμεις ἅγιαι ἀχώριστοι θεοῦ*, "thrones are sacred powers insoparable from God." (*c*) And that the *ἀρχαὶ* and *ἐξουσίαι* are the spiritual powers of sin and evil appears not only from less distinct allusions, as when Satan is called *ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, "the prince of this world" (John, xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11), or *ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος*, "prince of the power of the air or darkness" (Eph. ii. 2), or when St. Paul speaks of our being "delivered from the power of darkness" (*ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ σκότους*, Col. i. 13), but specially and fully, when it is stated that Jesus "stripped off from himself, and triumphed over the principalities and powers" (Col. ii. 15), or where we are told that "our wrestling is not against blood and flesh, but against principalities and powers, that is, against the world-rulers of this life's darkness, against the spiritualities of wickedness in heavenly things" (Eph. vi. 12). This last passage explains itself in the sense of Origen (*in Matt.* xii, p. 528, De la Rue), that "every power and world-ruler of this darkness and every spirituality of wickedness

in heavenly things, is a gate of hell and a gate of death" (*ἑκάστην ἐξουσίαν καὶ κοσμοκράτορα τοῦ σκότους τούτου καὶ πνευματικὸν τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις πύλην εἶναι ᾅδου καὶ πύλην θανάτου*). In fact, St. Paul himself gives a similar limitation of meaning, by the definitions which he has appended. The *ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐξουσίαι* seem to be divided into two classes. (1) They are "the world-rulers of this life's darkness," *i.e.*, fleshly lusts and passions; for "the world" and "darkness" are two common expressions for that sin which is opposed to the armour of light; and that *ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος* refers to the conditions under which sin is possible, appears from Matt. xiii. 22; Luke xvi. 8. (2) They include "the spiritualities of wickedness in regard to heavenly or spiritual things," *i.e.* temptation to religious infidelity; for we read elsewhere of "an evil heart of unbelief" (*καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας*, Hebr. iii. 12); and while the very nature of the contest with "the prince of the power of darkness *who worketh in* (*ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν*) the children of disobedience" (Eph. ii. 2), implies that this power does not find its battle-field "in heavenly places," there are other passages which show that *τὰ ἐπουράνια* may denote "heavenly or spiritual things," and that the word is almost a synonym for *τὰ πνευματικά* (*cf.* Eph. i. 6: *ὁ εὐλογήσας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*, with John, iii. 12; *πῶς ἐὰν εἴπω ὑμῖν τὰ ἐπουράνια πιστεύσετε*; and 1 Cor. ii. 13: *πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ συγκρίνοντες*). The interpretation, which applies to Eph. vi. 12, must also explain Eph. iii. 10; and the verb *φωτίσαι* in ver. 9 shows that the *ἀήρ*, *σκότος*, "darkness," and not the region of heavenly light, was conceived as the abode of the invisible spirits respecting which St. Paul adopted the phraseology of the Gnostics, with a very different meaning.[1]

[1] Without accepting the theory of De Wette, that the Epistle to the Ephesians was not written by St. Paul, and that its language is carelessly imitated from that of the Epistle to the Colossians, we must admit that its style is by no means so precise and accurate as that of the sister composition. In i. 20, it seems very doubtful if *ἐπουρανίοις* is the right reading. Lachmann reads *ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*, which seems to us infinitely better. Hofmann (Schriftbeweis, i. pp. 401, *sqq.*) has a long discussion on *ἐπουράνιος*, which he interprets in the old superstitious manner. He remarks, however, which is an approximation to the true meaning, as we conceive it: "when St. Paul says that the evil spirits, which exercise their power in the world, so far as it is darkness, so far as it is irreligious, are in heaven, he teaches in this nothing

It is clear, then, that the principalities and powers are not only invisible powers of earth, but also that they are powers of evil, with which every Christian has to contend in the battle-field of his own heart. And we must now inquire in what sense St. Paul says that "by divesting himself of, or stripping off from himself, the principalities and powers, he made an open show of them and triumphed over them on his cross or in himself." Although it was left to the writer of these pages to discover, or rather to re-discover, the proper rendering of *ἀπεκδυσάμενος* in this text, there is not the least doubt that the participle here bears its only possible signification. The following reasons ought to be conclusive :—

(1). There is no instance of any other use of *ἐκδύω* and *ἐκδύομαι* than that according to which the active signifies, "I put or strip off from another," and the middle, "I put or strip off from myself." And *ἀπεκδύομαι*, which appears only in the middle, must mean, "I take off and put away from myself."

(2). If there had been any instance of a different use of *ἀπεκδύομαι* or even of *ἐκδύομαι*, the participle *ἀπεκδυσάμενος* must have borne its proper middle sense in this passage, because in Col. iii. 9, the only other passage where the word occurs in the New Testament, it is confessedly used with reference to putting off from ourselves the old man; because in this very chapter (v. 11) we have the phrase *ἐν ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*; and because the analogous use of *ἀπόθεσις* and *ἀποτίθεμαι* leads inevitably to the same conclusion (*cf.* 1 Peter, iii. 21; 2 Peter, i. 14; Rom. xiii. 12; Eph. iv. 22—25; Col. iii. 8; James, i. 21; 1 Peter, ii. 1).

As far as the interpretation of the Greek words is concerned, these considerations are sufficient to settle the point, and we had acquiesced in the conclusion that this was the Apostle's meaning long before we were called upon to defend this interpretation from a charge of novelty. We then found that the oldest version —the Syriac—and the most learned of the Fathers, either supplied

new or strange; nor does he refer to any strange popular conception, but merely asserts that they are spirits, and all that is included in that term. So long as the evil spirits remain active in the terrestrial world, so long they also remain in heaven, not confined to this or that locality of the terrestrial world, but overruling it, as the heaven surrounds the earth." If the being *ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις* merely means that the *πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας* are *πνεύματα*, we do not get beyond the idea suggested in the text, though we attribute to St. Paul the Gnostic belief, which he rejected.

τὴν σάρκα, as the immediate object of *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, or, without this supplement, rendered the word in its proper sense. The Syriac version has: "et per exspoliationem" (ܘܒܫܠܚ) "corporis sui" vel "carnis" (ܦܓܪܗ), "diffamavit" (ܦܪܣܝ) "principatus et potestates et confudit eos palam in semetipso." Here *τὴν σάρκα*, which is found in one or two of the MSS., is inserted to explain the nature of the clothing which Christ put off by his death on the cross; and the same reading has been adopted by some of the Fathers. Thus Hilarius Pictaviensis translates the passage as follows: "spoiling himself of the flesh, he led in procession or exhibited openly the principalities and powers, triumphing over them in himself" (de Trinitate, ix. p. 265, x. p. 355). Similarly, Augustine: "What is the meaning of the circumcision of the flesh? what but the putting off that mortality which we carry as the result of our fleshly generation? On this account the Apostle says: 'putting off from himself the flesh, he made an example of principalities and powers, confidently triumphing over them in himself'" (contra Faustum, lib. xvi. p. 362, tom. x. ed. Benedict). Origen brings out the intended meaning still more strongly, by defining the principalities and powers as *in us* (*ἐν ἡμῖν*). "Who is this," he asks, "but Jesus Christ, by whose stripes we, who believe in him, were healed, because he put off from himself the principalities and powers which are in us, and made an example of them on his cross?" (contra Celsum, i. p. 55, i. p. 370, ed. De la Rue: *τίς δ' οὗτος εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός; οὗ τῷ μώλωπι ἰάθημεν οἱ εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύοντες, ἀπεκδυσαμένου τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ παραδειγματίσαντος αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ*). From this it is perfectly clear that the enemies called principalities and powers, whom Christ stripped off from himself by his death on the cross, and with whom every Christian has to contend, are the incidents of our carnal or animal nature, "the pleasures that war (*στρατευομένων*) in our members" (James, iv. 1), "the fleshly lusts that war (*στρατεύονται*) against the soul" (1 Peter, ii. 11); and in accordance with this, Clemens Alexandrinus has well said, that "the contest, involving all kinds of weapons, is not against blood and flesh, but against the spiritual powers of innate passions working by and through our members" (Strom. vii. p. 839, Potter: *τὸ παγκράτιον τὸ πάμμαχον οὐ πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ τὰς διὰ σαρκῶν*

ἐνεργούσας πνευματικὰς ἐξουσίας ἐμπαθῶν [*lege* ἐμφύτων] παθῶν; where the word ἐνεργούσας refers to the important text, Eph. ii. 2: τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ νῦν ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας). As the statement that Jesus divested himself of the clogs of mortal passions, by an act which is called his moral or metaphorical circumcision, implies only a triumph over that which was contained in the flesh of every man, it is manifest that no separable personality is attributed to the principalities and powers, which were thus stripped off and cast away. Nor can any such inference be drawn from the fact that St. Paul refers to the conquered principalities and powers by αὐτούς, instead of the more grammatical αὐτάς, which is introduced by Origen. This is merely a confusion of metaphor, which is common enough. The principalities and powers are regarded as enemies, who have pitched their camp in the flesh, and are also put off, like a garment, with the flesh wherein they are contained. So that αὐτοὺς refers to the transparent personification included in the other metaphor, just as the neuter plural βλαβέντα, in Æsch. Agam. 119, refers to the mother and child included in the feminine singular: λαγίναν ἐρικύμονα φέρματι γένναν. We have a similar mixture of metaphors in 2 Cor. v. 4, where the fleshly tabernacle oscillates between a house and a garment. At any rate, it is quite clear that we cannot really suppose that the principalities and powers were personalities like those which figure in Milton; otherwise we must come to the monstrous and horrible doctrine that Jesus had not only "a devil," as the Jews asserted, but a whole legion of them!

If this interpretation of Col. ii. 15, required any additional support, it would find this in the folly and recklessness of the attempts which have been made to maintain the common rendering. For when the advocate, who is so zealous for his cause that he does not scruple to set at nought all the rules of veracity and honesty, cannot produce an argument which is even plausible, it may well be inferred that the cause is hopeless. Nor can any favourable inference be drawn from the ignorance and want of ability displayed by the maintainers of the old interpretation, as if some better results might have been obtained by more competent reasoners; for the silence of all good scholars is in itself an admission of the untenableness of the ordinary view.

Since the assertion of the simple and obvious proposition that ἀπεκδυσάμενος must bear the same meaning, and that the only possible one, in two contiguous chapters of the same short Epistle, there have been three formal attempts to bolster up at any price the erroneous rendering in the former of these passages. The first attempt was made in 1855 by the Rev. John James Stewart Perowne, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in Hebrew and Divinity in King's College, London, in a pamphlet, which was adequately disposed of at the time both on this point and others. It will be sufficient to mention here that his defence of the old version confines itself to the assertion that "ἀπεκδυσάμενος may very well be rendered having stripped, spoiled, disarmed for himself (*i.e.* for his own glory) the powers of evil." Now he has not attempted to produce from the whole range of Greek authors any one passage in which ἀπεκδύομαι or even ἐκδύομαι bears this signification; and putting out of view the peculiar force of the double compound,[1] there are many passages in which stripping another for our own honour or advantage would have been expressed by ἐκδύομαι rather than ἐκδύω, if it did or could bear this sense; for instance, in Luke x. 30, the thieves certainly stripped the poor traveller for their own advantage, and yet we have ἐκδύσαντες αὐτόν. But even if our opponent could have done this, which he was bound above all things to do and has necessarily not attempted, he could not alter the true interpretation of ἀπεκδυσάμενος, used twice, and twice only, in immediate connexion with a certain ἀπέκδυσις. Besides, it is false doctrine to say that Jesus stripped the principalities and powers for his own glory. He suffered on the cross not for himself, but on behalf of others, *i.e.* mankind in general (see 1 Peter, ii. 21, iii. 18, iv. 1; 1 John, iii. 16); and instead of doing all for his own glory, his especial claim to exaltation was that he humbled himself (Phil. ii. 8); for he sought not his own will (John, v. 30, vi, 38); but, on the contrary, his whole career was an abnegation of selfishness, as indeed this very passage tells us.

The second attempt was made by an anonymous writer in the

[1] We have it in one other passage, Josephus, *Antiq.* vi. 14, 2: ἀπεκδὺς τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐσθῆτα, "having divested himself of his royal habiliments." For the distinction between ἀποδύω and ἐκδύω, see Lysias, *accus. Theomn.*, § 10: φάσκων ἱμάτιον ἀποδεδύσθαι ἢ τὸν χιτωνίσκον ἐκδεδύσθαι.

Record of July 6th, 1855, who undertook to bestride the first champion of error, after he had been disgraced and overthrown. And, truly, the two men were worthy coadjutors, worthy advocates of a cause which thrives by means of falsehood acting on ignorance. The line of argument adopted by the writer in the *Record* is a good specimen of the style of writing which imposes on "the religious world." He begins with the insolent declaration that "it does not require profound learning to show that this great discovery (*i.e.* that of the true rendering of *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*) is nothing better than a gross and ridiculous blunder." The first argument to show that it is "a gross and ridiculous blunder" to render the participle in Col. ii. 15, in the same way as all, including the Recordite, agree that it must be translated in Col. iii. 9, is this: that "it is quite certain that the middle of the kindred verbs *ἐκδύομαι* and *ἐνδύομαι* are used in the New Testament in a passive sense, as Luke, xxiv. 49; 2 Cor. v. 2—5. For it is plain that the Apostles were passive in receiving the miraculous gifts on the day of Pentecost, and that the dead bodies of Christians do not raise themselves." And from this it is argued that since the middle voice is used in a passive sense, we should allow that it here receives an active meaning! A notable argument! which will be appreciated by all school-boys, who know that the passive and middle actually concur in all tenses except the aorist, whereas the deponent verb, in which we have passive or middle inflexions with an active signification, has no active form or passive meaning. It would be absurd therefore to maintain that because a *middle* verb means both "I clothe myself" and "I am clothed," which in result are the same, it might also mean "I clothe another man." But in point of fact the verbs are middle and not passive in signification, even in the passages quoted; for the parable of the wedding-garment refers to the practice of the Jews, according to which that necessary robe, prefiguring the graces of the Spirit, was presented to the guests, who were liable to expulsion if they neglected to put it on; and St. Paul's metaphor about the house and the garment would have little meaning if it implied that we were violently thrust into the one and forcibly endowed with the other.

It would have been well, however, if the Recordite had contented himself with the self-evident folly of asserting that be-

cause clothing yourself and being clothed is much the same thing, it is also a matter of indifference whether a verb, which means "I take off my own clothes," should also be rendered "I strip another person of his vestments." With perhaps a conviction of the absurdity of this supposition, and despairing of victory by any fair means, this champion of the truth has had recourse to the worst form of falsehood—that of compelling a book to bear false witness. The example is so striking, as indicating the degraded morality—that "truly deplorable dulness of moral perception"—which characterizes the Recordites, that the whole passage must be quoted at length. "If Dr. Donaldson, from his height of Greek learning, would condescend to turn back to Matthiæ, sec. 492, he will read as follows: 'The peculiar signification of the middle is the reflective, where the action returns upon the subject of it. *More frequently*, however, the subject of the action is the *remote* object of it, with reference to which it takes place; so that the middle is equivalent to the active, with the dative of the reflective pronoun. Thus ἀφαιρεῖν, to take any thing from another, ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, to take any thing from another for one's self, to retain, to use it.' All this loud outcry, then, against Mr. Perowne, our translators, and all other critics, for not being able to distinguish the middle from the active voice of a Greek verb, resolves itself into the Doctor's oblivion of the most frequent use of the middle voice itself. The words of the Apostle, by the most exact laws of the Greek language, will bear *that precise meaning* which the whole scope of the passage requires. Having, for his own sake (or with a view to his own triumph), stripped naked principalities and powers, he made them a public spectacle, triumphing over them in it."

Now the obvious intention of this citation from Matthiæ was to gain a victory by appealing to a well-known grammatical authority. It was hoped that the supporters of the *Record*, those conscientious bibliolaters who delight in slander and libel, would probably not understand the drift of the passage quoted; or, at any rate, would not take the trouble of referring to the book itself. Those, who do so, will not fail to see that Matthiæ is speaking of the very distinction on which we insist: and that the next example but one to that at which the Recordite stops is ἐνδύειν, "to put anything on another," opposed to ἐνδύεσθαι

"to put anything on oneself"!! With this example close at hand, it is idle to say that the Recordite did not understand Matthiæ's meaning. Accordingly, when he quoted this passage to show that the meaning claimed for *ἀπεκδύομαι* was not in accordance with the views of Matthiæ, who particularly referred to that meaning, and when he did this to bring discredit on the scholarship of an opponent, the Recordite was guilty of the most barefaced and deliberate falsification. The forgery of a deed to destroy a man's title to his estate may be more criminal, but it is not more dishonest in itself, than this act of a man, who is probably a shining light of the Low Church party. The poet considers the detractor, who filches a man's good name, as a worse robber than the common thief who steals one's purse. Now here was an attempt to show that a professed scholar and grammarian had been guilty of "a gross and ridiculous blunder" in his own department; that he was ignorant of a fact mentioned in the commonest manuals of Greek grammar. And as far as the writer succeeded in deceiving his readers, it was a robbery of reputation. It was, in fact, just like poor Mr. Perowne's assertion that the same writer was unacquainted with an elementary principle of Hebrew scholarship, which, it turned out, was twice stated in the little Hebrew Grammar on which that misguided individual founded his ridiculous allegation. The only difference is that the latter falsehood brought upon its author immediate exposure and humiliation, whereas the anonymous Recordite is personally safe behind his mask, and has only added to the general discredit of a journal, which has no character to lose, and supplied a fresh proof of the fact, that Bibliolatry, which begins by teaching men to believe a lie, ends by preventing them from seeing the immorality of disingenuousness.

The third attempt to maintain the belief that St. Paul, having twice and twice only used the participle *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, and that, too, in consecutive chapters of the same short epistle, employed it first *without* and then *with* a knowledge of the language in which he was writing, has been made by the Rev. Dr. Rigaud, Master of Ipswich Grammar School, in a note to a sermon preached before the University of Oxford, which will be noticed in its proper place. Dr. Rigaud has wisely avoided compromising himself with any definite opinion respecting the meaning of the participle; but, although he is a Doctor in

Divinity, he has not scrupled to tell us, as an obvious fact, that the putting off the principalities and powers, together with the other circumstances of the crucifixion, are predicated by St. Paul of God the Father!! As this might seem incredible without ocular demonstration, we subjoin the whole note (Two Sermons, p. 68): "Dr. Donaldson has relied much in one part of his argument, and in his reply to Mr. Perowne, upon the force of the participle *ἀπεκδυσάμενος* in Col. ii. 15. The simplest reply to all which he has said consists in the fact noticed to me by a friend, that this participle agrees with the nominative to *συνεζωοποίησεν* in v. 15; *i.e.* God the Father, not the Son. The English is ambiguous, but the Greek is not." This wonderful discovery, which Dr. Rigaud accepts as soon as it is offered to him, is to be found, where it ought to be, in an English Unitarian version of the New Testament, and in all the commentaries of modern German expositors, with the single exception of Baur.[1]

There are two different classes of heterodox theologians. One consists of those, who have studied theology, who unhappily cannot agree with the formularies of the Church, who perceive their disagreement, and conscientiously avow it. The other class consists of those, who profess orthodoxy, and are anxious to persecute all who do not come up to their own imaginary standard; but who, having no theological knowledge, get out of their depth as soon as they engage in a biblical argument, and betray at once their ignorance and their unsoundness. Dr. Rigaud belongs to this latter class of heterodox divines; for according to the interpretation, which he has so rashly accepted, he is a Sabellian and Patripassian of the deepest dye. Making the change, which he adopts, and supposing that he translates *ἀπεκδυσάμενος* in the usual way—though we cannot see how a change in the nominative can affect the voice of a verb, and so be "the simplest reply" to the proposal to construe the verb properly—the following doctrine will result: "God the Father blotted out the handwriting of ordinances, that was against us, and raised it aloft nailing it to his cross; and spoiling principalities and powers, he triumphed over them on his cross, or in himself." So that God the Father was crucified, as the Sabellians maintain! We congratulate the University of

[1] "Paulus d. Ap. Jesu Chr.," p. 152.

Oxford on the possession of such a divine; and the Vice-Chancellor, on his approbation of such a preacher. But even if Dr. Rigaud had no fear of creeds before his eyes, he was bound, as a professed teacher of the classical languages, to attend to those simple rules of grammar, which German theologians may be permitted to neglect, but which all competent schoolmasters inculcate on their pupils in this country. And these simple rules would have told him that there can be no nominative to *συνεζωοποίησεν* in ver. 13, except the antecedent to ὃς in v. 10, *ἐν ᾧ* in v. 11, and *ἐν ᾧ* in v. 12, *i.e.* *Χριστός*. We entertain the impression that St. Paul was well acquainted with Greek, and that he was no more likely to take his nominative case from an incidental genitive like *τοῦ θεοῦ* in v. 12, than he was to misapply a participle like *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*. But waiving the monstrous absurdity of predicating this last word, in its proper sense, of God the Father, the context is sufficient to show that Christ alone is intended. It is true that in Ephes. ii. 5, we have the phrase *ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς συνεζωοποίησε τῷ Χριστῷ*, but this does not prove that the same writer could not say *ὁ Χριστὸς συνεζωοποίησεν ὑμᾶς σὺν αὐτῷ*, where the repeated *σὺν* has its special force; and that he does mean this is clear, independently of the *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, from the facts (1) that immediately after *ζυνεζωοποίησεν* in this passage, he says of the subject of the sentence, *χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ παραπτώματα*, for this was what Christ did, as he says in the next chapter (iii. 13): *καθὼς καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐχαρίσατο ὑμῖν*; (2) that he says of the subject of the sentence, *ἐξαλείψας τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν* (*cf.* Acts iv. 19); and this again was a function of Christ, of whom he says in Ephes. ii. 15: *τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ, τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν καταργήσας*; (3) that he says: *αὐτὸ ἦρκεν* (or *ἦρεν*) *ἐκ τοῦ μέσου προσηλώσας αὐτὸ τῷ σταυρῷ* — for, having come *ἵνα τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἄρῃ* (1 John, iii. 5), and having been lifted up like the serpent in the wilderness (John, iii. 14; *cf.* 1 Cor. v. 2), Jesus took away our judgment with him, and nailed it to the cross on which he was himself sacrificed.

The failure of these reckless attempts to defend the common version is an additional proof of its hopeless error, and the meaning, which we have thus vindicated for St. Paul's most explicit

declarations on the subject, gives a full and ultimate development to the proposition which we have endeavoured to illustrate. We see that both philosophy and revelation agree in the conclusions that man is really a microcosm or union of spiritual and material life; not in the Manichæan sense,[1] as though he were a mixture of light and darkness, created by the powers of evil in imitation of the brighter beings, like the man of Prometheus or Frankenstein,—a sort of prison-house for the soul; but because he is really the apex of creation, a material and animal body, which the one Supreme Being, the good and wise God, the only Creator, has thought fit to endow with his own inbreathed Spirit. We see that it is thus the duty of all reasonable beings to subordinate the flesh to the Spirit, not on account of any fantastic dualism, which opposes light to darkness, and life to matter, but because there is in man a real opposition between a higher and a lower, a spiritual and a carnal, an immortal and a perishable nature. And this being so, we see the full force of the Apostle's statement, that, when the Father manifested himself in his Son, or assumed personal relations in regard to the world in which we live, and which He created through the Son, an exemplar or anticipation of all created nature was thus produced, and that, instead of any dualism, like that which Simon Magus imagined and Manes developed, all powers and faculties, the active and primary, and the derived and permissive, were included in this one beginning, and God was all in all.[2]

[1] The speculations of the Manichæans in general will form the subject of the next Appendix. Their views with regard to the nature of man are thus summed up by Baur ("das Manichäische Religionssystem," p. 131):

1. The soul of the world diffused through matter is concentrated in man.
2. The body of man must be regarded as merely a prison, which, by means of sexual generation, is continually tightening the bonds of matter, and so increasing the captivity of the soul.
3. Man is a creation of the Prince of Darkness, but there is in him, as in a microcosm, a reflection of the whole universe.

[2] Since this Appendix was written, we have seen a little book in which a similar view of the question is maintained in a popular and rather superficial style: its title is "An Inquiry concerning the Principles in the Constitution of Human Nature, which are the Causes of Moral Evil." By a Layman. London: Rivington, 1856.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRUE DEFENCE OF THE FAITH.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAWS AND OBJECTS OF A TRUE DEFENCE OF THE FAITH.

When we maintain, on the positive and consistent authority of Scripture, and therefore without any fear of contradiction from those who regard this authority as paramount, that Christian Faith, whether we regard it as nurtured in the soul of the believer or as propagated by the conversion of others, must depend on the conduct of the professor, on his obedience to the law of the Gospel, on his personal righteousness and spiritual wisdom—in a word, on his power of subordinating the flesh to the spirit, the lower to the higher nature of man,—when we maintain this, we speak of the faith as it originally was, as it was understood and intended by the first preachers of our religion, long before its brightness was clouded by the mists of human folly and selfishness. But a defence of the faith now-a-days implies a maintenance of special opinions respecting Christianity, opinions which have grown up and formed a sort of incrustation of rust around the simple and sincere Word of God. The title, which is still borne by the Sovereign of England—that of "Defender of the Faith"—is traced back to the time when Henry VIII. entered the lists against Luther in support of some of the worst errors of Romanism. And this title, or some equivalent designation, is

from time to time conferred by the party-men of religion, the heretics of some age or country, on those who most strenuously and unscrupulously uphold their own peculiar dogmatism, whereas all opponents are stigmatized as unbelievers, as adversaries and impugners of the faith. Much as we may regret and deprecate this state of things, it naturally flows from the conditions of our being and our subordination to the intuitions of space and time. All truth is viewed by man through the coloured medium of his own temporary or local prepossessions. A set of opinions is formed, and soon usurps the place of the principles in which they originated. And these opinions are liable to be preserved by artificial means beyond the natural period of their existence, until a change of atmosphere supervenes, and the mummy crumbles into dust. Christianity, though designed for all countries and all ages, contracts, in a particular age and in a particular country, some corresponding peculiarities. Systems of theology, ritual, and church government are gradually formed, and men think that in contending for these they are fighting the battle of the Lord, and defending the faith as it is in Christ Jesus. The same is the case in regard to the political opinions and the political institutions of men. And it is found that, in religion as well as politics, the machine requires to be adapted from time to time to the atmosphere in which it moves; in other words, the vital and inherent principles, for which we contend, must from time to time be divested of the unessential appendages, by which they are enveloped and encumbered. Accordingly, the true conservative and the true defender of the faith, he who really wishes to maintain what is tenable and essential in existing systems of government and theology, must be prepared from time to time to relinquish what he feels or finds to be untenable and unessential. Otherwise, he becomes, whether consciously or not, a destructive rather than a conservative;

and delivers into the hands of the enemy the cause which he undertakes to defend and the principles which he wishes to assert.

In order to the more satisfactory establishment of this view, it will be desirable to inquire what conservatism really is. We may say that the word, like the thing which it designates, is not only of English growth, but still confined to its native soil. His insular position, combined with those features of the Teutonic character which he has in common with his brethren on the continent, makes the Englishman constitutionally averse to all sudden changes, but especially to those changes which are due to the importation of foreign ideas. The political and ecclesiastical history of our country is one continued proof of the adhesiveness with which we cling to every old practice, to every time-honoured institution, which we are not forced, by the pressure of circumstances or by the spirit of the age, to abandon as untenable. There can be little doubt that this insular idiosyncrasy, as it has been termed, is connected with that pride in our country, and that regard for our own peculiar form of government, which is the foundation of the noblest emotions of patriotism and loyalty. M. Capefigue remarked some years ago: "l'esprit Torysme anglais est essentiellement patriotique;" M. de Montalembert has recently defined the same principle as "l'esprit de conservation, qui est le plus précieux apanage de la race anglaise.[1] And there can be no reason for denying that an enthusiastic regard for that which we term "our glorious Constitution in Church and State" springs

[1] In another passage, M. de Montalembert observes: "*L'esprit conservateur* qui a toujours distingué les universités anglaises est uniquement le fruit spontané de l'indépendance et de la conviction. Elles sont en cela, comme en tout, l'image de la société anglaise et de son aristocratie, libre, fière, mais ordonnée, d'autant plus respectueuse envers l'autorité, qu'elle en est plus indépendante, toujours ouverte au mérite, *toujours prête aux progrès utiles, aux réformes nécessaires*, mais solidement assise sur la tradition et sur le droit individuel."

from a spirit of grateful recognition, which has enabled us to preserve many of the blessings of which we boast. When firmly-established dynasties were falling to pieces on the continent in the spring of 1848, and when those, whose hearts were set upon disorder, thought that the favourable moment for their operations had at length arrived, we saw how entirely the spirit of conservatism predominated in this country; and the 10th of April will long remain a day remarkable in our annals for the bloodless triumph of legality and existing rights.

But while we have clung tenaciously to all that is good in the laws under which we live, the spirit of commerce and freedom has not permitted us to surround ourselves with a Chinese wall of exclusiveness, and to shut our ears to the voice which proclaims from time to time, that the age demands a revision of our code, and that we cannot retain our fixed position without suitable modifications and improvements. And so from time to time we have re-adjusted the machine, and accommodated it to the atmosphere in which it has to move; and thus by gradual and progressive reforms we have in most cases avoided the abrupt and dangerous innovations, which pave the way for revolutions. Whenever we have failed to do this, we have proved by the exceptional results the wisdom of our usual procedure; and we have found that the violence of the reaction has been directly proportional to the obstinacy of the disease, which, refusing the gentler remedies of reform, invoked the sterner treatment of revolution. Then, again, the extravagance of the cure has induced the opposite disorder—

> Dumque nimis jam *putris membra recidit*,
> Excessit medicina modum, nimiumque secuta est,
> Qua morbi duxere, manus: [1]

and a counter-revolution has restored the previous state of things, with new calls for alteration. The resistance, which

[1] Lucan, *Phars.* ii. 141

kingly prerogative opposed to the just demands of the people in the 17th century, caused the overthrow of Church and State; and the tyranny of the victorious Republicans brought back the abuses of royalty, which had to be again cast off with rude vigour and boisterous effort. In our own time, the Duke of Wellington's refusal to concede a gradual reform of Parliamentary representation brought about a more startling interruption to our conservative tendencies. And we may truly say that the 10th of April, 1848, would have been a day less honourable to our patriotic unanimity, if it had found us with a narrow and inconsistent franchise, with a tax on the importation of corn, and with our penal laws still unmodified by a spirit of wise and liberal toleration.

The existence of the Church of England may be attributed to the same cautious and conservative method of reformation to which we owe our political constitution. But the Church has not continued to act on this principle, otherwise we should not now be surrounded, as we are, by clamorous crowds of Nonconformists. At first we find that our Reformers endeavoured to keep as closely as possible to the outward observances of Church ritual and Church government, which the spirit of the age, aroused and stimulated by the religious movement in Germany, had compelled them to re-adjust and modify. And herein they acted wisely; for we cannot reform religion without some shock to long-cherished associations, and every precaution should be taken in order to prevent the amputation of the morbid excrescences from proving fatal to the patient, whose religious circulation is implicated in that of the tumour. In a word, the excision must be gradual. But while it is unsafe to make sweeping innovations in religion,—for this might overthrow the little faith of the many who cannot discriminate between the value of that which is retained and the worthlessness of that which is cast off, this very confession of an im-

perfect reform presumes that the process will be repeated until the whole of the necessary changes are fully effected. As a second edition of our Articles was published some ten years after the first, as the second was briefer and more comprehensive than its predecessor, and as it contained passages referring to its provisionary and temporary character, it might have been expected that the good work would go on, as the occasion served, and that the basis of the Church would be gradually widened until it was purged of all dogmas and practices to which Protestants could reasonably object. Unfortunately, some of the forms retained by the Church of England were only too well suited to the arbitrary character of the Tudors and the Stuarts, and too well adapted to countenance the sacerdotal pretensions of the prelates who then ruled the Church. Although the foolish intolerance of Laud had contributed to the overthrow of king and priests in the Great Rebellion, his successors at the Restoration had learned but little wisdom from his example and its consequences. The Act of Conformity was the result of the triumph of Priestcraft over Protestantism; and we are still suffering from the evils which it brought upon the cause of pure religion in this country. It is true that the wide basis of the Articles was still retained, and that the wise and liberal Tillotson, who succeeded Sancroft at the Revolution, would have been glad to accommodate the Prayer Book to the larger Protestantism of the formularies by which it is sanctioned. It is true that other enlightened Archbishops have openly maintained the latitudinarian and comprehensive interpretation of our Liturgy. It is true that the Bangorian controversy overthrew the priestly power of the Convocation; and that many attempts to narrow the dogmatism of the Church have been signally defeated. Still the Prayer Book and its Rubrics furnish materials for a renewal of the follies of Laud; and the time is come when the Church of England must imitate the true conservative principles of the

English commonwealth, and maintain what is worth maintaining by a concession of reforms, which are felt to be so imperatively demanded by the spirit of the age, and so urgently recommended by the advances of Popery and the requirements of improved scholarship. The reforms which seem to be desirable are (1) an abridgement of the Prayer Book; (2) a new edition of the Articles; (3) a corrected version of the Bible.

(1) It would be easy to point out the curtailments of the Prayer Book[1] which are necessary to effect the removal of Romanistic suggestions, or to obviate inferences at variance with the results of a higher exegesis and criticism. No additions would be needed; and a few verbal alterations would enable us to retain many a beautiful prayer which is felt to be objectionable on account of certain particular expressions. It might even be left to the minister and his vestry, with or without the sanction of the Bishop or Archdeacon, to abridge, at least, the services of the Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury does this in his own chapel at Lambeth, and the Episcopal ministers in Scotland, at least in Edinburgh, have been known to dispense with the Athanasian Creed, and, we believe, other parts also of the Prayer Book, when their congregations have required the omission. Indeed, it is difficult for a reasonable man to understand the superstitious reverence, which would retain at all

[1] We have not seen the details of the plan proposed by the Rev. James Hildyard. A sensible writer in a weekly newspaper has made the following suggestions bearing generally on the questions discussed in the text. He proposes—"1. To interest the laity in the efficiency of the Church, by substituting for the present Convocation, which, as now constituted, is an absurdity, a synod in which they would be fairly represented; 2. To shorten and vary the services, so as to lead the people to feel their value more deeply, and to make the churches continually available for their religious improvement; 3. To remove such stumbling-blocks as now needlessly deter good men from joining the communion of the Church or entering its ministry; and to this head I will add (though no interference is here wanted except that of common sense and a catholic spirit) to abstain from all theological law-suits, and from decisions calculated to narrow its pale; since it is of more consequence to us to make war together, in the name of Jesus Christ, on unbelief and immorality, than to wrangle on doubtful speculations as to the manner of His presence in the Eucharist, or the exact nature of the change in baptism."

costs the integrity of a miscellaneous compilation, to which no man has ventured to ascribe a divine origin—(though we may live to discuss some theory of the plenary inspiration of the Liturgy),—and which owes all its authority to acts of the secular power, perfectly analogous to those which we so unscrupulously repeal or neglect as obsolete.

(2). Although there is much of exaggeration and inaccuracy in Lord Chatham's invidious statement that we have a "Popish liturgy, Calvinistic articles, and an Arminian clergy"; though the second of these items of indictment is the least valid of the three, because, as Archbishop Laurence has shown, the Articles rather represent the views of Melanchthon and Bucer than those of the Genevan school; and though there is little reason to complain of the narrowness of our Anglican confession, it would still be advisable to follow the example of those who, in 1562, revised the formularies of 1552, and to publish a new edition, omitting those articles which tend to introduce specialties of interpretation or inference. And here, as in the Prayer Book, no additions would be required. Perhaps the following omissions are most calculated to widen the basis of the Church without surrendering any principles, and so to carry out the views of those who originally framed the Articles or consented to their abridgement ten years afterwards. As the third Article was deprived of its specialty in the second edition, and as it does not involve any great principle, nothing would be lost if it were omitted altogether. As the second clause of the sixth Article defines as canonical those books of the Old and New Testament, the authority of which has never been doubted in the Church, it would be as well to omit a list containing some books which fall within this law of exclusion, and to expunge the last paragraph, which prefers the vulgar canon of the fourth to the critical canon of the third century, and so contradicts the definition of canonicity in the second clause of the Article. The

words prefixed in 1562 to the present tenth Article are either superfluous or liable to misconstruction, and the Article might very well resume its original form. If the Articles are still to be a test to be subscribed by those who are not complete theologians, it would be advisable to withdraw the thirteenth Article, with its scholastic subtleties. Although Archbishop Laurence has fully relieved the seventeenth Article from the charge of Calvinism, it does not seem desirable to have a dogmatic statement on such a perplexing subject as predestination. The gross misconceptions, which the eighteenth Article has occasioned, show that it serves no good purpose in a general collection of religious statements. The first two lines of Article twenty, which Archbishop Laud was wrongly accused of forging, might be obliterated without any loss to the Church. As excommunication is now an unknown thing, the thirty-third Article is quite unnecessary. Since the Homilies are obsolete, and were only intended to serve a temporary purpose, the thirty-fifth Article concerning them might be allowed to fall into oblivion. A similar remark applies to Article thirty-six, which refers directly to objections no longer commonly entertained, or at least set aside by a long continuance of Anglican ordinations. If, then, by omitting these seven Articles—the third, thirteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, thirty-third, thirty-fifth, thirty-sixth; and by combining Articles twenty-eight, twenty-nine, and thirty in one statement respecting the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, we reduced the Articles from thirty-nine to thirty, no one, we conceive, would be a loser, and the national Church would gain in breadth and efficiency. We make this suggestion, not because we entertain any theological objections to the Articles in question, but because others, who do not pretend to theological knowledge, have found them superfluous or unnecessarily precise.

(3). The necessity for a corrected version of the Bible has

been urged in the House of Commons, and argued by correspondents in the *Times* newspaper. It seems to us that if there was no reason for this good work beyond that which is alleged as the chief objection to it, namely, that it would shake the common people's unthinking idolatry of the sacred volume, which is known to them only in the established version,—this reason alone would be quite sufficient to recommend that revision which the Bibliolaters so earnestly deprecate. For nothing can be more directly opposed to the growth of vital religion than this slavish adoration of its vehicle. That men should not only worship an ancient literature, but should even invest a translation of ancient books, in some parts not made from the original but from a Latin version, with the attributes of unchangeable excellence, seems to us a prostration of the intellect, from which we cannot too soon rouse its insensate votaries. So far is this homage paid to the letter or rather to the printed types of the translated letter, from being a support to religion or morality, that it actually degrades and debases both. The effects of this unreasoning devotion have been so disastrous, that one of the ablest Englishmen now alive has been known to say, that it would be a good thing for Protestants if the Bible could be buried for one hundred years and then rediscovered, in order that men might start afresh on the study of its meaning, unencumbered by the prejudices which have grown up around their minds. But even if it were desirable to consult the fancies of an irrational multitude, it is obvious that their respect for the established version is more disturbed by the constant statements in the pulpit that given texts have been wrongly translated, than it could possibly be by any differences which they might discover for themselves between their own printed Bible and that which was used by their parents or forefathers. We happen to know that the preacher's custom of pointing out mistranslations produces a feeling of continual irritation and discomfort in the

minds of the more reflecting members of his congregation; and we have heard it said more than once, "If the English Bible is so full of errors, why do they not give us an improved edition of it?" The reasons for revising the established version at the present time are chiefly the two following: (*a*). The discovery and collation of manuscripts have placed the text of the Old and New Testament on a footing entirely different from that in which it stood when the authorised translation was made; (*b*) Greek and Hebrew scholarship have made greater progress in the last half century than in all the previous period since the revival of letters. Having therefore both better materials and better machinery, it seems perfectly preposterous that we should shrink from doing in the middle of the nineteenth century what was thought so necessary at the beginning of the seventeenth. Let us, by all means, retain the general style of our existing version, and its words, wherever they do not flagrantly violate the sense of the original; but let every acknowledged error be at once removed; let no passage stand in the context of the version which scholarship has removed from the context of the original Hebrew or Greek; and let us without delay substitute a division into paragraphs, according to the sense, for the absurd division into verses, which has no value except as a marginal guide for the purposes of comparison or reference.

But it is not only on behalf of the Church of England that the true conservatism of Christians must prepare to concede that which has become, or is felt to be, untenable. The same laws apply to the defence of religion in general. Revealed truth itself requires no champion, and can make no concessions. It is invincible and indestructible; and, as we have seen, is supported by the witness within our hearts. But a message from God is delivered in human language; it is accommodated to the weakness of those to whom it is addressed; it is written down and preserved for after ages by men, who necessarily represented

their own conceptions of its meaning, and set it forth with affections of phraseology and imagination suited to the mental atmosphere, in which their own spiritual life consisted. It is clear, then, that although a revelation from God is in itself immutable, its outward clothing may be only a temporary accommodation to the weakness or ignorance of man; it may be a scabbard or even a coat of rust to the sword of the Spirit; it may become a disguise to the truth which it once helped to convey, and may eventually be mistaken for the truth itself. If this happens,—if religion seems to identify itself with its vehicle, if it seems to make itself responsible for statements not in themselves religious, and manifestly inconsistent with the established truths of science and with the general knowledge of the generation, it encounters the greatest dangers to which it is liable. Faith and reason, which are naturally inseparable, mistake one another, and break out into open hostility; and unless it can be shown that what is unreasonable and scientifically false, is not a part of religion, and not an object of faith, the mind of man will naturally revolt from its allegiance to that which it cannot receive without renouncing its noblest prerogative.

The principle of political conservatism, which requires that the machine of state should be re-adjusted from time to time, in accordance with the progressive alterations of the atmosphere in which it works, is equally applicable to the case of a religion revealed in human language many centuries ago. As this revelation was made once for all, it is clear that it was designed to satisfy the intellectual and religious cravings of mankind in all ages. It must be as well adapted for the expression of religious faith in the scientific and enlightened Europe of the 19th century, as it was to the very dissimilar medium through which it was contemplated in different ages by Paul and John, Clement and Origen, Abelard and Lombard, Thomas and Ockham, Luther and Melanchthon. Christianity necessarily

expands with the mind of man, and strengthens with the gradually increasing strength of human knowledge and reason. With this expansive power, it cannot be shut up within the narrow limits of bygone traditions and prescriptions; and our Lord himself has left us a significant warning of the danger of such an attempt[1]: "No man putteth a piece of new cloth into an old garment, for that which is put in to fill up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse. Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles break and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved." This text is the *locus classicus* for religious conservatism. The spirit and life, which dwell in Christianity, are here compared not only to the wedding-garment of righteousness, which is given new and complete to every Christian, and must not be used to patch up old and superannuated systems of worship, in order to cover the unseemly rents in the parti-coloured robes devised by man, but also to the new wine still fermenting and active, which no old bottles will ever be able to contain. On the one hand, our Lord here makes answer to all scribes and Pharisees, who wish to reduce him to their own level, who would graft Christianity upon Judaism, and take from the robes of Christian grace and illumination only a few purple patches, to adorn an arrangement of rites and ceremonies and formal worship. On the other hand, he warns us, that man goes on from age to age forming for himself new orbits of scientific and moral speculation. What was the sublimest reach of knowledge to our ancestors, is now either scouted as superstitious ignorance, or regarded as superficial information within the reach of the most ordinary capacity. But Christianity is eternal. By its inherent elasticity it accommodates itself to all periods, to all developments of speculative and practical wisdom; and those, who, in the 19th century,

[1] Matth. ix. 16, 17.

would confine it within the narrow limits of obsolete theories and systems of dogmatism, are from time to time shaken in their faith by finding that the old bottles burst asunder beneath the pressure of a spirit which they are unable to contain. It is too often forgotten that even the language of theology is undergoing a constant change, and that we are perpetually unlearning and relearning the vocabulary of our faith. So that contests arise from the differences of the phraseology of the learned and the ignorant; and these are fomented by the unequal progress of religious and secular education. One of the most profound thinkers of modern Germany has justly observed[1] that "a full half of the evils, which at present oppress the Christian life, come simply from the fact, that our Churches have not been mindful at the *right hour* of arming themselves with a speculative theology. There was a time when philosophy and the doctrines of the Church reckoned with ideas of precisely the same magnitude (since both employed the same alphabet of ideas) and on that account understood each other mutually. The apparatus of ideas, which the Church received from an earlier age, is antiquated in relation to science generally, and appears out of course; so that the language sanctioned by the Church, to philosophically educated minds, is oftentimes unmeaning; and when the attempt is really made to come to an understanding with them in their own language, the appropriate words and phrases are entirely wanting." It is owing to this inequality in the progress of the religious and secular intellect respectively, that we find outrageous opposition in one age, when a subsequent generation cannot understand or recognise the discrepancy. The whole of Europe was startled in the sixteenth century by propositions which are now accepted as the groundwork of Protestant theology by the great majority of the population in Northern Germany, Holland, England, and North America.

[1] Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, quoted in Wilson's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 52.

The flippant sneers of Voltaire in the last century are now more than represented by the solemn concessions of religious men, who believe themselves to be the advocates of Christianity. And there can be no doubt that the struggles of Bibliolatry at the present day will be regarded less than one hundred years hence with a mixture of amazement and indignation. The fact is, that we have now arrived at a very critical period in the development of the forms of belief. Christian orthodoxy, as represented or caricatured by the conventional misconceptions of an ignorant theology, has, especially in England, broken out into open warfare with that Biblical learning, which, in a former age, was bound down by a corresponding limitation of knowledge. In the conflicts which have already taken place, the conventional anachronists have suffered a series of ignominious defeats, and whether the reconciliation is brought about in the present generation, or postponed until some future time, the ultimate result cannot be doubtful; and, sooner or later, a final victory must remain with the champions who are most fully armed in the panoply of truth and knowledge.

Under these circumstances, who is the true conservative? who is the able and honest advocate of Christianity? Is it the patcher of obsolete vestments, the user of worn-out wine-skins, who would destroy the old garment, and lose all the wine, rather than abandon his antiquated costume and his superannuated vehicle? Is it he who maintains that religion must stand or fall with that which science has proclaimed to be childish credulity? or he who will not make the life of religion dependent on its outward shell? who meets science half-way, and, while he admits that the untenable is not to be maintained, proves to the satisfaction of all reasonable men that the truth of religion is not in the slightest degree affected by the rejection of any irrational hypothesis or tradition?

There would be no difficulty about the proper answer to these

questions if all men who have honest hearts had also clear heads; if, indeed, those who are sincerely attached to religion were not in too many cases prevented by want of ability or information from understanding the steps of an argument, and discriminating between that which is and that which is not essential to its maintenance. And it must be allowed that the defence of religion has one peculiar difficulty, which increases the confusion on the part of its friends. The facts of revelation are maintained by two classes of believers. The one includes all those who have no independent learning, and who adopt without examination every stereotyped opinion respecting the positive value of the Scriptures and their contents. According to these persons, there is no opening for a critical discrimination between the true and the false in ecclesiastical traditions, and we must either accept all, or relinquish all, without any reservation. The other class of believers consists of men whose upright and independent minds are enlightened by science and strengthened by learning. These persons are convinced that the teaching of religion has been accompanied by the propagation of a great deal of falsehood and error, which constitute the principal obstacles to the universal reception of our faith. To both these classes of believers are opposed those professed infidels, who deny altogether the divine origin and distinctive character of Christianity. In conducting their attacks against the evidences of religion, they insist chiefly, if not exclusively, on the errors which the former class of believers persist in considering as inseparable from religion itself, and which the latter class relinquish as untenable. We find then that each class or section of the friends of Christianity stands in open agreement with infidelity on the very subject which furnishes unbelievers with the means of assailing the faith. Certain doctrines, resting either on presupposition or deduction, have connected themselves with the teaching of Christianity. Infidelity maintains (1) that they are false or erroneous;

(2) that they are inseparable from Christianity. The former class of believers admit, or rather strenuously assert, the second of these propositions; but as earnestly deny the former statement. The latter class of believers at once and without the slightest hesitation concede the errors of the teachers of religion, but then they join battle with their opponents on the other proposition, namely, that Christianity is answerable for these errors, or endangered by their overthrow.

From this state of things arises that confusion in the minds of simple believers to which we have adverted. They feel that the admissions of more learned defenders of the faith have weakened their own position, or left them unsupported at the outposts, and therefore identify them with their assailants, or rather regard them as traitors.[1] But surely the facts are very different. If the positions attacked by unbelief are really indefensible and strictly immaterial, the demonstration of these two assertions is clearly a gain to Christianity and a loss to infidelity, for it shows that our adversaries have been fighting with a shadow and have left the substance untouched. On the other hand, the determination to stake all on the defence of an untenable post is fatal to the cause of truth, and, if not attribut-

[1] These facts have been well stated by Professor Norton in his able defence of the "Genuineness of the Gospel," ii., p 405: "He who discusses the errors that have been connected with our religion, for the purpose of separating them from it, and preventing their further hinderance to its reception and influence, must prosecute his labours under a great disadvantage, for he is liable to be altogether misunderstood or misrepresented. There are two classes of writers, who, with wholly opposite views, have called attention to these errors. One class consists of those who have confounded them with our religion, who regard them as essential parts of it, who direct their reasoning or their ridicule against them, and, in exposing them, consider themselves as confronting the claims of Christianity. The other class is composed of such as, with a deep sense of the value of our religion, are solicitous to remove from it all that has obscured its character and weakened its power. The purpose of one class is the very opposite of that of the other, but they agree as to the nature of the errors. By both they are equally considered as indefensible; and often this correspondence alone is regarded, and the most earnest defenders of Christianity have been confounded with its enemies, by such Christians as agree with its enemies in viewing these errors as essential to our faith."

able to treason, is certainly due to prejudice, obstinacy, folly, or ignorance. What should we say of a garrison which was divided in opinion on the two proposals (1) that they should await the enemies' attack within the walls of an impregnable fortress situated on a rock; (2) that they should break down their walls and level their approaches in order to include within the circuit some low-lying valley cannonaded on all sides by the shot of the enemy? Suppose, for example, that Elliott had made his defence of Gibraltar dependent on his maintenance of a line of outworks on the neutral ground beyond the range of his own batteries. Would this have been the proper method of opposing the overwhelming force of Crillon? If not, how can any man be charged with hostility or faint friendship to Christianity, when he refuses to peril the maintenance of his faith by marching down to meet his enemy on ground which the experience of ages has proved to be both neutral and beyond the scope of his artillery?[1]

[1] That this mode of regarding the true functions of the Christian advocate or apologist is gaining ground even in this country, is shown by the fact that writers, who have no immediate connexion with one another, and who cannot be supposed to have borrowed from contemporaries the phraseology in which they express their own ideas, have instinctively, as it were, adopted the metaphor in which we have conveyed our meaning in the text, namely, that Christianity is not concerned about the defence of those human outworks which the enemies of our faith have so successfully assailed. Thus Philelutherus has said ("Vindication of Protestant Principles," § 52, p. 114): "If the assaults of the unbelievers, grown every day more formidable, are to break like the angry but impotent waves on the rock of our salvation, it must be because we have concentrated our strength; for these are not days when we can keep back the earnest attacks of our enemies by a wide circle of pasteboard outworks, which, in the present state of learning, we could not attempt to maintain without sacrificing a part of our garrison, and so enabling the triumphant victors to exhibit among their trophies the flimsy tinsel of cant, which was worn instead of the golden panoply of truth." In a similar strain Lord Arthur Hervey remarks ("Genealogies," p. 348): "Truth is that at which all men should aim, and those especially who are ordained to preach the Gospel of truth. Now can there be a worse or more false calculation than to suppose that the truth requires the assistance of falsehood to maintain it, or that there is any danger lest the progress of truth should endanger the Truth. The only danger is, when rotten buttresses are set to prop up a solid building, lest, when the buttress falls, inconsiderate and short-sighted people should imagine that the building is falling too." The same view, in its proper application, has been fully developed by another able writer ("The

We shall endeavour to prove that the first class of believers in fact make common cause with infidels and betray the faith into their hands, and that the true champions of Christianity are to be found in the second class only, by showing—

(1) That there are certain truths, essential to the establishment of Christianity, as a revelation from God, which are unaffected by the result of the controversies between the defenders and impugners of our faith.

(2) That the dogmas supposed to be connected with religion, which the results of the conflict between the advocates and the enemies of Christianity have proved to be untenable, are not among the truths which are essential to the establishment of our faith; that, in fact, they are immaterial as well as indefensible.

If these two propositions can be established, it will follow that the champions of unbelief have up to this time thrown away their labours, except so far as they have been seconded by mistaken Christians, who have endeavoured to defend, under the name of a divine revelation, a set of opinions as unsubstantial and delusive as the scenic villages which deceived and delighted the Empress of Russia.[1]

Divine Drama of History and Civilization," by the Rev. James Smith, M.A., London, 1854, pp. 62—3): "Thus falsely primed with first principles, believers stumble at the Word and are afraid of science, and infidels triumph through the weakness of believers, and popular teachers have learned to support one form of truth by hiding their faces from the other; whilst enemies assail and batter down the paper walls of the letter, in which there is no strength, and shout like children, as if they had gained a glorious victory. But there is neither victory nor defeat. Both armies have possession of a portion of the field and will keep their possession till a mutual understanding takes place." And the author of these pages has elsewhere said ("New Cratylus," 2nd edition, § 14, p. 17): "If the Christian religion is to maintain its distinctive position, if it is to enjoy other homage than that which must always be paid to its intrinsic truthfulness, its final triumph over the dangers to which it has been exposed by the ignorance and prejudices of its teachers, will be secured by the scientific philology which has cleared away the obstructive suburbs, and has thus shown the fortress in its true and native strength."

[1] Catherine II. had ordered some villages to be built, but her commands had been neglected. To avoid the consequences of their disobedience, the Ministers deceived the Empress by the erection of painted house-fronts in the localities which she traversed in her rapid journeys.

All that we have to plead for on behalf of Christianity is contained in the demonstration of its divine origin and distinctive character.

Religion, as the true and primary[1] signification of the word implies, is a permanent influence, an abiding affection of the conscience of man. It naturally rests on his belief of the personal existence of God and of his own immortality, and necessarily presumes some sense of law and duty, and of sin as their violation. Every thinking subject is convinced that there is a reality in his own impressions, and in the world without him, which he regards as their cause,—in a word, he believes in the existence of himself and in the reality of the outer world. He is also led to conclude that there is something, which is neither subject nor object, but which is the creator of both. In some form or other he will connect the assumption of a first great cause with the approving and disapproving power, which resides in his conscience, and, however vaguely or imperfectly, he will thus construct for himself some system of religious belief and worship. An examination, however, of the mythologies of all nations will enable us to see that there is no instinctive belief of the personal existence of the Deity, and no true consciousness of sin or its remedy; and that it is only in the religion of Jesus Christ, and less completely in the Jewish faith, which served as its imperfect but necessary vestibule, that we can find any clear statements with regard to these indispensable conditions of all real religion. They are indispensable, because the conscience would be left to its vague and uncertain promptings, if we had not a conviction of that everlasting relation between the soul of man and "the Father of the spirits of all flesh," which is necessary to our reasonable conceptions respect-

[1] *Religio*, according to its primary signification, is "perpetually thoughtful care in regard to some object affecting the conscience."—See *Lat. Gr.* p. 200; *Varron.* p. 407, 2nd edit.

ing the moral government of the world. Granted that the soul of man is destined to a conscious immortality, and that God is not merely the animating principle of the Universe, but a Person endued with certain attributes, and capable of making himself more or less known to his creatures, we can then understand and supply the imperfections of that scheme of retribution, which our conscience requires and finds wanting in this world. For the appearance of evil suggests but little difficulty, when we are enabled to regard the present life as a state of probation only; and all the most intricate problems in biology are solved at once by the fact that man is only a temporary lodger in this frail tenement of clay, and will account in another state of existence for all conscious deviations from the true conditions of his nature.

In order to show that there really is this essential distinction between that which we call revealed religion, and all the systems of belief and worship, which we can trace to a human origin, it is necessary that we should, however briefly, examine the different modes in which the intellect has grappled with religion, and contrast them with those views respecting the personality of God and the nature of sin, which are to be found only in the religion of Jesus Christ, and in that part of the religion of Moses which the Gospel has accepted and ratified.

It may be said with truth, that all false religions fall into three main classes,[1] involving some form or other of specific error in regard to the distinction and opposition between man and the world. (1). The lowest form of error is when man seeks for God in the outer world itself, and prostrates his own personal and individual consciousness before the visible elements of created power, which he sees and feels. He worships as deities the sun and moon and stars, the sea, the winds, the day and night, and even the abstractions of his own passionate desires or intellectual

[1] See Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. 18.

conceptions. In proportion to its refinement, this species of worship connects itself with a poetic or philosophical mythology, and calls in the aid of art to gratify a love for the beautiful, and to relieve the mind, which is impatient of pure thought. This form of error is called *Polytheism*, "the worship of many gods," and its outward exhibition is generally idolatry or the veneration of images. It is so far from cultivating the religious sentiment that it generally plunges its votaries into the grossest abominations of superstitious sensualism. And yet it was the religion of the most civilized nations of antiquity, and to this day, with different degrees of refinement, it is the faith of heathendom, wherever the popular mass is united by a system of outward observances. (2). The second form of error is when man, unable to solve the conflict between himself and the world, gets rid of the difficulty by assuming two opposing powers—the power of good, who is represented by his own spirit, and the power of evil, who is represented by matter. Thus man is mixed up of both, he is a subject of both empires, or rather his soul is a battle-field for the perpetual warfare of the King of Light and the King of Darkness, the Good God and the Evil Demon. This form of error is called *Dualism*, or a belief in two gods of contradictory functions but antagonistic power, for the material and the immaterial world are both invested with the attributes of divinity. This dualism was the creed of the Medes, Persians, and Babylonians, among whom the Jews spent the long years of their captivity, from which they returned not unimbued with the superstitions of their masters. It was also the religion of the rude northern nations of Europe, who traced back their origin to the Median territory. It was combined with Christianity in the third century by a heretic, Manes or Manichæus, of Persian extraction, and is unfortunately still preached as Christian truth by many uninstructed divines,

chiefly of the Puritanical or Calvinistic persuasion.[1] It is the tendency of this development of false religion to encourage self-conceit and arrogance, and to reject the pleasures and seductions of sense. A sort of ascetic purity is its first discipline, but it sometimes falls into the lowest abyss of carnality from the belief that the spirituality of the elect cannot be stained by fleshly sins. (3). The third form of error is the converse of the first. Instead of worshipping God in the representative objects of the visible world, it mixes up man and the world together, and recognises a divinity in the whole complex mechanism of the universe. This form of error is called *Pantheism*, or the deification of collective nature. It is only an apparent solution of the conflict between man and the world. According to this system, God, so far as He has any existence at all, is identified with man; but in truth God and man both love their personality: God becomes the floating substratum of a mass of phenomena, and man, ceasing to be a person, is converted into an individual form. This Pantheism was the ground-work of Egyptian mythology, and so developed itself in the Alexandrine Gnosticism. It is the creed of the educated classes in India, and it is the living result of long-continued scepticism in Germany. It is in fact only a refined modification of Atheism; for we cannot really believe in God unless we regard him as endued with a personal character and personal attributes. And it must end in a subversion of morality; for it tends to substitute the merely subjective for the objective reality, to make man, as an individual, the criterion and standard of truth, to annihilate the idea of law or duty, and to create an absolute autonomy or independence in every thinking being.

[1] The relations between Manichæism and Christianity are sufficiently discussed in the Appendix to this chapter.

We thus see that although natural religion recognises as three distinct realities—God, man, and the world—it does not arrive at the only pure monotheism, that which discerns the personal character of God. It has a tendency to sink into Polytheism, in which man finds God in the visible world, and spirit bows before matter; or into Dualism, which opposes spirit to matter, as good and evil principles of equal and independent power; or into Pantheism, which mingles all three realities in one tangled web of inextricable confusion. Widely as the three forms of false religion differ in other respects, they have all one common discrepancy from the truth; they all equally ignore the same religious postulates; they are all equally silent respecting the personal character of God; they all refuse to answer the demands of our conscience respecting that religious sense of responsibility and that consciousness of sin, to which it gives birth in the awakened soul. It is true, that, by the very constitution of our nature, we can never be entirely without the power of choosing the good and refusing the evil on its own account. The conscience is never entirely dormant; the distinction of right and wrong is never quite obliterated. But we cannot attain to a truly religious condition, for we cannot really feel our responsibility to a higher power—in other words, our duty to God;—we cannot be conscious of that state of guilt and depravity which makes us sinners before Him, and denies to our souls the tranquil thought that we are at peace with our Maker—we cannot, in fact, rest upon the only sure basis of faith and worship, if we frame to ourselves any system or theory which strips God of his characteristic attributes.

Denying, then, that there is any other system, which may not be reduced to Polytheism, Dualism, or Pantheism, let us now see how the Christian religion and that part of Judaism, for which Christianity is responsible, have dealt with the personality

of God and the consciousness of sin, which are essential to the mutual support of faith and practice.

The earliest teachers of Christianity expressly tell us that the first true knowledge of sin was conveyed by the law of Moses, and that the first complete development or manifestation of the personal character of God was revealed by Jesus Christ. St. Paul said:[1] "By the law is the knowledge of sin." St. John declared[2]: "No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him." And the same Apostle records a conversation in which the same fact was most significantly stated by our Lord himself.[3] "Lord, show us the Father and it sufficeth us," said one of the disciples; and the answer was: "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father: and how sayest thou then, show us the Father?" In order to understand and reconcile the two propositions, that the knowledge of sin was by the law of Moses, but that the personality of God was manifested by Jesus Christ and not before, we must remember that the distinction between the two schemes of revealed religion consists entirely in a difference of degree. There could have been no knowledge of sin without a corresponding knowledge of a personal God. And whatever contributed to increase our acquaintance with God would tend also to increase our appreciation of that sin which his law forbids. On the one hand, then, we are to understand that by giving a knowledge of sin, the law did impart a proportional knowledge of God's character: and, on the other hand, we are to perceive that by increasing, or rather by completing, our knowledge of God's character, Jesus Christ did increase and complete our appreciation of the nature of sin. The false systems of religion, which we have briefly

[1] Rom. iii. 20. [2] John, i. 18; *cf.* Matth. xi. 27. [3] John, xiv. 8, 9.

described, as various results of an attempt to reconcile the two elements in the double nature of man, show that it was necessary to enlighten the mind of man by an authoritative statement of the truth. We contend that such a statement was made, when the revelation of God's law was communicated through Moses to the children of Israel. The solemn injunctions engraved on the two tables of stone were calculated to correct all false notions respecting the personal relations which connect God, the Creator, with the rational beings whom He has made. The Israelites were told that the duty of man consists in loving God above all things and his brother man as himself:[1] so that love, as the opposite of selfishness, is the fulfilling of the law. While the first table exhibited to them, in such a form as they could understand it, the manner in which they should revere God and their parents, and the motives for it; the second table, by a series of prohibitions, laid bare the forms of that selfishness in which sin consists,[2] and showed it under its three aspects—of the world or selfish aggrandizement, the devil or selfish malice and falsehood, and the flesh or selfish lust and voluptuousness. And in declaring the character of God, the revelation of Moses chiefly exhibited him as a being who was the ideal of moral uprightness (*jashar*), and the name given to the chosen nation indicated that his worshippers were bound to do that which was just and righteous, and so to liken themselves to the personal character of the Jehovah whom they adored.[3] For it is a necessary inference from any monotheism, even though it be a mere idealism, that moral rectitude and its consequent happiness consist in becoming like God. Plato, who was not unacquainted with some form of Oriental dualism, seems to

[1] Deut. vi. 5; Levit. xix. 18.

[2] See Julius Müller, *die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, i. pp. 120—262. 3rd edition.

[3] *Jashar*, pp. 178, 222, 327.

have recognised this in the midst of the erroneous speculations by which he was surrounded. He makes Theodorus, the mathematician, say to Socrates: "If you could convince all men, O Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of what you say, there would be more peace and less evil in the world." And Socrates replies: "Neither can evil, O Theodorus, perish altogether,—for there needs must be always some counterpart of good—nor can it find a seat in heaven; but it necessarily haunts our mortal nature and this lower region. On which account we must endeavour to flee as quickly as possible from this world to the other. But that flight consists in our becoming as like God as possible; and we become like him when we become just and holy as well as wise."[1] In thus telling men that they must imitate the righteousness of a holy God, the law of Moses did but hold up a warning against the inveterate self-love of man. "It was added because of transgressions,"[2] that is, it was put forth as a set of positive rules to guide the childish and unformed understanding of a barbarous people. It did but evince the unreconciled hostility between God and man; it did but justify and give greater force to the accusations of an unsatisfied conscience. And having thus established the consciousness of sin, of a fallen nature, of an abnormal relation between God and man, it left the true Israelite longing for a remedy. It was the slave who guided the child to the teacher's door,[3] but it tarried without. It pointed to a need which it could not gratify; it set forth all the ghastly colours of sin; it dissected the crude anatomy of a corrupted soul; it placed a stamp of divine reprobation on that which was already condemned by the voice of conscience; for although sin was in the world before the law, yet sin is not imputed where there is no law.[4] And all

[1] *Theætetus*, p. 176 A. [2] Gal. iii. 19. [3] Gal. iii. 24. [4] Rom. v. 13.

this to prepare the way for that fulness of time when God would exhibit himself to the eye of faith in all the beauty and glory of his true character; when he would show himself not only as the righteous judge, but also as the benefactor who by his self-abasement purchased for man the inestimable gifts of spiritual grace, and as the example of that noble humiliation which is the only access to supreme exaltation and felicity.[1]

For the preparatory dispensation the voice of man was sufficient; it was enough that man, speaking in the name of God, should declare the nature of sin, whereby God and man were at enmity; but to prove and show to men that "God is love,"[2] and that by loving we both obey God and become like him, God himself, manifested in the form and nature of man, came forward to provide the means of reconciliation and atonement; for "the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."[3] The only method by which the disease of a corrupted nature could be healed, and the reproaches of a guilty conscience quieted, was that which God himself contrived, which God himself revealed to us. As man had allowed his lower or animal nature to gain an undue control over that higher or spiritual personality, which constitutes his resemblance to his Maker, and had subjected his divine and immortal part to the mortal and corruptible frame in which it was encased, it became necessary for his release from the consequences of this fatal overthrow, that the lost ground should be more than regained, and that the Godlike should reign triumphant over fallen humanity. Almighty condescension has effected this. God assumed our nature, and in the human form asserted the Spirit's superiority to carnal selfishness. Jesus Christ became the victim for sin, and the example of all men who would escape from sin. He has taken our glorified body up to heaven, and has sent his holy Spirit

[1] Phil. ii. 5 *sqq.* [2] 1 John, iv. 8. [3] John, i. 17.

to dwell with our bodies upon earth. He became man that man might become Godlike. He is our advocate with the Father,[1] that his Spirit might be God's advocate in our hearts.[2] God's spirit had never been absent from the world from the time when it first brooded over the unformed chaos. It animated the frame of man when he was first made from the dust of the ground. Prophets spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and the same influence filled those who were permitted to hail the first coming of our Lord.[3] But the descent of this divine Paraclete, as the perpetual indweller in all believing souls, was reserved for the time when men could appreciate and appropriate to themselves the work of Jesus Christ in reconciling man to God; and this the Redeemer has done by laying low the fence of sin, which kept them asunder, "for he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition; having abolished in his flesh the enmity—even the law of commandments contained in ordinances—in order to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace, and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity in himself."[4] The hostility of opposing principles in man could only be conquered by Jesus Christ, who was both God and man. And it is easy to see that this victory effectuated the reconciliation or *at-one-ment* of man, as such, with God. For sin or selfishness is overruled by obedience or love. But God is love. Therefore the obedience of man brings him into union with God. As, however, fallen man could not by his own strength fulfil this obedience, a means has been found by which the aid of God's Holy Spirit may be imparted; and for those, who in faith and repentance make their first approach to God, the divine will again unite itself with

[1] 1 John, ii. 1. [2] John, xiv. 16. [3] Luke, i. 41; ii. 25. [4] Eph. ii. 14 16.

the human, and the handwriting of ordinances that was against us will again and again be nailed to the cross of self-denial.

We thus see that Jesus Christ revealed to the world a completion of the Mosaic scheme, and taught men, more fully and truly than they had known them before, both the nature of God and the nature of sin. When even the Jews could not conceive any other idea of God than that he was an offended and avenging judge, Jesus Christ revealed him as a forgiving father, who ran forward to greet the distant approach of the returning prodigal; and in this he showed forth, manifested, and declared to mankind, in a way in which the world had never seen it before, the "express image" of divine personality—in this he exhibited to our re-awakened religious apprehensions the essential attributes, the distinctive character, of the everlasting Ruler of the Universe; for he was here, in his communion with man and in his redeeming acts, a type of infinite power working by and through infinite benevolence. Reason had concluded that God must be almighty, omnipotent, and omniscient; but it was left for Christianity both to teach and to prove that "God is love." In a lower application, the visible world had long told us that this was so: every flower, every blade of grass, every living creature that moves on the face of the earth proclaims that "God is love." That word, as the true designation of the Heavenly Father, is written on the broad surface of this our dwelling-house in such distinct and palpable characters, that the wayfarer, be he never so simple, might read it there, if he could but distinguish between abstract nature and a living God. But this personal attribute of the Creator was not implied in human language.[1] The epithet had

[1] The following are the designations of "God" in the languages of civilized nations. The Hebrew names are *El*, *Elôah*, denoting "power," *Jehôvah Jahve*, denoting "self-existence," *Shaddai*, meaning "the Almighty." We have of course passages in which His mercy and loving kindness are expressed by predicates, as in Joel, ii. 13; but this is not the idea generally attached

not fixed itself as a general term. And though philosophers had arrived at the fact, there was no world-consciousness of it. In this sense too it might be said that the "only-begotten Son" had manifested that God, whom "no man had seen at any time." For the Divine Being was never so seen in his personal characteristics, as when he came into the world to struggle with sin and die for us, that we might conquer sin and live through Him. Then was seen that divine love which poets had not imagined, which philosophers had failed to discover. And when by that Godlike condescension, mercy and truth, so long divided by the stern decrees of perfect justice, at length exchanged greetings, when peace and righteousness, so hard to be reconciled, were once more clasped in a sisterly embrace,[1] when the law, which spoke of guilt and separation, was merged in the Gospel, which proclaimed reconciliation and forgiveness; there was placed before the world a manifestation of heavenly goodness, which the whole universe, announcing as it does, with its million voices, the infinite benevolence of the Deity, had failed to impress on the thoughts and the language of men.

We maintain, then, that revelation is distinguished from all human religion by the development of the personal character of

to his name, and when the epithet טוֹב, "good" is applied to Him, it is generally as a term implying that moral righteousness which He expects in his worshippers. The Sanscrit term *Dévas*, like the Greek Ζεύς, refers to "light" as the visible emblem of God, and to "heaven" as his dwelling-place. The Greek θεός, and the Latin *deus*, refer us to the root θε-, *de-*, signifying "to make," and the same is the case with the Teutonic *Gott* (*New Crat.ylus*, § 473). There is therefore no connexion between "God" and "good" in our language, and though the Greeks and Romans called certain of their gods εὐμένιδες and *manes*, both terms denoting goodness or kindness, this was rather a deprecating reference to the powers of the other world, than an idea of deity as such. The Chinese names for God are *Shin*, denoting "spirit," and *Shang-te*, meaning "supreme ruler" ("Who is God in China?" by S. C. Malan, pp. 135, 165). When God is called "good" in ancient systems of religion, it is generally only because he is placed on the side of light in a system of dualism.

[1] Psalm lxxv. 8-11; Isaiah, xxxii. 17; Jerem., xxiii. 5, compared with Isaiah, ix. 6; Hebr., vii. 1.

God and the real nature of sin, which is shown to have been undiscovered and undiscoverable by the mere instincts of man, by the fact, among others, that God is not personally designated in any branch of human speech as love or benevolence, and that sin is not described in any idiom or any system of faith as a result of carnal selfishness.[1]

It will, of course, be objected that, as far as the Jews were concerned, this revelation was mixed up with views of the character of God quite inconsistent with the notion that "God is love,"—that, in fact, they adopted the gloomy superstition that God required to be propitiated by the blood of innocent victims—nay more, by that of human victims—nay, worst of all, that man was expected to offer up his own children to the angry Deity, and that the turning-point in the religious history of the Jews depended on the willingness of their progenitor to offer such a sacrifice when required of him by Jehovah.[2] That human sacrifices are connected with the worst form of idolatry, that they take their origin in one of the most repulsive of

[1] The Hebrew phrases for "sin" generally refer to the apostacy from God, breach of covenant with him, and sin-offering incurred, which belong to the sacrificial system; see Müller, *von der Sünde*, vol. i. pp. 177, 268 *sqq.*, 3rd edition. Much the same seems to be the idea attached to our *sin* and the German *Sünde*; see Grimm, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, pp. 747 *sqq.* The Greek ἁμαρτάνω and ἀμπλακέω both denote "missing the mark or the way, straying, wandering," etc. The Latin *pecco* means to commit "a stupid or brutish fault," "to act like a brute" (from *pecus*, cf. *vacca*, *veho*, etc.) The other terms are *delictum*, "a fault of omission," *crimen*, "an established charge," *scelus*, "a cause of expulsion," *facinus*, "a monstrous act," *nefas*, "a violation of divine law," *flagitium*, "a crying iniquity," *vitium*, "a forbidden act," *culpa*, "a deceit," *noxa*, "a mischief," *fraus*, "a deprivation." The Sanscrit *pápa* is connected by Bopp (*Gloss. Sanscr.* p. 215) with the Greek κακός, which Pott (*etym. Forsch.* i. 232) connects with the Sanscrit *çankurá*, "fearful." The Greeks had the words ἀνθαδής and ἀνθαδία, φίλαυτος and φιλαυτία, but not as general designations of sin. It is somewhat remarkable, perhaps as an indication of our inability to recognise the true character of our natural sinfulness, that the English words "selfish" and "selfishness" are not more than two hundred years old (see Trench, *English Past and Present*, p. 69).

[2] This subject has been fully discussed in a learned and able treatise by F. W. Ghillany, *die Menschenopfer der alten Hebräer*, Nürnberg, 1842. See also Mackay, *Progress of the Intellect*, vol. ii., pp. 406 *sqq.*

religious conceptions,[1] that they were a part of that worship of Moloch, which the Israelites too readily adopted from their immediate neighbours in Canaan, that they passsed from the Eastern coasts of the Mediterranean to those regions in which Phœnician adventure first clashed with Hellenic civilization, that the interruptions to the sacrifice of Isaac and of Iphigenia indicate a revulsion of feeling, which ended in the abolition of these hideous rites, or, at least, in their temporary suspension,—all this we are willing to admit. But it does not follow that because the Jews, as a nation, adopted the superstitions of their neighbours, a pure religion was not antecedently revealed to them. On the contrary, our belief in the original divinity of that revelation is increased by our knowledge of the difficulties with which its transmission was encumbered. The sun is not the less a source of warmth and light because the atmosphere is occasionally obscured:

"The clouds are earth-born, but his fire divine."

And when we find that in spite of the golden calves of Egypt, the phallic abominations of Baal-Peor, the cannibalism and infanticide of Moloch, and the forged ritual of a sacerdotal caste, the great truths of revelation, the law of righteousness and the

[1] Mr. Helps has made a very remarkable apology for human sacrifices. He says ("The Spanish Conquest in America, vol. ii. p. 165): "Human sacrifices, though very horrible, are not by any means the most cruel things that are done under the sun, being full of motives. Considering what we know of each other's sufferings, how the most prosperous life is thick with concealed disaster and disappointment, no more to be relied on than the smooth surface of the sea near a rocky coast, how any man can needlessly molest another is astonishing, but nothing is to be wondered at when the logical faculty is once fairly applied to the service of superstition or resentment." And again (ii. pp. 339, 340): "When we reflect upon the untoward, disastrous, and ridiculous aspect of human life—when we behold the successful iniquity, the immense injustice, and the singular infelicity, which often beset the most innocent of men—nay, further, when we see the spitefulness of nature—for so it seems unless profoundly understood—when we consider the great questions of human life, such as free-will and the origin of evil, etc., we cannot wonder at the belief in evil deities of great power and supremacy. And then what more natural than to clothe such deities with the worst attributes of bad men,—than to offer to such gods of the best upon earth, namely, our fellow-men?"

law of love, so far survived all interruptions and hindrances, that an Incarnate God could make the old system a basis for his divine teaching, we strengthen rather than weaken the *à priori* argument, which appeals to the inherent distinction between revealed religion and all faiths and worships invented by man.

If, then, the truths which are necessary to the completeness of religion; if this revelation of God as essentially loving and good, this manifestation of sin as a result or product of carnal selfishness, cannot be recognised in any of the systems which are referred to a human origin, and if it may therefore be inferred that these truths are not discoverable by our unaided powers of reasoning, it is necessary that our knowledge of them should be derived from divine revelation. As, therefore, the Christian religion alone contains a distinct statement of these all-important facts, it may be concluded, *à priori*, that Christianity is from God.

Thus, the very existence of our faith proves its divine origin; and those who are versed in philosophical speculations, and qualified to test the claims of abstract truth, require no other demonstration. To the majority of men, however, something more tangible and concrete than absolute truth is necessary as a foundation of assured belief; and for them—that is for the world at large—we are required to establish the facts of historical Christianity. We have to maintain, as real occurrences, recorded in the annals of the past, and confirmed by all the aids of documentary evidence, the momentous statements that God spoke to man by Moses, that He has revealed himself to man in Jesus Christ; that by the former, as a preparatory dispensation, and by the latter, as its fulfilment and completion, He has brought life and immortality to light. Now this amounts to an assertion of the miraculous origin of Christianity and its antecedent Mosaism. All revelation from God to man is a superhuman act; and if we cannot believe that a certain doctrine

comes from God, because the truth involved, though it approves itself to our reason, is not discoverable by our ordinary faculties, we must fall back upon history for some testimony to the supernatural signs by which the manifestation originally established its divine origin. However much it may have been misrepresented, this is the only question really at issue between the believer and the infidel. If we do not believe *à priori*, or cannot prove historically, that Christianity and the spiritual substance of the Mosaic religion, for which it has pledged itself, contain a distinct revelation from God to man, we must subside into Pantheism. For we must give up all idea of a personal God, if we do not believe, or cannot show, that He has revealed himself personally to man. And even when we acquiesce for ourselves in the internal evidences of Christianity, and admit that miracles are not for us the proofs of its celestial sanction, we must assume the occurrence of something supernatural at the time when the religion was first promulgated, for otherwise we cannot account for the fact of its original reception as a message from God to man.

The spread of Mahommedanism admits of an obvious explanation, which is not applicable to either of the religions which preceded it, and furnished it with all the religious ingredients which it possesses. For the faith of Mecca is, after all, only an offshoot from the heresies and corruptions of the Nestorians and other Eastern Christians, supported by fresh materials borrowed from Rabbinistic Judaism, and diffused by the only missionaries of arbitrary opinions—conquest and despotism. To say nothing of the fact that Moslemism has no religious originality, and that it owes its solidity to the revealed truths which it has borrowed from Christianity, the difference in the mode of propagation destroys all analogy between the opposed dominations of the Crescent and the Cross. We have no occasion to seek for miraculous signs of a heavenly mission

on the part of a man who drew to his standard wild hordes of Arab warriors by the profession of a faith much nobler than their previous religion, and by the natural magic of courage, ability, and success.

But if we consider the phenomena presented by the religion of Moses, and still more by that of Jesus, we shall find no explanation of their continued existence except that which is supplied by their history, namely, that they, from the first, approved the divine origin, to which they lay claim, by supernatural and miraculous confirmations.

With regard to Christianity, we have all the evidence which history can furnish—more evidence than can be found for any other occurrences of that age—to support the belief that miracles and mighty signs were wrought by the first Founder of our religion. The positive testimonies are sufficiently precise and consistent, and there is no extant record of an early contradiction to the statements of our annalists, but, on the contrary, a general admission of their truth on the part of contemporaries, whether friends or foes. Besides, it is clear that the miraculous origin of Christianity was preached by those who were, by the act of preaching, rendered liable to cruel persecution, to stripes, bonds, and death, and who could have had no inducement to play the parts of hypocrite and impostor. The growth of this mustard-seed of despised preaching into a tree of life overshadowing the whole of civilized Europe, can only be traced back to the energetic impulse of divinity at first imparted to it.

With respect to Judaism, it is to be remembered, in the first place, that Christianity stands surety for the divine origin of all that is spiritual in the creed of Moses—that is, for its essence or substantial reality. All the Levitical rites are abrogated by Jesus, the machinery of a priesthood, a temple, a succession of festivals, and a minute arrangement of sacrificial ordinances were set aside by Him, and in all probability were not of Mosaic

origin: but He has declared that no jot or tittle shall be taken from that divine law which is summed up in the two commands, that we should love God above all things, and our neighbour as ourselves. In this respect, Judaism and Christianity mutually support the pretensions of each other; as Bishop Warburton has well remarked, in speaking of the nature and genius of the two religions, which lay claim to a true revelation: "The first," he says,[1] "is the Jewish, in which was taught the belief of one God, the maker and governor of all things, in contradistinction to all the false gods of paganism. . . After this religion, comes the Christian, which taught the belief of the same one God, the supreme cause of all things; and, being a revelation like the other from heaven, must needs be built upon that other, or on the supposition of its truth."

But in addition to the support which it derives from the recognition afforded by Christianity, the religion of Moses has independent proofs to offer of its divine origin. The complete and absolute distinction of the Jewish faith from that of any other ancient nation, and the pure and noble conceptions, which the Israelites alone entertained of the nature of God, and of the duty of man, combined with the undying influence of those convictions, which kept them from the dim beginnings of history, and keep them still, separate from all other nations, are phenomena explicable only on the assumption that their history is substantially true—that their religion was communicated to them by immediate revelation from God and enforced by miraculous confirmation, which produced an indelible impression on the fathers of the race, and on the generations which followed them. "When we consider," says an able modern writer,[2] "what the Jews were in other respects, the simple direct knowledge which they possessed of God, as the sole Maker and Governor of the

[1] "Divine Legation," book ii., sect. 6.
[2] Norton "On the Genuineness of the Gospel," ii., p. 412 415.

Universe, presenting so striking a contrast to the mythology of the most enlightened portion of the ancient world, affords the strongest confirmation of what they asserted, that its source was a divine revelation. This appears more clearly when we reflect that the idea of God was not with them a matter of speculation among a few philosophers, but formed the fundamental doctrine of their popular faith. The mere fact, likewise, of their most extraordinary belief that they had been separated from all other nations, by being called to worship Him, admits apparently of no other solution than that their belief was true. From an antiquity which would be shrouded in darkness were not a dim light cast upon it by their own history, this small people has flowed down an unmingled stream amid the stormy waves of the world. For a phenomenon so marvellous, it is idle to assign any ordinary causes. One cause alone explains it. We must regard it as an inexplicable wonder, or we must believe that this people were, as they profess, separated from the rest of man by God, and this in a manner so evident, solemn, and effectual, that the ineffaceable belief of the fact has been transmitted from generation to generation, as an essential characteristic of the race."

In addition to these general considerations, we may remark that the history of the Jews has been more carefully preserved than that of any other nation, and the tendency of all investigation has been to confirm, rather than invalidate, its most important features.[1] And with regard to Christianity, which

[1] In making this remark, we are far from sharing in the delusion that the corroborations of the Jewish histories from external sources have any bearing on the claim of infallibility which is set up for them. For instance, the Theban hieroglyphics establish the fact that Shishak conquered Rehoboam, but this does not render more credible the statement (2 Chron. xiii.) that in the reign of Rehoboam's successor, the two petty kingdoms of Judah and Israel fought with 400,000 against 800,000 all mighty men of valour, and that the latter lost 500,000 in the battle. In the same way, the Assyrian records may prove the reality of the war between Hezekiah and Sennacherib, but they do not explain the sun-dial of Ahaz, or the death of 185,000 Assyrians in one night

is comparatively of recent origin, we have already said that the admissions of enemies, the silence of calumniators, and the minutely examined coincidences of letters and history, all combine to assure us that, whatever credit is due to the annals of the past, may be safely reposed in the narratives which tell of the wonders by which Jesus confirmed the divine authority of his mission.

Thus, then, stands the case of the advocate of Christianity. An *à priori* presumption in favour of the revelation from God, without which the peculiar doctrines of our religion could not have been imagined by man, is supported by all the historical evidence of which the case admits. The existence of Judaism and Christianity would be more wonderful, on the supposition of their human origin, than any wonders by which their divine origin was established.

And now, on what grounds are we invited to reject the historical explanation of the phenomena? What counter-statement are we called upon to adopt?

We are told that Moses was an enlightened Arab, whose enthusiastic genius and courage were tempered with the deep learning of Egypt, and who, from various reasons, gained a great influence over the mixed hordes which he led out of the land of bondage. We are reminded that all the ancient legislators laid claim to inspiration, and that superior abilities and energies are easily attributed by a rude nation to supernatural influences, especially when wisdom is recommended by success in battle, which seems to have been the case with Moses. With regard to our own faith, we are told that its founder was neither more nor less than a learned Rabbi, who was cut short in a noble attempt to reform the religion of his countrymen and

If we understand the cautious language of Sir Henry Rawlinson ('Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,' xv., p. 215, note), he is not a believer in the infallibility of the Hebrew records.

to restore the spirit of the law of Moses, which had been overlaid by the subsequent accretions of a sacerdotal system. We are desired to believe that Jesus himself made no claim at first to Messiahship or any superhuman attributes, but that he was either led to the adoption of this character by subsequent consideration, or arbitrarily invested with more exalted pretensions by the Jewish prejudices or ignorant enthusiasm of his followers. And with regard to the history as it stands, we are reminded that the books of the Jews are full of mythical ingredients, and that the Gospels are made up of legendary exaggerations, in some cases designedly fabricated for the purpose of giving to Jesus a superhuman office and origin which he never claimed for himself. Finally, we are assured that every fulfilled prophecy is a lucky coincidence or a prediction posterior to the event, and that every miraculous narrative is necessarily impossible, and therefore, *ipso facto*, false.

Now it must be conceded by every candid man, whose logical powers are in full activity, that this mode of accounting for the origin of Judaism and Christianity does not touch the grounds on which their advocate would rely. If the religion of Moses and its influence on the Jews had been comparable with the effects of legislation on any other ancient race, we might have been disposed to disregard the claim to inspiration, which is the only feature common to the Jewish and heathen lawgivers. There are no resemblances between Mosaism and Mahommedanism except those which the latter has borrowed from its predecessor, and the schemes of older legislators have neither the sublime conceptions nor the lasting separative effects of the Jewish revelation. The statement with regard to Jesus does not accord with the impressions which his history inevitably makes upon every unprejudiced reader, and the denial of the possibility of miracles, without which such a view respecting the origin of Christianity would be rejected with disdain, is clearly begging

the whole question respecting the historical truth of a revelation from God. The simple questions are: have we the testimony of competent witnesses? could they have been deceived? were they likely on any account to propagate a falsehood? If our evidences on these and other points will stand the test of the strictest scrutiny, and this has been shown again and again, we must believe that Christianity was from God, and then its miraculous confirmations are mere incidents presumed in the general fact. The evidence of prophecy is one which demands a very minute examination; and it must be treated in subordination to the results of scientific criticism; but when submitted to a strict and honest scrutiny, it will convince us that the holy men of old were instruments in a revelation from God to man. Into these and other details we need not enter; they are fully discussed in well-known and generally accessible treatises. It is sufficient to have shewn generally that nothing has been advanced against Christianity which has tended to shake the historical foundations of our religion or to impugn its divine origin and distinctive character. And thus our first proposition is established.

We now come to our second proposition, namely, that Christianity is not interested in the maintenane of the assumptions or allegations on the part of itsadvocates, which its assailants have successfully impugned.

If we consider the long period during which persons have been found to object to the arguments adduced by the advocates of Christianity, if we remember that the supposed enemies of our faith have included among them many men distinguished no less by their abilities and learning than by their wisdom and love of truth, if we bear in mind that the course which they have taken has exposed them to a great deal of obloquy, if not to more serious inconveniences, and that it is recommended by no prejudice or suggestion of personal advantage; we cannot

resist the impression, that the long-continued opposition to Christianity must have been sustained by a conviction that the right was at least partially on the side of the assailants, and that the defenders had mixed up with the truths, for which they pleaded, some large and fatal admixture of falsehood or error. This impression grows stronger, when we observe that the grounds on which our opponents mainly rely have received an increasing support from the inductive philosophy of nature and from philological and historical criticism. The men, who have cultivated these branches of profound and accurate knowledge, have generally been found among the friends of religious truth; some of them have been the most able and conspicuous defenders of the Christian faith. And the sober veneration, with which they regard all the works of the Creator, gives an additional value to the concessions which they have so frankly and unreservedly made. We cannot, therefore, refuse to accept the explanation which has been already suggested, that Christianity has been implicated in the maintenance of some untenable positions, that the safety of the fortress has been compromised by a descent to the neutral ground, or, to resume the Scriptural metaphor, that the champion of our religion has taken, instead of the shield of faith, the worthless buckler of ignorance protected by sophistical argumentation, and has endeavoured to propagate revealed truth, not by the genuine sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, but by the human weapons of stereotyped dogmatism and bigotry.

It is not difficult to show that the only triumphs which have been achieved by the adversaries of religion result from the developments of an apparent opposition between certain assumptions of Christian theology and the inevitable conclusions of learning and science. Revealed religion is true and certain, because it is from God; opinions respecting religion are not necessarily true, because they are from man; and when they have

no authority except that which they derive from traditions tracing their pedigree to an ignorant and uninquiring age, theological dogmas are not calculated to carry on a successful war with the results of modern philosophy and scholarship; for then it is only a battle between human puerility and human manhood; unless, indeed, we go a step farther and say, that science is the true interpreter of the voice of God, which speaks in nature, and scholarship the true interpreter of the voice of God, which speaks in the records of revelation, so that theological dogmatism, in this opposition, represents man as engaged in a controversy with his Maker.

A little consideration will convince us that all the difficulties by which the defence of Christianity has been impeded have arisen from the maintenance by our teachers and advocates of two specific opinions; (1) that every statement in the Scriptures is inspired and infallibly true,[1] and (2) that Christianity has made itself responsible, not only for the truth of Judaism, to which we attribute an authority scarcely less divine than that of Christianity itself, but also for a belief in good and bad angels, which is clearly traceable to a human origin. Learning and science repudiate these dogmas: there is no leading man in any sect who will attempt to defend them on scientific principles, and the pleas by which they are generally supported are so irrational that we can hardly resist the occasional suspicion that they are brought forward with a secret conviction of their worthlessness, and with the dishonest intention of deluding the

[1] This dogma has been most unflinchingly avowed by Dr. S. P. Tregelles, who says: "I avow my full belief in the absolute plenary inspiration of Scripture, 2 Tim. iii. 16. I believe the 66 books of the Old and New Testament to be verbally the Word of God, as absolutely as were the Ten Commandments written by the finger of God on the two tables of stone." It is needless to add that Dr. Tregelles, who is a very confident gentleman, has never attempted to prove this astounding proposition; he does not even tell us to which of the two copies of the Decalogue he gives the preference; but his edition of Gesenius' Lexicon shows that he can repeat *usque ad nauseam* the most peremptory and unreasoning platitudes.

ignorant and superstitious into a belief, which may strengthen the authority of the priestly conscience-keeper.

What can be more destructive than such a conservatism as this? What can be more unwise than to say that all Christianity depends upon dogmas, theories, or assumptions, call them what you will, for which no man can be found to put forward an honest argument? We are told that speculations on these subjects are dangerous;—to what? to the indestructible truth of God, or to some perishable fallacy of man?[1] If to the latter, why do we consecrate error with an apotheosis, and fling the charge of blasphemy against those who would break to pieces this monstrous image of Dagon? Such is the fatal obstinacy of those who identify human error with divine truth, that an able, and, in one sense, learned Bishop, has told his assembled clergy that a man can hardly deny the received theory of inspiration without calling in question the historical evidences of Christianity, and so advancing one step towards the rejection of the Gospel as a revelation from God.[2] And evangelical clergymen, who endeavour to compensate for a lack of critical learning and argumentative ability by loud denunciations of those who differ from them, have been known to wind up a Manichæan sermon with the astounding declaration, that, if we do not believe in the personal and eternal existence of the devil, we must relinquish all faith in God and in Christ! If it can be shown that these dogmas are quite unconnected with the truths of revelation, and quite untenable even on theological grounds, what shall we say of those whose faith is dependent on their maintenance? Do they deserve to be called the advocates of Christianity? Are they even worthy of being termed the friends of religious faith? And are not both names more

[1] Dr. Whichcot well observes: "Every thing is dangerous to him who is afraid of it."

[2] Bishop of London's Charge, 1850, p. 59.

properly applicable to those who would set our religion free from the necessity of sanctioning indefensible error?

As we entertain no doubt whatever on this subject, we feel that we shall do good service to the cause of Christian truth, and that we shall place the defence of the faith on a true and secure basis, if we show that these two erroneous assumptions or opinions—the latter of which is a mere offshoot from the former—are not only indefensible in themselves, but also unessential as theological dogmas, and not included among the elements of Christian orthodoxy.

APPENDIX II.

(CHAP. II. P. 103).

ON MANICHÆISM AS OPPOSED OR RELATED TO CHRISTIANITY.

THE particular form of heresy which is called Manichæism, from the Persian Gnostic, Manes, or Manichæus, to whom it owed its special development in the middle of the third century, is, in every sense, the most important and interesting of those attempts to connect Christianity with existing forms of belief or speculation, which were so rife in the earliest ages of the Church. It has not failed to attract the notice which it deserves, for, in addition to the clear and sensible account of this heresy which is to be found in the pages of Mosheim and Norton, we have two complete and elaborate works on the subject, that by Beausobre, of which the first volume appeared in 1734,[1] and that by Ferdinand Christian Baur, which was published in the corresponding period of the present century;[2] and with a special reference to these works, Dr. Pusey has called attention to the subject in an appendix to his translation of the Confessions of St. Augustine.[3] But the majority of theologians in this country entertain very vague notions as to the relationship between Christianity and Manichæism; as to the amount of truth or falsehood

[1] *Histoire Critique de Manichée et du Manicheisme.* Amsterdam, vol. i., 1734, vol. ii, 1739.

[2] *Das Manichäische Religionssystem nach den Quellen neu untersucht und entwickelt.* Tübingen, 1831.

[3] Pp. 314 346. Dr. Pusey says that "Beausobre's work on Manichæism is altogether confused by its liberalist principles. It is not a history, but an apology of a system which he ill understood."

in the latter, and as to the influence which, in its worst features, it has exercised, and still exercises on the opinions and practice of Protestants. We propose, therefore, to indicate very briefly (1) the nature of the Iranian religion, in which this dualism originated; (2) the declared opposition of Jewish monotheism to this system of belief; (3) the tendency of the Jews, during and after their connection with Babylon, to adopt some portion of this dualism; (4) the manner in which the early Christians adopted what was true, and rejected what was false in the dualistic theory; (5) the special attempt of Manes to make Christianity responsible for the whole system; (6) the existing manifestations of Manichæism. This inquiry will be a necessary supplement to the discussions in our first Appendix.

(1). With the exception, perhaps, of the Jews, there is no ancient nation whose religion is more interesting to us than that of the Persians. Occupying, as they did and still do, a part of the original home of the great Indo-Germanic family to which we belong, and standing more closely in contact with the Semitic tribes than any other branch of the family, their religion furnishes a much better basis for comparative mythology than that of any other Arian race. For while, as we shall see, their dualism has passed from their Babylonian subjects to the Jews, and from the Jews to the Christians, the oldest remains of the Indian language and literature betray evident traces of the ancient worship of Persia, and the European children of Irân have retained in their vocabularies many peculiar terms borrowed from the same form of religion. Thus the name of God in old Persian is *daêva*, a word connected with the root *div* or *dyu*, "*to* shine," and so indicating the Persian conception that the good God is the principle of light. We have the same word, but not always the same idea, in the Sanscrit *dévas*, Latin *deus* or *divus*, and *dies-piter*, Greek Ζεύς, διFός, Lithuanian *dievas*, German *Zio* and *Tyo*. The Persian *Yimâ* becomes, with a slight change of attributes, the *Yama* of the ancient Indians (see Spiegel, *Avesta*, p. 7). Similarly, *Ahura*, who, as *Ahura-maz-dao*, "the spirit of the great God of light," is the beneficent deity of the Persians, is represented in India by a bad divinity, *Asura*; and in both religions we have the *Haoma* or *Soma*, a plant regarded both as an instrument and as an object of worship. Independently of the more ancient traces of religious influence,

such as the stories of Artemis Tauropola and Europa (*Varronianus*, pp. 49-51), the attempts of the Persians to conquer Eastern Europe, their settlements in Asia Minor, the early intercourse of Greek physicians and travellers with the subjects of the great King and with the great King himself, above all the fulfilment by Alexander of those plans of conquest, which Xenophon's narrative had suggested and proved to be feasible—all this would fully account for a steady and continuous dissemination of the creed of ancient Irân. It seems probable that the speculations, which claim Zoroaster for their author, were given to the world in the sixth century before Christ, namely, in the same century with those of Buddha and Confutsee or Confucius, but a little in advance of them (see Röth, *Gesch. unserer aberländischen Philosophie:* Mannheim, 1846, pp. 348 foll.). The machinery of the religious system, which was introduced or elucidated by the Bactrian sage, is well known, and may be stated very briefly. Zoroaster assumed that all things good and evil emanated from one everlasting but unmanifested deity, who created from himself a dualism perpetually exhibiting the antithesis of light and darkness. This absolute god they called *Zaruana akarana*, "the uncreated eternity" (Röth, *u. s.* note, 604), and they considered that this primary existence contained all space and time (Damascius, *de primis principiis*, p. 384, Kopp). From *Zaruana akarana*, two special gods, the real objects of worship and fear, were immediately derived—the god of light and goodness, whom they called *Ormuzd*, in Zend *Ahura Maz-dao*, "the spirit of the great god," also *çpento-mainyus*, "the holy-minded":—and the god of darkness and evil, whom they called *Ahriman*, in Zend *Anghra-mainyus*, "the evil-minded," also *dush-mainyus*, δυσμενής, "the hostile" (Burnouf, *Yaçna*, pp. 88-91). It is remarkable that they regarded the evil principle as anterior to the good in this manifestation of dualistic divinity, so that the latter came into being as a remedial dispensation, as a principle of light and order, to regulate the chaotic darkness and anarchy, which had already established itself in the universe. This work, however, was supposed to involve a perpetual contest; and Zoroaster was not content to place "light" and "darkness," as Pythagoras did, on the two opposite sides in a συστοιχία or parallel columns of opposed realities. It was supposed that the *çpento-mainyus*, Ormuzd, generated from himself six other spiritual beings of the

same nature, bearing the name of *Amshaspand*, that is, in Zend, *amesoha-çpenta*, "immortal saint"; and Ahriman, in like manner, gave birth to six *devs*, *daevas* or evil spirits, between whom and the followers or companions of Ormuzd there is perpetual war. These bands of six are not only opposed to each other in the aggregate, but in each class the separate beings have their special opponents. The following table exhibits the supposed opposition:

Amshaspands (*Ormuzd*).	Devs (*Ahriman*).
1. *Bahman*, "goodness."	1. *Akuman*, "malice."
2. *Khordad*, "creator."	2. *Tarik*, "destroyer."
3. *Amerdad*, "giver of immortality."	3. *Zarech*, "the waster."
4. *Rashnerast*, "truthful."	4. *Ndoghaitya*, "deceiver."
5. *Ardibehesht*, "pure-fire."	5. *Sarva*, "destroying fire."
6. *Shahriver*, "giver of wealth."	6. *Indra*, "the divider or impoverisher of men."

The first five pairs in this comparison are given by Röth (*u. s.*, p. 400). We have opposed *Indra* to *Shahriver*, who, as *Kshathravairya*, "the lord of the desirable," is a god of wealth, and corresponds to πλοῦτος, placed by Plutarch among the Amshaspands (*de Iside*, c. 47; *cf.* Burnouf, *Yaçna*, p. 151), because the first spirit in each class seems to stand by itself, because *Khordad* and *Amerdad* always form a pair of spirits (Burnouf, *Yaçna*, pp. 158-9), and because *Ndoghaitya*, *Sarva*, *Indra*, form a trio in the Indian mythology, and the two former being appropriated as opponents of *Rashnerast* and *Ardibehesht*, there remains only *Shahriver* as the opponent of *Andra* or *Indra*. It is true that the latter is sometimes opposed to *Behram*, the spirit of the planet Mars, and is the rival of *Ardibehesht* in the creed of the later Parsees. But *Behram* is not a regular Amshaspand, and *Ardibehesht* is better matched with his mischievous correlative *Sarva*. Having, by this play of fancy, arranged the oppositions in the spiritual world, Zoroaster's scheme proceeds to deal with the visible and tangible creation. The higher spiritual existences constitute the model or type according to which the visible world is formed; and the agent in the creation is either Ormuzd alone, or this good spirit in conjunction with the Amshaspands. The same word, *honover*, by which *Zaruana* created Ormuzd, is used by the latter for the creation of the World-egg, and the twenty-four Izeds which it contained (Röth, *u. s.* p. 401). The work of creation was carried on for a succession of six periods; and as

the six days' creation of the Jews was connected with the ordinary week of the Egyptians, which they had adopted, so the similar theory of the Persians points to the division of the year into six seasons. It was not without reference to this, that Plato adopted the perfect number, six, as the type of completed creation. (See *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1843, No. 8.) Although the scheme of Zoroaster makes a marked distinction between the invisible world and its visible counterpart, it must be remembered that the latter too was full of objects of worship. Heaven and earth, the stars, the sun and moon, light, fire and water, the winds, the mountains, the rivers, and even the trees, were supposed to be instinct with life, and to be worthy of adoration. But this does not raise them to the rank of deities. They are rather watched over and protected by spirits of their own, who play the same part as the guardian angels of mediæval Christianity. The sun especially—in Zend, *Hvare*—is connected with a great spirit, *Mithras*, who, as the diffuser of light, and the dispeller of darkness, is the chief associate of Ormuzd, and the most active enemy of Ahriman. He is called the invincible Sun-god, because he exhibits himself every morning as victorious over the darkness of night; and he is also termed the mediator, either because the sun conveys to men the blessings of light and warmth, for which they praise *Ormuzd*, or because he stood between *Ormuzd* and *Ahriman*, and partook, in some measure, of the nature of both (Plutarch, *de Iside*, c. 46). The latter explanation of the name 'mediator' appears to be supported by the planetary mythology of the Chaldæans, who considered two of the planets as beneficent, two as malignant, and the other three as partaking of both natures. And the same view seems to have been adopted by the Greeks, when they regarded Jupiter as the god of light and blessing, Hades as the god of darkness and evil, and imagined Harmonia as the offspring of malignant Mars and benignant Venus (Plut., *ibid.* c. 48). Without pursuing the Persian religion into its details, it is clear that it was a system of dualistic belief, refined by the Bactrian Zoroaster from a more ancient worship of the elements. To the end, however, of their history, the Persians adored the visible elements, both immediately and under the form of representative symbols. In the *Yaçna* we find such invocations as the following (Burnouf, p. 375): "I celebrate, I invoke Ahura and Mithra, exalted, im-

mortal, pure; and the stars, holy and celestial creations; and the star Tashter, luminous, resplendent; and the moon, which preserves the seed of the bull; and the sun, sovereign, rapid steed, eye of Ahuramazdao; Mithra, chief of the provinces." In accordance with this, Darius, who in the Behistun inscription ascribes his sovereignty to the favour of Ormuzd, is made by Herodotus (iii. 84-88) to record on an inscription the fact that he owed his throne to a groom and a steed; and we have shown, in a special paper, that this inscription must have referred to the favouring influence of the Sun-god, whom the Persians worshipped under the form of a horse, or of a chariot and horses (see *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xvi., pp. 1-7). Now this idea must have been much older than the time of Zoroaster. The chariot of Phœbus was imagined or adopted by the Greeks long before the sixth century, and horses and chariots of the sun are mentioned among the imported superstitions of the Jews before the reign of Josiah in the seventh century (2 Kings xxiii. 11); so that, if Zoroaster's epoch is fixed at the period from 589-512 B.C. (Anquetil du Perron, *apud Kleuker, Zendavesta*, part iii., p. 40, *sqq.*, *Anhang*, pp. 327-349), he must have confined himself to systematizing or explaining by philosophical commentaries an elementary dualism, reaching back to the earliest ages of the Iranian race. And when Plutarch tells us (*u. s.*, c. 46) that Zoroaster taught the Persians to offer prayers and thanksgivings to *Ormuzd* and his associates, but to make averting and gloomy oblations to *Ahriman* and the host of darkness, he must mean that the Bactrian sage, whom he so completely ante-dates, stood as the representative and improver of an existing creed, which he carried to its last refinement, when he divided fire into the two opposing deities, *Ardibehesht* and *Sarva*, the one representing the purity and life of the element, the other its agency in destruction and death.[1]

(2). The Jews, who had previously known, and shown a tendency to adopt, some parts of the elementary worship of their Eastern neighbours, became acquainted with the special doctrines of Zoroaster when the Persians conquered Babylon, the land of their captivity; and at this epoch we have a direct reference to

[1] It is worthy of observation, with reference to the functions of *Sarva*, that the Greeks qualify both *fire* and *Hades* by the same epithet, ἀΐδηλος, "destructive;" *cf.* Hom. *Il.* ii. 455, Soph. *Ajax*, 608.

the Bactrian dualism in the religious writings of the Jews. It is a well-known and generally-admitted fact in Biblical criticism, that the prophecies attributed to Isaiah must be divided into two main subdivisions; the one, consisting of the first thirty-nine chapters, is the work, for the most part, of the great prophet, who flourished in the eighth century B.C.; the other, containing chapters xl.-lxvi., is attributed to some eminent writer, who flourished in the sixth century, in the time of Zoroaster, when the Persian conquerors of Babylon began to hold out to the exiled Jews some prospect of a return to their native country. This beautiful supplement to Isaiah, by whomsoever written, is inspired with the noblest sentiments of the prophetic school, and represents the thoughts of the truest Israelites. Although, therefore, the writer regards Cyrus as a benefactor, as a servant or instrument of the true God, he does not hesitate, in directly addressing the Persian king, to controvert in express terms the dualism of Zoroaster, and to maintain that there are no opposing deities of light and darkness, but only one Supreme Being, to whom good and evil equally belong. Jehovah is made to address "his anointed Cyrus" in these remarkable words (xlv. 5 *sqq.*): "I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me: that they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that there is none beside me. I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all these things." Surely there could not be a more explicit contradiction and repudiation of the Persian dualism than that which is contained in these words addressed to a Persian king. We have another example of the same kind in the Elohistic cosmogony in the Book of Genesis, which, as will be shown on independent grounds in the following Appendix, was drawn up at the same epoch as the supplement to the prophecies of Isaiah. In this account of the creation, we find it stated, with a tacit reference to Zoroaster's theory, that, although the elements of water and darkness, which he placed in the domain of Ahriman, were antecedent to the creation, yet it was Elohim, who, at first, and without any previous creation of Ormuzd, introduced light and order into the chaotic mass; it was He—for the polytheism is merely grammatical—who immediately divided the light from the darkness. And though the writer speaks of the heavenly host (ii. 1),

there is not the slightest reason for any assumption that the heavenly bodies were regarded as created intelligencies. These are special examples of the opposition between the more ancient Judaism and the dualism of Zoroaster. But in the whole body of Jewish literature prior to the exile, there is constant evidence of the fact, that no intermediate agencies were recognised, that there were no separate powers of light and darkness, of good and evil, but that, in all his manifestations, the one personal God was immediately apparent or immediately active. The term *mal'hâk*, which we render "angel" in the earlier books of the Old Testament, is never used to signify a created intelligence, but always indicates God himself, in some manifestation or other. Indeed, the form of the word, as Fürst has shown, excludes the sense of personality. Thus, when the three angels come to Abraham (Gen. xviii. 1, 22), it appears that his intercourse is with God alone. When Jehovah so emphatically reveals himself to Moses (Exod. 2-*sqq.*), it is said that the angel of the Lord appeared to him in the bush. And when the angel had appeared to Manoah and his wife, the remark is "we shall surely die, because we have seen God" (Judges, xiii. 22). Perhaps the best examples of the fact to which we are referring are those in which God appears as an agent in the suggestion of evil thoughts. Thus not only is it stated (Numbers, xxii. 32) that God himself appeared to be a Satan or adversary to Balaam, but he is represented as hardening Pharaoh's heart (Exodus, iv. 21, vii. 3, 13, etc.); and while, in the book of Chronicles (xxi. 1), which was written after the captivity, David's sinful wish to count his people is attributed to the suggestion of Satan, in the older books of Samuel (2 Sam. xxiv. 1) it is expressly said that the Lord moved David to number Israel and Judah. With regard to the most distinctly symbolical of those forms under which the Jews conceived the agency of God, namely, the Cherubim and Seraphim, which they represented under forms derived from the Egyptian hieroglyphics, it is quite clear that these were not regarded as spiritual intelligences, but merely as the natural phenomena of meteorology; the clouds and the winds being called *cherubim* or "snatchers," and the lightning and other fiery appearances being regarded as *seraphim* or "burners," just as Æschylus sums up the objects of elemental fear in the description, that the "mid-air teems with floating fires, and that things which walk and fly can tell of the

virulence of gusty hurricanes" (*Choëph.* 581-4); a classification of precisely the same kind as that in Psalm civ. 4, where we read that God makes the winds his messengers, and the flames of fire his ministers. The same renunciation of the idea of intermediate agency between God and man may be seen in the general opposition, by the Old Testament no less than by the New, of the divine Spirit to the flesh, whether of man or beast. Nothing stands between these two. They form the one antithesis. The true Israelites worshipped Jehovah as "the God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numbers, xvi. 22. xxvii. 16), whether of men (Isaiah, lvii. 16) or of other animals (Psalm civ. 29, 30; Isaiah, xxxi. 3). His spirit hovered over the unformed mass of matter and animated it (Gen. i. 2); the same inspiration made a living soul to dwell in the dust of the ground (Gen. ii. 7; Job, xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4); and wherever men are clever artists (Exod. xxxi. 3), skilful generals (Numbers, xxvii. 18), brave warriors (Judges, vi. 34; Psalm cxliv. 1), and zealous preachers (Isaiah, lxi. 1), it is the spirit of Jehovah that comes upon them, and gives them their competency or intellectual and moral eminence.

(3). Notwithstanding their previous immunity from any superstitious personification of the powers of nature, the Jews did not return from exile without some infection from the system with which they lived in contact during their residence in Babylonia, and subsequent influences tended to strengthen the hold of this new superstition, which had asserted its full supremacy by the time when the Book of Daniel was composed, in the second century before our era. In this book we find the celestial hierarchy of Amshaspands fully recognised. We may be disposed to waive the question whether the word קָדוֹשׁ, which means "a saint," or "a holy one," in Daniel, iv. 13, viii. 13, Zech. xiv. 5, is, or is not, a translation of the old Persian *çpentô*. The same word is found, with a similar reference, in a more ancient, but interpolated poem, the supplement to the blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxiii. 2), and seems there to be predicated of the seraphim (see *Jashar*, p. 230), the fiery spirits who surrounded the throne of Jehovah (Isaiah, vi. 3), and constituted his host (1 Kings, xxii. 19), though they were not personified till the Jewish writers, as in the last quotation, had an opportunity of enriching their style with pictures borrowed from Babylonian mythology. In the Book of Daniel, however, we have not only

a distinct personification, but a nomenclature, to which the Jerusalem Talmud expressly assigns a Babylonian origin. The statement is (Lightfoot, *Horæ Heb. et Talm. in Luc.*, p. 723): "R. Simeon, the son of Lachish, says: 'the names of the angels came up in the hand of Israel from Babylon. For, before this, the expression merely was: one of the seraphim flew to me; the seraphim stood before him, Isaiah, vi. etc.; but, afterwards, the man Gabriel, Dan. ix. 21, and Michael, your prince, Dan. x. 21.'" In the Book of Tobit, the angel Raphael describes himself as "one of the seven holy angels who enter in before the glory of the Holy One (xii. 15)"; and in precisely the same way, the angel Gabriel describes himself in St. Luke's Gospel. He says to Zacharias (i. 19): "I am Gabriel, that stand in the presence of God." In the former of these passages, Gabriel makes himself one of seven ministering spirits, and this is in close approximation to the Zoroastrian idea of Ormuzd and his six Amshaspands. But the Jews, in adapting this machinery to their own purposes, seem to have limited the attendant spirits to the number four, probably from some confusion between the Amshaspands and the seraphim of Isaiah on the one hand, and the four creatures of Ezekiel on the other. Hence arose the idea that the *Tsaba*, or "heavenly host," was divided into four armies, corresponding to the four great divisions of the Hebrew host in the wilderness, and distinguished by similar ensigns (Numbers, ii., *cf.* Rev. iv. 6). And the Jewish tradition tells us, that "there are four armies of angels of ministry singing praises before the Holy and Blessed One. The first, that of Michael on his right hand; the second, that of Gabriel on his left; the third, that of Uriel in front of him; the fourth, that of Raphael behind" (*Pirke Rabbi Eliezer* iv. init.). It is idle to object to the obvious fact that these ideas came from Babylon and Persia, by saying that the names of the angels "are not only Semitic, but of that Semitic form which is distinctively and peculiarly Hebrew, as distinguished even from the Aramaic of Babylon, in which the greater part of the book of the prophet of the captivity is written" (Mill, *Mythical Interpretation of Luke* i. p. 57). As the Jews retained their own name, *Mal'hâk*, although it was properly inapplicable to these created intelligences, and did not adopt the Persian word, which had, at a much earlier period, found its way into the Greek language (see Leducq, *On the Origin*

and Primitive Meaning of the word Ange, *Trans. of the Philological Society*, vol. vi. No. 132), it was not likely that they would borrow designations for the individuals of the hierarchy, which they did not import literally and *in extenso*. With regard to the names, which they composed for the purpose, it is worthy of observation, that they are the same formations as those which are found in the names of the prophets Ezekiel and Daniel; and we shall see, in the following Appendix, that this is really an argument of time, and tends to show that Michael, Gabriel, Uriel, and Raphael, were designations compounded at the time when Jehovism was temporarily suspended, in the latter half of the captivity. When it is urged that an evil being, an accuser and afflicter of men, is undoubtedly brought forward in the Book of Job (i. 6, *sqq.*; ii. 1, *sqq.*; xxxviii. 7), and that a being, with the attributes of the archangel Michael, appears to Joshua before Jericho (Josh. v. 13-15), we merely say, waiving all argument on the latter passage, which may, after all, be a theophany, that these two books belong to the class in which we should expect to find some traces of the Babylonian influences; for the Book of Job is shown, by its place in the Hagiographa, and by many internal evidences, to be one of the later books in the Canon; and the Book of Joshua, with its quotations from older works, and its confusion between Joshua and Barak, is one of the least original of the Masorethic compilations, the tail-piece being a clumsy Elohistic restoration. On the whole, then, it cannot be doubted that Dr. Strauss stated a simple fact when he said (*Leben Jesu*, § 17): "it is in the Maccabean Daniel, and in the Apocryphal Tobit, that this doctrine of angels, in its more precise form, first appears; and it is evidently a product of the influence of the Zend religion of the Persians on the Jewish mind."

(4). As Christianity took its rise among the Jews after they had been familiarised with the most influential superstitions of the Persians and Babylonians, it was a matter of course that the Jewish Christians should more or less adopt what had become the religious phraseology of their countrymen. The extent, to which the first teachers of our religion implicated themselves in the demonology of their countrymen, will become the subject of discussion in a subsequent chapter. Here it will be sufficient to call attention to the fact, that at all events they were free from any real approach to dualism. This will be shown best by con-

trasting the general spirit of their teaching, and some of their most emphatic declarations, with the language which they borrowed from the Babylonian school. For in this way it will appear that they used the language of Oriental dualism with an intentionally controversial reference. The commencement of St. John's Gospel is a striking example of the opposition between light and darkness as types of good and evil respectively, which is common to the teaching of Zoroaster and the early Christians. Yet we see here that there is no assumption of parallel kingdoms of opposed spiritual beings. The language is obviously metaphorical; but there are express statements in contradiction to the dualistic hypothesis. The writer begins by saying that the Word was co-eternal with the Father, not a created being like the Ormuzd of the Persians. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made. There were not therefore separate creations of light and darkness, separate workings of Ormuzd and Ahriman. The Word is the only source of light and life; and when it is said that the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not (John, i. 5), we are to understand that this refers to that love of evil in the lower nature of man which prevents him from discerning the righteousness of God (John, iii. 19, xii. 35, 46, viii. 12). When, therefore, Satan is mentioned as the ruler of this world, and as a power of darkness (John, xii. 31; Acts, xxvi. 18; Ephes. ii. 2, vi. 12, etc.), we see that this is only a personification referring to the carnal wickedness, which makes the natural man, represented by the wicked world in general, at enmity with the light of God (*cf.* 1 John, ii. 13, with 1 John, v. 4, 18, 19). And that the disciples of Christ may not be so far misled by the adoption of the Babylonian antithesis of light and darkness, as to believe that even the representatives of the former are angelic beings to be worshipped on their own account, even in the most fantastic and pictorial forms of this imagery, a caution is introduced (Rev. xix. 10, xxii. 9); and St. Paul expressly says to the Colossians, by way of warning against these Rabbinistic anticipations of Manichæism, "let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into things which he hath not seen" (ii. 18). That there were inconsistencies in the opinions and expressions of the Apostles respecting angels and devils is only too true, and they had, no

doubt, very little idea of the use which would be made of their concessions to prevalent phraseology. But they did not pretend to infallibility; and if they could now see the manner in which they are invested with superhuman attributes, they would exclaim to their modern worshippers, as they did to the poor mistaken heathens of Lystra, "Sirs, why do ye these things? we also are men of like passions with you" (Acts, xiv. 15). But it is one thing to personify the elemental agencies, which exhibit the power of the great Creator in his dealings with this lower world, and it is another thing to adopt the Persian superstitions, and pay worship to a hierarchy of intermediate beings. It is one thing to say to Christians, who have devoted themselves to a life of purity and holiness, after having been addicted to gross and polluting superstitions: "Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord: walk as children of light" (Ephes. v. 8); or: "Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we are not of the light, nor of darkness. Therefore let us not sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober" (1 Thess. v. 5, 6): it is another thing to say with Zoroaster and his followers, that the Supreme Being has created two distinct kingdoms of light and darkness, and has placed them under the control of immortal beings, good and evil, who are in perpetual contest and controversy, and to call upon men to offer idolatrous worship, of prayer and deprecation, to the deities of these two realms. Whatever hold or handles the Apostles of Christianity may have given to those, who wished to bind more closely the ties which connected effete Judaism with the dualistic worship of Persia, they themselves believed and preached that there is only one God, and he supremely good, and that all men, Jews and heathens, have access through the Son by one Spirit to the Father (Ephes. ii. 18).

(5). Originating as it did with a people who had connections with Alexandria on the one side, and with Babylon on the other, it was to be expected that the earliest affections of Christianity would be traceable to those two sources of corruption. And, in point of fact, we find that the first and most influential heresies took their rise either in the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which found its cradle in the Græco-Egyptian metropolis, or in the Medo-Persic speculations, which the Rabbis of Babylon were too willing to adopt and propagate. On the one hand, most of the

Gnostics were Egyptians, who contemplated Christianity from the point of view attained by the Platonic philosophy, modified by fresh contact with those Egyptian ideas which had influenced Greek thought from the days of Pythagoras. It was here, too, that Philo and others had made a mixture of Judaism with the same elements. On the other hand, in addition to the less prominent influence of the Rabbinistic doctors, whose lore was derived from Babylon, we have the great and prominent case of Manes, who professedly and intentionally rejected all the doctrines and facts of Christianity, which he could not bring into harmony with the Zoroastrian religion of ancient Persia, and his own speculations built up on this basis. It is quite possible that the Gnostics may have imbibed some principles of Persian dualism, and that even the Greek philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato may have derived some materials from the same source. But the author of the Manichæan heresy stands distinct by the boldness of his avowals, and the completeness of the scheme of accommodation which he endeavoured to substitute for the Christianity of his age.

It appears that Manes, or Manichæus, was born probably at Carcub, in Huzitis, in the year 240 A.D. He was of Magian blood, and combined with a perfect knowledge of the doctrines of Zoroaster a number of accomplishments eminently rare in those days and in that part of Asia. He was acquainted with the language and literature of Greece. Mathematics, music, and geography, were his favourite studies, and he had made himself master of Jewish and Christian theology. It is difficult to say whether he was most zealous originally for the faith of his ancestors, or for the creed of Christianity, which he had adopted. But there is no doubt that personal vanity was mingled with his enthusiasm, and that, in seeking to combine in one system the dualism of ancient Persia and the revelations of the Gospel, he assigned to himself a part not less prominent than that which he allowed to the lawgiver of the Magians, or the Head of the Church. And he paid the penalty for his ambition by a death, which was martyrdom, or just punishment, according to the sincerity of his convictions. This took place in 277 A.D., and Manichæism was established by the death of its founder (*Beausobre*, i. p. 209).

The system of Manes, as we have already said, was an

amalgamation of the old dualism of the Persians, as we have described it above, with the more salient features of the Christian revelation. Starting from the opposition between light and darkness, and the spiritual beings who peopled the two kingdoms, he assumed that they had long existed side by side, when the Prince of Darkness, happening to discover that there was this antagonistic realm, invaded it with his host of Devs. The armies of light, with the first man for their leader, did battle with him, but not so successfully as to prevent him from infusing his material elements into the once pure kingdom of light. And although the Living Spirit, who succeeded to the command of the host of light, gained some advantage over the invaders, the common ground was still occupied by both parties, and Ahriman was able to create the parents of our race, who were compounded of both natures, having a material body and two souls, one full of concupiscence, and the other fraught with reason and immortality. The earth, as a habitation for man, was framed by the Living Spirit from the matter of darkness; and as allies to what was good in man, the Supreme Being produced from his own substance two secondary existences, Christ, who resided in the sun, and corresponded to the Persian Mithrás, the mediator; and the Paraclete or Holy Ghost, who floated in the earth's atmosphere, penetrating the souls of men, and gradually preparing them for restoration to the kingdom of light. In the course of time, Christ came down from the sun, and assuming the form of man, appeared among the Jews, and taught and worked miracles, till the Prince of Darkness instigated the unbelievers to procure his semblance of death on the cross. The Mediator then reascended to the sun, leaving the Paraclete to complete his work on the earth. Manes announced that he was this Paraclete, and that those who received his version of Christianity would gradually triumph over matter, and, after an abode of fifteen days in the purifying waters of the moon, would proceed to the sun, whose fire would cleanse them from all the stains of matter. Those, on the other hand, who refused to receive the teaching of Manes, would, after death, pass to other forms of matter, and inhabit the bodies of the lower animals till they had atoned for their unbelief. Lastly, the world would be consumed by fire, and so the powers of darkness would be expelled, and driven back to their original abode in the realms of gloom and despair.

From this account it will be seen that Manichæism was, in the language of Gibbon (iii. 42, ed. Smith), "an artful composition of Oriental and Christian theology." Our present limits will not allow us to draw a parallelism between Manes and Mahomet (Mosheim, p. 748), or to inquire how far he was anticipated by Simon Magus (Baur, pp. 467-475), and how many points of resemblance there are between his scheme and that of the Buddhists (Baur, pp. 433-451). But it is highly important to show, however briefly, that the heresy of Manichæism, or that which constituted its distinctive position in regard to Christianity, consisted in his attempt to make Christianity responsible for the whole system of Persian dualism; to substitute that system for Judaism as a basis of Christianity, and, assuming for himself the functions of an Apostle, or more, to supersede those Jewish Preachers and Evangelists to whom the foundation of our religion was actually due. In setting aside the authority of the Old Testament, and maintaining that the books of the Jews were overlaid with un-Mosaic falsifications, the Manichæans merely took the same ground as the authors of the Clementine Homilies, and anticipated the results of Biblical criticism. But this was only a negative part of their system. Not content with this abjudication, he made the Zoroastrian dualism more completely a substratum for Christianity than Judaism had ever been. On the one hand, the Manichæans accepted only the moral law of Moses. "Age, si libet," says Faustus (*ap. August.* xxii. 1), "assensu communi scriptoribus damnatis, defensionem suscipiamus legis et prophetarum. Legem autem non dico ego, non circumcisionem, nec Sabbatha et sacrificia, ceteraque ejusmodi Judæorum, sed eam quæ vere sit lex, id est, non occides, non mœchaberis, non pejerabis, et cetera. Cui quia olim diffamatæ in gentibus, id est, ex quo mundi hujus creatura consistit, Hebræorum scriptores irruentes, tanquam lepram et scabiem, abominanda hæc sua et turpissima præcepta commiscuerunt, quæ ad peritomen spectant et sacrificia, age, si es pro certo et tu amicus legis, damna ea mecum, qui hanc violare ausi sunt hac commixtione inconvenientium eidem præceptorum." It would have been very well if the Manichæans had stopped here; but they proceeded to establish their dualism with all its angelic machinery in the place of the Jewish religion, and to carry to the extreme point that Babylonian and Persian system which the Jews only partially adopted after

the Exile, and which was more opposed to the spiritual law of Moses than the after-growths of Levitical ritual. On the other hand, the Manichæans received only those parts of the Christian system which squared with their Magian speculations. "Whatever," says Baur (p. 375), "in the writings of the New Testament seemed to concur with the dualism set forth by Manes, was accounted among the most genuine ingredients in the doctrines of Christianity, and Manes and his adherents were very glad to cite for the confirmation of their own doctrines and principles passages like Matthew vii. 18, xiii. 24; John, i. 5, viii. 44, xiv. 30; 2 Cor. iv. 4 (*cf.* Epiph. *Hær.* lxvi. 67-69); and especially also those in which the apostle Paul speaks of the opposition between flesh and spirit. As they, however, found so much in the New Testament, which not only did not confirm the Manichæan doctrines, but stood in open opposition to them, they were obliged, in accordance with the hypothesis that the original doctrines of Christianity did not differ from those of Manichæism, to regard all passages of this kind as a distortion and falsification of Christianity. Accordingly, they laid down the rule that the written records of Christianity ought not to be received unconditionally, but must be subjected to a previous scrutiny, with a view to ascertain how far they exhibited the genuine substance of Christianity; and this was limited to those portions which bore the character of Manichæism; so that, following this criterion, whatever did not harmonize with their own doctrines, was rejected without hesitation, because original Christianity could not contradict itself." These ideas they worked out in a manner peculiar to themselves, and with results decidedly unfavourable to the integrity and authenticity of the New Testament. They could accept neither the doctrines nor the facts of revelation, unless they could regard them as a reflex of their own dualism. Without wishing to reject Christianity, they made their own system the standard of measurement, and lopped or stretched the religion of the Cross, wherever it did not fit in with the religion of Light and Darkness. The identification of Christ with Mithras led, of course, to a profession of Docetism, namely, to the assertion that our Lord's sufferings on the cross were not real, but apparent only. Christ had no real human body, no double nature, but only a fantastic semblance of corporeity, in which his essence, as the Son of Everlasting Light, was presented

to the eyes of men. *In his letter to Odas, the heresiarch himself says: "When the Galilæans speak of two natures in Christ, we break forth into loud laughter at their not knowing that the nature of Light does not mix itself with another nature, that of matter, (ἡ οὐσία τοῦ φωτὸς ἑτέρᾳ οὐ μίγνυται ὕλῃ) but is pure, and cannot combine itself with another nature, even though such a union may seem to have taken place. The name Christ is a misapplied designation, which denotes neither a kind nor a nature. The supreme Light, combined with its own essence, showed a body in the material bodies. In and for himself, Christ is throughout only one nature." Accordingly, Christ had no human birth, and his apparent sufferings were really inflicted on him by his enemy, the Prince of Darkness; and in thus resolving the life of Jesus into a series of illusory appearances, the Manichæans take from Christianity all its historical foundation, and leave us nothing but the realistic applications of a few Christian metaphors. In order to make this nullification of the human nature in Christ as conspicuous as possible, they inverted the meaning of the passage in the Epistle to the Colossians, which we have discussed in the first Appendix. For whereas St. Paul makes the Son of God the exemplar of all creation, as well as an agent in it, the Manichæans transfer this office to their archon or evil spirit, and make the primitive man the exemplar or microcosm. "In eadem," said Manes—that is, in the image of the archon — "construebantur et contexebantur omnium imagines, cœlestium et terrenarum virtutum, ut pleni videlicet orbis id, quod formabatur, similitudinem obtineret" (Baur, p. 146). That there is a certain amount of philosophical and theological truth in this idea, has been sufficiently shown by the discussions in the first Appendix. But the dualism perverts the truth of the statement; and the full amount of the error will be most fully appreciated by those who can best understand the meaning of St. Paul in the passage which we have so fully examined.

(6). In spite of its manifest opposition to Christianity, Manichæism had adopted so much of the truth, and had exhibited a method so much in accordance with the subsequent procedure of reflecting men in their reasonings on the subject of religion, that it necessarily found partial representatives in the most opposite parties and sections in the Church. Baur has well remarked

(p. 402): "Great as is the opposition which Manichæism, with its rationalism and docetism, raises in contrast to a Christianity resting on a firm and historical basis; and much as the contradiction, which ensues, runs into vagueness and excentricity, we nevertheless see here the starting-point in that remarkable opposition, which protests against the Christianity of the Catholic Church, and which pervades the later Manichæans and Cathari, and other sects standing in nearer or remoter connexion with the old Manichæans. This contradiction was always opposed to a view which wished to raise the external above the internal, the letter above the spirit, and to sanction forms, in which genuine and living Christianity seemed destined to perish—dead, material forms resting on a blind belief in authority, which threatened to throw back Christianity into the same class with Judaism and heathendom." A similar opinion is expressed by Mr. Keightley (*Roman Empire*, p. 406): "The Manichæan system long continued to flourish. It spread itself over both the empires. We believe there is little doubt, that those who, under the names of Albigenses, Paulicians, Cathari, and other denominations, were so cruelly persecuted by the Church of Rome in the middle ages, were the descendants of the Manichæans. There is reason to suppose that the mistresses and the loves of the Troubadours of the south of France were not earthly; that the conventional language, retained by the Soofees in Persia, had been carried by the Manichæans to Spain and France; that in Italy, this language, which had hitherto been confined to religion, was by Frederick II. and his friends extended to politics, and made the bond of union of the Ghibellines, and that it is only by a knowledge of it that the writings of Dante, Petrarca, Boccaccio, and the other writers of that age, can be understood. In fine, it might appear that Manichæism eventually led to the Reformation."

We have no intention of entering on the wide and important argument which is here indicated: nor do we wish to inquire how far the more valid principles and more valuable results of Protestantism are traceable to the procedure of the early Manichæans. It will be sufficient for our purpose to show how far the dualistic hypothesis, on which Manes built up his speculations, is adopted by professing Christians in this country. We must premise that dualism, properly so called, personifies the evil or material principle no less than the good or spiritual essence, and

invests the former as well as the latter with the attributes of divinity. In point of fact, genuine dualism approaches more nearly to polytheism than it does to monotheism. The very idea of two distinct realms, independent of each other, and governed by separate powers, presumes a coequal authority and a godhead in the prince of each domain. It is true that the Manichæans, when pressed on the subject, endeavoured to evade the argument of the orthodox party by restricting the name of God to the principle of light and goodness, whereas they called the lord of the other realm of darkness and evil by the name of "matter" or "dæmon" (August. *contra Faustum*, xxi. 1; Baur, p. 25).[1] In denying, however, that God, properly so called, exerted his power in the other realm, they really made the power of darkness act as an independent deity, and thus, whatever they professed, their religion was a dualism in the proper sense of the term. "Dualism," says Baur, (p. 26), "emanating from Polytheism, remains true to its proper character only when it places both principles side by side as gods; if, in name only, it regards the one as God and the other as dæmon, it is on the point of passing over to absolute Monotheism." The question, however, is—whether the distinction in name only is or is not a mere evasion. If the attributes of divinity are conceded to the principle of evil, if God is not regarded as the one and only Creator of all that is in the world, no evasion will rescue the creed from the charge of dualism; and there is no doubt that this charge may be sustained against Manichæism in all its forms and manifestations. Now it so happens that the party, which claims exclusively the high-sounding titles of "orthodox" and "evangelical," is Manichæan or dualistic in its worst form, namely, that which approaches nearest to Polytheism. A belief in the personality of the evil spirit—the ruler of this world—is as much an article in the creed of the Recordites,—as they are called after the scandalous journal, which is the organ of the ultra-section in the Low Church faction,—as a belief in the personality of God. Indeed, it is reported that one of the party, Mr. Howson, who has written the life of St. Paul, said, at the Liverpool Clerical Society's meeting, on the 5th May, 1836,

[1] For the classical distinction between θεὸς and δαίμων, see note on Pindar, *Ol.* vi. 8, 9. According to Plato's definition (*Symp.* p. 202 E) neither Ormuzd nor Ahriman could properly be called "a dæmon."

"that his difficulty was not to believe in the devil. Of that he found abundant proof in himself, and in everything; his difficulty was to believe in God" (!!). This is the faith exacted from all who would be considered "orthodox" and "evangelical;" and those, who are most anxious for success as schoolmasters, are called upon to give more than negative proof of their soundness in this respect. The head master of Harrow has been obliged to record his faith in the "personality of the temptor," and he has been servilely followed by the principal of a municipal grammar school, who, besides publishing a sermon expressly on the subject, has declared, before the University of Oxford: "I need not pause here to prove the Personality of the Temptor [Dr. Vaughan's own phrase!];—a personality which I do not hesitate to say is as distinctly put forward on the face of Holy Scripture as that of either [does he mean 'any one'?] of the Persons of the adorable Trinity." This is, in fact, next to the hypothesis of infallible Scripture, the favourite Shibboleth of the school. And what does it amount to? Simply an assertion of Manichæan dualism, not unconnected with a sort of tritheism. Starting with a bibliolatry, with which Manichæism has nothing to do, these mistaken Christians assume the divine infallibility of the Jewish conceptions in the time of the Maccabees. Thus, they not only recognise the divine sanction of the Jewish ritual system, but extend the same veneration to the belief that this world is a battle-field between the spirits of good, and the dæmons, or evil spirits, which were cast out from heaven. Their views on this subject have received some additional consecration from the genius of Milton, and the Arianism of that great poet passes with them into a sort of tritheism, which they deny to themselves and others, but really entertain. In a Seatonian poem, by the late Mr. Hankinson, one of this school, we have even the Manichæan machinery of seven spiritual beings recognised as distinct but corresponding realities in heaven.[1] The Three Persons of the Trinity, and the four beasts about the Throne, are so placed side by side, that no reader could fail to understand something similar to those collections of greater and lesser deities, whom Homer groups around the throne of Zeus, or those Amshaspands, who shared in the derived divinity

[1] *The Ministration of Angels.* Hankinson's Poems, p. 228.

of Ormuzd. In accordance with the same view of the mediatorial office, Christ, as the Spirit of Light, must not be contaminated by union with a real humanity; and we find this class of theologians perpetually evading or denouncing all inferences from the fact that Jesus was perfect man as well as perfect God. Although they are far from any Docetism, with regard to his sufferings, which their adoption of the Jewish sacrificial theory obliges them to regard as real and complete, yet, by deifying the humanity of the Son of God, they make him as little a man of like passions with ourselves, as though he had been a Mithra descended from the Orb of Light. These Recordites also carry out the dualism of the Manichæans by a system of separation among the professed and matured believers in Christ. They have their line of demarcation between the men of light and the men of darkness. It was the practice of the Catholic Church to recognise only one distinction among Christians — that between the *Fideles* and the *Catechumeni*, between the mature Christians and those who were not yet fully instructed in their profession, or fully prepared to undertake it. The Manichæans, adopting this distinction, in name and appearance only, considered the *Auditores* who corresponded to the *Catechumeni* in designation, but comprehended all the members of their community, who freely engaged in worldly and social occupations—as an inferior branch of co-religionists, not yet fully weaned from the world of darkness; whereas the *Electi*, corresponding in terminology to the *Fideles*, were the purifying lights of the world, who stood on a pedestal of high religious exaltation. "In general," says Baur (p. 281), "the *Electi* and *Auditores* are related to one another in the same way as the Gnostics used to distinguish the *pneumatic* and *psychic*, the *spiritual* and *natural* man; and as the *hylic*, or material, stood in the third rank, this class, according to the Manichæan view, included all who were not to be found in the Manichæan society, and still belonged entirely to the material world. Strictly and consequentially as Manichæism laboured to carry out its dualistic view of the world in other respects, it was compelled here, at least, to prevent the practical problem of religion and morality from appearing an inextricable puzzle, to interpolate something intermediate between spirit and matter, and to admit of a gradual transition from one to the other of their opposed principles." But notwithstanding this, as the same writer re-

marks (p. 282): "What the Manichæan church is in relation to the world, is again the narrower circle of the *Electi* in relation to the wider union of the *Auditores;* and what in this is subdivided into many parts, and separated into distinct units, is, in the latter, concentrated in a substantial unity." It will be observed that the religious party, to which we are referring, carry out this distinction to its fullest extent. Those who are willing to pronounce the Shibboleth of their party, to adopt their Bibliolatry, Sabbatarianism, Proselytism, and Jewish enthusiasm, are alone called "Evangelical," "Orthodox," "Gospel-Christians," "the Religious World." All the rest of men, whether professing believers or not, are still in darkness. The preachers, who do not take their view, preach anti-Christ; and while any amount of sin and wickedness may be condoned in a member of the inner circle, while even a swindling banker may find a groan of pity in the *Record*, no blamelessness of life, no amount of Christian zeal and activity, can save a man from misrepresentation and malicious slander, if he happens to oppose himself, however theoretically, to the pet doctrines of these "children of the mist," who consider themselves the only denizens of the kingdom of Light.

CHAPTER III.

INFALLIBLE LITERATURE.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY.

CHAPTER III.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN INFALLIBLE LITERATURE.

THE hypothesis of an infallible literature, which has assumed the form of the most degrading idolatry that ever enslaved the reasonable soul of man, has in our days reached the critical period in its development. Devised by the religion *ab extra*, as a substitute and counterpoise to its other resource, the dogma of an infallible Church, Bibliolatry is now rejected by all intelligent and well-informed men, and is maintained with various modifications by those only who prove, by the recklessness of their arguments and by their personal violence, that they are the advocates of a desperate cause.

The grounds on which the dogma or hypothesis of the infallibility of the Old and New Testament is made to rest, or the ultimate argument to which its supporters are invariably driven, may be described by the following combination of the vicious circle with the assumption of the thing to be proved.

(*a*). Inspiration is equivalent to infallibility.

(*b*). The books of the Old Testament are inspired, and therefore infallible, because St. Paul has said so.

(*c*). The books of the New Testament are inspired, and therefore infallible, because it is reasonable to suppose that, if these qualities belong to the records of the Jewish religion, they

must be equally characteristic of the records of Christianity, and because it would be a great inconvenience if it were not so.

(*d*). As the books of the New Testament are inspired and therefore infallible, we have a certain knowledge of the very words of Jesus Christ, and he appeals to the Old Testament as a decisive authority. Therefore, again, the Old Testament is inspired and infallible, and therefore, by analogy, the New: and so on in a perpetual circle.

It does not require much logic to discern, or much candour to confess, that these arguments are utterly worthless; and yet it is on the strength of this reasoning, if it deserves the name, that men, not only calling themselves Christians, but almost claiming an exclusive possession of Christian truth, venture to denounce the ablest and most sincerely pious men of the day as little better than heathens and publicans. And it is to be remarked that not only is the reasoning in itself circular and vicious, but that each separate proposition in it, is either false or incapable of demonstration. For (*a*) it is not true that inspiration is equivalent to infallibility. On the contrary, although there is abundant evidence that the Apostles were inspired in the highest sense of the term, it is equally certain that they were fallible men, of like passions with ourselves.[1] This proposition being contradicted, the word infallible must be expunged from all the other statements respecting inspiration. (*b*). St. Paul does not say that all the books of the Old Testament were inspired, but only that all inspired writings—whatever that means—must be profitable. (*c*). There is no analogy between the Jewish and Christian collections of sacred books, because the former are the whole literature of the ancient Jews, whereas the New Testament is neither the whole literature of the early Christians, nor is there, either within or without the Canon, any sure line of

[1] This has been shown, popularly but sufficiently, by Mr. Macnaught, in his book on "The Doctrine of Inspiration." London, 1856.

demarcation between the books which ought and ought not to be regarded as sacred. On the contrary, it is certain that our present Canon contains some books, which, in the judgment of the third century, were not entitled to a place in it, and it is probable that some books have been lost or omitted, which were equal in value to any that we now have; for example, the original of St. Matthew's Gospel. (*d*). Waiving any question as to our Lord's human infallibility before the resurrection, there is internal evidence that we do not know the exact terms in which Jesus Christ cited the Old Testament. For example, in the three accounts of the same transaction, he is said to have cited the third chapter of Exodus in three different forms of speech.[1] Assuming that any one of these three citations was an infallibly accurate statement of the very words which Jesus used, it is obvious that the other two are inaccurate; and as we cannot know which of the three is to be preferred, we must conclude that there is no certainty as to the fact that he called the book of Exodus "the book of Moses." Again, even if we had this certainty, we cannot be confident that he did not acquiesce in a merely conventional expression, just as intelligent clergymen among ourselves talk of the Creed of Athanasius, although they know that the Symbol so designated was written in France one hundred years after the death of that Father. And that Jesus Christ did not regard the books attributed to Moses as divine and infallible is proved by the fact that he abrogated the ritual and ceremonial law of the Jews, without stating that he did this in virtue of his divine authority, or because that law, though divine, was instituted by God to serve a temporary purpose. On the contrary, he declared expressly that he came to fulfil, not to destroy, the moral law,—that heaven and earth should pass away before that law suffered the least diminution. He did therefore most emphatically distinguish between the spirit of the decalogue

[1] Compare Matth. xxii. 3; Mark, xii. 26; Luke, xx. 37.

and the Levitical ordinances of his own countrymen, and both by his words and actions signified that the one was divine and eternal, the other human and temporary.[1]

We see then, by a mere statement of the reasoning used in its support, that the hypothesis of an infallible literature is as baseless as the fabric of a dream. But even though we allowed all weight to the antiquity of this hypothesis, even though we conceded that the greatest respect was due to the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, who, in proportion as their age receded from the origin of Christianity, in the same proportion attached increasing reverence to the selected records of their faith, we should still be unable to believe, and, as honest men, we should not be permitted to assert, that the sacred books of the Jews and early Christians were infallible, if, as a matter of fact, we found them betraying the usual marks of human inaccuracy. And if we wished to regard them as inspired, we should be obliged to seek out some signification of that term which did not denote or imply that these books were entirely free from error.

Now the following are the results of the inquiry by which it has been discovered that the assumption of the infallibility of Scripture is contrary to the facts of the case; and these results are derived, as we have already intimated, from two distinct branches of modern science — inductive philosophy and philological criticism.

Since the days of Galileo and Copernicus, an opinion has been gaining strength that the writers of the Old Testament were, as might have been expected from the age in which they lived, simply and entirely ignorant of the facts of physical astronomy. No rational and educated man will now believe that God made the round world so fast that it never should move at any time; or that the sun and moon and stars revolve around the globe, and were created subsequently to this planet.

[1] See Appendix III., where these and other matters are fully treated.

and solely for the purpose of giving light upon the earth; or that the atmosphere is a solid expanse or firmament, with doors and windows to allow the passage of the rain; or that the rainbow was fixed in heaven for a sign, after the world had existed some 2000 years, and consequently that there was no rain before the first appearance of that phenomenon. To say nothing about the sun standing still upon Gibeon, or on the dial of Ahaz, the erroneous conceptions, to which we have referred, are sufficient to assure us that the writers of the Old Testament, so far from being infallible on the subject of cosmogony, had neither more nor less knowledge than their contemporaries; in other words, they were utterly ignorant of the facts which modern science has discovered and demonstrated. This appears still more clearly when we call in the aid of geology, which teaches us that the work of creation did not take place in six periods of twenty-four hours each, but in a succession of incalculable ages; and that the phenomena attributed to an universal deluge, long subsequent to the origin of man, are really due to the lacustrine period which preceded the development of dry and solid earth, capable of furnishing a healthy abode to our species. Even natural history, which already counts more than 307,944 species of breathing creatures, independently of fishes and infusoria, pronounces sentence upon the ignorance of a writer who supposes it possible that an ark 500 feet long, 82 feet wide, and 50 feet high, could contain at least duplicates of every zoological specimen, such as live in the water being alone excepted, together with their appropriate food for 110 days![1] Unless, indeed, we adopt the very rational supposition that the deluge of Noah, like that of Deucalion, was only partial, and affected only those tribes who descended at a very early period from the mountains of Armenia to the Mesopotamian

[1] The argument referred to in the text, is fully sustained in a pamphlet by an incumbent of the Established Church, which was published in 1860, under the title: *Hebrew Cosmogony, and Modern Interpretations.*—See p. 22.

plains; but then there would be no occasion for the formation of a floating menagerie, and we should only substitute a charge of inaccuracy and exaggeration for one of simple ignorance of the facts of natural history.

An attempt has been occasionally made to get rid of these difficulties by a mode of interpretation, which, if it is put forward in good faith, is eminently puerile and absurd. The plainest meaning of the Hebrew text is perverted, in order to extract a sense in accordance with the deductions of modern science. But whatever partial success this endeavour may have had on the minds of the indolent and careless, who have prejudged the case, it is obvious that the removal of any objections on the score of physical science could have no effect on the issue of the questions raised by philological criticism.

All children, and many uneducated people, accept, without scruple, whatever they find in print, and this torpid acquiescence once regulated the opinions of scholars also, in regard to the whole domain of ancient literature. The first great shock to this lethargic state of mind, was produced by Bentley's demonstration, from internal evidence, of the spurious character of the Epistles attributed to Phalaris. From that time to the present, the spirit of critical inquiry has been alive and active, and many ancient writings have been assigned to other authors than those whose names they had previously borne. It was not to be expected that the canon of Scripture would escape from an application of the same procedure, especially as the slightest investigation tended to show that not a few of the books, now classed together as equally authoritative, were regarded by the early Church as differing in the degree of credit which was due to them. Indeed, we can fix the time when the line of demarcation between the universally received and the doubtful writings of the New Testament was broken down by an age which had not the same means as it

predecessors of testing the genuineness of these documents. When we find, then, that the third century exhibited a discrimination which is wanting in the fourth, it would be the strangest result of a veneration for transmitted opinions to prefer the more recent to the more ancient tradition. And yet such is the case in the Christian Church. Now, Biblical criticism starts from the point of view conceded by the Church historians, and every result of an examination is in favour of the judgment displayed by those who placed a mark of doubt on some of the so-called Apostolic Epistles. There is internal evidence to show that the Epistle attributed to Jude was not written by any Apostle or in the time of the Apostles,[1] and that the second Epistle attributed to Peter was coined in the same mint or derived from the same common source. The Apostolic origin of some of the other Epistles might justly be called in question; and though the genuineness of the historical books—in their original form—may be considered as sufficiently established,[2] want of manuscript evidence or incoherences of style and matter would induce the critical scholar to omit or inclose in brackets many passages of greater or less importance. Thus, the first two chapters of the Gospel according to Matthew are obviously a preface of inferior authority borrowed from some other source; and the whole Gospel, as we have it, is, by almost universal agreement, regarded as a mere translation from an Aramæan or Hebrew original; and if this were extant, the Greek text, which contains many obvious errors, would sink to the same rank as the Alexandrine version of the Old Testament. With regard to the only prophetic book, the Apocalypse, although there are reasons for the prevalent belief that the author was the Apostle

1 Jude, verses 17, 18: "Remember the words *formerly said* (προειρημένων) by the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ, that *they used to say* (ἔλεγον) to you that in the last time *there shall be* (ἔσονται) mockers."

2 See Appendix IV.

John, there have been many who have attributed it to a Presbyter of Ephesus who bore the same name.

Careful investigation has proved that the formation of the Canon of the Old Testament originated in a wish to collect all the remains of Hebrew literature which were extant when the Jews returned from the captivity; that the process of collection commenced about 450 B.C.[1] and continued for nearly three centuries; that the existing miscellany contains no book which, in its present state, is older than the reign of David and Solomon; that, with the exception of the majority of the Prophets and the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, no author's name can be fixed with anything like certainty; that the historical books in particular are compilations from older documents, which are sometimes quoted;[2] and that we cannot, except by conjectural criticism, determine even approximately the authorship or age of all the poetical fragments which are incorporated, and sometimes erroneously interpreted, in the narratives of the Masoretic

[1] Zerubabel came to Palestine in 536 B.C., Ezra in 478 B.C., Nehemiah in 444 B.C.; and it was at this time that we hear of the public reading of the law (Nehem. viii. 1 *sqq.*; *cf.* 2 Maccab. ii. 13).

[2] The following are some of the principal works quoted as authorities in the sacred books of the Jews, but now lost:—

1. The Book of the Wars of Jehovah; Numbers, xxi. 14, 15.
2. Joshua's Division of the Land in Seven Parts; Josh. xviii. 9.
3. The Book of Jashar; Josh. x. 13, 2 Sam. i. 18. To this collection probably belonged also the fragment from those "that speak in proverbs," Numbers, xxi. 17.
4. Solomon's Proverbs, Songs, and Natural History; 2 Kings, iv. 32, 33.
5. The Acts of Solomon; 1 Kings, xi. 41.
6. The Annals of Samuel, Nathan, and Gad; 1 Chron. xxix. 29.
7. The Life of Solomon, by Nathan, Ahijah, and Iddo; 2 Chron. ix. 29.
8. The Acts of Rehoboam; 2 Chron. xii. 15.
9. The Chronicles of Judah or Israel; quoted thirty-one times.
10. Life of Uzziah; 2 Chron. xxvi. 22.
11. The Book of Jehu; 2 Chron. xx. 34.
12. The Book of the Kings of Israel and Judah; 2 Chron. xxviii. 26, xxxv. 27, xxxvi. 8. The last two may have been included in No. 9.
13. Isaiah's Life of Hezekiah; 2 Chron. xxxii. 32.
14. The Life of Manasseh; 2 Chron. xxxiii. 18.
15. The Prophecy of Ahijah; 2 Chron. ix. 29.
16. The Book of Shemaiah; 2 Chron. xii. 15.
17. The Sayings of Hosea; 2 Chron. xxxiii. 19.
18. The Lamentations; 2 Chron. xxxv. 25.

editors. The language, in which the whole collection is penned, is, with trifling exceptions, one and uniform, and there is no trace of those archaisms by which the ancient writer is invariably distinguished from those who wrote the same language many centuries after him. Chaldaic words and idioms, and even Persian terms and Greek vocables, mark the later writings, which proceeded from men to whom the classical Hebrew of the Priests was becoming a dead language; and this infection of foreign residence is not always wanting in the purer works: but otherwise there are no differences which would not be consistent with the supposition that the whole Bible, as we have it, was written out in uniform style by a series of contemporaries. Now this unity of language is not only inimical to the alleged authorship of the older books, on the ground that the difference of age would have exhibited a difference of phraseology: it also shows that the poetical works, which, either as entire or fragmentary remains, are attributed to ancient writers to whom Hebrew was a foreign language—such as the book of Job and the prophecies of Balaam—could not have proceeded in the first instance from those Edomites and Moabites, but must have been fictitiously ascribed to them, or, at best, were free poetical translations of traditionary documents—internal evidence being decidedly in favour of the former conclusion. It has been observed that the most original and genuine works contain spurious additions loosely incorporated or appended. Thus the undoubted Psalms of David form but a small portion of the five successive collections in which they are contained, and which are so carelessly put together that the same poem is sometimes inserted twice from slightly different transcriptions. In the book of Isaiah it is not difficult to separate the authentic vaticinations of that great Prophet from the later but congenial author bound up with him. And in the books attributed to Moses, it may be shown that the older Jehovistic portions are imbedded in a

continuous fabric of Elohistic compilation. The spirit of the revelation, of which Moses was the minister, undoubtedly finds its most original and accurate manifestations in the last book—that of Deuteronomy — which alone professes to have been written by him; at any rate, it is obvious that the decalogue is more satisfactorily set forth in that book than in the book of Exodus. There is abundant evidence to show that the provisions of the Levitical law did not emanate from Moses, but were subsequently invented by the Priestly caste, whose successors, the Scribes and Pharisees, are charged by our Lord with having made the law of God of no effect by their traditions.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that the proofs of an unequal authority, furnished by this examination of the Scriptures, are no less fatal to the theory of an infallible dictation, or even guidance, than the results of physical science, when compared with the statements of the older books. For if we have compilations from older writings, in prose and verse, sometimes cited, and sometimes quoted at length—if the greater part of the Hebrew collection is of the nature of a *rifacimento*, or modernized edition and remodelled abbreviation or expansion of old fragmentary remains—and if we have translations from lost works by the side of genuine relics, it is impossible to believe that such a farrago can possess, as a totality, the unvarying impress of a celestial sanction, extending to every detail, however minute and insignificant, and claiming infallible accuracy as well for the passage quoted, as for the work in which the quotation appears, with comments more or less erroneous. With regard to the longest and most circumstantial of the four Gospels, it has been admitted, by the warmest defenders of the cause, that its authority would be precarious and uncertain, and its value and claim to respect almost set aside, if the general tradition respecting it were to be received.[1] And yet this

[1] It is almost amusing to find that the Rev. Jeremiah Jones, in his "New

general tradition, which represents the extant Gospel of St. Matthew as the anonymous translation of a lost original, is confirmed by every available testimony; and it has never been shown that its claim to a canonical authority is less than that of the other Gospels, which are as universally supposed to be original works. The theory of inspired dictation, or literary infallibility, takes account of the canonical books only, but extends itself to all of them without reservation or exception. Consequently, the tradition, which constitutes the canon of Scripture, is the sole criterion of infallible authority; and if it is admitted that any document, though canonical, is yet of uncertain or precarious importance, it must follow that a place in the canon does not bestow a character of infallibility, and that the theory of inspired dictation or guidance is not more applicable to a canonical work, than to any other ancient writing.

But the results of philological criticism are not confined to this mode of examining the literary history of Scripture. Effects not less decisive to the question of plenary inspiration, or scriptural infallibility, are produced by a scrutiny of the context and subject matter of the particular works.

All scholars can convince themselves that the cosmogony and

and Full Method of Settling the Canonical Authority of the New Testament," mentions, as a reason for not accepting the universal tradition respecting the Hebrew original of St. Matthew's Gospel, that the "supposing it to be so makes its authority very precarious and uncertain" (vol. iii., Oxford, 1827, p. 250). He is candid enough to add, that "this argument is founded upon the supposition of this (as well as other historical books) being wrote by the influences and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Now the supposing it a translation is inconsistent with that authority and esteem which every inspired book does necessarily demand." And this was also the opinion of Casaubon, whom he quotes (*Exercit. ad Baron. Ann.*, c. xvi. § 115): "Si auctoritas Græci textus pendet ab Hebræo textu, quum Hebræa dudum perierint, neque usquam exstent hodie, sequitur necessario, nullum hodie ejus Evangelii debere esse pondus, nullam auctoritatem." Again Mr. Jones says: "For my part, I freely own if I believed it to be a translation made by a person I know nothing of, I could not yield it the same respect, and have that same value for it, as the other parts of the sacred writings." And after referring to the use made by the Roman Catholics of the fact that St. Matthew's original work is lost, he finishes by saying: "As we would avoid this consequence of making the authority of this Gospel uncertain, we must conclude it not to be a translation."

the history of the fall of man are a pragmatical translation of deep philosophical or religious symbolism; that the lists of patriarchs are poetical or ethnographic statements personified by an arbitrary rationalism, not unlike that by which Euhemerus endeavoured to reduce the ancient mythology to a dry deposit of uninteresting biography; that the sums of years, assigned as periods of longevity to the members of these primeval pedigrees, are calculations of secular cycles, and that the date of the birth of each successive descendant of Adam is arranged so as to produce for the whole series a round number of exactly 2000 years. This pragmatical meddling with the old poetry of the Jews, or, if it is more correct to say so, this substitution of priestly ingenuity for primeval tradition, speaks but poorly for the judgment of the editorial scribes; and whatever value we may attach to the truths concealed in the old mythological allegories, we cannot reasonably ascribe the slightest authority to the commentatorial misrepresentations by which they have been still farther disguised. Similar remarks might be made respecting all the historical books of the Old Testament. Glaring discrepancies in the statement of facts, dates, and places, and all the usual apparatus of difficulties suggested by ancient writings, might be adduced to invalidate the hypothesis of literal and verbal infallibility.[1]

Nor would the same process fail in its application to the New Testament. A want of sequency in the narrative of events, and in the record of speeches and conversations, inconsistency in the different descriptions of the same incident, and many circumstantial varieties in the details of the history, set aside all attempts at a synopsis of the four Evangelists, except on the exploded principle, maintained by Osiander, that every discordant statement refers to a separate and distinct occurrence.

[1] A sufficient collection of instances will be found in Ghillany, *Menschenopfer der alten Hebräer*, pp. 8 *sqq*.

principle which would be fatal to the reception of all evidence, whether forensic or historical. In some places we find absolute poetry, in the shape of hymns or psalms, mixed up with descriptions of supernatural occurrences; and in many parts of the historic books the critic cannot resist the impression that the writer had received an imperfect or erroneous account of the event which he wishes to record.[1]

Without entering into any further particulars, we are only expressing the sentiments of every sober theologian when we say that the assumption of a verbal or absolute infallibility of Scripture is felt to be incompatible with the known facts of science and with the reasonable deductions of scholarship; and therefore it is obvious that we cannot hope to confute an unbeliever, or one who refuses to accept of the fact that God has personally revealed himself to the world, so long as we admit, what he is anxious to maintain, that religion depends upon an acquiescence in the literal and verbal inspiration or unexceptional infallibility of the Old and New Testaments.

In order then to show, which is our present purpose, that Christianity is not interested or implicated in the adoption of this or any other theory respecting the Scriptures, we must begin by calling attention to the fact, so constantly overlooked, that the question of inspiration is of dogmatic, not of historical import. The advocate of Christianity is engaged to maintain the historical fact that God did personally and at a given epoch reveal himself to man. It is clear that the establishment of this fact does not in the slightest degree depend on any dogma or opinion respecting the documents in which it is recorded and preserved, but that it stands or falls with our belief or disbelief of the witnesses, with our convictions respecting their competency

[1] These difficulties are noticed, not only by such writers as Strauss, Parker, and Newman, but by earnest Christians like Mr. Macnaught, in his book on Inspiration (pp. 27 52).

and veracity. A string of circumstances, attested by a miscellaneous assemblage of persons, often including some of the most worthless of our species, will satisfy us that a great crime has been committed, and induce us, with perfect tranquillity of belief, to sentence the offender to an ignominious death. We do not ask whether the witnesses are inspired or infallible, whether their testimony is dictated or dynamically guided by a higher power. Their general agreement and the coherency of their statements, though, perhaps, affected by occasional discrepancies, are sufficient to convert our suspicions into certainties. Nor do we apply any other criterion to test the credibility of ancient history. But here a long lapse of time gives an additional advantage; for the absence of all contradictory testimony, of all statements tending to weaken our belief, of any other way, in fact, of accounting for transactions, which have left their impress on the world, increases our confidence in received and admitted history. And of course this argument is applicable *à fortiori* to the case of religious history, where enemies of the faith are always found, and where an objection to alleged facts would naturally be made, if it were capable of establishing itself in successful opposition to the narratives on which the doctrines are supposed to depend. If we look into works professedly written in defence of the truth of Christianity, such as Paley's, or its forerunner, Lardner's, we shall see that the evidences brought forward are such as we have briefly described. No allusion is made to the inspiration of the documents, as furnishing any additional or independent confirmation of the statements they contain. These able advocates avoided the *petitio principii*, since they well knew that they had to prove the occurrence of facts, and that they would weaken rather than corroborate the credibility of the historians, if, for the use of their senses and reason, they substituted some other machinery which can neither be conceived nor described. The dogma of inspiration add-

nothing to the facts of revealed religion, but it calls upon the believer for faith in something besides and independent of the revelation itself; and its only effect must be to add the impossibility of adopting an unnecessary and incomprehensible theory to the difficulty of believing in the occurrence of supernatural events.

But though it must be admitted that the historic truths of religion are quite independent of the dogma of inspiration, and therefore that the Christian advocate need not concern himself about it, it will be urged that it is essential to Protestant theology that there should be an infallible record of facts and doctrines. The theory of verbal or absolute inspiration was first started with the intention of opposing the claims of Popery by a counter claim of still greater authority, and the liberty of private judgment was conceded on the assumption that the subject matter of the judgment would be fixed and unalterable. This view has been allowed even by some of the most moderate and rational divines. "A reasonable belief," says a distinguished Oxford Professor, "requires that there should be somewhere found a broad and unambiguous line of separation between that which is revelation and that which is not: some direct authentication of the depositary of inspired communications and divine truth. This is the essential point in all discussion of the evidence of the New Testament; and to this point the learning and talents of the most eminent critics and divines of successive ages have been worthily dedicated. Their continued researches have fully confirmed and brought home to the present age the force of that evidence which enabled contemporaries to draw a distinct line defining the Canon of the New Testament."[1] Now, this plea on behalf of authority seems to confuse the adoption, by the common consent of the Church, of one standard of appeal for all matters of faith and doctrine, with the attribution of certain

[1] Professor Baden Powell, *Tradition Unveiled*, p. 69.

characteristics to the documents thus accepted as the materials of private judgment. It does not follow that because we regard only a certain number of books as canonical, therefore all that is contained in those books is infallibly true. In proportion as the canonical books deal with subjects not immediately connected with the development of religious truth, in the same proportion must theology refer to something contained in them rather than to all that they contain. And this seems to be the view adopted by our sixth Article. The argument from necessity is quite inadmissible in a case like this. It has indeed been said that "if the general truth of Scripture be proved, the simple principle of the necessity of the case will go far to establish a minimum, below which we cannot naturally reduce the degree of Scriptural inspiration."[1] But how can we prescribe rules according to which Divine Providence must act? or on what principle are we entitled to assume that it was the will of God to enlighten and evangelize the world, not only by the preaching but also by the writings of the Apostles? The Church was constituted long before any collection of sacred writings was canonized by the early Christians; and the same tradition, which discriminates between the canonical and uncanonical books, might have transmitted to us, in a secondary form, a history of our religion and a summary of essential doctrines. That the Creed and the Canon rest on the same authority has been stated plainly enough by the leaders of one extreme party in the English Church. One of these writers, after admitting that God "both secretly inspired the books and secretly formed them into a perfect rule or canon," proceeds to say: "If asked how we know this to be the case, I answer, that the early

[1] Bishop Terrot, translation of Ernesti's *Institutes*, vol. ii., p. 3. This plea from the necessity of the case, whether it appears as an *à priori* or as an *à posteriori* argument, has been well exposed by Mr. Macnaught, *Inspiration*, pp. 158 163.

church thought so, which must have known. And, if this answer does not please, the inquirer must look out for a better as he can. I know of no other; I require no other: for our present Church it is enough, as the Homilies show.[1] It is enough that Scripture has been overruled to contain the whole Christain faith, and that the early Church so taught, though its form, at first sight, might lead to an opposite conclusion."[2] According to this view, we should have had an equally authentic depositary of revealed truth, if the Christians of the third and fourth centuries, instead of transmitting to us a collection of books bearing the names of the original preachers of Christianity, had, like the author of the Epistle attributed to Jude, been content to convey to us in their own names, "the words which were spoken before of the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ."[3] And though the Church of England accepts the Creeds because "they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture," the advocates of ecclesiastical tradition have maintained, with good reason, that, instead of setting up an infallible literature against an infallible Church, those who object to Church doctrines, as such, ought, if they acted consistently on their own principles, to object to Scripture also; and the writer, to whom we have referred, says, with the emphasis of sincere alarm:[4] "I wish to declare, what I think will be found really to be the case, namely, that a battle for the canon of Scripture is but the next step after the battle for the Creed,—that the Creed comes first in the assault, that is all; and that if we were not defending the Creed, we should, at this moment, be defending the Canon. Nay, I would predict, as a coming event, that minds *are to be* unsettled as to what is Scripture, and what is not; and I pre-

[1] The writer forgets that the Homilies claim inspiration for the Apocrypha.

[2] "Tracts for the Times," No. 85, pp. 32, 33.

[3] Jude, 17.

[4] *Ubi supra*, p. 72.

dict it, that, as far as the voice of one person in one place can do, I may defeat my own prediction in making it." This warning voice was lost on the eager assailants of Tractarianism, and they have been taught, by experience only, that the mode of attack, which they indicated in their dealings with Ecclesiolatry, was equally applicable to their own Bibliolatry; that, by assailing one form of the religion *ab extra*, they undermined their own defence of another form of the same substitute for Christianity; that if the dogma of an infallible Church was untenable, the hypothesis of an infallible literature was not less indefensible.

Although, therefore, we admit the convenience of recurring for our information respecting the doctrines and practices enforced by Christianity, to "a determinate written record alone authentic and authoritative," we must maintain at the same time that any particular opinions respecting the origin or nature of the composition of Scripture belong to that class of dogmas concerning which Protestantism maintains a liberty of private judgment. And it seems strange that those, above all others, who proclaim themselves free to think in matters of religion should have allowed themselves to regard free-thinking as a synonym for infidelity, as soon as it is applied to one of the most vague and uncertain opinions ever entertained by religious men.

The fact is, that the term "inspired," which is used to designate some theory or other respecting Holy Writ, is a metaphorical epithet which entirely escapes from the control of accurate definition as soon as it is applied to the text of the Bible. A Calvinistic divine, who is regarded as the great champion of plenary inspiration in our time,[1] has told the world, with some indignation, that he has been unjustly accused of maintaining the system of dictation; that his distinctive theory on this subject is not to have a theory at all; and that he has often insisted on the impossibility of forming any system, and on the danger of

[1] See Gaussen's letter in the *Record*, 24th October, 1850.

the attempt. While he maintains that the Bible is everywhere entirely from God, he is careful to assure us that it is everywhere of man; and thus allowing the individuality of its human authorship, he complains of an almost constant disposition to consider inspiration in the man, instead of seeing it in the book. When, after this jumble of ideas, he insists on "the great fact of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, while abstaining from hypotheses touching its modes," and wishes us "to contemplate this work of God in its result—the Bible—rather than in the secret impressions of the men of God," it must be obvious to every clear-headed reader, that he designs to compel us to use a certain word, and that he will not allow us to inquire for ourselves, or ask him to tell us, what that word means! If this mode of proceeding is not akin to the nonsensical mysticism, with which nurses rebuke the impatient curiosity of intelligent children, we know not how we ought to designate it. When the writer says that he cannot explain the mode of inspiration, while he insists upon the fact, he can only mean that he uses a word which conveys no sense to himself or others.

If we fall back upon the Greek original of the epithet "inspired," namely, the compound adjective *θεόπνευστος*, we see that it implies the inherent influence of the spirit of God in some person or thing. The word occurs once, and once only, in the New Testament, namely, in the Second Epistle to Timothy, where we read that "all inspired Scripture is also, or as such, profitable for instruction, for rebuke, for correction, for religious education," and where the reference is, of course, to the sacred writings (*τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα*) of the Old Testament, in which Timothy had been instructed from his childhood.[1] The

[1] 2 Tim. iii. 16: *πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος, πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, πρὸς ἔλεγχον, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, πρὸς παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ.* It appears to us really surprising that any one calling himself a scholar should for a moment hesitate to recognise that *θεόπνευστος* here is an epithet and not a predicate. First of all, it is the obvious intention of the writer to say of the

same adjective occurs also in the lines attributed to Phocylides, but in all probability written by some Christian poet in the fourth century, where we read that "the reason is the best part of that wisdom which comes from divine inspiration;"[1] and several of the fathers have borrowed the compound which appears in the Epistle to Timothy, without, however, appending any precise definition of the meaning which they attached to it.[2]

Now any one, who inquires into the signification with which this epithet is applied to the Scriptures, must see at once that it refers to the subject matter, and not to the mode of composition.

γράμματα,, which he has already called ἱερά, that they are δυνάμενα σοφίσαι, or ὠφέλιμα πρὸς διδασκαλίαν κ. τ. λ., not that they are θεόπνευστα. Again, there is no example to prove that γραφή, without an article or epithet, denotes the sacred writings of the Jews or any special work. When the Scripture, as such, is designated, we have ἡ γραφή, αἱ γραφαί, or some collocation (πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς, 2 Pet. i. 20), or epithet (ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις, Rom. i. 2, διὰ γραφῶν προφητικῶν, xvi. 26), which serves the purpose of definition. The same is the result of the addition of such epithets as ἑτέρα (John, xix. 37), and αἱ λοιπαί (2 Peter, iii. 16). Again, the parallel construction in the first Epistle (1 Tim. iv. 4) shows that θεόπνευστος is here also the limitation of a general phrase; for in πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ καλόν, the genitive θεοῦ, corresponding to the adjective θεόπνευστος, determines the universal πᾶν κτίσμα, and καλόν the predicate is appended like ὠφέλιμος without a copula. Again, the Greek idiom shows that καί is placed between the limiting epithet and the main predicate to imply the apodosis of a condition included in the former. The Apostle says to Timothy, "you know from a child the ἱερὰ γράμματα, which are able to make you wise"; and adds: "every writing, if it be ἱερὸς or θεόπνευστος, must be also profitable for instruction," etc. Just in the same way Aristotle says (*Eth. Nic.* i. 10, § 10): τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται καὶ μονιμώταται, "of these very virtues the most valuable are also the most permanent." Lastly, the Fathers were not unable to see the true construction. For although Clemens Alexandrinus (*Cohort. ad gentes*, ix. p. 71, Potter) rather inverts the sentence, he implies that θεόπνευστος is an epithet, when he says: τὰς γραφὰς ἀκολούθως ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπόστολος θεοπνεύστους καλεῖ ὠφελίμους οὔσας. And others of the Fathers directly interpret it as we do. Origen (ii. p. 443, ed. Delarue) cites the passage thus: πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος οὖσα ὠφέλιμός ἐστι. Joannes Damascenus (*de fide orthodoxa*, lib. iv. § 17, t. i. p. 282, ed. Le Quien, Paris, 1712) thus: πᾶσα τοίνυν γραφὴ θεόπνευστος πάντως καὶ ὠφέλιμος, ὥστε κάλλιστον καὶ ψυχωφελέστατον ἐρευνᾶν τὰς θείας γραφάς. Ruffinus (*Expos. in Symb. Apost.* p. 26, apud Cyprian., ed. Amstel. 1691) thus: "Omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum." We are happy to add that Mr. Ellicott, the most accurate and scholarlike of modern commentators on St. Paul, has adopted the true rendering.

[1] Phocyl. 121: τῆς δὲ θεοπνεύστου σοφίης λόγος ἐστιν ἄριστος.

[2] Basil, *Moral. Reg.* 26; Cyril, *Hierosol. Cateches.* iv. 33; Syn. Antiochad. adv. Paul. Samos., *apud* Reuth, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 292. They also used other phrases of similar intention, as θεῖος, θεϊκός, ἅγιος, ἱερός, θεόφατος, θεοδίδακτος, θεσπισθείς, etc.; *cf.* Lee, *on inspiration*, pp. 470 *sqq.*

We might speak of a writer as influenced by the spirit of God, just as we read that "holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."[1] But a writing cannot be so described, except with reference to its contents. To say, in any intelligible sense of the term, that the Scripture is inspired, is the same as saying that it is the Word of God; not that it is, in a material and carnal manner, a collection of words, syllables, or letters of divine origin; but that it includes or contains the substance of the true revelation of God's will; that it is a properly authenticated record of His holy communications; that it is a memorial, wherein His declarations respecting Himself are explained and preserved. The separate books, of which it is composed, and even the older works from which they were translated, abridged, or compiled, were written by men, and betray the human ingredients of error; they contain much that is not connected with the revelation of God's will, and not a little which is alien from the spirit of His religion. But if, in the midst of all these fallible materials, the divine truth runs through the pages, as the limpid stream winds its way through tangled bushes, swampy meadows, verdant groves, blooming orchards, flourishing corn-fields, and desert heaths, until it mingles with the boundless ocean, we may truly say that the Holy Scriptures are θεόπνευστοι; that is, inspired, or divinely animated;[2] that the spirit of God breathes through this Book; that the Word of God sounds in its echoes; that we may draw from it, as from a well of life, the refreshing water of eternal comfort and grace.

It is idle to object that we have no test or criterion to enable

[1] 1 Peter, i. 21.

[2] This translation of θεόπνευστος was first suggested in the opening sentence of *Jashar*: "Sacros Judæorum Christianorumque libros divino quodam afflatu animari, nemo negaverit," etc. It is adopted independently by Mr. Rowland Williams, *Rational Godliness*, p. 291: "If the religious records represent faithfully the inner life of each generation, whether a people or a priesthood, they will all be, in St. Paul's phrase, *divinely animated*, or with a divine life running through them; and every writing divinely animated will be useful."

us to distinguish between that which is and that which is not religious revelation in the documents; between that which is essential to our faith and to our religious system, and that which is human history, tradition, or poetry. Clement of Alexandria has told us that "the canon of Scripture is neither more nor less than the concent and harmony of the law and the prophets with the covenant delivered at the time of our Lord's appearance,"[1] and this statement respecting the substantial

[1] The whole passage from Clemens is well worthy of the attention of the theological student. He had said before (*Strom.* vi. p. 784, Potter) that various similes might be borrowed from harmony; for example, we might compare man in a state of salvation to a harp: "You may understand," he adds, "another sort of musical concord, that of the Church, namely, the harmony of the law and the prophets with the writings of the Apostles, and with the Gospel; and the concord which enters into each individual prophet and is independent of the changes of person" (λάβοις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλως μουσικὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικήν, νόμου καὶ προφητῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀποστόλων σὺν καὶ τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ· τήν τε ὑποβεβηκυῖαν τὴν καθ' ἕκαστον προφήτην κατὰ τὰς μεταπηδήσεις τῶν προσώπων συνῳδίαν). He clearly implies that this harmony is best perceived by the philosophically instructed reader (p. 786): "As some for the benefit of their neighbours take to writing and others to preaching the Word, both other education is useful, and the reading of the dominical Scriptures is necessary for the demonstration of what is said, and especially if those who hear come from the schools of Greek learning" (διὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν πέλας ὠφέλειαν τῶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν ἰεμένων, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παραδιδόναι στελλομένων τὸν λόγον, ἥ τε ἄλλη παιδεία χρήσιμος ἥ τε τῶν γραφῶν τῶν κυριακῶν ἀνάγνωσις εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν λεγομένων ἀναγκαία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀνάγωνται παιδείας οἱ ἐπαΐοντες). Indeed he does not hesitate to say that philosophy by itself contains the elements of theology (p. 802): "Philosophy at all events, in declaring the providence of God, and the rewards and punishments of a future state, gives a summary of theological instruction" (ἡ γοῦν φιλοσοφία . . . περιληπτικῶς θεολογεῖ). And having intimated that all the instruction contained in the Scriptures is conveyed under the form of parables, he adds (p. 803): "But, as the Scripture says, all things are right in the eyes of those who understand (Prov. viii. 9), those, namely, who have received and preserve the explanation of the Scriptures declared by our Lord himself, according to the Canon of the Church: now the Canon of the Church is the *harmony* and *concord* of the Law and the Prophets with the Testament delivered at the coming of the Lord" (πλὴν ἅπαντα ὀρθὰ ἐνώπιον τῶν συνιέντων, φησὶν ἡ γραφή· τουτέστι, τῶν ὅσοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Κυρίου] σαφηνισθεῖσαν τῶν γραφῶν ἐξήγησιν κατὰ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν κάνονα ἐκδεχόμενοι διασώζουσι· κάνων δὲ ἐκκλησιαστικὸς ἡ συνῳδία καὶ συμφωνία νόμου τε καὶ προφητῶν τῇ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου παρουσίαν παραδιδομένῃ διαθήκῃ). This view of the Canon of Scripture as regulated by the internal coherency of its different parts is identical with the doctrine of inspiration maintained in the *Vindication of Protestant Principles.* "Whether the books in the Bible," says Phileleutherus (p. 51), "were written by the men whose names they bear, or by others even less exempt from error or sin, we still hear, from its first to its last page, the still small voice of divine truth,

unity of the religious contents of the whole Bible sufficiently describes the Word of God, which is contained implicitly in this collection of documents. The message from God to man, which forms the link of connection between the Old and New Testaments, which is consistently delivered in the first no less than in the last pages of the Bible, is at once the proof of inspiration, namely, that a revelation has been given, and, at the same time, it is the

speaking, *in one continuous or ever-recurring harmony*, to the secret echoes of our moral convictions." The same author quite agrees with Clemens that the divine truth contained in the collection of the works of men which we call the Bible, is most likely to be extracted therefrom by the enlightened eye and by the pious hand (p. 50). The view of inspiration propounded by Philoleutherus Anglicanus has been supported by Mr. De Quincey with his usual power of language and logic in some articles on *Protestantism*, which appeared in *Tait's Magazine* for 1847 (pp. 758 *sqq.*, 843 *sqq.*). He says: "My own solution of the problem would reconcile all that is urged against an inspiration with all that the internal necessity of the case would plead on behalf of an inspiration. So would *Phil.'s*. His distinctions, like mine, would substantially come down to this—that the grandeur and extent of religious truth is not of a nature to be affected by verbal changes such as *can* be made by time, or accident, or without treacherous design. It is like lightning which could not be mutilated, or truncated, or polluted. But it may be well to rehearse a little more in detail both *Phil.'s* view and my own. . . . Whilst rejecting altogether any inspiration as attaching to the separate words and phrases of the Scriptures, *Phil.* insists (§ 25, p. 49) upon such an inspiration as attaching to the spiritual truths and doctrines delivered in these Scriptures. And he places this theory in a striking light, equally for what it affirms and for what it denies, by these two arguments—first (in affirmation of the real spiritual inspiration) that a series of more than thirty writers, speaking in succession along a vast line of time, and absolutely without means of concert, yet all combine unconsciously to one end—lock like parts of a great machine into one system—conspire to the unity of a very elaborate scheme, without being at all aware of what was to come after. . . . At length all is finished. A profound piece of music, a vast oratorio, perfect and of elaborate unity, has resulted from a long succession of strains, each for itself fragmentary. On such a final creation, resulting from such a distraction of parts, it is indispensable to suppose an overruling inspiration, in order at all to account for the final result of a most elaborate harmony. . . . Briefly, a great mysterious *word* is spelt, as it were, by the whole sum of the Scripture books—every separate book forming a letter or syllable in that secret and that unfinished word, as it was for so many ages. This co-operation of ages, not able to communicate or concert arrangements with each other, is neither more nor less an argument of an over-ruling inspiration, than if the separation of the contributing parties were by space and not by time. . . . So far on behalf of inspiration. Yet, on the other hand, as an argument in denial of any blind mechanical inspiration cleaving to words and syllables, *Phil.* notices this consequence as resulting from such an assumption, viz., that if you adopt any one Gospel, St. John's, suppose, or any one narrative of a particular transaction, as inspired in this minute and pedantic sense, then, for every other report, which, adhering to the spiritual *value* of the circumstances, and

substance of the revelation itself. Jesus has declared to us, in few words, what is the essential purport of the law which Moses preached, and which he came to restore, confirm, and purify. For in answer to the question, "What is the great commandment in the law?" he said: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."[1]

virtually the same, should differ in the least of the details, there would instantly arise a solemn degradation. All parts of Scripture, in fact, would thus be made active and operative in degrading each other. Such is *Phil.'s* way of explaining θεοπνευστία, or divine prompting, so as to reconcile the doctrine affirming a *virtual* inspiration; an inspiration as to the truths revealed, with a peremptory denial of any inspiration at all as to the mere verbal vehicle of those revelations. He is evidently as sincere in regard to the inspiration which he upholds as in regard to that which he denies. *Phil.* is honest, and *Phil.* is able. Now comes my turn. I rise to support my leader, and shall attempt to wrench this notion of a verbal inspiration from the hands of its champions by a *reductio ad absurdum;* viz. by showing the monstrous consequences to which it leads; which form of logic *Phil.* also has employed briefly . . . but mine is different, and more elaborate." After pointing out the futility of drawing inferences from either interpretation of 2 Tim. iii. 16, Mr. de Quincey proceeds to develope his own argument against the theory of verbal inspiration, which, he says, "turns on the self-confounding tendency of the common form ascribed to θεοπνευστία, or divine inspiration." He shows that besides the inspiration of the original composers of the sacred books, which he grants, though distinguishing as to its nature, the Bibliolaters want inspiration for the countless translations of the Bible; again, for a selection of the best version; again, for the selection of the right reading in every textual variation; and, "even after this fourth inspiration has qualified us for selecting the true reading, we shall still be at a loss how, upon this right reading, to fix the right acceptation; so that we want a fifth inspiration, which, as we all know—each knows by his own experience—is not forthcoming; and, in the absence of *that*, what avail for *us* all the others?" But, as Mr. de Quincey adds: "These chains of inspiration are needless. The great ideas of the Bible protect themselves: the heavenly truths, by their own imperishableness, defeat the mortality of languages with which, for a moment, they are associated." And borrowing the phraseology of Phileleutherus and Clemens, he speaks of religious truth as one "to which the key-notes of Scriptures (once awakened in the great organ of the heart) are sure to call up corresponding echoes. It is not," he adds, "in the power of language to arrest or to defeat this mode of truth; because, when once the fundamental base is furnished by revelation, the human heart itself is able to co-operate in developing the great harmonies of the system, without aid from language, and in defiance of language; without aid from human learning, and in defiance of human learning" (p. 847).

[1] Matth. xxii. 36–40.

Whatever is in accordance with the spirit of these words, whatever illustrates their meaning, or enforces their obligation, whether found in the Old Testament or in the New, is part of the revelation from God to man,—and we can draw this spiritual food from almost every page: whatever is inconsistent with them, or does not speak their meaning, is not of God, but of man; not of the body, but of the vestment; not of the eternal, but of the temporary and transient; not of the spirit, which giveth life, but of the letter which killeth. And thus we come back to the principle on which we have more than once insisted, that we appreciate the difference between the voice of God and the voice of man, just in the same proportion as we do the will of our Father which is in heaven; and so our insight into the mysteries of faith becomes brighter and clearer as our growth in holiness is more and more confirmed and assured.

If we question any really religious man, who can see truth, and will own it when seen, as to his belief on the subject of inspiration, we shall find that it really amounts to this. He will tell us that he receives the Bible as an authoritative guide for his conduct, an authoritative sanction for his hopes, because the voice of God, which speaks in Scripture, finds its echo in the voice of God, which speaks in his own conscience.[1] He knows that he will not be the happier, here or hereafter, for the establishment of any theory respecting the mode of communication.

[1] This is the meaning of J. A. Ernesti when he says (*Opusc. Theol.* p. 609) that "as formerly the Holy Spirit afforded a testimony of truth and divine authority to the doctrines of Jesus Christ, and in that way brought over many to the faith, so also afterwards in all time he has offered himself and still offers himself as a witness in the minds of men to the celestial truth of the Word of God, so that no doubt is left concerning it"; and then follows the passage quoted in *Jashar*, p. 3. To the same effect Mr. Rowland Williams (*Rational Godliness*, p. 309), after admitting "that the Church was before the Bible as a speaker is before his voice, and that Holy Scripture is not the foundation of the Christian faith so much as its creature, its expression, and embodiment," concedes also "that the two things from which Scripture strang are for ever in the world—namely, the conscience of man and the Holy Spirit of God—and that from these two, meeting in the Church, the Bible derives its origin, its authority, and its power to persuade."

He, whose heart is set on practical holiness, is satisfied with learning and obeying the will of God. For this purpose, it is sufficient for him that the religion of Jesus, in its essential import, and the religion of Moses, so far as it is confirmed by Jesus, should be both true and cognisable. He can walk in the garden of the Lord, and derive spiritual sustenance from the fruit of the Tree of Life, without thinking it necessary to feed on the boughs and foliage, or on the grass under his feet. He knows that God breathed into his soul the breath of life, and gave him a spirit by which he might discern spiritual things. When, therefore, his mind is properly enlightened by education, he scorns the teaching which identifies the shell with the kernel, and he refuses to take the husk instead of the "flour of wheat." To him the Bible is a human composition, or rather a compilation from literary fragments, but its theme and substance are divine; for it tells how God manifested Himself, and declared His will to the beings into whom He had breathed a particle of His own Spirit. And he thankfully acknowledges the good providence which has preserved such an intelligible record of great facts and greater truths.

This is the only doctrine of inspiration which is sincerely entertained by religious and reasonable men. They value the Bible for what it teaches—for what they can draw from it: they thank God for His revelation, and for His providential preservation of its records; but they do not, contrary to all reason, bow down to the mechanical traces of words and letters, which neither live themselves, nor can give life to others. Even Mr Gaussen means this, if, indeed, any definite idea is involved in the hazy mist of words by which he has endeavoured to express or disguise his confused apprehensions. He asks: "Is it not enough for me always to see in Jesus Christ the son of man and the Son of God, as it is enough for me to see always in the Holy Scriptures the word of man and the Word of God?" To say

nothing of the inapplicable and virtually heterodox reference to the two natures of Christ, it is obvious that the Bible cannot be at once the Word of God and the word of man, in any sense, except that which has already been given; namely, that it is the word of man in reference to its literary composition and authorship, and the Word of God in reference to those divine communications of which it is the only authentic record. Thus the doctrine of plenary inspiration is, to all intents and purposes, abandoned by its most eager and unscrupulous advocates, and thus we are left without the least defence of an opinion[1] which is useless to theology and prejudicial to religion, which clogs with unnecessary impediments the wavering faith of the intelligent but unenlightened Christian, and invites the unbeliever to an assured and even easy triumph.

But though we hope to have shown that Christianity in general is independent of the untenable assumption that the books of the Bible were written under infallible dictation, the important question remains—how far the national Church of England has included in the terms of its communion any opinion respecting the question of Inspiration?

We shall show more at length in a subsequent chapter that whatever tends to narrow the basis of a State Church is, *ipso facto*, detrimental to its security; and it would be a great aggravation of the difficulties occasioned by expressions in the Liturgy and Articles referring to distinctive details, if the Church were pledged to maintain a theory which has perilled the existence of general Christianity. The doctrine of plenary inspiration has contributed in no slight degree to form the rationalistic scepticism of Germany; and though the Biblical learning of that country has averted the evils which were threatened by the spread of a general disbelief in revelation,

[1] For the dynamical theory, see Appendix V.

the rank weeds have been transplanted to the uncultivated soil of English theology, and seem likely to produce lasting mischief. In spite of their ordination vow, the great mass of our clergy are grossly ignorant of Biblical criticism. There is scarcely one in a thousand among the clergy of the Low Church party who could give any account of the origin of the Canon, or sustain a rational argument on the internal discrepancies of Scripture. In the meantime, speculative knowledge is spreading rapidly among the working classes, especially among the intelligent mechanics who crowd our manufacturing towns. The results, if not the details, of science, are communicated by lectures delivered at Athenæums and other Literary Institutions; newspapers discuss or allude to religious difficulties, which are farther enforced by the clamorous denunciations of the so-called religious press; cheap editions of sceptical works are extensively circulated; and if, in the midst of all this, the clergy are found to repeat and appropriate the ignorant assertions of ages long gone by, if they maintain assumptions which they cannot defend and which all intelligent men feel to be indefensible, it is clear that the obstacle of general unbelief and perhaps general contempt may soon be added to the more easily conquerable difficulties of hereditary or personal dissent from the Church.

Even those who countenance the sacerdotal pretensions of our ministers must admit, what we shall afterwards endeavour to prove, that their position is virtually professional, and that their influence depends more or less on their educational superiority. And those of the Broad Church, as it is called, have openly insisted on this supposed distinction between the clergy and the laity. An able and well-informed divine has recently declared before the University of Oxford, that "an effectual ministration must commend itself to the popular judgment (ill-directed as it too commonly is), by at least evincing an en-

lightenment which keeps pace with that of the age"; and especially for the reasons which he adduces: "It is not sufficiently considered," he says, "that at the present day among the thinking and educated classes there are hundreds of acute and powerful, though not always well-directed, intellects, engaged in keenly scrutinizing the very foundations of faith; and that among the half-educated and evil-disposed masses the example is widely followed with a less equivocal tendency towards total irreligion. This state of things is not to be met by empty denunciations or clinging to prescriptive authority; and, least of all, amid ecclesiastical contentions and divisions; but by a more enlightened and honest devotion to the cause of truth, combined with the true spirit of charity and moderation in the mode of upholding it."[1]

When sentiments like these proceed from an Oxford Professor, and when we recollect that liberal views are entertained by many resident members of the two Universities, and by not a few distinguished writers, who are not only clergymen, but beneficiaries of Cathedral establishments, there is little reason to fear a total want of scientific and philosophic illumination on the part of our ministers. But it is desirable to show, and we shall do this more fully in a subsequent chapter, that their hands are not tied, as is too often supposed, by any thing in the formularies of the Church to which they belong.

The words "inspiration" and "inspired," as applied to Scripture, do not occur once in the Articles or Liturgy,[2] and therefore

[1] Professor Baden Powell, "The State Church," a Sermon preached before the University of Oxford, 5th November, 1850, p. 36.

[2] The word *inspiration* is used in the Liturgy to denote the influence of the Holy Spirit on the minds of all true believers; thus we have it in the first Collect of the Communion Service, and in the Collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter (*cf.* Collect for Whitsunday). In the same sense it is used in the English version of Job, xxxii. 8: "But there is a spirit in man, and the *inspiration* of the Almighty giveth them understanding." If, then, we thought it necessary to derive a dogma about inspiration from the use of the term in these passages, we should conclude that all good and wise men are

it cannot be said that the Established Church has any received theory respecting the composition of the Bible, as affected by a special influence exerted on the minds of those who wrote the Sacred Books. We cannot be said to assert, under a particular form, that which we do not even mention in express terms. It is perfectly true that the Bible is termed "Holy Scripture" and "the Word of God"; that it is repeatedly mentioned as the only source of information respecting the doctrines of theology and the truths of religion, as the only authority for creeds, church-decrees, and councils; it is true that we acknowledge the Canon in its most comprehensive form; that we recognise the religious harmony of the Old and New Covenants, and declare that the Holy Spirit spoke by the Prophets; and that, extending the words of St. Paul to the New Testament, we ascribe it to the good providence of God that he has "caused all holy Scriptures to be written for our learning." But we have already shown that by the phrase "Word of God," it is sufficient to understand the divine revelation contained in and conveyed by the Bible, and that we need not extend this to the literary fabric which serves as the vehicle. The epithet "holy" merely implies a religious use, and "sacra scriptura" refers, like "sacra theologia," to the subject-matter of the book, and of the

inspired in some general sense; and we should infer from the profession made by the Deacon that he trusts he is *inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost* to take upon him that office and ministration, and from the words "receive the Holy Ghost," which are addressed to every Priest and Bishop at his ordination and consecration, that the Church of England attributes inspiration in some special sense to all ordained ministers. And this special sense can only be an intensive use of that general meaning of inspiration which is implied in the prayer that "the thoughts of our hearts may be cleansed by the inspiration of God's Holy Spirit," and that "by God's holy inspiration we may think those things that be good"; so that Godfrey Hermann was not far wrong when he considered the "receiving the Spirit" spoken of by St. Paul (Gal. iii. 2) as equivalent to "being imbued with religiousness of heart." He says (*Opusc.* v. p. 124): "Prædictus est a prophetis cruciatus Jesu, per quem, non per legem, illa animorum pietate (hoc est enim τὸ πνεῦμα) imbuti estis." And so we come back to our former principle that we must needs discern and distinguish what is and what is not inspiration in Scripture by the amount of inspiration or real religiousness in ourselves.

science which deals with it. In giving an equal authority to all the books of the latest Canon, the Church only places itself on the footing of the fourth century; and no evil can arise from the extension, if we only admit the proper functions of Biblical criticism, and reject the material hypothesis of verbal infallibility; for the Protestant divine may always use the language adopted by Scaliger in speaking of the doubtful treatises: "Ego credo iis quæ intus quia nihil contra nos."[1] The doctrine of a providential preservation of the documents may indeed be carried too far; and, as we have seen, it is extended beyond its proper limits when it is used as an argument from the necessity of the case; but, in itself, it is perfectly in accordance with the most obvious view of the dealings of God with his reasonable creatures.

The Church of England, then, asserts the value of the Scriptures, and allows their authority, without developing or adopting any theory respecting the mode of their composition. If the Prayer-Book cites any passages at variance with the conclusions of modern science, or modern scholarship, we are not to argue in favour of an assumption which enhances this antagonism, but must perforce admit that the criticism which is applicable to the Bible itself, cannot be inapplicable to these extracts from the Bible. But, above all, we are not to allow the most able, intelligent, and honest of our clergy and laity, to be saddled with arbitrary conditions, not implied in the terms of our national subscription, merely because it suits the convenience of those ignorant Puritans, who appropriate the name of Evangelicals, to fortify their arrogant pretensions by an appeal to the literal infallibility of translated Scripture, or because the middle classes are prejudiced in favour of a system of text-worship, which they have neither the leisure nor the ability to compare with the

[1] *Scaligerana*, p. 72.

results of learning and common sense. We can readily understand that certain preachers of the Exeter Hall school should feel their vocation to be gone from them, or, at least, their hold on the allegiance of the weak-minded persons who constitute the majority in every congregation, to be shaken, by the concession of a right to examine into the authority and real signification of documents, which, by garbled quotations, can be made to speak any language, and to confirm any doctrine. But the Church of England is a Protestant community, and we are not likely, as a body, to sacrifice a liberty, purchased by the blood of martyrs, in order to bow our heads to a yoke which our fathers were not able to bear. Those, whom Moses led out of the land of Egypt, did not pass into the wilderness merely to substitute the domination of Korah and his company for that of the sceptered Pharaoh of Memphis. If criticism is to be brought under bondage to an arbitrary hypothesis, merely to avoid any interference with the presuppositions of blundering pastors and ignorant congregations, we have really rather lost than gained by the Reformation. "In the Church of Rome," said the late Archdeacon Hare,[1] "a person subjects himself to condemnation if he dares to notice any error in the Vulgate. This practice we reprobate as Romish: but the self-same spirit is perpetually found even in those who are loudest in railing at the Church of Rome; and they will be no less eager in condemning a person who points out any mistake, not in the Bible, but in our vulgar conception of it, in our Vulgate. This, however, assuredly is, as it ever has been, a tendency subversive of faith. Faith may easily co-exist with much latent, unconscious error; but, when we become conscious of it, we must cut it out, or the mortification will spread through the whole body. Every honest heart revolts from trickery in the service of religion." The ignorance of the

[1] "Letter to the Editor of the *English Review*," p. 43.

mass of people in a congregation is often pleaded as an excuse for upholding views respecting inspiration which the minister himself feels to be untenable, and we are told that we ought not to remove any of those artificial supports by which a feeble faith is kept from falling. But even though we should admit that a worthless credulity is to be invested with the holy name of faith, and carefully guarded from every shock by which it might be alarmed or subverted, this consideration should only prevent us from announcing the truth until our audience is better prepared to hear it; it would not justify us in continuing to inculcate error, still less in denouncing as enemies to the faith those who are supposed or known to hold a different opinion. The fact is, that the ignorance and superstition of congregations have no necessary or independent existence; they are produced and sustained by the clamorous pulpit oratory of those evangelical demagogues, who rival the popish priests of the middle ages in violent bigotry, and in open hatred of science and learning. To these false brethren, who spy out the liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they may bring us into bondage, let us not give place by subjection, no, not for an hour,[1] but let us so expose and rebuke them, that the Gospel, which they misrepresent, may continue among the people of England, uncompromised by ignorance and folly, and untainted by subterfuge, trickery, and falsehood. That the spirit of bibliolatry is as inconsistent with Christianity, as the dogma itself is prejudicial to the advocacy of religious faith, may be learned from the history of the Haldanes, its most uncompromising champions in these latter days, and from the whole career of the libellous and dishonest journal which is the acknowledged organ of the party.[2] And there cannot be the least doubt that, if their power was equal to their will,—and they boast of their power,—the advocates of

[1] Gal. ii. 5. [2] See Appendix VI.

an infallible Bible would treat the upholders of free criticism with persecutions not unlike those by which the fanatical votaries of an infallible church endeavoured to quell the first struggles of Protestanism.

With all the facts before us, we must be blind to the signs of the times, if we cannot see that we have arrived at a critical period, when it is imperatively demanded of all who claim to be lovers of intellectual and religious freedom,—nay, of all who call themselves educated men and Protestants,—that they should, by one combined effort, terminate for ever the tyranny of that loud-voiced ignorance which has staked the existence of revelation on the hypothesis of an infallible literature. We have seen that this assumption is utterly opposed to the facts of the case; we know that it is supported, not by honest arguments, but by the most contemptible falsehoods, combined with the most malignant persecution of those who assert either the contrary proposition, or the right and duty of examining its truth. If the proposition were true, it would be condemned sufficiently by the spirit which it has evoked, and the immorality which it has occasioned. But it is so palpably false, that candid men, even where they come to the inquiry with an antecedent prejudice and an earnest wish to find it true, are invariably led to an opposite conclusion.[1] What Voltaire and D'Alembert exhorted one another to do, with reference to that mother of superstition and immorality, the dogma of an infallible church, all educated men, who are anxious for the development of religion and Christian ethics, must endeavour to effect, in regard to the other groundwork of the religion *ab extra*, the

[1] That the writer of these pages, before he had professedly engaged in biblical researches, both wished and expected to find the Scriptures as infallible in all respects as they had been represented to him, may be inferred from the manner in which he approached the book of Genesis in one of the earliest of his works—the "New Cratylus."

assumption of an infallible literature.[1] For this cumbrous idol, to which human truth and human love are every day offered up in sacrifice, there is only one duty to be performed—to crush this pernicious fallacy, or misrepresentation of the facts, and consign it to everlasting oblivion. And this can only be effected by a sudden and unanimous effort on the part of those who have the wisdom to see the truth, and the manliness to assert it. An able writer has recently observed that we ought "to remember that Protestantism, if it mean anything, is liberty of thought. It is not salvation which is at stake, but religious and political liberty. Every one who fears to think, who submits reason to prejudice, is a Roman Catholic already in his heart; and no amount of dogged obstinacy, or sectarian party spirit, will ultimately prevent the spurious Protestanism of the day, if unredeemed by a higher and more universal education, from ultimately merging in Popery. Those who would check thought, and make the mass of mankind into mere machines, would fain persuade us that the meaning of the Bible is equally or even more open to the simple and uninstructed than to the educated. They would have it to be exactly what the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is to the Catholic—a stumbling-block to the intellect, and a badge of mental servitude. We must resist the infliction, and rouse ourselves from the mental torpor and inanition engendered by the long continuance of such treatment."

And in making this effort to shake off the trammels of Bibliolatry, let us tear away the vain pretences, by which an attempt is made to check, at the very outset, all critical inquiries respecting the authority of Scripture. When we are told that, if we hazard any doubts on this subject, we declare that "the Church of God, the Church of Christ, has been wrong in its

[1] It is now well known that the French philosophers were opposed not so much to religion as to the Romish misrepresentation of Christianity.

belief for more than 3000 years," let us answer that we are not concerned with the inherited prejudices of preceding generations; but that the history of the Jewish Canon is the history of an editorial compilation, and that the history of the Christian Canon tells us of discriminations in the third century which the fourth and following centuries have thought fit to disregard: so that the stately column rests on a rotten foundation, which modern research has laid bare to the eyes of all who can see. Then again, when we are told that the Bible exercises a divine influence wherever its free use is permitted, that it sheds a ray of light wherever it is allowed to circulate, and that this alone proves its incontestable sanctity; when this plausible argument is advanced, we may always, without denying to Scripture its just claim to reverential consideration, prove to demonstration that the alleged effects are due to those principles of Protestant liberty, to that unfettered freedom of examination and discussion which Protestantism implies, and which Bibliolatry, not less than the doctrine of an infallible Church, impedes and endeavours to prohibit. "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty"[1]: and conversely, where we find liberty, we may generally conclude that we have the spirit as opposed to the letter.[2] Above all, when the advocates of an infallible Bible endeavour to justify their derelictions from Christian and moral principle by appealing to their "zeal for the Word of God," we may reduce them to silence by pointing out the undeniable fact that the idol, to which they invite our reverence, is not the Word of God, the revelation from God to man, for which we are quite as zealous as themselves, but either a peculiar definition of that term, which is not accepted by even a majority of English clergymen, or else a special hypothesis respecting the literature of the ancient Jews and early Christians, which all candid and learned men have renounced as utterly untenable.

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 17. [2] *Ibid*, v. 6.

APPENDIX III.

(CHAP. III. P. 156).

ON THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE JEWISH COLLECTION OF SACRED BOOKS.

We are convinced that the only opinion respecting the Scriptures, which is compatible with true religious conservatism, or with a safe advocacy of revealed truth, is that which implies that the whole of the inspired record is in the Bible, though the whole of the Bible is not the inspired record; and that, although the Scriptures are truly called the Word of God, they do not possess in detail that sovereign authority and absolute certainty which would presume that their human authors were infallible. The chief reason why this opinion is not universally adopted is the unwillingness or inability of the great mass of theologians to grasp and realise to themselves the fact, that the whole Canon of Scripture was formed by a gradual process, and that the Old Testament in particular is a compilation, which has passed, perhaps more than once, through the remodelling editorship of a Masoretic school. Reserving for another Appendix some remarks on the structure of the Christian Scriptures, we will here examine, as briefly as possible, the origin and growth of the Jewish collection, and endeavour to ascertain the materials which were at the disposal of the Scribes, to whom we owe the Canonical recension.

When a character of peculiar sanctity is claimed for a collection of ancient books, it is natural that we should inquire, when and under what circumstances this character was first recognised

and admitted. Now, there is no doubt, that the Jews did not begin to make a formal collection of their sacred books until after their return from exile in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah. It was then, according to the Jewish account, which contains much that is obviously fabulous, that the great synagogue or convocation was convened and kept together for the establishment of what was ultimately the Masora or traditionary text of the sacred books, and the members of this committee of authorized editors were called the Masorethæ or traditionists. The labours of this standing committee were carried on for many years, and they gradually extended, with a diminishing regard for antiquity and genuineness, the series of works to which they assigned an indefeasible authority. At first they had only two classes of sacred books—the Law, which included only the Pentateuch, or the five books referring to the history of the Israelites before they took possession of the promised land; and the Prophets, or the eight books,—*i.e.*, Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and the minor prophets,—which carried on the history up to the time of Ezra. The last of the Prophets, Malachi, "my messenger," was identified by some of the Jewish doctors with Ezra, and the spirit of prophecy failed after this time. The third class of sacred books, commonly designated as the Hagiographa or "Holy Writings," must have existed, at least in the earlier portions of the five collections of Psalms, before the time of Ezra. And as this was the first and most important of the Hagiographa, it sometimes gave its name to the whole class, as when our Saviour said: "All things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets and the Psalms concerning me" (Luke, xxiv. 44). But the collection was kept open for the reception of additions at least until the time of Antiochus Epiphanes (B.C. 175—164), when the book of Daniel was composed. It was probably about this time that the Canon was closed. For Jesus, the son of Sirach, in the prologue to Ecclesiasticus (written about 130 B.C.), speaks of his grandfather as having "given himself to the reading of the law and the prophets and the other books of our fathers" (*τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πατρίων βιβλίων*), which seems to imply the whole collection. On the same authority we learn that a part at least of the Greek version of the Scriptures was then in existence. And it is clear that in our Saviour's time the

Jews were acquainted with the whole collection, as we have it now: for our Lord himself not only cites the Hagiographa, along with the Law and the Prophets, under the name of the first and principal part of that class, the Psalms (Luke, xxiv. 44), but in apparent allusion to the whole range of Jewish records, he places Abel, who is mentioned in the fourth chapter of Genesis, and Zacharias, who is commemorated in the second book of Chronicles, at the beginning and end of past history (Matth. xxiii. 35). Now the Hagiographa in the Masoretic text contain the following twelve works—Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Solomon's Song, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemia, Chronicles. So that Genesis and Chronicles are the first and last books in the Jewish Canon. Accordingly, there is presumptive evidence, that, at the Christian era, the Jewish collection was fixed and completed; and Josephus, who flourished in the first century A.D., mentions all the books in a division of twenty-two parts corresponding to the letters of the Hebrew alphabet.

From this brief survey of all the available evidence, the reader will see that the Hebrew collection of sacred books originated with the Jews, who returned from exile in the fifth century B.C.; that the second part was closed with the book of Malachi, about 400 B.C.; and the third part with the book of Chronicles, about 150 B.C. We have, therefore, a gradual growth of the collection extending over some 300 years; and it would be a waste of words to show that the priestly caste, who took it upon themselves to say what books should be regarded as sacred, and what books should be excluded from the Canon, who accepted Daniel, and rejected Jesus, the son of Sirach, did not, during that long period, abstain from remodelling, perhaps rewriting, some of the older books. At any rate, as prophecy or inspiration, according to their own tradition, terminated with Malachi, the remaining 250 years of editorship, which are evidently the most important with reference to the present state of the canonical books, must be regarded as a period when one-sided, uncritical, and superstitious priests were left to the uncontrolled tendencies of their own fallible judgment. That a collection, gradually growing up under such auspices, should be invested with the attributes of literary infallibility, and that this opinion should be maintained by any one in the nineteenth century, is, of itself, a most remarkable phenomenon, which can

only be explained by the existence of some deeply-seated error, prejudice, or misconception.

The following is, in fact, the reason why Christians acquiesce in the Jewish notion that their long series of Masoretic editors were endowed with superhuman and infallible accuracy. It is supposed that our Lord has sanctioned this opinion by his divine authority. It is maintained that, as He recognises the whole collection of Jewish Scriptures, and cites passages as unquestionable authorities for doctrine or practice, with the simple introduction "it is written," He must have regarded the Old Testament in all its parts, and in its then existing state, as divine and infallibly accurate. And there are enthusiastic Christians, who stigmatise as infidelity or apostacy from Christ the proposition, which we regard as an inevitable postulate, that the Masoretic editors and compilers were and must have been fallible. Before, then, we consider the nature of the Masoretic editorship, and the materials from which they derived their compilation, it is highly necessary that we should inquire whether the Author of our religion has pledged his sacred word for the genuineness, authenticity, integrity, divine authority, and infallible accuracy of the Jewish collection of sacred books. The main points in this question have been already discussed, in a calm and dispassionate manner, by Professor Andrews Norton ("Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospel," vol. ii., pp. 475 *sqq.*). He calls attention to the two important considerations, "that, in order to accomplish the great purpose of his mission, it was necessary for Jesus to abstain from directly opposing many gross errors of his countrymen;" and "that the fact is unquestionable, that the Evangelists did not always report the language of their Master with verbal exactness." From these considerations, it follows, that, while we must not "reject any declaration ascribed to him, as not founded on what he actually said, or as not, in its essential meaning, true," we must make allowance for the reserve with which He necessarily expressed himself when his words would have rendered him liable to general misconstruction, and must understand what was the meaning of the words, attributed to Him in a particular case, by the general tendency of his teaching. Professor Norton has not forgotten another reason which makes it still more necessary to prefer the evidences furnished by the main scope of our Lord's teaching to that which

results from particular expressions, which the Evangelists have recorded. "Every one," he says, "easily slides into the language of a popular error, or rather we may find it difficult to avoid such language, when not expressly contending against the error. But on the supposition that the Evangelists had not decidedly renounced the opinions of their countrymen respecting the Pentateuch and the Levitical law, we connot doubt that they might unconsciously attribute to Jesus incidental expressions favouring those opinions;—that they might have done so in cases, where, if his precise words had been compared with their report of them, they would not have recognised any important difference of character or effect between his language and their own."

With these considerations before us, we shall have no difficulty in estimating the character which our Lord attributed to the Jewish collection of sacred writings. He necessarily abstained from any critical remarks which would have shocked without edifying his hearers, and generally accepted the whole collection for the sake of the revelation of which it was the record, and of the religious ideas of which it was the vehicle. Accordingly, if his words are reported with literal accuracy, he not only spoke of the Pentateuch in general as the work of Moses, but even drew an illustration from the most incredible incident in the fabulous book of Jonah, and quoted by the name of Daniel the undoubtedly spurious book attributed to that prophet, but not classed with the other prophetic writings by the Jews themselves. It might indeed be said that the use of διὰ instead of ὑπό, in Matth. xxiv. 15, relieves the passage from the assertion that Daniel was the author of the saying there quoted; and this presumes the most minute accuracy in the record, which is contradicted by the fact that in Mark, xiii. 14, we have ὑπὸ instead of διά. On the other hand, it might be alleged that the citations of the same passage, even when most emphatic, are not always given in the same words: thus the quotation, by which Jesus silenced the Sadducees, is given in Mark, xii. 26: "Have ye not read in the book of Moses, at the bush, how God spake to him?" but in Matth. xxii. 31, it is: "Have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God?" and in Luke, xx. 37, it is merely: "Moses indicated at the bush." And in general it might be urged that minute accuracy of citation could scarcely be

expected from a writer who attributes to Jeremiah a passage from Zechariah (Matth. xxvii. 9); or it might be remarked that we often quote from writers whom we do not consider divine, or of superior authority to ourselves, and that St. Paul, for example, does not intend, by citing Aratus, Menander, and Epimenides, to invest those poets with the attribute of infallible inspiration. Waiving all these criticisms, we incline to the conclusion suggested above, that our Lord adopted the popular language in speaking of the sacred books of the Jews, just as English clergymen speak of the "Creed of Athanasius," although every man of ordinary information is aware that it was not composed by that learned Father, and that, according to Waterland, it was written more than a century after his death by Hilary, Bishop of Arles. But although He so far condescended to the general notions of his countrymen as to quote from their sacred books without any apparent discrimination, and with a general recognition of their authority, our Lord has told us, not only by the general tendency of his doctrines and actions, but also in express terms, that even the books attributed to Moses were not, as a whole, of divine authority and lasting obligation. It seems wonderful that any readers of the Gospels should fail to observe this. If we except that obedience to the Levitical law, as the statute law of the land, which was the duty of all good citizens, and which Jesus therefore both enforced and exemplified, we shall find that he treated all the ritual and ceremonial ordinances of the Jews, even the Sabbath, as matters of indifference in themselves, but which, having become superstitious substitutes for the true religion of the heart, must be abandoned even by the Jewish disciples of Christ. As Professor Norton has well observed: "Had the ritual law been, as represented in the Pentateuch, promulgated by God, it is evident that the obligation of the Jews to obey that law could not cease till it was explicitly and solemnly repealed by God. But we find nowhere any declaration of our Saviour recognising its divine origin, and asserting his commission to declare it no longer binding. One of two inferences necessarily follows; either that the law remained binding upon his followers from among the Jews, contrary to what is affirmed by St. Paul and contrary to what He himself taught by his actions and words, or that this law did not proceed from God, and, therefore, that no express declaration was necessary to invalidate its au-

thority." And again: "The ritual law was not solemnly repealed by our Saviour in the name of God, as if it had been solemnly promulgated by God; it fell before his teaching like a form of human superstition;" and this "shows that the common opinion of the Jews respecting its divine origin was not sanctioned by the teaching of our Saviour." But we are not confined to the mere tendency of our Lord's doctrine and actions. We have express assertions that while the moral law as contained in the decalogue, explained in the book of Deuteronomy, and enforced by the Prophets, was of divine origin and eternal obligation, the ritual and statute law attributed to Moses was human and temporary and opposed to the true spirit of revealed religion. Thus we have the *locus classicus* in the Sermon on the Mount (Matth. v. 17—20). "Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." As he did destroy the ritual law, this must be understood of that religion of the heart, which is taught by Deuteronomy and the great Prophets, who so constantly, as we shall see, repudiate the idea that sacrifices are necessary or pleasing to God. "For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled" (*cf.* Luke, xvi. 17). Here again the moral law alone can be intended; for this literal and absolute retention of words, until the end of the world, could only apply to brief and emphatic commandments of divine origin like those of the ten tables. That this is the reference is shown by the next verse. "Whosoever therefore shall break one of these commandments, even the least of them, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." As our Lord is here speaking of the Christian dispensation, which is referred to by the phrase "kingdom of heaven," and is obviously alluding to the ministers of his own religion, it is plain that his warning applies only to the ten commandments, as summed up in the two great precepts of love to God and man, on which hang all the law and the prophets (Matth. xxii. 40): and the allusion to the least or shortest commandments in the two tables is to be explained by the commentary of St. James (ii. 8—11), namely, that the spirit of the law of love is involved in every commandment. That the moral law in its simple essence is here opposed to the

ceremonial ordinances substituted for it by the sacerdotal superstitions of the Jews is clear from the concluding verse of this important passage: "For I say unto you, that except your righteousness shall exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." It is manifest from this general and sweeping statement that the ritual law, as enforced and upheld by the Scribes and Pharisees, was temporary and of human origin, and that the real law of God—the moral law—was eternally binding even on the ministers and disciples of Christ. And this general view is supported by special examples. Take, for instance, the manner in which our Lord speaks of the Jewish law of divorce (Deut. xxiv. 1—3). When this law is alleged against Him, he does not say that it was ordained by God and that he was appointed to annul it: but "Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so" (Matth. xix. 8). Surely there could not be a more express admission that the law contained enactments of human origin, and of incidental value and exceptional expediency.

But there are two supplementary considerations of great importance in reference to our Lord's estimate of the value and authority of the Pentateuch; his preference for Deuteronomy as a text-book, and his citation of those passages in the great Prophets which disallow the divine origin of sacrificial rites.

Although, as we have seen, our Lord was probably acquainted with the whole Pentateuch as we have it, and did not directly contravene the common opinion or phraseology that this was the work of Moses, no careful reader of the Gospels can fail to observe that his chief authority, or, at any rate, the text which was most distinctly impressed on his memory, was the book of Deuteronomy. This is evident from the three cases in which the authoritative quotation from Jewish Scripture is placed in the strongest light. (*a*). In the narrative of the temptation, which recounts the struggle in our Saviour's mind at the commencement of his ministration, we find that He silenced the promptings of his lower nature by three appeals to the book of Deuteronomy. As the Israelites are especially enjoined to commit to memory these precepts of the book of Deuteronomy (vi. 6—9), it is reasonable to conclude that our Saviour had stored them up in the treasure-house of his human reason, and they would therefore recur

to his recollection amid the distraction of contending thoughts. That these quotations, and these alone, supplied him with weapons in such a mental contest, seems to show that he attached some peculiar and exclusive importance to the book from which they were derived. (*b*). When our Lord summed up the pith and marrow of the commandments on which "hang all the law and the prophets," the first and great commandment, or that of the love of God, is derived literally from the book of Deuteronomy (Matth. xxii. 37; Deut. vi. 5). And though the second commandment, or that of the love of our neighbour, which St. James calls "the royal law" (*νόμον βασιλικόν*, ii. 8), is given incidentally in Leviticus (xix. 18), there are critical reasons for believing that this Jehovistic portion did not originally belong to the Elohistic book of Leviticus, and that the particular command at all events must have occurred along with the other great commandment in the chapter of Deuteronomy so explicitly quoted by our Lord; and even if it were not found there in so many words, the general tendency of the book, which enjoins the love of the stranger (x. 18, 19), and regards it as a mortal sin "if any man hates his neighbour" (xix. 11), would induce us to suppose that our Lord, like the prophet Micah (vi. 8), found in Deuteronomy the requirement of righteousness and mercy, no less than that of walking humbly with God. (*c*). Above all, it was to the book of Deuteronomy alone that our Lord appealed for the predicted criterion of his own divine mission. He said to the Jews, when they wished to slay him: "Ye search the Scriptures; for in them ye think that ye have eternal life: and they are they which testify of me; and ye will not come unto me that ye might have life" (John, v. 39, 40); and: "Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" (*id. ibid.* 46, 47). Now, it is not denied by any commentator that these words refer to the test of the true prophet, who was to come, in the remarkable passage of Deuteronomy (xviii. 15-22), and there is no other passage in the Pentateuch which can be cited as distinctly foretelling the coming of such a prophet as our Lord. Moreover, the Prophets whom our Lord most preferred to cite, Isaiah (li. 5, 7, 16; lix. 21), Jeremiah (xiv. 14, 15), and Zechariah (xiii. 3), directly refer to this criterion of Messiahship; and their authority was coupled with that of Moses in the expec-

tations entertained by pious Israelites (John, i. 45). It cannot, therefore, be doubted that Deuteronomy was also in this most important reference our Lord's only standard of appeal.

Not less significant are those prophetic passages by the citation of which our Lord distinctly intimates that the sacrificial and ceremonial ordinances of the Jewish religion were not of divine origin, and that their violation in the cause of humanity involved no guilt. He said to the Pharisees, quoting Hos. vi. 6, Micah, vi. 6, 7, and through them referring to Deuteronomy: "Go ye and learn what that meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice" (Matth. ix. 13); and again: "If ye had known what this meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the guiltless" (*id.* xii. 7). It seems quite marvellous that any attentive reader of the Gospels should have failed to see the full bearing and importance of such passages as these. For while the former passage rebukes the exclusiveness of the Jews and their neglect of the Deuteronomic precept to show mercy to strangers (x. 19), the latter deals with the most solemn ordinance of the ritual law—the observance of the Sabbath—and proclaims that the violation of the Sabbath, as understood by the Jews, might be guiltless in the sight of God. And yet we read in the book of Exodus (xxxi. 15, xxxv. 2), "Whosoever doeth any work in the Sabbath day, he shall surely be put to death." Surely it must be certain, if anything is certain with regard to our Lord's teaching, that he did not regard a law, which might be violated without guilt, as part of that divine revelation which was to last as long as the solid fabric of heaven and earth. We may also infer from this citation that our Lord attached great weight to the discrepancy between the express statements of the great Prophets of Israel and that law of ceremonies and sacrifices, which the Jews attributed to Moses as the interpreter of God's revealed will. Now the Prophets before the captivity not only speak of offerings and sacrifices as though they were neither acceptable to God nor enjoined by Him, but even tell us expressly that such rites were not required at the hands of the Israelites, that they were the offspring of their own erroneous and irreligious hearts. Thus while Hosea, as we have seen, speaking in the name of God, declares: "I desired mercy and not sacrifice (vi. 6); while Micah asks: "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justice and to love mercy and to

walk humbly with thy God?" (vi. 8): and while the authors of the Psalms, in the earliest part of the collection, declare: "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not require" (Psalm xi. 6); and: "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it: thou delightest not in burnt offering" (Psalm li. 16); we find in other Prophets a distinct contradiction of the popular belief that these Levitical rites were as old as the Exodus and as divine as the Law which was so terribly promulgated in the wilderness. Isaiah says (i. 10—13): "Hear the word of the Lord—I delight not in the blood of bullocks or of lambs or of he-goats. When ye come to appear before me, to trample my courts, who hath required this at your hand? Bring no more vain oblations." Still more distinctly, Amos (v. 22—25): "Though ye offer me burnt offerings and your meat offerings, I will not accept them. Did ye offer me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" But the most emphatic announcement of the fact that sacrificial rites formed no part of the authentic and original system of the Mosaic law is that which is made by the priestly Jeremiah (vii. 21—23): "Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel: Put your burnt offerings unto your sacrifices and eat flesh. For I spake not unto your fathers nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices; but this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice and I will be your God and ye shall be my people: and walk ye in all the ways that I have commanded you, that it may be well unto you." Our Lord could not have been unacquainted with these statements of "the Prophets and Psalms," which so exactly express his own views; and the general tendency of all his teaching is to show, as these Prophets had previously done, that the genuine law of Moses, the great former revelation of God's will, had been corrupted and nullified by human aftergrowths and interpolations.

We are, then, far from conceding to our modern Judaizers that Jesus has sanctioned by his divine word the coequal authority and infallibility of the whole Jewish collection. On the contrary, we regard such a view as a grave and scandalous misrepresentation of his whole teaching; and if it were necessary to pronounce an opinion respecting the sinfulness of those who, as we believe, neglect, misapply, or pervert the teaching of our Lord, we should be obliged to stigmatise with the strongest

reprobation these modern Pharisees, who misrepresent not only his recorded words, but the whole tendency of his ministration. It appears to us as certain as any thing in this world, that he regarded the Old Testament just as we regard the whole Bible, namely, as containing the Word of God implicated and involved in the words of man; and that he sanctioned by his example the practice of enlightened teachers in all ages, who, while they clearly indicate the truth, abstain, as far as possible, from startling the prejudices of their hearers. As it was, he said and did enough to bring upon himself the deadly hatred of those who were interested in maintaining the divine origin of a sacerdotal system; but he would not have been allowed to teach as he did for a few years, if he had begun by a plain declaration of that to which all his teaching tended, namely, the human origin and religious worthlessness of the ceremonial law commonly ascribed to Moses.

If from our Saviour, who had before Him the whole collection of sacred books contained in the Masoretic Canon, we pass to the great Prophets before the captivity, whose views, as we have seen, he so fully adopted, we shall be able to establish a conclusion, which would have been still more shocking to the Scribes and Pharisees of his day. It is this—that not only did they, like him, prefer Deuteronomy to the other books of the Pentateuch, not only did they regard the moral law as divine, and the ceremonial law as human; but they had no book of the law except Deuteronomy, and no law passing under the name of Moses except that which taught the great obligations of morality. When the temple was consecrated by Solomon, we read that "there was nothing in the ark save the two tables of stone" (1 Kings, viii. 9). But when David asserts the doctrine, which is also attributed to Samuel (1 Samuel, xv. 22), and which is found in the book of Deuteronomy (x. 12 *sqq.*), that obedience is the only requirement of the divine law, he appeals to "the roll of the book" (Psalm xl. 7); and it is therefore probable that there was some record of the teaching of Moses besides the two tables of stone (*cf.* 1 Kings, ii. 3). Now the book of Deuteronomy, as the name signifies, professes to be the exact or authentic copy of that law which was kept in the temple by the side of the ark (Deut. xvii. 18, xxxi. 24—26). In the reign of Josiah, it is stated that Hilkiah the high priest "found the book of the law

in the house of the Lord" (2 Kings, xxii. 8); and it is clear from the reference to Deut. xxix. 27, in v. 13, that this book of the law was no other than Deuteronomy. It is asserted by Clement of Alexandria, and it is probable in itself, that Hilkiah, the father of Jeremiah, was the high priest who found and republished the book of the law; at any rate, it is certain that this discovery of the law of God was contemporary with the appearance of Jeremiah as a prophet of Jehovah; for the former event is placed in the eighteenth (1 Kings, xxii, 3), and the commission to prophecy in the thirteenth year (Jer. i. 2) of Josiah's reign: and it is equally certain that the language of Jeremiah is pervaded by a perpetual strain of allusion to the book of Deuteronomy, insomuch that some have been led to suppose that he had a share in the revision and editorship of that book as it now stands.[1] The writer of the book of Kings, whose date is not earlier than the fortieth year of the captivity (2 Kings, xxv. 27), speaks of Deuteronomy as "the book of the law of Moses" (2 Kings, xiv. 6; *cf.* Deut. xxiv. 16); and the contemporary prophet Ezekiel (xviii. 4, 20) refers to the same passage in such terms as bring forth most emphatically its opposition to the doctrine of the books of the Pentateuch. A recent writer (Dr. E. Riehm: *die Gesetzgebung Mosis im Lande Moab*; Gotha, 1854) thinks that even the book of Deuteronomy was not written until the second half of the reign of Manasseh (*i.e.* between 667 and 640 B.C). One of his reasons for concluding that the book was not written before Hezekiah's time is that the confusion between the priests and Levites only occurs in books written after that time, and that the Deuteronomic expression, "the priests the Levites," is found in these books (Jer. xxxiii. 18 [21]; Ezek. xliii. 19, xliv. 15; Isaiah, lxvi. 21; 2 Chron. xxx. 27, xxiii. 18); and the book of Kings (1, xii. 31) blames Jeroboam because he did not take his priests from the tribe of Levi, not because he did not take them from the family of Aaron. Admitting fully that Hilkiah may have made some additions and alterations in his edition of the old book which he found in the temple, we think

[1] It is worthy of remark, that the later historical books (2 Kings, xvii. 13; Ezra, ix. 11) actually speak of the Prophets as the authors of the law, which must refer to the share which the schools of the Prophets had in the compilation of the sacred books, or to the editorship of Deuteronomy by Jeremiah in particular.

that the necessary inference from the confusion of the priests with the Levites is that the Deuteronomic view of the matter was the only tradition on the subject which was, at that time, recognised as Mosaic and divine; that the ritual and sacerdotal system set forth in the other books of the Pentateuch either did not exist or belonged only to the bye-laws of the temple; and this inference is confirmed by the whole history of the Jewish religion up to the time of the captivity. We find throughout unmistakeable traces of the fact that the Levites were a servile order, without any pre-eminence of rank or dignity. They sometimes appear as private chaplains (Judges, xvii. 5 *sqq.*, xxvii. 30); but their ministerial aid is not necessary, and both private individuals (Judges, vi. 17 *sqq.*, xiii. 19 *sqq*) and kings (1 Sam. xv. 21; 2 Sam. vi. 13, xxiv. 25) and prophets (1 Sam. xvi. 2) offer sacrifices to Jehovah without their intervention. Even Solomon acts as High Priest at the consecration of the temple (1 Kings, ix. 25), and the Levites held office at the pleasure of the king (1 Kings, ii. 27). Previously the High Priest seems to have been an elected functionary, whose business it was to take care of the ark (1 Sam. vii. 8). The first assumption of important functions by the sacerdotal caste was connected with the revolution which overthrew the usurpation of Athaliah (2 Chron. xxiii. 2 *sqq.*); and there can be no doubt that the downfall of the secular monarchy and the long period of exile enabled the priests and scribes, who were the literary men of the nation, to reduce to a complete and elaborate system the ritual observances, which had gradually come into vogue; and, on their return, to ingraft them on the law of Moses, to incorporate them in the oldest historical records of the nation, and to publish them, with their own glosses and comments, as the very words of the inspired legislator (Nehemiah, viii. 1—8).

In order that we may the better understand the editorial procedure of the priests and scribes, who returned from the exile, and the manner in which they gradually completed the collection of sacred books, it will be necessary to inquire what were the original materials at their disposal, and, for this purpose, to ascend, if possible, to the first beginnings of Hebrew literature.

The Augustan age of Jewish literature was undoubtedly the reign of Solomon, and the first beginnings of composition, perhaps even of the art of writing, are to be traced to the time when

Moses led the chosen people out of the land of Egypt. Between these two epochs, the researches of Lepsius (*Chronologie des Egyptes*, pp. 314-404), independently confirmed by those of Lord Arthur Hervey (*Genealogies of our Lord and Saviour*, pp. 204-276), have shown that there was an interval of not more than three centuries. We shall have no difficulty in showing the manner in which the sacred literature of the Jews was formed and developed within these comparatively narrow limits. From the venerable hands of Moses himself, we have, perhaps, only the decalogue and the nucleus of its Deuteronomic exposition. The song of triumph over the defeated Egyptians, retains probably the main features, if not the very words, of the original hymn of Miriam. The similar song of Deborah was undoubtedly the original production of that prophetess, and therefore belongs to the second century after the Exodus. There is a stamp of genuine antiquity on the fragments quoted in Numbers xxi. One of these fragments is cited from a special work, "The Book of the Wars of Jehovah" (v. 14), and it is a reasonable inference that this book contained an epic chronicle of those successful battles in which the Israelites engaged between the Exodus and their final conquest of the promised land. It is with reference to these battles that we read the expressions: "Jehovah is a man of war" (Exod. xv. 3), and "Jehovah fought for Israel" (Deut. i. 30, Josh. x. 14, 42, xxiii. 3). The fragment in the same chapter, which is introduced with a general reference to the poets "that speak in proverbs" (v. 27), seems, from the style, to have belonged to a work of the same age as the former fragment, namely, "The Book of the Wars of the Lord." But as the prophecy of Balaam (Numb. xxiii. 7, 18, etc.) is described as "a proverb," as this prophecy belongs demonstrably to the Solomonean epoch, and as Jeremiah mixes up the proverb of Balaam and this other proverb in one quotation (Jer. xlviii, 45, 46), it is a reasonable supposition that, in the prophets' time, these fragments were side by side in one collection. There are traces of a poetical history of the hero Samson, and it is probable that there were genealogies and lists of official personages more or less accurately preserved. But in general there was little union, either national or religious, during the period which is so confusedly described in the book of Judges, and therefore little likelihood of the formation of a national religious literature. It was in the beginning of the

third century after the Exodus, namely, the eleventh B.C., that the great prophet and legislator, Samuel, began to fix in a literary form the revealed system of religion and morality of which Moses was the first minister. It was he who not only established a centralised military government, but also constituted the schools of the Prophets, which were destined to give a fixed and uniform expression to the religious sentiments of the whole people. These religious and literary colleges were established at Ramah, Jericho, Bethel, and Gilgal, in the very heart of the Holy Land, and, like the schools of the rhapsodists among the early Greeks, furnished the community at large with an adequate supply of religious teachers, poets, political demagogues, annalists, medical men, and musicians. What the school of Pythagoras was to the Greek colonies in Italy, the same, and much more, the prophetical schools were to the people of Israel. Here, then, was the real beginning of that sacred literature which, only one hundred years afterwards, reached its culminating point in the reign of Solomon, and which finally developed itself in the glorious compositions of Isaiah, Micah, Amos, Jeremiah, and Hosea. The great warrior of the nation, David, was an illustrious member of the prophetic schools, and his poems remain as a proof of his prolific genius and eminent inspiration. Even Saul was once known to prophecy at Naioth, in Ramah, along with David and Samuel, and among the "proverbs," which emanated from these religious and literary fraternities, there was one which recorded that solitary instance of poetic enthusiasm on the part of the rude and violent Benjaminite—"Saul also among the Prophets" (1 Sam. xix. 24), though, according to another tradition, this proverb referred to an earlier outburst of prophetic inspiration (1 Sam. x. 11, 12). We read of special literary productions attributed to the pens of particular prophets. Thus the acts of David, first and last, are said to have been written in the book of Samuel the seer, and in the book of Nathan the prophet, and in the book of Gad the seer (1 Chron. xxix. 22), where the book of Samuel must refer to the present compilation, known by the name of the Prophet, who died before David became king. Similarly, the acts of Solomon, first and last, are said to have been written "in the book of Nathan the prophet, and in the prophecy of Ahijah the Shilonite, and in the visions of Iddo the seer" (2 Chron. ix. 29). And Rehoboam's acts, first and last,

were written "in the book of Shemaiah the prophet, and Iddo the seer, concerning genealogies" (2 Chron. xii. 15). These and similar histories were incorporated "in the book of the Chronicles of the kings of Judah," or "of Israel," from which there are thirty-one quotations in our present books of Kings. But the first and most important product of the prophetic schools was, according to a conclusion at which we have deliberately arrived, "the book of Jashar,"—that is, "the book of the upright," or "of the true ideal Israel, of the nation blessed and chosen by Jehovah, so far as they were upright or obedient to his laws,"—a book which contained a collection of religious and national poems either of more ancient date, or then first composed, for the purpose of explaining and developing the main principles of the Mosaic dispensation,—a book which was commenced by Samuel and David, and completed by Nathan and Gâd, at the beginning of the reign of Solomon.

The book of Jashar, according to this conception of its original form and significance, has been made the subject of a critical investigation by the author of these pages (Jashar: *Fragmenta Archetypa Carminum Hebraicorum collegit, etc. Joannes Guilelmus Donaldson*, Berolini, 1854). Referring to the book itself for all necessary details, we will here make some supplementary observations, which may tend, in conjunction with what has been said, to elucidate still farther the general scope of the book, and to correct the misconceptions, and perhaps dissipate the prejudices of adverse criticism.

If we had nothing to guide us in an attempt to restore the book of Jashar beyond the two quotations in the Masoretic text (Josh. x. 13, 2 Sam. i. 18 *sqq.*), we must needs acquiesce in the common opinion about it, namely, that it was a collection of miscellaneous poems, containing commemorations of victories, like that of Joshua, and songs relating to heroic characters like Saul and Jonathan. With regard to the latter, most attentive and acute readers of the Bible would come to the same conclusion as Mr. Lee ("Inspiration of Holy Scripture," p. 454): "The author of the books of Samuel on one occasion only makes express mention of documentary sources. The frequent insertion, however, of poetic pieces, plainly intimates that such sources were at his command. Hence we may not unfairly form a conjecture as to the source of such quotations; and conclude that these poetic

pieces were selected from the book of Jashar." The same inference is applicable to the other case of direct citation; and if Joshua's triumphal ode belonged to the book of Jashar, it would be in the highest degree probable that the triumphal odes of Moses and Deborah were contained in the same collection. If it were urged, on the other hand, that, as Jehovah is called "a man of war" in the song of Moses, the poem, in which these words occurred, more properly belonged to "The Book of the Wars of the Jehovah," the answer is plain and conclusive; for it is said of Joshua's victory, that "Jehovah fought for Israel," and Joshua's victory was undoubtedly commemorated in the book of Jashar; and therefore the inference clearly is that the triumphal odes belonged to that book, and the epic narratives to the other record. Here, however, we must have stopped, if we had nothing to guide us except the two fragments actually referred to in the book of Jashar. The further prosecution of the subject, and all the results which have been obtained by the author of these pages, flow from a true perception of the meaning of the term *Jashar*, which gave a title to the ancient book.

It is certain that the word *Jashar*, יָשָׁר, denotes straightness in the sense of a horizontal line. It is properly applicable to a perfectly level road, neither rendered uneven nor made tortuous by any obstacles on the surface of the ground. For this primary signification, we have an ample guarantee in several passages of Isaiah. Thus in xxvi. 7, we find: "the *way* of the just is *straightness* (lit. levels, *mêshârim*): thou, O *righteous* (*jâshâr*), dost direct the *path* of the just." Again in xl. 3, we have: "*make straight* (*jashshrû*) in the desert a high-way for our God;" and v. 4: "the rough place (*hâqôv*) shall become a *level* (*mîshôr*):" Again in xlii. 16: "I will make the blind go in a road which they know not; I will make a road for them in a path they know not; I will make darkness before them to be light, and *crooked things* (*ma'haqashshîm*) to be a *level* (*mîshôr*)." We have similar references in 1 Sam. vi. 12, Proverbs, iii. 6, xi. 5, Psalm, xxv. 8. In this application, *jâshâr* is distinguished from its moral synonym *tsaddîq*, which denotes vertical straightness in the perpendicular line, and as this word contains the root of *sed-eo*, etc., "to be fixed in the ground," so *ja-shar* contains the root of *ser-o*, Sanscrit *sri*, etc., "to go on in a straight line." In their secondary sense, as denoting moral excellence in general,

there is scarcely any difference between *jâshâr* and *tsaddîq*, and they may be rendered alike "righteous," "upright," or "just;" but this is only a result of the carelessness of common language; and in its emphatic use *jâshâr* reverts to its etymology, and is employed as a special or distinctive term of gravest significance. And here it connects itself with a weaker form of the same root, which, though sometimes strictly synonymous, generally denotes the prosperity, blessedness, and success of those who proceed in the straight course of probity. This weaker form *'hâshar*, אָשַׁר, which, in the construct state, *'hashréi*, אַשְׁרֵי, is the key-note of so many of the Psalms, and begins the prefatory poem of that collection, seems particularly applicable to the expression of that happiness, which was promised to true Israelites, as the reward of their righteous conduct. Thus we read at the conclusion of the song of Moses (Deut. xxxiii. 29): "O thy happiness (*'hashreikâ*) O Israel, who is like unto thee, a people preserved by Jehovah?" So completely did the ideas of goodness and prosperity run into one another, that *derek jeshârâh*, "a straight road," meant "a prosperous journey" (Ezra, viii. 21). In fact, all prosperity was attributed to the great truth that God was himself *jâshâr*, and therefore rewarded those who were faithful to that character. "All his ways are judgment: just and right (*jâshâr*) is he" (Deut. xxxii. 4). And therefore the blessedness of his servants was a proof of His righteous dealing. Thus the Psalmist says (xcii. 12—15): "The righteous shall flourish like a palm-tree; he shall grow like a cedar in Lebanon. To show that Jehovah is right (*jâshâr*), that he is my rock, and that there is no unrighteousness in him."

This being the usage of the word, it need not surprise us that "Israelites indeed, in whom there was no guile" (John, i. 47), that is, true servants of Jehovah, would on the one hand be represented as doing that which was *jâshâr* or "right," and would on the other hand be designated by this name as denoting at once their moral or religious excellence, and the happiness which was its natural result. As, then, the law enjoined the Israelites to do what was *jâshâr* in God's sight (Deut. vi. 18), so it is expressly said of true Israelites, when they furnished an exception to the sinfulness of their race, that they did that which was *jâshâr* before Jehovah (1 Kings, xv. 11). Hence the people of God were collectively styled the righteous, *jesharîm* (*cf.* Psalm

cxxv. 4, 5, cxi. 1, lxxiii. 1; Isaiah, xxvi. 7), and the collective term *jeshur-ún* is four times used in poetical passages (Deut. xxxii. 15, xxxiii. 5, 26; Isaiah, xliv. 2) in the same signification. Even the name Israel, or, as perhaps it ought to be pronounced, Ishrael, must be explained in the same way. For although in Gen. xxxii. 28, it is referred to the root *sârâh*, שָׂרָה, "he fought," we have a more distinct statement respecting the imposition of this name, in contrast to that of Jacob, in Gen. xxxv. 9, 10: "And God appeared unto Jacob again, when he came out of Padan-aram, and blessed him; and God said unto him, Thy name shall not be called any more Jacob, but Israel shall be thy name: and he called his name Israel." The context clearly shows that the writer of this passage referred the name ישראל either to אָשַׁר, "he blessed," or more properly to יָשָׁר or יִשַּׁר, "he made straight, *i.e.* prosperous or morally good," hence "approved of" (Psalm cxix, 128); so that ישראל will be the same sort of name as יְחִזְקֵאל, *Ezekiel*. And as *jâshâr*, יָשָׁר, is directly opposed to *ʾhâqov*, עָקֹב, we recognise in this change of name the contrast between the previous and the subsequent, the ordinary and the religious designation of the chosen people; that is, they were in their unconverted and uncovenanted state *Jaʾhaqov*, a "perverse, crooked" generation; but became *Ishrael*, those whom "God has made straight, right, moral, approved, happy." We have seen that in Isaiah, xlii. 16, the word מֵישׁוֹר *mîshôr*, from יָשָׁר, *jâshâr*, is opposed to עִקֵּשׁ, *ʾhiqqésh*, "crooked," "perverse"; and the latter, which, like the former adjective, is predicated of roads or ways (Prov. ii. 15, xxviii. 6), is especially applied to the Israelites when they departed from their true exemplar and ideal; as in Deut. xxxii. 5, where, after saying that God is just and right (*jâshâr*), the poet adds that the Israelites had corrupted themselves, and were "a perverse (*ʾhiqqésh*) and crooked generation."

There cannot therefore be a doubt that the word *jâshâr* does in itself contain the substantial expression of the religious and theocratic ideas of the chosen people—their idea of the nature of God and of his dealings with men, their idea of the connexion between man's duty and man's happiness, their idea of all that was and ought to be distinctive of their own nature in contrast to its condition before it was specially selected by God, and in contrast also to the other nations, from whom they were separated and set apart.

Such being the case, when we find that there was a book of *Jashar*, and that this is quoted only twice by the Masoretic compilers of the historical books; when we find also that the fundamental notion of such a book, and sometimes the key-note of the word itself, is constantly repeated in those books; when we find here and there poetical fragments inserted in the text, like patches of mosaic work, which contribute to the development of the idea of *jâshâr*, and which, when detached from their present connexion and placed side by side, thoroughly harmonise, as a combined expression of that idea; it seems to be an inevitable conclusion that the book of *Jashar* was the first religious book of the Jews, the first offspring of the prophetic schools, which inaugurated their sacred literature; the nucleus of that theocratic history which, with a concretion of other materials more or less ancient, more or less religious, more or less intrinsically divine, has been transmitted to us by the scribes and priests who returned from the Chaldæan captivity and found that the language of the law and the prophets was no longer the living idiom of their native land. The simple fact that a book with such a comprehensive title is only twice quoted by name appears to us to show conclusively that the two cases of express citation were exceptional, that is, less in accordance with the general scope and idea of the book. Ewald, in his review of our treatise (*Götting. Gel. Anz.*, 1855, pp. 144 *sqq.*), a review characterised by his usual self-confidence, lays some stress upon the fact that we could not derive an adequate idea of the book of *Jashar* from the two passages actually cited from it. It appears to us that they were cited by name for that very reason, namely, that they were less connected than the other citations with the general bearing of the old religious book. When Ewald lays it down that the first business of a critic, who proposes to restore or recover the fragments of the book of *Jashar*, is to show that the existing books contain other fragments besides the two which are cited by name, he forgets his own procedure, to which however, in the same page (149), he makes a very complacent reference. He can tell us all about a great book of *Urgeschichte*, or "primeval history"; and like Dr. Astruc, who wrote on the subject one hundred years ago, he can indicate the different materials of which the great book was composed. One of these he calls the *Buch der Ursprünge*, like Cato's *liber originum*, after the Hebrew תּוֹלְדוֹת *tôldôth*, although he acknowledges (*Gesch.*

d. Volkes Israel, i. p. 96) that this is not the true force and application of the word! We, too, admit that there was a book of *tôldôth*, but we use the word in its proper sense, and render it *genealogiæ et gesta patriarcharum*. But even before his supposed "book of origins," which he professes to restore with the greatest confidence (p. 115) and attributes to some contemporary of Nathan (p. 116), Ewald places with equal certainty "the oldest historical work and its antecedents" (p. 75), and after it he gives us "a third and fourth narrator of primeval histories" (pp. 118 *sqq.*). Now he not only cannot prove that fragments of these four books are to be found in the Masoretic text, but he cannot even allege any argument beyond conjecture to show that such books ever existed. And yet he will not allow us to assign to the book of *Jashar*, which is cited by name, and that name a very comprehensive and intelligible title, a number of undoubted and isolated fragments, which range themselves naturally in accordance with the scope of a book so designated. The fact is that Ewald claims for himself an immunity from error, which he does not concede to the traditions or records of the Church, and invariably rejects every hypothesis which he has not originated.

Under any circumstances, it would seem to us indubitable that an attempt to gather together the remnants of a book known to have existed and cited under an intelligible title, from the text of a collection of works known to be a compilation and incorporating a number of distinct, separable, and unappropriated fragments, must be a legitimate object of literary and learned speculation. To what an extent this process has been carried in classical philology is well known to all who have studied the collections of Greek and Latin fragments. A pregnant example of what may be effected by ingenuity and learning in this field of conjectural research is furnished by Welcker's inquiries respecting the lost dramas of Æschylus and the lost poems of the Epic Cycle. In the case before us, however, we obtain results much more important than the gratification of literary curiosity. By developing the idea of *jâshâr*, we trace the *spina dorsalis* which runs through the oldest records of revelation, and so bring out in strong relief those features, which the Jewish and Christian dispensations, being both divine, must have in common; we give greater distinctness to the religious significance of the Hebrew records; we strengthen the connexion between the Old and New

Testaments, and exhibit more fully the consistent harmony of the substantial contents of the Scriptures.

The process is simply this: I. It was the profound and strictly true notion of the ancient Israelites, that God was *jáshár;* that it was the duty of men to become *jáshár* like Him; and that by becoming so, and by this alone, they would be prosperous and happy. This idea has been fully expressed by that admirable Christian divine, Benjamin Whichcot: "The best way to find out what is religion in us, is to inquire what is true concerning God: for religion in us is our resemblance of God, who is ever best pleased with those things in His creatures which are most eminent in Himself." And the Hebrew idea of *jáshár* is still farther developed by the religious poet, Joseph Addison (*Cato*, act v., sc. 1):—

> "If there's a Power above
> (And that there is all Nature cries aloud
> Through all her works), He must delight in virtue,
> And that which he delights in must be happy."

Now the Book of Ecclesiastes, which is attributed to Solomon, and undoubtedly contains excerpts from his traditionary sayings, expressly declares (vii. 29): "Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man (*Adam*) upright (*jáshár*), but they have sought out many inventions." No one will hesitate to refer this emphatic passage to the statement in Gen. i. 27: "God created man (*Adam*) in his own image; in the image of God created He him." Now the word which we render "inventions" (*ᶜhish-bónóth*), is a derivation from the same root as *machshvóth*, predicated of the evil thoughts of man's heart, which led him into sin (Gen. vi. 5); and in 2 Chron. xxvi. 15, the only other passage where the word occurs, we have, in conjunction, *ᶜhishvónóth machsheveth ᶜhóshév*, "cunning-devices, the cunning-contrivance of the cunning." Accordingly, we are led to seek the beginning and foundation of the book of *jáshár* in the account of the creation and fall of man, which is given in the book of Genesis. Here we have two distinct and separate statements. The first is the brief, simple, and Elohistic narrative; the second, the longer, symbolical, and Jehovistic document. The latter, as we shall see, is the more ancient and original version; the former, a pragmatical commentary upon it.

(*a*. The Elohistic narrative states simply that man was

created in the image of God, but that, in consequence of his fleshly lusts, he was deprived of the perpetual indwelling of God's spirit. This is the substance of the fragments which are found in the first and sixth chapters of Genesis. Whether the details of the six days' creation were originally prefixed to this account of man's downfall, so that the whole passage is of later date, we have no means of judging. It is also uncertain whether the Titanic attempt to scale heaven, and the subsequent dispersion of man, which, as we have elsewhere suggested, might have been a second version, or supplementary description, of the banishment from Eden, might not have appeared in some connexion with the primary sin of man. As it now stands, the account in Gen. xi. is not only a mixture of the Jehovistic with the Elohistic, but otherwise betrays a later hand; for Babel and its bricks could not have been known to the Israelites before the later years of the monarchy, perhaps not until the time of the exile. It might also be asked, whether the word *jâshâr* must not have appeared in the original fragment. If this was the case, it must have occurred in the mention of man's blessing (Gen. i. 28), which would stand on the same footing as the blessing of Jacob (Gen. xxxv. 9), if it ran thus: "And God blessed them and said, I have made you *jâshâr*, for my spirit is in you." It is clear that the *machshvôth*, or "cunning devices," by which man corrupted his way, are a very good representative of the perverseness and tortuous course which is opposed to the straightforwardness signified by *jâshâr*, just as Pindar opposes ὁδοὶ σκολιαί, or "crooked ways," to the sincerity of the εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνήρ (Pyth. ii. 81).

(*b*). The Jehovistic narrative is given in a symbolical or allegorical form, and is, perhaps, wrapt up in intentional mystery, designed only for the edification of the initiated. The modern grammarian can act as hierophant, if he is willing to trace patiently the signification of every word, and is not afraid of anatomical results, which, though revolting to us, were familiar enough to the ancient Jews. As Gesenius says of the metaphor in Numbers xxiv. 7, these things are "ex nostro sensu obscœna, sed Orientalibus familiaria." The true interpretation of the allegory, as it appears to us, is simply this. The garden of Eden, or the paradise of delight or pleasure (עֵדֶן), is the field of all those gratifications which God allows to the intellects and senses of man. In the midst of this garden are planted, side by sid

(Gen. ii. 9, iii. 3), and, therefore, in distinct contrast or opposition, the trees of life and of the knowledge of good and evil. The former represents the central or concentrated essence of the spirit, that is, religious reason; the latter is the concentrated essence of the flesh, that is, sensual concupiscence. In the former, eternal life is involved, as the reward of a triumph over carnal selfishness; in the latter is death, as the fruit of carnal sin (Gal. vi. 8). Now with regard to the latter, the lowest form of moral sin is the illicit and extravagant indulgence of the sexual appetite, and the lowest form of religion is idolatry; and these two are described in the Bible under the common name of "fornication," and were both practically included in the Phallic worship of Baal-peor, against which the Israelites were especially warned.[1] This view is fully borne out by the details of the allegory, which, in these days of false delicacy, can only be discussed in a dead language.[2] It would, however, be the height of

[1] In addition to other arguments, it may be mentioned that the Israelites of David's time called Baal by the name of *bósheth*, *i.e.* shame, which denotes the sexual shame alluded to in Gen. ii. 25.

[2] Although our philological discussion respecting the temptation of Adam is clothed in the classical garb in which the minutest details of anatomy are expounded by medical writers, and though the object and results of the investigation proposed are manifestly moral and religious, we have been exposed to the most odious censures, couched in the most outrageously violent language. One of the most ignorant and silly of our censors, who is in such a ferment that he prints "passages" for "pages," declares that if our sense of the allegory were true, it "would render it incumbent on all decent persons to bury this leaf of the Bible nine fathoms deep in the earth." If this would be his treatment of an allegory, what would he do with the thirty-eighth chapter of Genesis, where there is no such disguise? Another critic of a gentler stamp objects to "the minuteness of the detail," by suggesting that "a few hints at the interpretation proposed would have sufficed." As it appears that even a complete sifting of the passage has not been sufficient to wean people from their long-established belief that we have here a *Protevangelium* clothed in the form of a *Thier-Epos*, we should rather conclude that we had been too brief, and that more arguments were required. Even in the case of a heathen poet, where no possible harm could result from a general interpretation, a Bishop of our Church has not hesitated to tell us that the virgin Iphigenia is called ἀταύρωτος "quia ταῦρος est αἰδοῖον ἀνδρός" (Blomfield *ad Æsch. Agam.* 236), and Valckenaer, to whom he refers us, has given the following excuse for very minute details on that point (*ad Ammon.* p. 41): "Caveant seriores ne nostram in his exponendis diligentiam insulse reprehendant; ne Sacri quidem Scriptores ab hoc vocis *Tauri* usu abstinuerunt. Placet veteris Poetæ dictum, quo importunum aliquando repressit Aristippus:

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν
ὁ νοῦς ὁ σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται."

We do not know why Dr. Blomfield calls this excuse "facetious." It has always appeared to us that St. Paul at least was serious when he said that

absurdity and ignorance to suppose that the want of modern prudishness, in this ancient allegory, detracts in the slightest degree from the probability of the interpretation proposed. The plain-spokenness of the Old Testament, in matters which we never mention, afforded Voltaire a ready plea for his scoffing depreciation (*Lettres d'Amabed*, Contes iii. p. 307); and it cannot be denied that it would be preposterous to judge these ancient writers by modern notions of delicacy. Not to speak of Gen. xix. 5, 32, xxxiv. 2, 25, xxxix. 12, Numbers, xxv. 8, 1 Kings, xxi. 21, Isaiah, xxx. 22, Ezekiel, xviii. 6, and a multitude of

"to the pure all things are pure" (Tit. i. 15); and that there is more indecency in the prudery of even women in America, where they will not talk of common things because there is a possibility of sexual associations in connexion with them, than in all the Dionysiac and Phallic rites of the ancient Greeks. It would be well if all these critics could recollect what Porson says of the indecency of Aristophanes (*Mus. Crit.* ii. p. 113): "Among the ancients plain-speaking was the fashion; nor was that ceremonious delicacy introduced, which has taught men to abuse each other with the utmost politeness, and to express the most indecent ideas in the most modest language. The ancients had little of this. They were accustomed to call a spade a spade; to give everything its proper name. There is another sort of indecency, which is infinitely more dangerous; which corrupts the heart without offending the ear." But here we are met with another objection One of our censors says that our "argument proves too much; for why should the writer, who uses at one time and ordinarily certain words without shame, disguise his meaning at another under a strange image? If Moses had intended what is suggested, he would have employed the common word, and not talked about a serpent." On the same principle, the Greeks, who were plain-spoken enough, ought never to have employed such terms as ταῦρος and χοῖρος. The fact was, no doubt, that the Jehovistic writer of the allegory, to which we assign a place in the religious book of *Jashar*, endeavoured to envelope his meaning in forms, which required interpretation no less than those which were adopted by the hierophants at Eleusis. And the later Jews, from whose Masoretic text we have derived the narrative, no doubt increased the obscurity of that which they did not understand. On the supposition, which these censors adopt, that every word in the Bible proceeds immediately from the Holy Spirit, Milton has well said: "God, who is the author both of purity and eloquence, chose this phrase [one objected to as obscene] as fitted for that vehement character wherein he spake. Otherwise the plain word might easily have been forborne: which the Masorets and Rabbinical scholiasts not well attending, have often used to blur the margent with *keri* instead of *ketib*, and gave us this insulse rule out of their Talmud: 'that all words, which in the Law are written obscenely, must be changed to more civil words': fools, who would teach men to read more decently than God thought good to write" (*Apology for Smectymnuus*, Works, p. 84). This prudery of the later Jews sufficiently explains the mystification which has converted the warning against Baal-Peor into a prophecy. And it would be strange enough if Bishop Blomfield and others were allowed to tell the classical student what the Greeks meant by "a bull" and "a pig," while the Biblical critic is prevented from inquiring into the signification of the Hebrew "serpent." We recommend these over-delicate critics to consult Bishop Lowth, *de sacra Poesi Hebræorum*, *Præl.* xxxi., and the Notes on Gregory's Translation, vol. ii. pp. 318 *sqq.*

other impurities, which are read to English congregations of men, women, and children, in the Proper Lessons of our Church, the anatomical minutiæ of Gen. xxxviii. 9, 28, the true meaning of the words which we render "male" and "female" in Gen. i. 27, and the constant allusions to circumcision, and to the word עָרְלָה, *præputium* (*e.g.* Exod. iv. 25), which, by its very meaning, suggests the filthiest ideas, but which the Jews did not hesitate to employ as the name of a place (Josh. v. 3); nay, the simple facts that a champion was allowed to lay at his king's feet a just tale of 200 *præputia* as the price of a princess's hand (1 Sam. xviii. 27), and that such a word might be used gratuitously as a botanical metaphor (Levit. xix. 23); all this shows that the appropriateness of an interpretation of the Hebrew text is not to be judged by its accordance with, or repugnance to, the refinements of modern English diction: and whatever censure may be directed against a new interpretation on this account, must be equally applicable to the numerous passages in the sacred text, which no interpretation can reconcile with the mawkish fastidiousness of the present day. Be that as it may, it is the duty of an honest commentator to look only to the meaning of his author, and to the true force of the context. And we contend that the sense which we have attributed to the symbolical narrative in Gen. iii., is not only the inevitable signification of the words, but their obvious tendency, when properly examined. In all ages this seems to have been the instinctive feeling of those who have grappled with the subject. Clement of Alexandria, even when he is arguing against Julius Cassianus, who held that all sexual intercourse was sinful, admits that the sin of Adam consisted in a premature indulgence of the sexual appetite (Strom. iii. pp. 552-556, Potter). Milton, too, attributes carnal and lascivious effects to the fruit of the forbidden tree (Parad. Lost, ix. 1011 *sqq.*). And the same view has been propounded by the anonymous writer of a tract, written in Anglo-Latin, and published in Germany, but confidently, and we believe justly, attributed to Archbishop Whately, (*Tractatus tres de arboribus sciontiæ et vitæ*, etc. Ed. Secunda, Stuttgartiæ, 1849), who hits at least the main point: "Nudos esse et non erubescere videtur necessario indicare alterutrum, aut pravitatem turpissimam brutisque simillimam, aut affectus sexualis absentiam." This necessary interpretation gains additional force from its reference to the worship of Baal-

Peor, the greatest national sin of the Israelites; and if the mysterious allegory, in which these great truths of religion and morality were enveloped, belonged to the esoteric teaching of the prophetic schools, then, as the allegory of Noah, considered as a type of rescue and regeneration, connects itself at once with the similar figures in the Eleusinian language, this mystery also, which may have been derived from Egypt, will harmonize closely and accurately with the Phallic enigmas of the hierophantæ of Attica.[1]

II. The next step in a book of Jashar, properly so called, would necessarily be to indicate how the Israelites got this name, and were separated from the conterminous and cognate nations. And here the book of Genesis, when critically examined, furnishes us with four successive stages of the sifting and winnowing process, four successive limitations of the primitive Church of God. (1) The family of Shem is separated from those of Ham and Japhet; (2) The family of Abraham is separated from the Kenites and other Semitic tribes; (3) The family of Isaac is separated from the Ishmaelites and other Abrahamidæ; (4) The family of Jacob is separated from the Edomites and other branches of the Isacidæ, and assumes the name of Israel. In order to extract these distinct and intelligible statements of fact from the present text of the book of Genesis, it was necessary to employ not only the torch,[2] but also the knife of scientific criticism; but there never was a case in which it was more needless

θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι.

There never was a case, in which the commentatorial meddling of a compiler was more manifest. Inconsistent genealogies are

[1] The view which we have taken (Jashar, pp. 59–62) of the two elements in the sin of Adam, namely, concupiscence and pride, is supported by Thomas Aquinas, *ad Rom.* vii. 7: see above, p. 58.

[2] That our torch has not always cast an uncertain light in these dark chambers, has been shown by some recent confirmations. We shall see below that our opponent Ewald has come independently to our conclusion, that *Lamech* is a Greek name. And Fürst, in the last part of his *Handwörterbuch*, *s. v.* לֶמֶךְ, has furnished an indirect argument in favour of our view that Cain represents the Kenites, a branch of the Amalekites. For Cain goes to the land of Nod, to the east of Eden (Gen. iv. 16), which is generally identified with Lud (Gen. x. 22), and referred to Lydia. Now the Kenites were the Eastern, and, as it seems, the chief tribe of the Amalekites. But Fuerst has shown, from Abulfida (*Hist. Anteisl.*, p. 16), that, according to the Arabic tradition, Lud was the origin of the race of Amalek. This throws additional light on the statement, that the Kenites went eastward, to the land of Nod or Lud.

made up partly from the same or slightly corrupted names. And in these lists we have names of real men mixed up with abstract personifications and the names of cities and tribes, much in the same fashion as the ante-historical traditions of the Hellenic race. The ages assigned to the supposed personages make up an arbitrary round number, and throughout there is an abundant evidence to show that we are dealing with compilation and patchwork, redolent of the scholiast and editorial scribe. As every modern scholar, with the exception perhaps of the late Fynes Clinton, has for some years refused to regard as biographical the genealogies of Hellen, Dorus, Æolus, and the rest, no Biblical critic can consistently set up this claim for the Jareds and Lamechs, the Mizraim and Philistim, of Genesis. When we are told that the Bible is a book *sui generis* and must not be treated critically, we know very well that this is merely the opinion of those who have never studied criticism, and do not appreciate its methods or its principles. If it is applicable to ancient history at all, it cannot be applicable to profane and inapplicable to sacred history. When it is urged that our Saviour himself cites the names of Abel (Matth. xxiii. 35), Noah (Matth. xxiv. 37), and Lot (Luke, xvii. 28, 32), as though these were historical personages, it must be remembered, as we have already said, that it was not our Lord's mission to criticise Jewish literature. If citation and allusion were to be taken as a proof that he attributed his own infallible truth to the works which he cited or alluded to, the same argument would show that he attributed infallibility to the Rabbinical writers, whose words he so often appropriates (*cf.* Matth. x. 16, from the *Shir hashshirim rabba*, fol. 15, 3). Or, carrying the same principle a little farther, we might refuse to believe the contemporary history of Thucydides, because he refers to Hellen, the son of Deucalion, as a real person (i. 3). Any one, who is willing to reflect, must see that our Lord referred to the whole body of Hebrew literature, just as he used the existing language of his countrymen, and that his object was to reach the understandings of his auditors by the only legitimate channels.

III. Having indicated the process of elimination by which the Israelites, as such, were separated from the rest of mankind, the book of Jashar must have shown, in the next place, how the chosen people became settled, according to their own idea irremovably, in a particular country (*vide* Deut. xxxii. 8 *sqq.*).

According to the phraseology which, to the last, was familiar to the Jews as expressing this promised abode, it was the land of *mᵉ-nûᶜhâh* or "rest." And we cannot but regard it as a striking proof of the fact that scientific criticism has had little to do with the text of the book of Genesis, when it is left to us to indicate that this attainment of a safe haven in the land of *mᵉ-nûᶜhâh* is the real meaning of the history of *Noaᶜh*, "the man of rest," and of the resting (*tâ-naᶜh*) of his storm-tost ark on the mount of Zion, in that mountain region (Deut. xxxii. 13), which was prepared for him. The evidences which support this application of the narrative are so striking, so consistent, and so numerous, that it seems impossible to doubt the justice of the inference, that we have here also, as in the third chapter of Genesis, a relic of the mysterious and allegorical teaching of the Prophetic schools, which the Masoretic scribes have misunderstood and rationalized. Its connexion with the mode of speaking adopted in the Greek mysteries, which were probably derived from the same source, namely, the lore of Egypt, is too striking to escape the notice of the classical scholar. An Apostle has told us that the ark of Noah is a type of baptism (1 Peter, iii. 20, 21), and it was by baptism that the mystæ were admitted to the privileges of initiation. It could not therefore be an accident that those, who were received into that shadowy church of heathenism, were expressly taught to consider and speak of themselves as having just escaped from the waves of a stormy sea and as having found shelter and peace. "Happy is he," they cried, "who has fled from the worse and found the better! happy is he who, leaving the sea, has escaped the waves and reached the haven! And oh! what greater bliss than thus to reach the shore, and, safe beneath some sheltering roof, to hear unmoved the pattering storm without!" The Exodus, or passing through the Red Sea, is regarded by St. Paul as also a type of baptism (1 Cor. x. i.). And the Egyptian name of the ark, namely, *têbâh*, which occurs only in reference to Noah's vessel and that in which the infant Moses was preserved, points to Egypt, which, in its poetical name *Rahab*, signifies a stormy sea or deluge, and from which the chosen people escaped with all their cattle, just as Noah takes with him all the animals. The Jews counted 215 years from the Patriarchs to Joseph, and 430 from Joseph to the Exodus. In round numbers the sum of these periods is expressed by the 600 years of

Noah's life. The forty days of Genesis vii. 12 are the forty years spent in the wilderness, and the interval between the first and second flight of the dove is that between Joshua and Samuel; whereas the second and more successful sally of the bird of peace indicates the interval between Samuel and David, who, in the evening of his life, contemplated the building of the temple. The third flight of the dove takes us to the days of Solomon, the true *Noa^{c}h*, or man of rest, who gave a fixed and, as it was thought, a lasting seat to the symbols of Jewish theocracy. The very name of this pacific king suggests the ideas conveyed by the narrative of Noah. His original designation was *Jedidiah*, "beloved of the Lord," a name of the same kind as that of his father David; and this name is said to have been imposed by the prophet Nathan (2 Sam. xii. 25). But the name Solomon, which was perhaps his surname, and which signifies "peaceable," is said expressly to have marked the contrast between him and his father, whose warlike life had prevented him from consecrating a temple to God. David is represented as addressing him thus (1 Chron. xxii. 7—9): "My son, as for me it was in my mind to build an house unto the name of the Lord my God; but the word of the Lord came to me saying, Thou hast shed blood abundantly and hast made great wars: thou shalt not build an house unto my name, because thou hast shed so much blood upon the earth in my sight. Behold, a son shall be born to thee, who shall be a man of rest (*m^{e}-nû^{c}h-áh*), and I will give him rest (*hâni^{c}hóthî*) from his enemies round about: for his name shall be Solomon (*Sholómóh, i.e.* 'peaceable'), and I will give peace (*shálóm*) and quietness unto Israel in his days." To say nothing of the similarity of style between this last verse and Gen. v. 29, we have here, in reference to the building of the temple, an emphatic allusion to the significance of the name of *Noa^{c}h*; and what shall we say then to the fact, that the day on which Solomon dedicated his temple, "was the seventeenth day of the seventh month," which is the date of *Noa^{c}h's* rest on the mountains (Gen. viii. 4)? It appears that "all the men of Israel assembled themselves unto King Solomon at the feast of the month *Ethanim* (*i.e.* of rains), which is the seventh month." *The* feast of the month Ethanim—for there were two—was that of tabernacles, which commemorated the restless wanderings of the people of Israel. It began on the fifteenth day of that month and lasted

for seven days (Levit. xxiii. 33 *sqq.*). Now the feast of the dedication lasted fourteen days (1 Kings, viii. 65), and the people were dismissed on the twenty-third day of the seventh month (2 Chron. vii. 10). Accordingly the great feast commenced on the ninth day, *i.e.* the day before the feast of expiation (Levit. xxiii. 27). Of this feast they celebrated the eighth day as their solemn assembly: "for they kept the dedication of the altar seven days and the feast seven days" (2 Chron. vii. 9). But 9 + 8 = 17. Therefore the day of the dedication of Solomon's temple was the seventeenth day of the seventh month. And this, we conceive, contributes in no slight degree to confirm the inferential identity of *Noa^{c}h* and the man of *m^{e}nû^{c}hdh*. These striking coincidences lie upon the surface; but there are others not less conclusive, which have not yet been alleged and for which we must dig deeper. It is stated that after the completion of Solomon's temple, the King received an express revelation, promising, in the phraseology of Deuteronomy (xi. 12), that God would hallow the temple which had been built, to put His name there for ever. "And mine eyes and mine heart shall be there perpetually. And if thou wilt walk before me (*l^{e}phânai*), as David thy father walked, in integrity of heart (see, of Noah, Gen. vi. 9) and in uprightness (*jôsher*), to do according to all that I have commanded thee, and wilt keep my statutes and my judgments; then I will establish the throne of thy kingdom upon Israel for ever" (1 Kings, ix. 3—5). Now it was the express hope of the true Israelites, that "the upright (*j^{e}shârîm*) should dwell in the presence of God" (*liphnei 'El*) (see Psalm cxl. 15; *cf.* Deut. vi. 17, 18, 24, 25). And this hope survived the downfall of the nation. But we find the promise and pledge of God's presence especially given to Noah, and confirmed by the symbol of the rainbow (Gen. ix. 9—17). This rainbow was really the same symbol as the ladder from earth to heaven, which Jacob saw at Bethel, "the house of God" (Gen. xxviii. 12 *sqq.*), when God appeared to him, and which, in the second instance, was more probably called Peniel, "the face or presence of God" (Gen. xxxii. 30), than Bethel (Gen. xxxv. 15). At any rate, we have the express testimony of the continuer of Isaiah that the rainbow of Noah was the pledge of God's perpetual presence with his true servants, those who deserved to be called Israel, *i.e.* the "upright before God." After having spoken of the chosen people as "a woman forsaken and grieved in spirit,

a wife married in youth, but divorced by her husband," the prophet utters the following consolation (liv. 8 *sqq.*): "For a little while I have withdrawn my face from thee in anger, but with everlasting kindness I will have mercy upon thee. For this is to me the waters of Noah, which I swore should never again overwhelm the earth; in the same manner have I sworn that I would not be wroth with thee or rebuke thee. For the mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed; but my kindness (*kaçd-î, i.e.* "special protection") shall not depart from thee; neither shall the covenant of my peace (*bᵉrîth shᵉlôm-î, cf.* Gen. ix. 11) be removed." From whatever side, then, we regard it, we must perceive that the story of *Noaᶜh* refers to that "rest which remaineth to the people of God" (Heb. iv. 9). There is no other explanation which corresponds to all the features of the narrative, and it is easy to see how the pragmatical or rationalistic account of the deluge has been intruded on this basis of significant allegory by the Masoretic scribes. The traditions of Babylonian archæology, preserved to us in the fragments of Berosus, exhibit a remarkable correspondence with those which are incorporated in the book of Genesis. It might, of course, be a question whether the Jews, during their captivity, borrowed the ten generations between Adam and Noah from the ten generations which connect Alorus and Xisuthrus, or whether they conversely furnished the Babylonians with the materials of their own cosmogony. In the absence of all evidence in favour of the supposition that the Jews had any such cosmogony before the exile, and with positive evidence of the fact that they borrowed many of their ideas from the heathen nations, among whom they sojourned at the time immediately preceding the formation of their present collection of sacred books, it would be more reasonable to conclude that the Babylonian traditions were the source of the Jewish. With regard to the deluge, at any rate, every candid inquirer must admit that, even if we had no other explanation to offer respecting Noah, the fact that the ark is represented as floating to the mountains of Armenia, points to the local inundation, which devastated Babylonia, and which the Babylonians limited to their own country (Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, i. p. 18). All traditions respecting deluges seem to have had a local origin, and to have referred to alluvial plains where such floods were possible, and where neighbouring

mountains furnished the means of escape. Such an instance we have in the Thessalian flood of Deucalion, and even the Americans speak of a deluge, of which the scene was either the lofty table-land of Mexico, which has still its remnants of stagnant water, or the great lake-country of the north, to which the traditions of that country point as the origin of the race (see Müller's *Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855). Whether the person who escaped was called Xisuthrus, Deucalion, or Coxcox, the tradition in each case is local; and as there is nothing in the physical conformation of Palestine to justify the supposition that it was ever visited by a flood, and as the Jews had the best means of learning this tradition from the Babylonians, whose country is peculiarly liable to such phenomena and was obviously the scene of the particular occurrence, it seems an inevitable inference that the religious allegory of Noah has been mixed up with the traditions which the Jews learned in their exile.

IV. A book of Jashar would be necessarily incomplete if it did not contain the rules and precepts of that "uprightness" which it was intended to enforce and recommend. In both passages where the book of Jashar is mentioned, the Chaldaic paraphrast renders the title "the book of the Law;" and Josephus (Ant. v. 17, § 1) intimates that the book of Jashar was preserved in the temple. Now the only book ordered to be preserved in the temple was the book of Deuteronomy, *i.e.* "the transcript of the law" (Deut. xvii. 18, xxxi. 24-26). It follows, therefore, that the book of Jashar was either identical with the book of the law, in its original form, or that the book of Deuteronomy, in its original form, was included in the book of Jashar. And this supposition is confirmed by the passages in which Micah, who refers to one of the acknowledged fragments of the book of Jashar, makes constant allusion to the idea of that book, to the uprightness and rest of the chosen people, and to the book of Deuteronomy. We have already mentioned the reasons which render it almost demonstrably certain that the book of Deuteronomy was the only "book of the law of Moses" known to the Jews, and recognised by them, before the captivity. Now Micah, who was intimately acquainted with Deuteronomy, and gives no evidence of an acquaintance with the other parts of the Pentateuch, makes express reference to the benedictions of Balaam

in especial connection with Deuteronomy (vi. 5-8). The Talmud, which contains traditions at least as old as those about the Great Synagogue and its procedure in forming the Canon, says expressly that "Moses wrote his book, and the portion of Balaam, and the book of Job," and, though it mentions the Pentateuch, does not attribute that collection to Moses (Talmud, *Baba batra*, fol. 14, 15, quoted by Jolowicz, *On the Correction of the Text of the Hebrew Scriptures, from the Talmud, the Targumim, and other Rabbinical Sources*, Lond. 1855, p. 6). As, therefore, "the portion of Balaam" is now contained in the Pentateuch, and as the same authority attributes to Joshua the last eight verses of the book of Deuteronomy, it follows that, according to this authority, Moses was regarded as the author of his book, *i.e.* the rest of the book of Deuteronomy, and of that part of the book of Numbers which contains the blessing of Balaam. The correctness of the tradition, which refers these writings, together with the book of Job, to the pen of the great legislator, may very well be called in question; but this statement is extremely valuable, as classing together a portion of the book of Numbers and the book of Moses, which must have been Deuteronomy. It is, of course, impossible to determine how much of the present book of Deuteronomy was included in the book of Jashar. That it was re-edited, and perhaps remodelled, by Hilkiah and his son Jeremiah, seems more than probable. But it is clear that its main scope was known to Micah and other earlier prophets, and that, as showing what was *jâshâr*, or "upright," and what were the promised rewards of obedience to the upright law, it must have contributed some portion, perhaps the main and central portion, to the book known by this comprehensive and significant title.

V. As the term *jâshâr* denotes not only "uprightness," but the blessedness of the upright, the law, which enjoined the practice of obedience, would naturally be followed by a declaration of the happiness which was its promised result. The book of Deuteronomy, as we now have it, terminates with two poems, or perhaps one poem in two divisions, attributed to Moses, in which this theme is poetically treated. And we have seen that the Talmud places in the same category the benedictions of Balaam, which it attributes to the great legislator. If we prefix to them the blessing of Jacob, which stands in the forty-ninth chapter of Genesis, and which being, as it stands, a poetical fragment, could

scarcely have been excluded from the collection with which it now so naturally connects itself, we shall have three distinct but cognate poems, which will conveniently form the fifth part of the book of Jashar, with or without others, which are either non-extant or not capable of identification.

VI. The promised blessings of Israel received historically their seal and accomplishment in the signal victories, in which they recognised the immediate interposition of Jehovah. Even if we did not know that the triumph of Joshua was commemorated in this collection of ancient poems, we should have conjectured that this argument would not have been passed over in a book so designated. Knowing, however, that Joshua's *epinicium* was written in the book of Jashar, we conclude with the utmost confidence that the noble songs of triumph, which Moses and Miriam sang by the Red Sea, and which Deborah chanted with Barak by the waters of Megiddo, were extracted from this anthology by the compilers of the books of Exodus and Judges. While, however, these two odes have descended to us complete, Joshua's triumphal lay is preserved only in a very short fragment. Any attempt to restore what is lost must be merely conjectural. We have given our reasons for believing that the spirit of the lay was imitated in those comparatively modern poems the 135th and 136th Psalms, but of course we do not suppose that the resemblance between these Psalms and the lost poem was greater than that which we recognise in the 68th Psalm as compared with the song of Deborah. If our restoration is so far right, and if the lay of Joshua referred to recent victories on the other side of Jordan, especially to the conquest of Sihon's territory, we may perhaps be disposed to recognise a lost strophe of this poem in the fragment attributed in general terms to them "that speak in proverbs" (Numbers, xxi. 27—30). The fact, to which we have already adverted, that Jeremiah mixes up this fragment with a quotation from the benediction of Balaam, and that, while the latter is Solomonean, the former is obviously archaistic, seems to show that the Prophet found them in a miscellaneous collection; and this would be quite in accordance with the supposition that Balaam's prophecy was the second poem in the fifth, and Joshua's lay the second poem in the sixth, part of the book of Jashar. A secondary argument for this conjecture is furnished by the order in which Jeremiah introduces his citations, which is not that of

the book of Numbers, but that of the supposed book of *Jashar*, as the following comparison will show:—

Numbers, xxi. 28.	Jeremiah, xlviii. 45, 46.	Numbers, xxiv. 17.
A fire is gone out of Heshbon,	A fire shall come out of Heshbon,	A star shall come forth out of Jacob,
A flame from the city of Sihon;	And a flame from the midst of Sihon,	And a sceptre shall rise out of Israel,
It hath consumed Ar of Moab,	And shall devour the corner of Moab,	And shall smite the corners of Moab,
And the lords of the high places of Arnon.	And the crown of the head of the children of noise.	And destroy all the children of noise.
	Woe be unto thee, O Moab!	Numbers, xxi. 28, 29.
	The people of Chemosh perisheth:	Woe to thee, O Moab!
	For thy sons are taken in captivity,	Thou art undone, O people of Chemosh!
	And thy daughters captives.	He hath given his sons that escaped,
		And his daughters, into captivity
		Unto Sihon king of the Amorites.

As Jeremiah did not recognise the divine origin of sacrifices (vii. 22), it is clear that he did not know or acknowledge the book of Numbers, which is stamped with the impress of a sacerdotal and sacrificial character. But he must surely have found the two passages, which he has mixed up in one quotation, in some book or collection with which he was familiarly acquainted. And as the fragment in Numbers, xxi., is essentially archaistic in style, while that in Numbers, xxiii., xxiv., clearly belongs to the end of David's or the beginning of Solomon's reign, it is a fair inference that this citation or imitation was derived from a collection of poems, which contained, in adjacent sections, the poetry of the Solomonean age, and the old triumphal songs of the Israelites. And such a collection was the book of Jashar, according to the general results of the preceding inquiry.

VII. In regard to any further portion of this ancient book, the mere knowledge that there was such a collection, and that its title bore the signification which we have attributed to it, would not enable us to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. But here the citation in the second book of Samuel comes to our aid, and shows us that it must have contained poems relating to David's reign. If it contained the elegy on Saul and Jonathan, who were the representatives of an excluded dynasty, it is not probable only, it is almost certain, that it contained also the

other poems referring more directly to the exploits of David himself, which are incorporated, without express reference to their source, in the same historical books. And if Psalm xviii. referred to the victory at Baal-Perazim (2 Sam. v.), we should hardly exclude Psalm lx., which refers to the not less important victories over the Moabites and Edomites (2 Sam. viii). Perhaps, too, many others of David's Psalms were included in the collection. But if the book of Jashar contained the last words of David (2 Sam. xxiii.), the completion of the anthology must be referred to the beginning of Solomon's reign. And in this case, having regard to the ideal of uprightness and blessedness, which the book professed by its title to develope and exemplify, we must include the forty-fifth and sixty-eighth Psalms, which commemorate the two great events of Solomon's earlier years—his marriage with Pharaoh's daughter, and the dedication of his temple. This date for the completion of the book of Jashar is supported by many evidences in the text of the fragments, which, on independent grounds, we have been led to assign to this collection. In the first part, we have the idea attributed to Solomon that man was created *jâshâr*, but fell; and it is only in the Proverbs attributed to Solomon that we find direct allusions to the garden of Eden. In the second part, we have a reference to the recovered independence of the Edomites, which belongs to Solomon's reign. In the third part, as we have seen, there are the most minute and circumstantial allusions to Solomon and his temple. In the fifth part, we have the benediction of Jacob, with its direct allusion to Solomon's name; the benediction of Balaam, with its phraseology borrowed from the latest Psalms of David; the benediction of Moses, with its reference to the assemblage of all the Israelites under the auspices of a king, an assemblage which took place only at the dedication of Solomon's temple. To these we may add incidental corroborations, such as the Greek name of Lamech in the second, and the Greek word μάχαιρα in the fifth part, which could not be earlier than the time when David, at the end of his reign, began to employ Cretan mercenaries. As the fourth and sixth parts, according to our view, are made up of ancient materials, we have thus in all the portions of the book which could have proceeded, by any thing like a contemporaneous effort, from the authorship of the Prophetic Schools, concurrent testimony in favour of the hypothesis, which

is antecedently most probable, that the book of Jashar was put forth *in extenso* at the most glorious period in the reign of King Solomon. This does not militate against our belief that Nathan, or whoever was the editor, commenced his work, and perhaps published part of it, under the auspices of King David. In the eulogium on David (Ecclesiasticus, c. xlvii.), it is expressly stated (vv. 9, 10) that "he established singers before the altar, and by their music sweetened minstrelsy; that he gave magnificence to the festivals, and adorned the solemn seasons unto perfection, by having the holy name of God sung from early morning." Now it is said in the express citation of David's elegy from the book of Jashar (2 Sam. i. 18), that the King "gave orders to teach the sons of Judah קשת," which has been rendered "the bow," or "the song of the bow." That this rendering is inapplicable to the context, must be obvious to any real scholar, although Lowth and Gesenius have been led to sanction it. Thenius proposes to read קְשֻׁבָה or קְשֻׁבַת *i.e.* "diligently," referring to Isaiah, xxi. 7. It appears to us that the true reading is קְשֹׁת from קָשַׁשׁ, like the common adverb רֻבַּת from רָבַב, and that the meaning is "in their assemblies," *i.e.* "publicly," which would accord with the statement just quoted from Ecclesiasticus respecting the public minstrelsy first instituted by David. In Zeph. ii. 1, where this verb occurs, some have proposed to give it the meaning involved in קְשֻׁבָה as suggested by Thenius; but the more probable opinion is that the verb, like the Arabic قشّ, refers to collections of cattle or men. The phraseology of the statement betrays a later hand: for the phrase וַיֹּאמֶר לְלַמֵּד is semi-Chaldaic (see Esth. i. 17; Dan. ii. 46, iii. 13). But there may have been a sufficient tradition that David's prophetic rhapsodists, like those of ancient Greece, recited publicly the poetic fragments contained in the book of Jashar, and if so, the beginning of this collection must have been made by him.

We have thus deduced, from the traces furnished by the fragments found in the Masoretic text, and illustrated by a true conception of the title, seven distinct but connected parts of the book of Jashar; and though the work may have contained many poems which are lost, or cannot be identified, there seems no reason to suppose that it contained more than these subdivisions. To say nothing of any *à priori* reasons in favour of the sevenfold division, it is remarkable that the book of Joshua, which contains one of the two quotations from the book of Jashar, actually

mentions (xviii. 9) a periegesis of the Holy Land "described by cities into seven parts in a book" (לְשִׁבְעָה חֲלָקִם עַל־סֵפֶר), where the term סֵפֶר, "a book," is that applied in the other passage to the book of Jashar. And it cannot be by accident that the תּוֹרָה, or "law," which, according to the Chaldaic paraphrast, gave its name to the whole book, should thus form the main and centre part of a book of seven sections, the first three consisting of a regular introduction, and the last three of separate poems, illustrating the blessedness of obedience. It will be observed that this order of the sections has not been invented by us. It flows spontaneously from the succession of the fragments in the existing text; for although Gen. xlix., is inserted before the law is declared, the benedictions of Moses, which furnish the clue, are placed at the end of Deuteronomy, and the benediction of Jacob, like the triumphal ode by the Red Sea, owe their present place obviously to historical considerations.

And now we are entitled to ask whether this is not a legitimate application of critical exegesis to a text manifestly made up of different materials? We may challenge the objector to show in what respects this reconstructive analysis is deficient in internal probability, or built up on a narrow or precarious foundation. The classical philologer will see that the principles and method of our criticism are the same as those which enabled Niebuhr to build up again the ruined vestibule of Roman history, and guided Müller in his work of extracting and restoring the fragments of Festus, imbedded in the compilation of Paulus Diaconus. There are some, indeed, who, with Mr. Grote and Sir G. C. Lewis, reject all hypothetical reconstructions from fragmentary materials, and content themselves with the results of a merely negative scepticism. But we do not expect to find these among the ultra-conservatives and literal interpreters of ancient documents, who ought to prefer, if possible, any hypothesis of original authorship to one which denies any such substratum as still extant and cognisable. All reproductions, like that which we have attempted, are the results of induction, furnished by internal evidence. If such evidence cannot be derived from the traces of compilation impressed on the Masoretic text of the Old Testament, how can we admit, as most persons do, that Owen is entitled to restore an entire skeleton from the evidence supplied by a single bone? To those, who imagine that all such restora-

tions must be hypothetical and conjectural rather than the consequences of true induction, it is worth while to remark that a large amount of assumption is necessarily involved in every process of inductive reasoning, and that the philosophy of induction is always more or less the philosophy of conjecture. This has been well stated by Professor Baden Powell (*Essays on the Spirit of the Inductive Philosophy*). He says (p. 6): "The logical analysis of induction exhibits a syllogism in which a large assumption is necessarily implied beyond, and independent of, any accumulation of facts. Thus every induction is seen essentially to involve a certain amount of hypothesis,—a certain assumption of more than the bare facts themselves seem strictly to warrant. We form intellectual conceptions of a nature more general than the mere enumeration of instances, however many, and thus supply the string on which (as Dr. Whewell happily expresses it) the pearls are hung; and perceive, according to the illustration of another able writer, how philosophy proceeds upon a system of credit, and that, if she never advanced beyond her tangible capital, her wealth would not be so enormous as it is." And having, in another place, appealed to Humboldt's assertion that conjecture, opinion, and surmise must be conceded to the inquiring spirit of man, he adds (p. 90): "Some persons speak as if all conjecture were alike delusive; but wise and skilful conjectures are very different from hasty and crude guesses; and the comparative probability of several hypotheses, all purely imaginary, admits of many degrees; and to reduce it to something like fixed principles, would constitute no unimportant branch of mental science—the logic of anticipation, the philosophy of the unknown." In general it may be said that the man of genius sees that the facts must be in accordance with his conjecture even before his inductive proof is complete; and in regard to the criticisms of philology we have had more than once instance in which hypothesis has been confirmed by positive evidence subsequently obtained. In every case the proofs are cumulative, and those, who have most ability in collecting them, are also most capable of appreciating the necessary inferences. To those who have passed through the requisite discipline in the schools of critical philology, we appeal confidently on behalf of our restoration of the book of Jashar, as a theory which, at all events, explains the existing phenomena. And those who revere the true Word

of God—the revelation of the Divine will included and contained, and sometimes concealed, in the text of the Bible—must feel that in proportion as we have been successful, in proportion as we have revived the oldest form of a portion of prophetic literature,—in the same proportion must revealed truth gain an accession of distinct and authoritative significance.

It would not be possible to apply the same reconstructive process with any hope of a satisfactory result to the fragments of the other ancient books from which the Masoretic scribes derived the materials of their compilations. For, on the one hand, we have no distinct and separable fragments, which we can assign to one or other of those lost books; and, on the other hand, when history is formed on a basis of ancient annals, genealogy, statistical records, and epic poetry, all these are so blended together, that criticism cannot attempt to unravel the threads which have been woven afresh into one composite texture. The only conclusions, which seem to be reliable, are the following:—

(1). There was "the Book of the Wars of the Jehovah," which, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, may be presumed to have contained an epic narrative of the events which intervened between the Exodus and the complete occupation of the promised land. Besides the fragment in Numbers xxi., we attribute to this book the oath against Amaleq in Exodus xvii. 16, and we assume that it supplied the materials for all the narratives contained in Exodus, Numbers, and Joshua.

(2). There was another epic book entitled "the Book of the Suffetes or Judges," which formed the basis of the history known by that name.

These two books may be considered as having formed the Epic Cycle of the Hebrews, and were followed (3) by the annals of Nathan and the other Prophets from which our present books of Samuel and Kings are derived. In Greek literature we have an antitype of the two older epic works in the poems of Homer; and the fragments respecting Samson are probably genuine relics of the second work. Though resting on a basis of authentic itineraries and other records (*cf.* Numbers, xxi. 17; Josh. xviii. 9), and referring to the oral reports of ancient tradition, both works probably proceeded from the prophetic schools of Samuel.

(1). Anterior in reference, but probably subsequent in date of composition, was the "Book of the Generations of the Fathers," a

sort of *Patrogony*, which bore the same relation to the other epic poems which the *Theogony* and *Eœæ* of Hesiod did to the epic poems of the Homeridæ. This work probably rested on genuine genealogies, which commenced with the Egyptian sojourn of the chosen people, and which their task-masters had taught them to keep. It is reasonable to suppose that these lists of names, like those of the Egyptian kings, which have given so much trouble to chronologers, were afterwards carried back to a period for which there were no authentic vouchers; and mythico-ethnological statements of successive events assumed the form of regular pedigrees.

(5). We have no means of fixing the commencement of that antagonism of the prophet and the priest, of the preacher of religion and the maintainer of ceremonial rites, which is so conspicuous in the writings of the great Prophets, and which came to its triumphant conclusion when our Lord established his own eternal system on the ruins of sacerdotal Judaism. We find that, even before Samuel revived the true spirit of the religion of Moses, a man of God was found to denounce the hypocritical and dishonest practices of the Jewish priests (1 Sam. ii. 27 *sqq.*). And though it seems that the Levitical priesthood did not obtain any power or consideration until after the downfal of Athaliah, and though even then it was limited to the smaller kingdom of Judah, there is every reason to believe, indeed there are many passages which prove it, that the colleges of the priests had their ritual books, which were disallowed indeed by the schools of the prophets, but which gradually gained favor with the superstitious populace, until, after the downfal of the monarchy and the cessation of the prophetic office, these ordinances were passed off by the sacerdotal caste, which after the captivity assumed the chief authority at Jerusalem, as genuine, integral parts of the original legislation of Moses.

In addition, then, to the book of Jashar, which was the manual or text-book of the prophetic schools, we must suppose that the Jews before the captivity had epic poetry and annals, which seem to have proceeded exclusively from the Prophets; genealogies, which may have been framed either by priests or prophets; and ritual books, which belonged exclusively to the priestly caste at Jerusalem. From these materials the Pentateuch and the historical books, as we now have them, were compiled by priestly scribes, and it is not difficult to gather from internal evidence

a probable account of the different stages in the process of compilation.

For the last hundred years, the attention of Biblical students has been directed to the obvious fact that the book of Genesis exhibits the traces of two different hands and falls into two main parts distinguished by the two names by which the Supreme Being is consistently or preferably designated. For while in some passages God is called by the general name *Elohim*, in others he is denominated *Jehovah*, a title peculiarly appropriated to the special worship of the Israelites; in others again we have a combination of the two names.[1] Further examination showed that the portions thus distinguished as *Elohistic* and *Jehovistic* respectively were discriminated by other peculiarities of style and language; and all attempts, which have been subsequently made to uphold the unity of the book of Genesis, have been eminently unsuccessful, even when they have not betrayed the eagerness of unscrupulous advocates. The same process of examination has been extended to the other books of the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua, and the following are the general results of the whole inquiry.

The Elohistic portions of the books of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers, are those which contain the continuous and connected narrative, so that if these portions stood alone the books would be tolerably complete. The book of Leviticus is entirely Elohistic, with the exception of an interpolation (chapters xviii.-xx.), which Ewald considers to be an isolated portion, and which from other reasons we have classed with the book of Deuteronomy. The book of Deuteronomy, on the other hand, is entirely Jehovistic, with the exception of a few interpolations. The same hand may be traced in the first twelve chapters of Joshua, but the tailpiece

[1] It seems clear to us, from internal evidence, that the passages in the book of Genesis, which have a combination of the names *Jehovah-Elohim*, belonged to the oldest documents incorporated in Genesis, and that in these the Elohistic editor merely appended the second name. The passages, in which *Elohim* alone is found, seem to us to have been written during the period when, as we shall see lower down, the name of *Jehovah* fell into temporary desuetude. And as the passages, in which *Jehovah* alone is the name employed, are proved by the style and other circumstances to belong to the latest period of the composition, we conclude that these were written and introduced when the sacred name had been resumed by the Elohists, and therefore we call them *Jehovistico-Elohistic*. The passages belonging to these three classes in the book of Genesis are enumerated by Keil, *Lehrbuch*, p. 82. This discrimination particularly applies to the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy.

has marks of Elohistic editorship. In the earlier books of the Pentateuch we recognise as Jehovistic all those passages which, from independent reasons, we have claimed for the book of Jashar, with the exception of the first fragment of the first part, which is, after all, only an expression in common language of the doctrine involved in the Jehovistic allegory of the garden of Eden, and ought, perhaps, to be regarded as a commentatorial exposition rather than as a distinct fragment. At any rate, as we have shown, the second part connects itself immediately with the allegorical narrative; and the third part, also allegorical, has furnished some materials for the pragmatism of the Elohist.

Agreeing generally with the best German critics in regard to the discrimination of the Elohistic and Jehovistic elements of these old books, we differ from them entirely as to the comparative antiquity of their constituent parts. It is the opinion of the German critics that the continuous Elohistic portion is the *Urschrift* or original document, and that the Jehovistic passages are subsequent insertions by way of supplement or completion; and it cannot be denied that this is *à priori* a very natural supposition. Our researches, however, have led us to the directly opposite conclusion. The two books of the Pentateuch, which may be regarded as most complete in themselves, are Deuteronomy and Leviticus; and with trifling exceptions the former is exclusively Jehovistic, the latter exclusively Elohistic. But we have ample reason for believing that Deuteronomy was the only book known as "the book of the law of Moses" before the captivity; and that the book of Leviticus was not known or not acknowledged before this epoch. From this alone we should conclude that the Jehovistic writer was older than the Elohist. Again, all the fragments which we claim for the book of Jashar, except the literal version of the introductory symbolism, belong to the Jehovistic portion and bear a Jehovistic stamp; and we find in the Elohistic parallelisms either expositions of the same statements or different and obviously less accurate accounts of the same fact. From this also we infer the priority of the Jehovistic element. Above all, the evidence furnished by the continuousness of the Elohistic sections in the earlier books of the Pentateuch seems to us to show that we have here the last hand—that of the final editor or compiler of the whole. If the whole collection had been ultimately revised by a Jehovistic writer he would not

have placed the book of Deuteronomy at the end, nor would he have commenced the Pentateuch with the Elohistic cosmogony, adding, with a fresh beginning, that of the Jehovist. The mere admission that the earlier books are a conglomerate of different materials shows that the continuous thread, which runs through the whole, comes from the *rédacteur*, who brought the work into its present shape. We do not therefore hesitate to conclude that the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua were compiled from older Jehovistic materials by an Elohistic editor.

This view is confirmed by all that we can learn respecting the date of the compilation. That the Elohistic compilation was not written till the Jews had become well acquainted with the country, the traditions, the usages of the Babylonians, is proved by the fact that the Elohistic portions abound in references to these matters, which the Jews had no previous opportunity of learning. Thus the pragmatical version of the deluge of Noah is clearly referable to the traditions of Babylon. So is the Jehovistico-Elohistic account of the tower of Babel, and the statement that they had brick for stone, and bitumen for mortar. But the most decisive indication of the kind, is the statement, in the Elohistic part of the book of Exodus (i. 14), that the children of Israel were employed in brick and mortar work during their captivity in Egypt. Now the Israelites had abundant opportunities of knowing, not only while the recollections of the Captivity were fresh, but by intercourse with Egypt to the end of their abode in their own country, that the building-material in that country was not brick but stone; when, therefore, the Babylonian materials are substituted for the Egyptian, we must reasonably infer that Babylonian life was present and familiar, but Egyptian life unknown or forgotten. The same conclusion follows from the Aramaic words, which are cited as Egyptian in the Elohistic portion of Genesis (Bohlen, *Genesis*, vol. i., p. 63. Heywood's translation). It is also to be remarked, that the name *Javan*, which, in the Jehovistico-Elohistic ethnography of Gen. x. 2, 4, is the general designation of Greece, was not the name adopted by the Oriental nations until after the time of Alexander the Great (see Schlegel on the *Râmâyana*, i. 2, p. 169; Gorresio, *Râmâyaṇa*, vol. vi., p. 443). And we have referred above (p. 133) to the antagonism between the Elohistic cosmogony and that of the Persians and Babylonians. We have already

seen that the Pentateuch, as it now stands, was unknown to the Jews before the captivity, and that even after the Israelites had been some time in exile, the book of Deuteronomy was the only recognised book of the law. And yet, soon after the return, we have every reason to believe that the present Pentateuch was put forth and accepted. It follows, therefore, that the present collection was compiled during the Captivity. And if there is any reason for believing that at this epoch there was a tendency to substitute the name Elohim for Jehovah, we have an adequate explanation of the composite phenomenon. It has not escaped the notice of Biblical students, that changes in the religious tendencies of particular generations among the Israelites are accompanied by corresponding changes in the proper names of individuals. Now the first revival, or indeed emphatic establishment, of Jehovism in Israel, was due to the great prophet *Samu-el*, whose name, like that of his father, *El-kanah*, and of his teacher, *Eli*, refers only to an Elohistic worship. The same may be said of Saul's family, for his grandfather's name was *Abi-el*. But Saul's ascent to the throne, under the auspices of Samuel, makes him at first a Jehovist, and he indicates this by the name of his son *Jonathan*, or *Jeho-nathan*, of which the other form was *Nathani-el*. Similarly, the grandson of *Eli* is *Ahi-jah*, and David's heir is called *Jedid-iah*. Saul's subsequent apostacy is indicated by the names of his son and grandson, *Ish-bosheth*, or *Ish-baal*, and *Mephi-bosheth*, or *Mephi-baal*. But generally we observe, throughout the kingly period, a predominance of the name *Jah*, or *Jehovah*, in the designations of kings, priests, and prophets. The great prophet, who preaches as a missionary to the Baalites of Samaria, is called *El-i-jah*, "my God is Jah!" The last of the kings are *Jos-iah*, *Jeho-ahaz*, *Jeho-i-akim*, and *Zedek-iah*. The great prophets before the exile are *Isa-iah*, *Jerem-iah*, *Mi-cah*, or *Mica-iah*, and *Hosea*, or *Jeho-shua*^{h}. But as soon as the kingdom of Judah is abolished, we find that the name of *Jah*, or *Jehovah*, is either proscribed or disused. The prophets are *Ezeki-el*, another form of *Hezek-iah*, and *Dani-el*. Even archangels are *Micha-el* and *Gabri-el*. In the list of the high-priests, *Eli-ashib* stands between *Joiakim* and *Joiada*. And in the royal house of David we find the same interruption to the succession of Jehovistic names. According to the ingenious restorations of Lord Arthur Hervey (*Genealogies*, pp. 62 *sqq.*),

the true order of names, before and after the captivity, was *Josiah, Jehoiachim, Jeconiah, Shealti-el, Zerubbabel, Hananiah,* or *Jochanan.* Here it will be observed that, with the exception of the names of *Shealti-el,* "I have asked God," and *Zerubbabel,* all the words involve *Jah,* or *Jehovah*; and while St. Matthew expressly tells us that *Jeconiah* begat *Shealti-el,* "after they were brought to Babylon" (i. 12), the name *Zerubbabel* denotes either "born in Babylonia" (from זָרוּעַ), or "dispersed in Babylonia" (from זָרָה). In either case, the name *Rhesa,* which, as Lord Arthur Hervey has shown (p. 112), means "prince," or "chief," may be taken with the word *Zerubbabel,* and the whole will signify "the Prince of the dispersed in Babylonia" (which would be equivalent to his actual title, רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, "the chief of the dispersion"), or "the Prince born in Babylonia." We see, then, that the name of *Jehovah* is kept in abeyance during the period of the exile, but revives immediately after, or shortly before, the restoration of the Jews, when the names *Nehemiah, Obadiah, Zephaniah, Zechariah,* and perhaps *Malachiah,* appear as the names or epithets of prophets to the closure of the Canon. If, in addition to this striking evidence of the cessation of a reference to the name of Jehovah during the period of exile in Babylonia, we revert to the fact already mentioned, that the ultimate compilation of the book of Genesis exhibits a familiar acquaintance with the traditions of Babylonia, and with the name of the country and its neighbours, and even with the peculiarities of the soil, and its great tower of Belus, we cannot entertain any reasonable doubt, that the last compiler or editor was the Elohist, and that the period of his labours was the latter half of the seventy years of exile. At no other period subsequent to the first establishment of the prophetic schools, can we find any evidence of Elohism similar to that which is furnished by this epoch, when priests, prophets, and kings, as if by general consent, intermitted the practice of calling themselves by the name of Jehovah (Isaiah xliv. 5). And as the book of Kings, which is carried down to the thirty-seventh year of the captivity of Jehoiachim, *i.e.*, B.C. 562 (2 Kings, xxv. 27), quotes the book of Deuteronomy as "the book of the law of Moses," it seems indubitable that the Pentateuch, in its Elohistic compilation, must be referred to the interval between that date and the return of the Jews in B.C. 446.

On a general review of all the facts and arguments which have been adduced, we may be able to establish the following conclusions respecting the origin and growth of the Jewish collection of sacred books. And for the sake of clearness, we will present the results in the form of a chronological table, divided according to the main epochs in the history :—

I. *Legislative and Epic period;*—Moses to Samuel.
B.C. 1300—1150.

a. Decalogue, and Original Laws of Moses.
b. Book of the Wars of Jehovah.
c. Triumphal and other National Odes.
d. Epic Traditions respecting the Suffetes.
e. Genealogies and other Lists.

II. *Complete Development of Literature;*—Samuel to Jeremiah.
B.C. 1150—600.

(1) Samuel to Solomon; B.C. 1150—975.

a. Prophetic Psalms, Parables, and Proverbs.
b. Annals.
c. Book of Jashar.

(2) Solomon to Josiah; B.C. 975—641.

a. Psalms, and Longer Prophecies; Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah.
b. Annals.

(3) Josiah to the Captivity; B.C. 641—600.
Literary Revivals; Hilkiah and Jeremiah.

III. *Editorial Period.* B.C. 600—130.

(1) Exile; B.C. 600—446.

a. Compilation of Pentateuch, and other Historical Records.
b. Ezekiel and other Prophets, including the Supplement to Isaiah.

(2) Restoration; B.C. 446—130.

a. Formation of the Canon, and Adoption of the Hagiographa.
b. Prophecies of Zephaniah, Haggai, and others.
c. Daniel and Sirachides.

Although we are prepared to admit that the Canonical books of the Jews, of which we have been endeavouring to trace the literary history, existed both in Hebrew and Greek at the time when our Saviour quoted from them, we have no reason to believe that the text was settled precisely in the state in which it is now found. No Hebrew MS. is known to be older than

Kennicott's No. 154, which belongs to A.D. 1106; and though there are much older MSS. of the Septuagint, there is so much discrepancy between this version and the original that it furnishes only a precarious guide for the establishment of doubtful texts. It seems, indeed, pretty clear that the editors of the Complutensian text arbitrarily accommodated the Greek to the Hebrew; and even in the Pentateuch, which is the oldest and best translation, the Greek in many places corresponds to the Samaritan rather than to the Hebrew. The Septuagint translation of Daniel, probably the latest of the Jewish sacred books, is so unlike the Hebrew that Theodotion's version was substituted for it at a very early period. And the labours of Origen and others seem to show that attempts were made from time to time to accommodate the Greek to the changes introduced by the Masorethæ into the Hebrew text. With regard to the Pentateuch, Gesenius supposed that the Samaritan and Septuagint versions were both translated from a text older than the present Masoretic, and there is nothing to invalidate this reasonable conjecture except the absurd hypothesis that the Canon was closed and our present Masoretic text established under the influence of inspired editors! The Samaritan text itself, for the reasons mentioned by Gesenius, must have been formed subsequently to the Exile,—probably in the reign of Darius Codomannus, when Manasseh, the brother of the High Priest at Jerusalem, married the daughter of Sanballat, the Satrap of the Samaritans, and, in order to keep both his wife and his priesthood, established on Mount Gerizim a temple-worship in opposition to that at Jerusalem. It may be inferred that the text, thus received by the Samaritans, was the same, in the main, as that which was adopted by the Sanhedrim in Judæa; and as the tradition respecting the seventy-two interpreters of the Septuagint points to the number of the Sanhedrim, who sanctioned that translation, as the Samaritan version of the Pentateuch, stated to have been made by the pontiff Nathaniel a little before Christ, agrees with the Targum of Onkelos, who flourished about the same time, and also with the Septuagint published about 100 years before, it would seem to be a fair conclusion that, making allowance for the intentional alterations of the Samaritans, these four versions represent to us the text of the Pentateuch, as it was from the Maccabæan age to that of our Saviour, more fully, on the whole, than the Hebrew text, which we have derived from

the subsequent labours of the Masorah, although this later recension is, in itself, better than any of the four. It is clear that the Masoretic school at Tiberias was engaged in settling or unsettling the Hebrew text until the final publication of the Masorah itself. With regard to the origin and antiquity of the Masorah there has been an old and long controversy among the Rabbis: on this point we refer the reader to Jolowicz's *Introduction to the five books of Moses* (Coeslin, 1847, pp, 22—30), who tells us in his tract on the first epistle of Baruch (London, 1855, p. 5, note): "The most recent researches on this important subject incline to the conclusion that the view of Elias Levita (b. 1472, d. at Venice 1549) 'the Massorah was committed to writing in 506 A.C. at Tiberias' is correct. Should this be admitted, then Ben Asher, who lived at a later period, was its last compiler and author. And in fact, Rabbi Saadja Gaon (b. 892, d. 941 or 42) states that he had seen the Massorah of Ben Asher. See Leopold Duke's *Konteros ha-Massorah*, Stuttgart, 1844." The same writer in another tract, to which reference has been made above (p. 223), has undertaken to show (p. 5) that "the Talmudists and the latter Rabbis, as well as the Chaldee paraphrast Jonathan ben Uziel, not only knew various readings most strikingly differing from our Canonical text, but also determined by the interpretations of the same most important usages of life"; and in his postcript (p. 15) he gives special proofs that the Talmudists had copies of the Pentateuch containing different readings, and that they sometimes used one MS. roll to correct many others. If, then, we take into consideration all the facts of the case—the variations of the Hebrew MSS., none of which can boast any great antiquity, the discrepancies between the Hebrew text and that of the Samaritan and Greek versions, the evidences of different readings furnished by the Talmud, Targumim, and other Rabbinical authorities, the change of the Hebrew character from the older Phœnician form to the square letters borrowed from the Syrians after the captivity, the late introduction of points and distinctions between medial and final letters,[1] the probability that the Jewish editors may

[1] "The quotations from Jonathan's translation of Hosea, vi. 5. and Mic. vii. 4, give the best proof that at the time of the composition of that translation the characters ף, ץ, ן, ם, ך, were not used as final letters, although there is a note in the Talmud saying that they were known. Probably they then were used only as letters of numbers: ך 500, ם 600, ן 700, ץ 800, ף 900" Jolowicz's *Correction of the Text of the Hebrew Scriptures*, p. 15.

have accommodated the Hebrew text to the Septuagint, and the evidence furnished by the very remarkable fact that some of the Jewish computations of time in the text of the Old Testament involve the date of the destruction of Jerusalem, and therefore presume a tampering with the text subsequent to this date,[1]—all this, and a great deal more that might be alleged, shows that we cannot place implicit reliance on the Masoretic text, and that, if conjectural emendation is allowable in the case of the classical authors, it is a still more legitimate instrument in the case of these compiled, revised, and perpetually re-edited remains of the ancient Jewish literature.

There will be little difficulty in showing that these results of Biblical criticism may be reconciled with the claims of Christian Orthodoxy. In point of fact, they contribute to the removal of some of the greatest difficulties by which Orthodoxy has been encumbered. When the treatise on the book of Jashar was first announced, the author stated that his researches, and the method of his inquiries, had enabled him "not only to throw some additional light on the construction of the Canon, but also to establish a number of original interpretations, which contribute, in a remarkable manner, to develope the religious significance of the Hebrew records, to strengthen the connection between the Old and New Testament, and to exhibit the consistent harmony of the substantial contents of the Holy Scriptures." All that he here professed to undertake the author still believes that he accomplished. And with regard to the religious results, which he has claimed, it seems to him obvious that the Jewish and

[1] It has been shown, in a very curious book, called "*Palmoni* (*i.e.* the mystic numberer), an essay on the chronological and numerical systems in use among the Jews; London, 1851," that the whole series of chronological calculations in the Old Testament rests upon purely arbitrary and fanciful combinations of solar and lunar years. The grand result is that we have "from the Creation to the Call two millennia of solar, 2087 of lunar years: from the Call to the second Destruction, 2000 solar, 2087 lunar years; so that it might be said that the time from the origin of the human species to the selection of one race to be a peculiar people equalled the time from that election to the rejection and final dispersion of the chosen people" (*Palmoni*, p. 491). It thus appears that "the chronological tables of the Jews must have been brought into their present state at a date posterior to the destruction of Jerusalem; and consequently that the charges which have been brought against the Jews of corrupting their sacred books are true to a greater extent than has been suspected, though the motive for the corruptions was not that which has been usually supposed."

Christian systems, being both divine, must have agreed absolutely in the essentials of revealed truth on which they rested. A critical investigation therefore, of which the object was to prove that the purer religion preached by the prophets, who claim to speak by divine inspiration, was more in accordance with the original teaching of Moses than the Levitical system, to which the later Jews attributed a Mosaic origin, but which our Lord rejected as neither divine nor worthy to be maintained,—such an investigation did certainly tend to develope the religious significance of the Hebrew records, by showing that it was the business of the true Israelite to be upright, or *jâshâr*, rather than a mere observer of ritual ceremonies: it certainly tended to strengthen the connection between the Old and the New Testament, for it reconciled the teaching of the Law and the Prophets with that of Jesus Christ, and thus exhibited the consistent harmony of the substantial contents of Scripture, relieved from after-growths and corruptions which marred that divine concent of the same recurring melody. The service thus rendered to the cause of revelation will be still better appreciated by those, who are aware that the religion of the Prophets stands opposed, not only to the rites and ordinances of Levitical Judaism, but also to a hideous practice of sacrificing human victims—even their own children—to Moloch, which the later Jews had borrowed from their Canaanitish neighbours. Now it has been argued[1] that this practice belonged to the most ancient and barbarous period of Israelitish history—that "it must have been originally the congenial invention of superstitious cannibals and savages, propagated and confirmed by habit;" that "in process of time these horrid rites were exchanged for milder ones, when the Bible writers eagerly vindicated the character of their God by transferring to old times the improvements of newer date, making old practices appear as detestable innovations, for which, with uncontrollable perverseness, the Jews were ever deserting their own purer theism;" that "among the Hebrews, as among other nations, there was a progressive development of better ideas about God, and the mode of worshipping him, which the compilers of the sacred volume, in their anxiety to uphold the credit of their ancestors, and the

[1] We are quoting here from an able pamphlet, printed for private distribution. The subject of human sacrifices among the Hebrews has been fully discussed by Ghillany, *die Menschenopfer der alten Hebräer*, Nürnberg, 1842.

continuity of revelation, unconsciously, but unwarrantably, transferred to ruder times." As this view of the case is directly opposed to the belief that the divine law, which Jesus Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil, was given by Moses, at the very threshold of Jewish history,—as it makes the Christian religion only the last of a series of gradual improvements, introduced into the Jewish religion by the growth of civilisation and refinement,—and as it is, nevertheless, supported by the undeniable allegation of great incongruities, surely good service is rendered to the cause of revealed truth when these incongruities are explained, without any sacrifice of the harmony which unites and combines the two revelations of Moses and Jesus Christ; when it is shown that the Levitical compilers of the Pentateuch, as we now have it, accommodated to their system rites and practises borrowed from the barbarous worship of the Canaanites, and theories and traditions which they had learned at Babylon, but that the religion of Moses and Samuel was, long anterior to their corruptions, a pure monotheism, resting on the everlasting basis of that morality, which alone can make a man Godlike, which declares authoritatively that those only who are *jâshâr* can enjoy the blessings, and inherit the promises of *Jeshuran;* that "he who cometh to God must believe that he is,"—that He has a personal existence and a definite character,—"and that He is a rewarder of them who diligently seek Him," by endeavouring to conform their own behaviour to his revealed attributes.

Notwithstanding the declared intention of the essay on Jashar, and its obvious tendency, when examined by intelligent and candid persons, and in spite of its being written in Latin, and addressed to a limited circle of learned men, the author was assailed, from the moment almost of its appearance, by an outburst of personal virulence. The attack was commenced by the most ignorant of the religious periodicals, and the subject was soon transferred even to the newspapers. Unscrupulous clergymen seized upon the opportunity, and joined in the clamour with the hope of making religious capital out of stimulated prejudices. And, in short, there has not been such an outcry since the day when Bentley first established the previously unsuspected fact—that all ancient books were not written by the men whose names they bear. If, instead of merely showing that the materials, out of which some of the Jewish books were professedly compiled,

might be indicated and restored by inductive criticism, the author had produced a forged book of Jashar, like that which was, with minutely circumstantial falsehood, stated to exist in an old translation by Alcuin,[1] there might have been some reason for the complaint that he was substituting something new for the Bible. As it was, the cause of all the tumult was an interference with the hypothesis of an infallible literature, as was stated plainly enough by one of the London papers; and, as this hypothesis could not be defended by calm argument, the Bibliolaters took the usual course, of crying out for the persecution and punishment of the bold bad man, who "called the child by the right name." Göthe says, with sorrowful bitterness:—

"Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt
Die thöricht g'nug ihr volles Herz nicht wahrten,
Dem Pöbel ihr Gefühl, ihr Schauen offenbahrten,
Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt."

"'The few, who know the truth, but foolishly
Disclose their full heart's feelings to the world,
And tell what they have learned—from earliest days,
These have been crucified or thrown to flames."

But England in the nineteenth century is not a favourable soil for the rank growth of bigotry and intolerance. A man cannot

[1] This clumsy fabrication, which bears about the same resemblance to the genuine Hebrew records, as the "Tales of the Genii" do to the "Arabian Nights," bears the following title: "The Book of Jasher: with testimonies and notes, critical and historical, explanatory of the text, to which is (*sic*) prefixed various readings, and a preliminary dissertation, proving the authenticity of the work. Translated into English from the Hebrew, by Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus, of Britain, Abbot of Canterbury, who went a pilgrimage into the Holy Land and Persia, where he discovered this volume, in the city of Gazna. Bristol, 1829." The original author of this book, which claims a place in the canon immediately before the book of Joshua (!), is alleged to be one Jasher, the son of Caleb, who was an eminent associate of Moses, and succeeded his father as Judge of Israel; so that, if he had been a real person, the omission of his name from the genealogies of the Jews would have been most marvellous. The first citation from the real book of Jashar is carefully introduced into the text of the forgery (chap. xxx. 11); but the other citation is only represented by a statement (chap. vi. 12, 13) that, "Caleb, the son of Hezron, invented the bow: for he was a mighty man, and a man of renown. He taught the children of Jacob to shoot with the bow: he learnt his brethren to prepare themselves for the battle." There are many little pieces of rationalism in the book, which would have been well enough as conjectures, but which only aggravate the absurdity, when put forth as constituent parts of a forged document. Perhaps, after all, the procedure of the Masoretic editors was not so very unlike that which has been adopted by this modern manufacturer.

now be constrained by the frowns of secular or ecclesiastical authority, or scolded to silence by a venal press, if he feels that he has truths to tell, which it is expedient not to conceal from his contemporaries. At any rate, the author of these pages will never become the echo or the presumed abettor of opinions which he knows to be false; and those who, either as open accusers or as anonymous judges, have spoken out in his condemnation, are greatly mistaken if they suppose that they have won their cause or gained a victory. It is easy enough to raise a premature song of triumph—

ἀλλ' οὔτι ταύτῃ ταῦτα, μὴ δοκεῖτέ πω.
ἔτ' εἰσ' ἀγῶνες τοῖς δικάζουσιν τάδε,
καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροισιν οὐ σμικροὶ πόνοι.

Even if we had advanced an untenable theory, supported by vicious criticisms, and if this had been shown by calm and reasonable argument, the position of the Bibliolater would not have been improved by the confutation of a solitary attempt to relieve the subject from some of the difficulties. An increasing number of well-informed and intelligent men agree with us in the main; and, as time goes on, more and more writers will be found to give expression to the thought so generally entertained—that the hypothesis of an infallible literature is an insult to common sense and a standing impediment to religion. But, as far as our hypothesis is concerned, we have not yet seen reason to recede in the slightest degree from the position which we have assumed. On the contrary, additional study and reflection have tended only to confirm our confidence in the validity of our conjectures. And, independently of this, we derive no little assurance from the character of the attacks to which we have been subjected. For whilst the accusers—for so we may call the few persons who have given their names to a controversy by which they hoped to improve their professional position—have incurred not only defeat, but even the most humiliating exposure, the self-constituted judges—if we may give this name to the anonymous writers in periodicals—have, without exception, adopted a mode of criticism which is tantamount to the admission that they have no confidence in the goodness of their cause. Every one of the attempts to review the treatise on the book of Jashar starts with the assumption that the infallibility of Scripture is an established fact, and that Christianity must stand or fall with its acceptance or rejec-

tion. Consequently, an attempt to treat the historical writings of the Jews as compilations, and to indicate conjecturally the form of one of the more ancient books, which they cite as authorities, is to be regarded as an impiety, as an exhibition of unbelief, as high treason against, what one of these writers is pleased to call, "the majesty of holy writ." Under these circumstances, there is no occasion for any argument. It is quite sufficient to state the results of the book or rather to exhibit those of its conclusions which are most offensive to the prejudices of Bibliolaters, and then to raise a cry of condemnation—"away with such a fellow from the earth: for it is not fit that he should live" (Acts, xxii. 22)—and though, perhaps, there is no exact parallel to the case of the Jews who "banded together and bound themselves under a curse, saying that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed Paul" (Acts, xxiii. 12), there is no doubt that some of these fanatics have complacently expressed their conviction that they have done signal injury to the offending editor, who is fortunately quite unconscious that he has received any harm or danger from their malice. There is something almost comical in the fact that there has been a quarrel among the so-called religious journals on this point; and while one of them has resented as libellous the imputations put forward by the most unscrupulous of these papers, that the High Church periodicals had been criminally lenient, they have all strenuously claimed their share in the work of casting stones—or mud—at the blasphemer. Not to be in a furious passion in such a case is positive sin. "There is such a thing," says the most violent of these journalists, "as a Prussian policy in theological controversy, which takes the right side, in the abstract, but deals so very tenderly even with heresy or blasphemy, as to become practically an accomplice in the evil it condemns, and, in its dislike to a vigorous assertion of the cause of truth, throws all its weight insensibly into the scale of error." When passion is enjoined as a sacred duty and calm reasoning rejected as an offence against God and man, there is little danger to the cause which is attacked in this spirit. What Lord John Russell said in his reply to the honorable and learned member for Sheffield, on the 19th July, 1855, —that is, exactly ten days after the appearance of the article just quoted,—whether applicable or not to the speech in question, was very applicable to the proceedings of these religious controver-

sialists:—"He (Mr. Roebuck) was so full of indignation that he left out proofs and arguments altogether. Indignation may make very good verses,[1] but it does not constitute proof or argument. The hon. and learned gentleman reminded me of an eloquent passage, with which most persons must be acquainted, in a speech of the great orator, Mr. Curran, who, when addressing a great statesman, then Lord Chancellor, said, 'I am aware, my Lord, that truth is to be found only by slow and painful progress; I know, also, that error is in its nature flippant and compendious; it hops with airy and fastidious levity over proofs and arguments, and perches upon assertion, which it calls conclusion.' That was the course which the hon. and learned gentleman has taken. He has perched upon assertions and called them conclusions." When the question really is whether the Bible, in its whole literary composition, is entitled to be regarded as "the Word of the Almighty, by which all mankind shall be judged," it is not very likely that a triumphant result will be obtained by those who assume this point, the very point which they have to prove, and then call upon every Christian to "disburden his conscience and heart by some plain, unmistakeable utterance of righteous indignation." Accordingly we find that in this, as in other cases, the advocates of Bibliolatry have shrunk from an investigation of the truth, and have contented themselves with statements and condemnations. What Talleyrand said of the positive old lady may be predicated of every one of these organs of religious dogmatism: "Elle est tout assertion; mais quand vous en demandez la preuve, c'est là son secret." What would have been the result, if there had been a full discussion of the critical details, may be inferred from the only case in which such a discussion has arisen—that of the proper interpretation of Col. ii. 15 (see above, pp. 61-76)—for here we see that a view attacked as erroneous and paradoxical turns out to be the inevitable inference from the fact that St. Paul wrote Greek, and also to be in accordance with the oldest and best authorities. And the same instance shows that the Bibliolaters employ without scruple the most dishonest artifices in order to evade a true interpretation of that which they profess to consider as the infallible Word of God.

The attacks, or, as they would call them, the judgments and condemnations of anonymous critics, to which the essay on the

[1] *Fecit indignatio versum.*

book of Jashar has been exposed, are so numerous that it would be impossible to reply to them all; and the majority of them are written in a style so offensive from its insolence, and with such a total absence of theological learning, that self-respect would prevent the author from noticing them. Fortunately, however, they are so uniform in their procedure that an exposure of one of them is an exposure of the whole chorus. For the ground taken up is simply this: (1), that the Bible being, in its present state, infallible, any attempt to find an inner marrow of literary or religious import must be as erroneous as it is impious; (2), that the mode of criticism adopted by this author is utterly absurd and vicious. On both these points, we might be well content to refer the reader to the discussion in the present Appendix. But it will be desirable to show by one specimen the otherwise incredible weakness of the anonymous judgments which have been passed upon us; and in selecting the *Christian Remembrancer* for October, 1855, we shall refer to by far the most favorable example. The writer of this review is, in literary ability, in scholarlike and gentlemanly style, and in Christian temper, almost a solitary exception to the general rule in these tirades. But with all these recommendations, he is liable to the same charge as the other critics—that he begs the question at issue, and, instead of meeting the arguments to which he objects, is contented to stigmatize their author as a person so reckless and unreasonable that it would be a waste of time to attempt to refute him.

The following extracts will show that this is really the procedure in the *Christian Remembrancer*. In p. 390 the reviewer says: "Jashar, then, is an imaginary work, created out of imaginary materials; which, had it been on the subject-matter of the early lays of Rome, or the fragments of Etruscan laws, would have been admirable for the learning, and the ingenuity, and the real contributions to criticism and archæology, which are incidentally brought out by it, in which the writer's want of perception of the value of evidence and his wild dreams would have been the occasion of many a smile,—but which applied to the Book of Books, that wherein is contained the Revelation of the Will of God, the teaching of his Holy Spirit—the work, as it were, of His hands—is simple impiety." Now here it will be observed that the reviewer quietly begs the question at issue—

namely, in what sense the Bible is the Word of God. And this *petitio principii* is the more remarkable, because he afterwards brings this very charge against the editor of Jashar. He says (p. 412): "Dr. Donaldson holds that they (the Old Testament Scriptures) are to be treated on the same principles of criticism as profane writings; which is, in fact, assuming the very point at issue." Supposing that the editor of Jashar had done this, would he not have been on exactly the same footing as his reviewers, who assume that these writings are *not* to be held amenable to the usual laws of criticism, that it is in fact "simple impiety" to treat them in this way? What we have really said is this—that the science of criticism must be the same whatever be its object (p. 346), but that there is a sacramental character in the Bible, that it is a Bethel or house of God—the habitation of Jehovah and the gate of heaven (p. 5). Now it is surely not impossible that a temple of the true God should fall into ruins, and that its fragments should be built up into a more modern edifice, intended, partly at least, to serve the same purpose, or that people should speak of the new fabric in terms which they would apply to the original building. And if it were thought desirable to endeavour by conjectural reproduction to form some idea of the original building from the old fragments which were imbedded in the modern walls, and if this could be done without any displacement of the existing stones, we conceive that the effort would be just as harmless in itself and would require precisely the same taste, knowledge, and skill as that which has been displayed by Quatremère de Quincy and [illegible] in their conjectural restorations of Greek architecture and sculpture. If this is not so, if the principles of Biblical and classical criticism are essentially different, and if it is a "simple impiety" to do in the former case what would be "admirable" in the other, there must be an end of all original and really learned exegesis in sacred matters, and Biblical scholarship must be, not only what it is in England, neglected and nearly non-existent, but even denounced and forbidden as dangerous and sinful.

So much for the *petitio principii*, on the strength of which the reviewer charges his author with impiety. Now for the allegation of recklessness by which he excuses himself from entering into detailed arguments with such a writer. We are told, at starting, that "the work is that of a person of wild and unre-

strained imagination, who lives in a world of his own, and seems to be without the capacity of appreciating the value of evidence, not to mention more grave faults" (p. 385). And, after giving a general sketch of the argument, he repeats the same charge. "Is it possible," he asks (p. 395), "for any one more entirely to disregard the laws of evidence than the writer of this book?" In order to estimate this contemptuous criticism at its true value, we ought to know what are the writer's canons of evidence—what are the rules of credibility or probability which he lays down for himself—and what is some particular instance of that neglect of those laws which he charges on the editor of Jashar With regard to the former point, his main principle is that conjectural criticism is quite inapplicable to the Old Testament, because the infallible New Testament is responsible for its integrity, authenticity, and signification. Now this view implies a very peculiar notion of the laws of evidence. In the first place, there is no proof whatever that our Lord or His Apostles maintained the integrity and co-equal authority of all parts of the Jewish canon; on the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Jesus constantly distinguished between the marrow of the Jewish moral law and the ritual system in which it was enveloped. But, even waiving this point, the argument on which these sticklers for evidence so entirely rely, belongs to a class which all educated persons reject as soon as heard. It amounts to this. The Old Testament is infallibly accurate, because the infallibly accurate New Testament says so; and the New Testament is infallibly accurate, because the Apostles were inspired, and because the New Testament cannot be inferior to the Old. A great authority with the party to which the *Christian Remembrancer* belongs, has told us that this is the only argument on which he relies (*Tracts for the Times*, No. 85, p. 11): "How do we know that the New Testament is inspired? Does it anywhere declare this of itself? Nowhere. How, then, do we know it? We infer it from the circumstance that the office of the Apostles who wrote it was what it was, and from the Old Testament being inspired." If there is anything certain in the literary history of the Jews, it is the fact from which our investigations take their origin, namely, that all the older books of the Jewish canon have come to us in the form of a compilation—in a revised, abridged, and secondary state. They are, therefore, so

far from being entitled to claim the impress of genuine antiquity, that they are fitter subjects for conjectural criticism and restoration, than any remnants of Greek literature, with the single exception of Homer's poems. Indeed, it must be remembered that while these latter, professing to be the oldest writings of the Greeks, have merely passed through the successive editorship of the Peisistratidæ and of the Alexandrian school, the very latest of the Jewish historical works, which were written before the return from exile, refers nearly forty times to older sources of information, and, besides the internal proofs of compilation, the whole literature has been reduced by the Masoretic editors to a uniformity of style and language which represents the latest rather than the oldest form of Hebrew. An investigation, then, which starts from these ascertained facts, is much more in accordance with the laws of evidence, than the assumption by which it is opposed—that we have, in this collection of Jewish books, a series of genuine and original documents. Our reconstruction is put forward expressly as a theory, and with a disclaimer of anything beyond inferential and approximate results. But it rests on the admitted fact that there was a book of Jashar; on an explanation of that name, which we consider perfectly certain; on the presumption that fragments, which would naturally belong to such a book, and are not claimed for any other book, did actually belong to it; and on the interlacing of internal and circumstantial evidence which crops out in every direction. The objections to this sort of evidence are just those which were put forward in the case of William Palmer. Because strychnine was not actually found in the body of his victim, it was contended that the greatest criminal the world has seen for some time ought to escape condign punishment; but judge and jury, and the universal public, were satisfied that the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. In the same way, unless it can be shown that the fragments claimed for the book of Jashar belong to the original structure of the books in which they are found, or that, being fragments, they belong more probably to some other old book quoted as an authority, it is a fair inference that they belonged to that book; and in proportion to the general scope and extent of that book; in proportion as it must, from its subject, have been the most comprehensive of the Jewish religious books; in the same proportion is it likely that an unclaimed quo-

tation or extract belonged to this rather than to any other of the lost originals. We have, therefore, very little to fear from a comparison of the laws of evidence and probability, by which we have been guided, and those which the writer in the *Christian Remembrancer* takes as his standard of credibility.[1]

If we now take some particular instance of the neglect of the laws of evidence which is charged upon the editor of Jashar, we shall see that the reviewer is as unable to absorb a gnat, as he is ready and willing to swallow a camel. We will take the instance to which the reviewer seems to attach most importance, —that of the alleged Greek word מָכֵרָה, *mĕkéráh*, *μάχαιρα*, —to which he twice reverts (pp. 395, 414).[2] And it is one of the most important points in the whole discussion. For if the so-called prophecy of the patriarch Jacob contains a genuine Greek word, and that too the name of a weapon, and if there was a particular time at which the kings of the Jews made use of Greek mercenaries, we have a decided note of time, quite as significant as any of those to which Bentley appealed in his dissertation on Phalaris. Now the reviewer objects to this argument that, "it is utterly valueless, being a mere conjecture, that because two words in two languages are similar, they are the same, when there are many other ways of explaining the fact." A statement of the argument will show how incapable this reviewer is of "appreciating the value of evidence," when he gives the name of "conjecture" to that which is established both by testimony and by induction. In the first place, the Rabbi

[1] A contemporary religious journalist, who copies the words of the *Christian Remembrancer*, and applies them to Bohlen's *Genesis*, has given us a beautiful specimen of "his capacity of appreciating the value of evidence." He writes as follows (*Clerical Journal*, Nov. 8th, 1855): "We cannot just now fix the precise date of the appearance of Strauss's *Leben Jesu*, but we have before us the third edition, published at Tübugen in 1838. As Von Bohlen published his *Genesis* in 1836, *there is evidence sufficient for our purpose* that Strauss's mythic theory took the lead, and most probably led the former to attempt in the Old Testament what the latter sought to accomplish in that of the New." Now, the fact is, that Strauss and Bohlen published their books in the same year, 1835, and within a few weeks of each other; and we may thus see that Bibliolaters are as reckless in their own literary conjectures, as they are insolent in their judgments of others.

[2] The *Dublin Review*, Sept. 1855, has also a long note on this subject, pp. 206–209. The conclusion that "we are quite as entitled to make *μάχαιρα* a word learnt by Greece from Asia, as to build a theory upon the opposite genealogy," is overthrown at once by the fact that there are obvious Greek etymologies for מכרה and לכך, and no Semitic affinity for either word.

Eliezer says expressly that "Jacob cursed their *sword* (using the common Hebrew word חרב) in the Ionian language." Secondly, there is no Hebrew root from which the word could be derived; for כור, to which some Hebraists refer it, makes מְכוֹרָה or מְכוֹרָה, and, at the very least, would require the form מְבִירָה like מְרִיבָה from רוּב. Thirdly, there seems to be no doubt whatever that the כָּרִי, who were the body-guard of the Jewish kings, were Carians, and that the כְּרֵתִי were Cretans, who served together as mercenaries in Palestine, just as the former did in Ægypt (Herod. ii. 152—5), in Cyprus (*id.* v. 111), and in the Phœnician colonies (Thucyd. i. 8). Fourthly, one of David's captains is actually called *Chepher ham-Mĕkĕrâthî*, "Hepher the swordsman" (1 Chron. xi. 36). Fifthly, the Carians were expressly distinguished by their use of the δρέπανον and other cutting weapons (Herod. v. 111, 112), and would thus stand in opposition to the bow-men of Palestine and Syria. Sixthly, to distinguish this weapon, which the Carians introduced among the inhabitants of the East, from his own δόρυ and ξίφος, Æschylus calls the latter τὸ μαχαιροφόρον ἔθνος; so also Thucydides speaks of the Thracians as μαχαιροφόροι (ii. 96, vii. 27; *cf.* Xen. *Cyrop.* vi. 2, 10): and this was a later name for guardsmen in particular (Menand. *Legat.* 283, 19). Seventhly, when the classical Greek writers distinguish between the μάχαιρα and the ξίφος, which sometimes hung side by side from the same girdle (Hom. *Il.* iii. 271), they always imply that the former was an instrument for striking, as the latter was for cutting, the former having a concave, the latter a straight edge. Thus while ξίφος (from ξύω, ξέϝω *cf.* βρέφος from βρύω) carries us to the idea of a ξύρον, or razor, the μάχαιρα is always compared to the κόπις, a broad curved knife, like our bill or chopper, and to the δρέπανον or δρεπάνη of the Carians, which was a blade shaped like a sickle or scythe, with a curved inner edge (*cf.* Xen. *Equ.* iv. 11; Eurip. *Cycl.* 241; Plut. *Cleom.* c. 26). Eighthly, although the word μάχαιρα was generally used in classical Greek, and indeed from a very early period, to denote the knife of the cook or the surgeon or the priest, rather than a military weapon, it is derived from the root μαχ—(Sanscrit *maksh* or *makha*, Benfey, *Wurzellex*, ii. p. 43; *mush* or *mush*, Bopp, *Gloss.* pp. 260, 268), which is at once the most ancient and most permanent expression for "battle" and "combat." And in the oldest forms of Low German we have the same

word in its military sense; for in Anglo-Saxon we have *mêce*, in Old Saxon, *mâke*, and in Old Norse, *mœker*, signifying "a sword" (Grimm, *Deutsche Gram.* ii. 511. iii. 440). Although, therefore, he mythical priest, Μαχαιρεύς, of Delphi (Strabo, ix. p. 421; *cf.* Pind. *Nem.* vii. 42), and the mythical surgeon, Μαχάων, the son of Æsculapius (Hom. *Il.* ii. 752), point to a very old use of this sort of weapon for sacrificial or surgical purposes, the derivation of the word, and its use by the Teutonic tribes in a military sense, show that this application must have been secondary, and that the substitution of the word ξίφος was due to the introduction of a sword of a different shape. So that, in all probability, the inhabitants of the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean fought with μάχαιραι, which were introduced among them by the Carians, whereas the Greeks, as early as the time of Homer, more generally substituted the straight ξίφος. Ninthly, the root of the word μάχαιρα, in its primitive military sense, appears also in the proper name לֶמֶךְ, for which Semitic scholars have vainly sought a Hebrew explanation. It seems that this hero represented the spirit of war and violence, at least this is the purport of the song put into his mouth; and if the word is merely the Greek Λά-μαχ-ος, probably an ancient name or epithet of the God of War, we shall have an additional evidence of the fact that the foreign mercenaries introduced into Palestine the names of their gods and weapons, and the spirit of open violence which belongs to the profession of arms. For this view we have an evidence in the admission of an opponent. Ewald, who had previously made the most desperate attempts to find a Semitic etymon for לֶמֶךְ, has lately arrived independently at the conclusion that this supposed antediluvian name is merely a Greek epithet from the coasts of the Mediterranean. In the *Jahrbücher der Biblischen Wissenschaft*, vi. p. 2, Dec. 1853, he writes as follows: "The man's name Λάμαχος, Gen. v. 25, iv. 18, recurs in Pisidia, *Corpus Inscr.* No. 4379; the woman's name Ἄδα, Gen. iv. 19, 23; *cf.* xxxvi. 2, 4, likewise in that district, *Corpus Inscr.*, iii. p. 333: this coincidence is all the more remarkable, as both names never again occur in the history of Israel." Tenthly, if מְגֵרָה had been a term of native origin, its appearance as a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, or nearly so, in the language, would have been more surprising than the solitary occurrence of the proper name *Lamech*. For the Israelites had the

thing designated by the name *μάχαιρα*, and it is mentioned in the Old Testament 380 times by its Hebrew name חֶרֶב, *ᶜherev*. It is therefore nearly impossible that a thing of such common occurrence should not have been mentioned occasionally by its other designation if it had had two vernacular names. And the only explanation of the fact is that which we have suggested, namely, that the song, in which the word occurs, was written at the same time as that when a guardsman was called *hammĕkĕráthî*, and this period has been fixed by Friedrich, on independent grounds, as the epoch of Nathan the prophet, when the employment of foreign mercenaries was first introduced into Palestine, when their names and the names of their weapons and the objects of their worship were strange to the Israelites, and when consequently these foreign words found acceptance for a short time until they were translated into terms of domestic origin. The Pyrgopolinices of Plautus was a later representation of these soldiers, properly so called, who raised *latrones* for the Eastern kings, and called themselves by the surname of *Lamachus*, the son of Mars, and husband of Venus or Ada, "the lovely," and who were sooner or later adopted as national heroes by the people whom they served. That the Semitic nations did, in fact, substitute their own name, *ᶜherev*, for a weapon corresponding to the *μάχαιρα* of the Greeks, and that this took place at a very early period, is proved by the Græco-Semitic fable of Perseus, whose scimetar, the gift of the Phœnician Hermes, is called *ἅρπη*=חרב, and this word appears (in Hesiod, *Op. et Di.*, 571; Soph. *Fr.*, 374) as a synonym for *δρέπανον*, being, as the works of art tell us, strictly speaking a *μάχαιρα*.[1] Belonging to the days of the Phœnician intercourse with Greece, the myth of Perseus must have gone back very nearly to the times of David and Solomon; and we may thus infer from the word *ἅρπη*, that the weapon introduced by the Carians very soon got a Hebrew name, which is just what we should expect from the solitary occurrence of *mĕkérdh*. Now all these arguments are either stated or implied in the original discussion. There is no illusion here—no "wild and unrestrained imagination"—no "world of our own." A Rabbi says that the Patriarch is made to use a Greek name for

[1] It may be inferred from Aristoph. *Thesm.* 1120, that the *harpe* of Perseus was called a *ξιφομάχαιρα* in the *Andromeda* of Euripides. The Scholiast says: *ἔλεγε τὸ ξιφομάχαιρα ὡς δρεπανομάχαιρα.*

the swords of Simeon and Levi. The best lexicographers agree that the kings of the Jews, beginning with the latter years of David, had Carians in their body-guard. The weapon which the Carians used,—a curved sword with concave edge,—was called by the very term used in the blessing of Jacob, a term employed as a synonym for δρέπανον. One of the guardsmen of David is called "the man of the *machæra*." The representative of bloodshed is called by the Greek name *Lamachus*. In the earliest ages the Greeks found the *machæra* called in the east by the name which the Hebrews exclusively used in speaking of the sword. This word occurs 380 times in the Old Testament, and the *machæra* is mentioned only in the benediction of the Patriarchs, and in the name of the guardsman. The benediction is attributed, by another scholar, and on independent grounds, to the Prophet Nathan, who flourished at the end of David's reign and at the commencement of that of his successor, and therefore at the very time when this weapon, then a novelty, would be known by its foreign name. The combination of all these particulars amounts to a convincing proof, not only that Jacob is made to curse his son's swords in the Greek language, but that the poem, in which this foreign name occurs, could not have been composed by Jacob, or even written by Moses, but must have been as late as the days of *ʿHepher ham-Mĕchérâthî*. If the reviewer cannot see this, it is plain that, although he is obviously a man of ability, he has not served his apprenticeship to philology, and that he has ventured to judge without knowledge. "Every one," says the great philosopher, "judges well what he knows, and of these things is a good judge" (Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 2, § 5). Anonymous critics imagine that it is safe, if not proper, to neglect this rule.

It is somewhat remarkable that only three writers — and those three clergymen—have been found to lend their names to "a railing accusation" against us. Considering that there are hundreds of persons who are anxious to render themselves conspicuous, and to obtain preferment by espousing the cause of popular prejudices, we should have expected that there would have been as many avowed, as there have been anonymous, assaults on the editor of Jashar. And when we find that only three have ventured to come forward *in propria persona*, and those three either unknown or of no repute, we may fairly

conclude that the task of refutation is neither so easy nor so necessary as the writers in periodicals would represent it to be; that, in fact, respectable men, with characters to lose, shrink from a warfare in which misrepresentation is necessary to obtain even a partial success. Two of these assailants have been adequately exposed and demolished. It remains that we say a few words about Dr. S. J. Rigaud's sermon, preached before the University of Oxford on the 1st July, 1855, and published at the request of the Vice-Chancellor. We should not have thought it worthy of even the briefest notice, if it had not appeared in the form of a solemn address, preached in a place of worship, before the representatives of one of our great seminaries of learning, and if it had not been printed at the request of, and with a prefatory recommendation from, the acting chief magistrate of the University, along with other sermons, including one by the Bishop of the diocese. Neither the literary character of Dr. Rigaud, nor the merit of his sermon, entitle him even to a passing castigation on his own account; but when the University of Oxford becomes responsible for a theological denunciation, it is not undesirable to show that the academical body is compromised by the patronage of an absurd and contemptible production. That Dr. Rigaud is an inaccurate scholar, and an unsound theologian, has been already shown (pp. 74 *sqq.*). We will now briefly indicate, from the contents of this sermon: (1) that he has misused his text; (2) that he is confessedly ignorant of the subject on which he has ventured to write; (3) that he misrepresents the argument which he undertakes to confute.

(1). It is generally supposed that a sermon ought to be a deduction from the text on which it is written. Dr. Rigaud's text is 1 Tim. vi. 20: "Oppositions of science falsely so called," ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως (*i.e.* oppositions of the misnamed Gnosis); and while he finds in this text a proper starting-post for an attack on what he calls "Neologian views," he contradicts all the Fathers and all the best modern commentators in their assertion, that St. Paul here means some early development of what was afterwards generally known as Gnosticism. Now St. Paul was himself a "Neologian," as his allegorical explanation of the story of Hagar (Gal. iv. 22 *sqq.*) very clearly shows; and the misnamed Gnosis, which he here deprecates, is represented rather by the procedure of Dr. Rigaud and

the other Oxford preachers, whose sermons accompany his, than by the doctrines and practice of those who are denounced in this set of discourses. For, whatever may have been the special opinions which St. Paul had in view (and angel-worship formed a part of them, Col. ii. 18), it is certain that he alludes to some positive form of speculative dogmatism, pursued for selfish objects, and at a sacrifice of Christian charity. In more than one passage the Apostle contrasts this γνῶσις with ἀγαπή. Thus, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, he prays that it may be granted to his readers "to know the love of Christ, which excels knowledge" (iii. 19); to the Corinthians he says that "knowledge puffs up, but love edifies" (1 Cor. viii. 1); and in this very chapter of the First Epistle to Timothy, it is clear that he is speaking of a similar effect of selfish dogmatism,—of a *Gnosis*, which leads to all kinds of uncharitable disputation, and which belongs especially to those who think that religion is a means of getting money (1 Tim. vi. 4, 5). That this spirit, at all events, is more likely to be found among heresy-hunters, than with those who speak what they believe to be true, in simple honesty of heart, and without fear of the consequences, is or ought to be sufficiently obvious. And there is certainly some reason to suspect that an attack upon "a Neologian," who was, at the time, a rival schoolmaster, may have had some special charms for one who has endeavoured to promote his professional interests by proceedings as obtrusive, "and, with all charity be it spoken, as unscrupulous," as any chiropodist or patent-medicine-monger has ever dared to adopt.

(2). Whatever other motives may have induced Dr. Rigaud to add an attack on some new interpretations of the Hebrew records, to his share in the declamation by which certain Oxford men, under the guidance of their Bishop, have cleared themselves from all participation in the opinions of their Regius Professor of Greek, his self-conscious simplicity has enabled us to see that he has not been led to enter on this subject by any course of previous study, by any interest of long standing, by that jealousy which we feel when we are watching our own preserves. Biblical criticism is, with Dr. Rigaud, like a fruit or a vegetable purchased in Covent-Garden market; he knows nothing of the cultivation, and is quite content to take it, stale or drooping, at third or fourth hand, from the retail representative of the market-

gardener. He has, indeed, the assurance to write the following words: "Dr. Donaldson's work on the book of Jashar, though it may appear startling to many an English reader, contains little or nothing which would be new in Germany, or to one acquainted even in a moderate degree with the history of German theology." As the book was published in Berlin, and has been treated by German reviewers as entirely original, we should have been disposed to inquire where Dr. Rigaud got this notion, if it had not appeared, on his own showing, that he is simply and absolutely ignorant of German literature,—theology and all,—and that he merely makes these remarks in ignorant presumption. It seems, indeed, that Dr. Rigaud has read only one book on German theology, and that only in an English translation. At least, his only references are to Hävernick's *Handbuch*, of which he has made considerable use, and he has to refer to this double medium in order to tell us what are the opinions of De Wette! (p. 54). The very slight attention, which he has paid to the subject, is farther shown by the fact that, although he has a distinct section on the mythical interpretation of scripture-history (pp. 57-64), he does not seem to have the remotest idea of the difference between a myth and an allegory, or between a myth and euhemeristic rationalism, or between a myth and a more recent falsification of history. All that he says, on the strength of his gleanings from Hävernick, is inapplicable to the immediate object of his sermon. We have put forth no mythical hypothesis. On the contrary, in the only passage in which we mention the word *mythicus* (p. 242), we are insisting, as we do in this book, on the historical basis of the Jewish traditions! Our business is with literary history, not with mythology. But when the preacher ventures to insinuate (p. 58), that there is nothing "approaching to a Hebrew mythology," he merely exposes his childish innocence in regard to the question. Scientific writers have expressly placed the "religious mythical system" of the Israelites by the side of the "poetico-mythical system" of the Greeks, and "the philosopho-mythical system" of the Indians (Lepsius, *Chronol. d. Ægypter*, i. p. 2); and no one, who pretends to have studied the subject, will venture to deny that there is just the same mythology in the interrupted sacrifices of Isaac and Iphigenia, and in the adventures of Sampson and Hercules. The Jewish literature is distinguished from the Greek

by the fact, that, besides the relics of a genuine mythology, the priests of a later day introduced arbitrary fables of their own. Thus the conversation between Balaam and his ass is manifestly a later invention. The story of Jonah and the great fish is a combination of biography and Phœnician mythology: and the wonders of the furnace and the lion's den, in the comparatively modern book of Daniel, are, in all probability, a realistic expansion of the metaphorical complaints of an exiled Hebrew poet.

(3). It would have been well, however, if Dr. Rigaud had been content to betray his ignorance and presumption. He underlies also the graver charge of intentional misrepresentation —which is a form of mendacity. Speaking from a pulpit in the University Church of Oxford, and after solemn prayer to the God of truth, he has the audacity to describe in these words the purport of the book, which he makes the object of a religious denunciation (p. 49): "The method in which the text of the Old Testament has been dealt with may be briefly stated. Whereas there are in holy Scripture two references to the book of Jashar, *therefore* that book not only existed, but formed the material from which, with many interpretations and interpolations of their own, the Hebrew doctors formed the mass of what was accepted by the Jewish Church in later centuries as the Canon." Not only every reader of the book referred to, but every reader of the brief account of it, which we have given above, must see at once that this is an utter misrepresentation. It is false, and Dr. Rigaud knew it was false, that any attempt has been made by us to show that the book of Jashar *formed the material from which the mass of the Canonical books was formed.* We have expressly excluded the ritual books from any connexion with that ancient treatise. The annals of the Jews were not included in it. The great mass of the prophetical writings were long subsequent to it. Psalms and Proverbs had but little to do with it. The noble book of Job was a later treatise on a subject not altogether dissimilar, as the Roman Catholic reviewer has well remarked (*Dublin Review*, Sept., 1855, p. 214),[1] and as we had remarked before him (*Jashar*, p. 328). This representation,

[1] The reviewer asks "why we did not refer to Job, if at no other time, when we were endeavouring to define the meaning of Jashar?" We answer, because we consider the book of Job as a late production, which could have had no value in our eyes for the development of Solomonean ideas. Internal evidence shows that this article was written by Cardinal Wiseman: see, for

then, is as false as the absurd and preposterous form which is given to our argument, that, *because* there are two citations, which are the starting-point to prove that such a book existed, *therefore* all the conclusions are derived from the first of the premises. Then again, Dr. Rigaud knew that he was stating an untruth, when he said (p. 52) that the "one principle only of selection" adopted in the book in question was the test of the two commandments. For he must have known that in p. 6, to which he refers, the book of Jashar had not yet been mentioned, and that the passage refers generally to what is and what is not the voice of God speaking in the whole of the Scriptures, Old and New; that, in fact, we are speaking of what is and what is not inspiration, not of what is and what is not a Jasharan fragment! Really one would think that it was even less necessary to be scrupulously truthful in the University pulpit at Oxford, than in the anonymous contributions to dishonest and malignant journals.

With these remarks, we can afford to take leave of all our critics and assailants. Whether writing in their own names or anonymously, they have merely succeeded in furnishing a fresh proof of the truth of the remark, with which Bentley consoled himself under similar circumstances, "that no man was ever written out of reputation but by himself." [1]

In fact, with the exception of the writer in the *Christian Remembrancer*, to whom we have addressed a few observations, and the Roman Catholic censor in the *Dublin Review*, whose stand-point is so different from ours that an argument on equal terms is quite impossible, no one of these critics rises to the level of ordinary ability and information. And if they had been ever so successful, the only important question would have remained intact. For it is a matter of trifling moment whether a particular author has or has not compromised his literary reputation, whether a particular theologian is or is not deficient in learning, good sense, or orthodoxy. The main point will remain as it was, and it will still be said in the words of an able writer, printed and communicated to us, but not yet published, "that the earlier books of the Old Testament are, generally speaking, compilations

instance, what he says about De Rossi in p. 216, and compare Wiseman's *Lectures*, vol. ii., pp. 175 177.

[1] Monk's *Life of Bentley*, i., p. 16.

from older documents, among which may be mentioned the Book of the Wars of Jehovah, the Book of Jashar, the gradual accumulations of sacerdotal law, and particularly the two cardinal authorities, the so-styled records *Elohim* and *Jehovah*, whose intertwined lore explains the twofold account given of the chief events of the early narrative"; that "the Old Testament Canon was not closed until the age of the Maccabees"; and that "from small beginnings it seems to have progressively grown during the whole preceding period, and to have undergone considerable modifications even after the Captivity, if we can attach any meaning to the legends about the great Synagogue, and the miraculous restorations of the collected books by Ezra and Nehemiah." And these being the views entertained by all Biblical scholars, whose number is continually increasing, it is an insult to educated manhood to suppose that any success in arguing against a theory respecting the details can affect the general proposition,—that no ancient literature has come down to us in a less original state than the sacred books of the Jews.

APPENDIX IV.

(CHAP. III. P. 159).

ON THE PECULIAR CHARACTER AND MUTUAL CONNEXION OF THE FOUR GOSPELS.

When Mr. Stanley speaks of a feature in the Gospel narrative as affording a "striking example of inspiration, or whatever else we may call the characteristic difference between ordinary writings and those in the sacred volume" (*Apostolic Age*, p. 146), he suggests a thought which has occurred to all reflecting theologians, and indicates at the same time, however obscurely, the true correction of a common error. That the Gospels, simple as they are, exhibit nevertheless the traces of a peculiar character, which is not found in other records of the lives and actions of religious teachers, is a fact which strikes all candid and pious and intelligent readers. But when it is supposed that this is an evidence of the inspiration, which guided the literary composition of these books, the general impression assumes to itself the form of a special dogmatism, which cannot be admitted until it can be shown that this hypothesis is either the only or the best explanation of the phenomenon. Now, the assumption that the writers were inspired is the assumption of their literary infallibility; and this is quite inconsistent with the fact that the four narratives, though exhibiting no discrepancies which are not compatible with the honest testimony of four competent but merely human witnesses, do not so entirely agree as we must presume they would have done if they had all proceeded in an equal degree from the infallible supervision of the eternal Spirit. Mr. Stanley, therefore, has done well in calling attention to the fact, while he leaves its explanation undecided, and intimates that the term inspiration is only a name, which may or may not be the most correct and appropriate designation of the peculiarity, which we agree with him in ascribing to the four memoirs of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

It appears to us that the divine light which gleams in the simple pages of the Gospels, the heavenly spirit which breathes through these inartificial narratives, is entirely due to the celestial origin of the revelation of which they are the vehicle, and to the Godlike character and attributes of the Person, whose sayings and doings they undertake to record. For the writers themselves, we need no explanation of these peculiarities beyond that which is supplied by the fact, that they, or their informants and authorities, passed some years in close and intimate association with the Fountain of Light and Life and Love; and that they were themselves so penetrated with his divine teaching, that they could not fail to show its refractions even in the unpractised efforts of their literary activity. The Persian poet said to the perfumed clod of earth: "Thou could'st not dwell so long with the rose, and not borrow thence some fragrance." And so we may say of the Evangelists, that although men, and writing, as men, what they had seen and heard themselves or had learned from others, they, or those whom they copied, were so influenced by recent contact with Jesus, so thoroughly imbued with the essence of his religion, that their writings became fraught with the inspiration of their great theme, and were virtually the Word of God, for they included and contained the utterances of a divine revelation. This, we conceive, is amply sufficient to explain and account for the peculiar character of the Gospels. But as sensible and candid writers have maintained that something is required beyond this, it may be necessary to show that there is no need to seek any other qualification on the part of the Evangelists, in order that they might be what they are to us. The most recent editors of the New Testament (Messrs. Webster and Wilkinson: *Introd.* pp. xxxvii. *sqq.*) have urged that the remarkable difference which exists between the writings of the New Testament and other compositions of nearly the same age can only be explained by regarding the fact and nature of their inspiration in its four elements. (1) Primary Tuition; (2) Intellectual Regeneration; (3) Internal Principle; (4) External Influence. "We cannot," they say, "satisfactorily dispense with either primary tuition and instruction, or a radical change of their original order of mind, or their conscious possession of a definite, powerful, and adaptable master-principle, or the action of a suggesting, guiding, and controlling influence from without. Each of these qualifications

must, from the necessity of the case, have been supernatural. And the whole taken together make up what we understand by Evangelical and Apostolic Inspiration." Now it must be observed that, as the authors of this theory admit that the necessary or actual conditions under which the inspiration of the Evangelists had to act, imply that their testimony must have been human, exhibiting substantial truth under circumstantial variety, and must have been co-existent with human imperfection and infirmity, and must have varied with the medium employed,—it is clear that the narrators are not regarded as immediately influenced by any infallible guide, that in fact the external influence is limited to the facts which they narrate, to the Person with whom they had to do, to the doctrine which he conveyed to them, and to the general effect which was thus produced on the character and disposition of their minds. Consequently, it is not necessary to suppose that they were, as writers, selected instruments for a special purpose, or that they were acted on with a view to that purpose in a special manner. On the contrary, it is to be presumed that they were representatives of the spirit which reigned in the earliest Church as a body, for it is only to collected Christians that the spirit of Christ is promised (Matth. xviii. 20, xxviii. 20); and that any other Christians, who had enjoyed similar advantages, might have produced works stamped with the same unique character. Indeed, the less qualified they were individually for the work of authorship, the more likely is it that they derived the peculiarity of authorship, in which they agree, from the general spirit of the Church, and from the still present influence of Him, whose disciples they were. Accordingly, the best illustration of the peculiar character of the Gospels is a knowledge of the relationship which connected the Evangelists with the Redeemer and with one another.

The first step is to inquire, more accurately than has generally been done, what was the composition of that first and smallest society of Christians, which enjoyed the privilege of personal and familiar intercourse with the blessed Author of our religion. It is really a remarkable circumstance, that although churches have been named, and festivals kept, in honour of the twelve apostles, and though bishops and priests profess to derive a special authority from these first ministers of our religion, we still require an effort of criticism to reconcile and harmonize the

original lists of these persons, as furnished by the Gospels. These lists are as follows:—

Matth. x. 2-4.	Mark, iii. 16-19.	Luke, vi. 14-16.
1. Σίμων Πέτρος	1. Σίμων Πέτρος	1. Σίμων Πέτρος
2. Ἀνδρέας	2. Ἰάκωβος ὁ Ζεβεδαίου	2. Ἀνδρέας
3. Ἰάκωβος ὁ Ζεβεδαίου	3. Ἰωάννης	3. Ἰάκωβος
4. Ἰωάννης	4. Ἀνδρέας	4. Ἰωάννης
5. Φίλιππος	5. Φίλιππος	5. Φίλιππος
6. Βαρθολομαῖος	6. Βαρθολομαῖος	6. Βαρθολομαῖος
7. Θωμᾶς	7. Ματθαῖος	7. Ματθαῖος
8. Ματθαῖος ὁ τελώνης	8. Θωμᾶς	8. Θωμᾶς
9. Ἰάκωβος ὁ Ἀλφαίου	9. Ἰάκωβος ὁ Ἀλφαίου	9. Ἰάκωβος Ἀλφαίοι
10. Λεββαῖος	10. Θαδδαῖος	10. Σίμων Ζηλώτης
11. Σίμων ὁ Καναναῖος	11. Σίμων ὁ Καναναῖος	11. Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου
12. Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης	12. Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώθ	12. Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώθ

In St. John's Gospel we read (i. 40 *sqq.*) that the first nucleus of these apostles was furnished by the disciples of John the Baptist: the earliest recognition of the Messiahship of Jesus was given by Andrew, and another disciple, whose name is not mentioned, but who was probably the writer, John the son of Zabdi or Zebedee. Andrew brings his brother Simon to Jesus, and no doubt John introduced his brother James, so that the first four names in the above lists—the two sons of Jona, and the two sons of Zabdi—were the four original attendants of our Lord; and, in point of fact, we find that three of these—Peter, James, and John—were always his most special companions. The next disciple, according to St. John, was Philip, of Bethsaida, a fellow-townsman of the sons of Jona: and he introduces Nathanael to Jesus. As Bartholomew, *i.e. Bar Talmai*, "the son of Talmai," is a patronymic, it has always been concluded, with good reason, that this Nathanael is the Apostle Bartholomew, who is always coupled with Philip. And thus the first six of the Apostles are settled without any difficulty. We can also see that they fall into pairs very naturally, and we can thus arrange, so far, the manner in which they were sent out "two and two" (δύο δύο, Mark, vi. 7). The next pair in all the lists is Matthew and Thomas. But it appears from Mark, ii. 13-17, and Luke, v. 27-32, compared with Matth. ix. 9-13, that Ματθαῖος or Μαθθαῖος was the same as Λευὶς ὁ τοῦ Ἀλφαίου (or, according to Origen, *Opp.* i. 376, Λεβής), and very little criticism is required to show that while Λεββαῖος, who follows James, the son of Alphæus, in Matthew's list, is this very Levi, or Lebes, the son of Alphæus, Θαδδαῖος, who occupies the same place in Mark's list, is a confusion be-

tween *Ματθαῖος*, the other name of the same person, and Jude, the son of James, who appears in Luke's list; and we know, from St. John, that there were two Apostles of this name (John xiv. 22). For, according to one way of writing the name, it would be easy to mistake מודי for מתי (ܡܬܝ), and we find that the Apostle of the Syrians was called ܐܘܕܝ as well as ܠܒܝ, so that, probably, a marginal explanation of the name of Matthew has got mixed up with the other form of the name of Jude. As this Jude is called the son of James, he probably was paired with his father, and although Matthew or Levi, as the son of Alphæus, was brother of James, he is always placed with Thomas, or "the Twin," who may have been his own twin-brother. At least Eusebius tells us (H. E. i. 13, p. 82, Heinichen) that Thomas' real name was Jude, and there was a Jude among the relations of Jesus (Mark, vi. 3). In the same way Judas Iscariot, who was the son of Simon (John, vi. 71, xii. 4, xiii. 2, 26), is paired with his father in Matthew and Mark. It has generally been supposed that the other Judas was the brother, not the son, of James; but *Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου* can only signify "Jude the son of James;" and if we adopt the opinion of Grotius, that the Epistle of Jude was written by the fifteenth Bishop of Jerusalem, we shall understand the phrase *Ἰούδας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Ἰακώβου*, as expressing his office rather than his relationship; "Servant of Jesus Christ, and brother of James," means merely "Christian Bishop of Jerusalem, as James was." Thus, then, the list of the Apostles will be complete, and will form the following six pairs of brothers, or near kinsmen:—

1. Simon, Andrew, } sons of Jona.
2. James, John, } sons of Zabdi.
3. Philip, Nathanael, } sons of Talmai?[1]
4. Matthew or Levi, Thomas, } sons of Alphæus.
5. James, son of Alphæus, Jude, or Thaddai, his son.
6. Simon, the Zealot (son of Alphæus?), Jude, his son.

This classification of the first adherents and ministers of our Lord, enables us to understand the traditions which have reached us respecting their divison of labour in the great work of propa-

[1] To this supposed relationship it is objected that Philip was of Bethsaida, and Nathanael of Cana,—as if two brothers might not reside in two neighbouring towns or villages in Galilee. That *ἀπὸ Βηθσαϊδά, ἀπὸ Κανᾶ*, need not imply the birth-place is clear, from the fact that Jesus, *ὁ ἀπὸ Ναζαρέτ*, was born at Bethlehem.

gating the Gospel. As far as we can learn, the family of Alphæus, or, as he was also called, Clopas or Cleopas (see Thorndike, *Gov. of Churches*, p. 5), undertook the work of preaching the Word and directing the churches in their native land, and in the immediately-adjoining countries. Up to a period shortly preceding the siege of Jerusalem, James, the son of Alphæus, was resident at Jerusalem, as the representative of the Church there. We here adopt the conclusion, that there were only two eminent members of the earliest church who bore the name of James, namely, the two Apostles, James, the son of Zebedee, who was put to death by Herod Agrippa in A.D. 44, and James, the son of Alphæus, who is called James the less, and also designated as "the just," and as "the brother," *i.e.* the first cousin of our Lord. We can see nothing more than *à priori* difficulty in reconciling James, the Apostle, with James, the brother; and while everything tends to prove that, after the death of James, the son of Zebedee, there was only one eminent disciple of that name, it seems to us impossible that, if there were two in a position equally prominent, we should not have had some distinctive caution in those passages which mention them. For a similar reason, we are convinced that the Cleopas mentioned in Luke (xxiv. 15 *sqq.*) was the same as Clopas or Alphæus, the father of James; and that Alphæus, the father of Matthew or Levi, was not a different person. But, in addition to the argument derivable from the absence of all distinctive appellations, there are other proofs, which have not been generally noticed, but which directly confirm the obvious inference that Cleopas and Clopas, or Alphæus, were one and the same person, and that Matthew and James were sons of the same father. If we turn first to the interesting account of the walk to Emmäus, on the day of the resurrection, we shall observe that Cleopas and his companion are described as "two of them" (δύο ἐξ αὐτῶν), *i.e.* of the Apostles and brethren; and they identify themselves with the immediate society of our Lord by speaking of Mary Magdalene, and Mary, the wife of Clopas, as "certain women of our company" (γυναῖκές τινες ἐξ ἡμῶν, v. 22). Moreover, on their return to Jerusalem, they rejoin "the Apostles, and those with them" (v. 33). In the absence, therefore, of all evidence to the contrary, is it not obvious, that the Cleopas mentioned in this narration was the Clopas, or Alphæus, whose wife Mary had

been one of the first to visit the sepulchre, and who had, as we shall see, three sons and a grandson among the Apostles of our Lord? And if we inquire, who was his companion, this impression derives an incidental corroboration. For St. Paul expressly mentions (1 Cor. xv. 7) that one of the special appearances of Jesus after his resurrection was that to "James;" and while all the other manifestations, which he mentions, may be accommodated to one or other of those mentioned in the Gospels, this is passed over in silence, unless we suppose that the unknown companion of Cleopas was his eldest son James, the Apostle. This will best appear from the following harmony:—

MATTHEW, xxviii. 1.	MARK, xvi. 1–3.	LUKE, xxiv.	JOHN, xx. 1.	PAUL, 1 Cor. xv.
Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of James go to the sepulchre.	Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome, go to the sepulchre, anxious about the removal of the stone.	Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Mary the mother of James, and other women go to the sepulchre.	Mary Magdalene goes to the sepulchre.	
2–4. An angel had rolled away the stone and scared the soldiers.	4. They see the stone rolled away.	2. They see the stone rolled away.		
		3. The women entering in do not find the body.	2. Mary Magdalene returns to Peter and John.	
5–7. They hear from an angel that the Lord is risen.	5–7. They see a young man sitting, who tells them that Jesus is risen.	4–7. They see two men, who tell them that Jesus is risen.		
8. With fear and joy they carry the tidings to the disciples.	8. Full of fear, they hold their peace.	8 11. They tell what they have heard, but are not believed.		
		12. Peter visits the tomb.	3–10. Peter and John visit the tomb.	

MATTHEW, xxviii. 9–10.	MARK, xvi. 9.	LUKE, xxiv.	JOHN, xx. 14–18.	PAUL, 1 Cor. xv.
Jesus meets them on the road.	Jesus shows himself to Mary Magdalene.		Jesus shows himself to Mary Magdalene.	
		34. Jesus appears to Peter.		5. Jesus is seen of Cephas.
	12. He appears to two of the disciples.	13 33. He appears to Cleopas and another.		7. He is seen of James.
		36. He appears to the disciples	19–23. He appears to ten of the Apostles.	5. He is seen of the twelve.
	14 *sqq.* He appears to the eleven Apostles and upbraids them with unbelief.		26–29. He appears to the eleven Apostles, and upbraids Thomas with unbelief.	7. He is seen of all the Apostles.
			xxi. 1 *sqq.* He appears to seven Apostles by the sea of Tiberias.	
16 *sqq.* He appears to the disciples in the mountain of Galilee.				6. He is seen of above five hundred brethren at once.

A careful and candid perusal of this harmony must lead us to the conclusion that, although the different narratives rest on a common basis of substantial truth and agreement, no one of the writers gives a complete and strictly accurate account of what occurred. The most striking differences have reference to the number of persons who took a part in the successive stages of the event recorded. St. John mentions only Mary Magdalene as having gone in the first instance to the sepulchre; but it is clear from the other Evangelists that the tomb was visited by several women. We learn that Jesus was followed from Galilee by Mary Magdalene, Joanna, the wife of Chuza, by Susanna, and many

other women (Luke, viii. 2); and we know that he was attended by his own relatives, his mother Mary, Mary the wife of Alphæus, and Salome, the wife of Zebedee. Of these it is expressly mentioned that Mary Magdalene, Mary Alphæi, Salome, and Joanna went to the tomb. And yet St. John mentions only the first of them. Conversely, he tells us that he accompanied Peter, when summoned by Mary Magdalene; whereas St. Luke mentions Peter only. Similarly, while Matthew tells us that Jesus appeared to the women who came from the tomb, and whom, according to St. John, Mary Magdalene had left, Mark and John tell us only that he appeared to the latter. It is therefore quite in accordance with the other slight discrepancies in the harmony, if, when Matthew and John say nothing about the appearance to the two disciples, Mark tells us only that they were two, Luke that they were "Cleopas and another," and Paul that Jesus appeared to James, he being the son of Cleopas. And it is not difficult to see why Paul mentions James only. At the time when he wrote, between A.D. 52-59, the aged Cleopas was probably dead, but James was one of the "pillars" of the Church at Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 9), and Paul was personally acquainted with him. It was therefore most natural that he should appeal to the living witness, as in v. 6 he is careful to state that the great part of the 500 brethren "remain unto this present." Luke, on the other hand, compiling from the original traditions or documents, would find the father mentioned either alone or more prominently, and would commemorate him accordingly. As St. Mark speaks of Cleopas and his companion as "two of them," and says that they "told it unto the residue," we are limited to the number of "them that had been with him" (Mark, xvi. 10). Now, with the exception of the eleven Apostles and this Cleopas or Alphæus, the father of three of the Apostles, and the husband of our Lord's aunt, there were no men in His small society. The companion of Cleopas was therefore an Apostle. And if so, it seems scarcely possible that he would have been accompanied by one of the other eight and not by one of his own sons. But Thomas was not his companion, for he did not see Jesus until his second appearance to the collected Apostles. And if Matthew had been the other wayfarer to Emmaus, he could hardly have omitted to mention so striking an incident in his Gospel. It remains, then, that Cleopas or Alphæus was attended by his eldest son, James.

With regard to the order of the events mentioned by St. Paul, Dœdes (*de Jesu in vitam reditu*, p. 168) has well observed: "Utrum temporis rationem habuerit non inquirimus, etiamsi εἶτα hoc certe verisimile reddit, at de ejus fide nihil detrahitur, si non eodem, quo Evangelistæ, ordine Jesu apparitiones tradiderit." That St. Paul's order does not correspond to that in the Gospels is obvious, for it is quite clear that the appearance to "the twelve," mentioned in connexion with the appearance to Peter (v. 5), is the appearance to the ten Apostles on the evening of the resurrection; and that the appearance "to all the Apostles," which is mentioned in connexion with the appearance to James (v. 7), is the appearance eight days afterwards when Thomas was with them. It is clear that the appearance to the 500 brethren was subsequent to this; and if it were necessary to presume minute accuracy in the sequence of events recorded by one who was not an eye-witness, it would be necessary to suppose that we have not the true reading, and that we ought to combine vv. 5, 7, thus ὤφθη Κηφᾷ [ἔπειτα ὤφθη Ἰακώβῳ], εἶτα τοῖς δώδεκα [εἶτα τοῖς ἀποστόλοις πᾶσιν], ἔπειτα ὤφθη ἐπάνω πεντακοσίοις κ. τ. λ., which would also be better suited to the rhetorical climax of the passage. But in any case we must suppose that the appearances to the two individual Apostles would be naturally mentioned before those to the collective body, and this will accord with our supposition and with the facts narrated in the Gospels. With regard to Thomas and Jude, the son of James, we have shown elsewhere (*Jashar*, p. 10) that Thomas "the twin," was a surname of Jude, the brother of James and Matthew, which he adopted to avoid confusion with his nephew, who was joined with him in the work of evangelizing the Syrians. We know very little of his career: but he and his nephew Jude are both mentioned as having been at Edessa; and the Syrian Christians, who from a very early period were settled in India, refer their conversion to St. Thomas, and this has led to the idea that he went to that distant land. If he was buried at Edessa, it is likely that his missionary labours did not extend beyond Mesopotamia. As, then, Matthew is consistently stated to have written his Gospel in Hebrew, *i.e.* in Aramaic, for the use of the nations who used this language, as James was settled to the last at Jerusalem, and as Thomas and Jude were the Apostles of Syria, it appears that the

family of Alphæus were the representatives and active functionaries of the Church in the home district. Now, if the son of Alphæus was the same as James, the brother of the Lord, his brothers must have been included among those brethren who did not believe in him (John, vii. 5). We are told that, even to the last, Thomas would not believe without tangible proof; and another brother of James, namely Joses, is never mentioned among the Apostles. It appears to us, that this tardy adoption of the cause of their great relative explains the place which the family of Alphæus occupy in the second half of the list of the Apostles. The first three pairs are made up of the sons of Jona, Zebedee, and Talmai; and, on the most important occasions, three disciples out of the first two pairs are the special attendants of our Lord. There is no reason to believe that all twelve of the Apostles were selected and commissioned together, and at one time. The words, which introduce the lists in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, do not necessarily imply this; and the first chapter of John distinctly tells us how and when the first six were selected, at a very early part of the career of Jesus. The statement, to which we have already referred, respecting the brethren of Jesus, assures us that they did not follow their teacher from the first, and a still later place would remain for Simon, whom some count among the sons of Alphæus (Mark, vi. 3), and his unhappy son, Judas. If this Simon really was a son of Alphæus, the whole of the last six Apostles would belong to the kindred of Jesus, and then the selection of the second Jude would find some explanation, which his personal qualifications will hardly supply. In addition to the distinct statement in the first chapter of St. John's Gospel, that Evangelist gives us incidentally another intimation that the first six of the Apostles had been associated with the Lord for a longer time than those of the number who belonged to his own kindred. In the fourteenth chapter, three of the Apostles are introduced as addressing him with words of doubt or question. To Thomas (vv. 5 *sqq.*) and to Jude (vv. 22-*sqq.*), the answer is made without any expression of surprise. But to Philip he says (v. 9): "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip?"

From all this we infer that the twelve Apostles may be divided into two classes of six each, the former consisting of

those who had been with their Master from the first, the latter, of those who had subsequently joined his company; the former consisting of men who were not closely related to him, the latter of men who were known as "his brethren." This view is simple and harmonious in itself; it accords with all that we read of our Lord's connexion with his immediate followers, and throws a clear light on the mutual relations of that little circle. But this view of the matter would be overthrown at once, if we adopted the paradox maintained by Wieseler (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1840, pp. 648 *sqq.*), that the wife of Alphæus was not the sister of our Lord's mother, but that his maternal aunt was Salome, the wife of Zebedee; consequently, that the sons of Zebedee, not the sons of Alphæus, were the first cousins, *i.e.* the brethren of Jesus. The main argument for this paradox is the assumption that, in John, xix. 25, we are to suppose that four women are denoted, namely, the mother of Jesus, her sister, the wife of Clopas, and Mary Magdalene; and then, as Salome, the wife of Zebedee, was one of our Lord's attendants (Matth. xxvii. 56), it is inferred that she was the sister in question. It seems that the Peschito places a copula between the words "the sister of his mother" and "Mary, the wife of Clopas," and it is argued that, even without this, we might divide the four women into two pairs. It is also urged that St. John would not have omitted to mention his own mother, as she was there; that there is a difficulty in supposing two sisters of the name of "Mary;" and that our Lord would not have committed his mother to the care of John if he had not been a relation. Now it appears to us that all these arguments are very weak. The passage, as it stands in all the best MSS., clearly intimates that only three women were present at the crucifixion; and, if St. John's own mother had been there, our Saviour's address to him respecting the Blessed Mary—"behold thy mother"—would have been very harsh. The difficulty about the two Marys in the same family is surely not greater than that caused by the fact that both the sons of Vespasian were called Titus Flavius. Besides, they may have been half-sisters; and there is a tradition that their husbands, Joseph and Clopas, were brothers (see Wieseler, p. 673). That our Lord should commend his parent to the disciple "whom He loved," rather than to one of those brethren who had been less eager to join Him, is not in itself surprising. Besides, the cir-

cumstances of the Apostle John may have enabled him to offer to the bereaved and widowed mother a more comfortable home than she would have found among her own kindred; for it has been inferred by Lücke and others, that Zebedee was in opulent circumstances (*cf.* Mark, i. 20, Luke, v. 10, John, xix. 27). Our earliest accounts of St. John represent him as a disciple of John the Baptist (John, i. 35 *sqq.*); we shall see that this fact appeared in the purpose of his Gospel, and there is no improbability in the tradition that Salome was a first cousin of the Baptist (Thilo, *ad. Cod. Apocr.* i. 363 *sqq.*). As the Baptist's mother Elisabeth is called a relation (*ἡ συγγενίς σου*, Luke, i. 36) of the mother of Jesus, there was, in this way, some connexion between the sons of Zebedee and our Lord; but, if they were more nearly related to John the Baptist, it is quite natural that they should attach themselves in the first instance to him, and pass from his teaching to that of Jesus.

It has been already intimated that the family of Alphæus, so far as their share in the first preaching of the Gospel can be ascertained, confined their activity to Palestine and Syria. At first, the other Apostles also settled themselves at Jerusalem. We hear especially of James, the elder, who was slain by Herod, of Peter and of John. The first beginning of preaching to the heathen was made by Peter; but when the converted Pharisee, Paul, had joined the Church, the missionary work became the chief employment of the Apostles. And while James the Less remained at Jerusalem, and while his brother and son were preaching in the conterminous districts, Paul carried the tidings of the Gospel over Asia Minor, Greece, Macedonia, Illyria, and Italy. Peter followed in the same track, addressing himself, however, more especially to Jewish converts (Gal. ii. 8). John, after Paul's death, undertook the general management of the churches in Asia Minor, making Ephesus his place of residence. Philip, according to the tradition, was settled in Phrygia; Bartholomew is stated to have preached in Lycaonia and Armenia; and Andrew, the other surviving Apostle of the first six, is commemorated as the missionary to Thrace, and the other northern regions.

We thus attain to a clear conception of the Apostolic agency in the first spread of Christianity. While the Apostles of our Lord's more immediate family, who, however, had originally

been slower in their acceptance of his mission, remained settled in the birthplace of the religion, preaching its doctrines to their countrymen and their eastern neighbours, who spoke cognate languages; the original Apostles, with the convert Paul to supply the place of the martyred James, the son of Zebedee, carried the glad tidings of salvation to the countries of the west, where the conquests of Alexander had established the Greek language as a general medium of communication. The other supernumerary Apostle, Matthias, who was selected to fill the place of the unhappy Judas Iscariot, is stated to have attached himself to the second class of the Apostles, and after preaching, like them, in the Semitic regions, and after publishing, like Matthew, a Semitic Gospel, to have been stoned by the Jews, before the destruction of the temple. If the two witnesses, whose corpses were "in the street of the great city" (Revel. xi., 3-8), refer to two definite individuals, they can hardly have been any others than James and Matthias.[1]

If we now turn to the literary activity of the first preachers of Christianity, we shall see that the view which we have taken of the composition of the Apostolic body, and of their combined and divided operations, tends at once to explain and account for the peculiar character and mutual connexion of the four Gospels. We read that, at first, they remained together at Jerusalem. In this way we may at once understand those features of literal agreement which lie at the basis of the first three Gospels, and also trace the source of that divine vitality which must have been due to the recent influence of a close and intimate familiarity with the Lord Jesus himself. It cannot be doubted that at Jerusalem, and in the first days of the Church, the Apostles were obliged to tell over and over again the particulars of that wonderful history, of which their minds and their hearts were so full. It may be assumed, with perfect safety, that these narratives were delivered orally, and often, perhaps most frequently, when the reciter was surrounded by those who, on other occasions, were called upon to be spokesmen. By this frequent repetition, not only the substance, but sometimes the very words of the nar-

[1] It is remarkable that Eusebius concludes his account of the death of James thus: μάρτυς οὗτος ἀληθὴς Ἰουδαίοις τε καὶ Ἕλλησι γεγένηται, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν καὶ εὐθὺς Οὐεσπασιανὸς πολιορκεῖ τὴν Ἰουδαίαν ἁλ χμαλωτίσας αὐτούς (*H. E.* ii. 23, p. 172, Heinichen).

rative would become identical in the successive versions of the same incidents: and this would be especially the case in regard to those instances in which they delivered to the new disciples the parables and other records of our Saviour's direct teaching. As the time advanced, and as the spoken narrative assumed a fixed and definite form, it would be committed to writing, either in whole or in part, and in this way different accounts would come into use in different parts of the regions in which believers were found, until some one of the original Apostles undertook to prepare an authentic and authoritative record of the common preaching of all the Apostles at Jerusalem.

The uniform and consistent testimony of the early Church assures us that this business of formal authorship first devolved upon St. Matthew, and that he wrote his Gospel in Aramaic for the use of converts in Palestine and Syria, to whom this language was vernacular. It is not difficult to understand why he of all the sons of Alphæus was best qualified for this literary undertaking. Having been a publican, probably a custom-house officer, under the Roman Government, he must have been well practised in the use of his pen; and having to deal with the provincials as well as with the Roman officers, he would be at least as familiar with the dialect of his own country as with the Greek language, which was his medium of communication with the *societas*, under which he acted. The Epistle of his brother James, if it is the original and not a translation like the present form of St. Matthew's Gospel, shows that literary accomplishments of a high order, and even a great mastery over the refinements of the Greek language, were among the characteristics of the brethren of our Lord.[1] When and by whom the Greek translation, in which Matthew's Gospel has come down to us, was first made and published, are questions to which no distinct answer can be given. It seems reasonable to suppose that the translation could not have superseded the original so entirely as it has done, until the destruction of Jerusalem, and the consequent dispersion of the Jews, had removed the class of readers for whom it was originally

[1] The hexameter line in James i. 17, whether we should read it:

πᾶσα δόσις καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθεν

or πᾶσα δόσις τ' ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον

seems to be a quotation from some heathen writer. At any rate, the use of the synonyms δόσις and δώρημα with a slightly different shade of meaning points to an author with whom Greek was vernacular.

designed, to lands in which the Aramaic dialect was not understood, and where Jews and Gentiles alike used the Greek *lingua franca*, which had been grafted by the conquests of Alexander in the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. That the translation, as we have it, could not have proceeded from the author is clear from instances in which the traces of letters in the original have been misapprehended (see *Jashar*, pp. 16, 17).[1] We agree, too, with Professor Norton (*Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. pp. 204 *sqq.*), that the translator and editor must have added some passages, which could scarcely have formed a part of the original Gospel. For example, there is every reason to believe that the first two chapters were derived from another source, and that the original Gospel began, like that of St. Mark, with the preaching of John the Baptist. Other probable interpolations or additions are the following: the account of the repentance and death of Judas (xxvii. 3-10); the statement that many saints rose from the dead at our Saviour's crucifixion (xxvii. 52, 53); the reference to the sign of Jonah (xii. 40); and the doxology of the Lord's Prayer (vi. 13). But neither these exceptions nor the effects of translation and editorship prevent us from recognising in the first Gospel an adequate representation of the preaching and teaching of our Lord's brethren, who remained behind in the country of their birth and told the story of his life and death to the Jewish and other Semitic converts.

The spread of the Gospel through Asia Minor into Greece and Italy connects itself primarily with the great names of Peter and Paul. And though neither of these Apostles, the earliest and the latest of those who held that high commission, has left us a Gospel bearing his name, there is no reason to doubt the tradition that the second and third Gospels were written by men who had been the associates of both Apostles, and who ultimately became their literary representatives. If, as we think an English writer has satisfactorily shown, Luke or Lucanus was the same person as the synonymous Silas or Silvanus (see *Journal of Sacred Literature*, October, 1850, pp. 328 *sqq.*), we shall be able to see that the second Gospel was written by one who was first the

[1] The phrase in Papias (*ap. Euseb.* iii. 39, p. 286, Heinichen): ἡρμήνευσε δ' αὐτὰ (scil. τὰ λόγια) ὡς ἠδύνατο (or ἦν δυνατὸς) ἕκαστος, "each interpreted the Aramaic Gospel of St. Matthew as best he could," shows that the translation was made by different hands, and did not proceed from authority

associate of St. Paul and afterwards the chosen companion and secretary of St. Peter, under whose direction his treatise was composed; and that the third Gospel was written by one who was first the special colleague of St. Peter, and afterwards adhered to St. Paul, from the time of his second progress, until, writing from his dungeon, in the immediate prospect of martyrdom, he said, "only Luke is with me" (2 Tim. iv. 11). This view of the matter will not only explain the remarkable correspondence between the second and third Gospels, but will also enable us to understand those features by which they are distinguished. For while the very brief Gospel of St. Mark, with its avoidance of all irrelevant matter, seems to agree exactly with our expectations respecting a document recording the concurrent preaching of the original body of Apostles, and published at Rome, where a less lively interest was felt in those particulars,' which were specially Judaistic; the more diffuse treatise of St. Luke—an acknowledged compilation from various materials—with its supplementary history of the Apostles, and its other indications of literary self-consciousness, as clearly points, on the other hand, to the writer of Antioch, who, living on the confines of prostrate Judaism and adolescent Gentile Christianity, turned his eyes now in one direction and now in another, and was able to depict at once the expectations which the Jews had entertained and the blessings which the Gentiles had realised.

We can see no reason to doubt that the writer of the second Gospel was John, surnamed Mark, whose uncle was Barnabas, the opulent and self-denying Cypriot, so well known as the companion of St. Paul, and whose mother Mary occupied at Jerusalem a house large enough to serve as the home of the Apostles and the rendezvous of all believers. It seems that Mark was originally converted by St. Peter. His relationship to Barnabas led to his accompanying that missionary and St. Paul on their first progress, as far as Perga; and though a misunderstanding prevented him and his uncle from joining Paul and Silas on the second missionary expedition, harmony was restored between him and the great Apostle of the Gentiles, whom he attended at Rome during his first imprisonment, and by whom he was sent with letters of recommendation to the Colossians. It may be inferred from 2 Tim. iv. 11, that he visited Rome again during St. Paul's final imprisonment, though he may not have arrived until after

the Apostle's death. From this period he seems to have been the confidential secretary, interpreter, and amanuensis of St. Peter, who calls him "Marcus, my son," in an Epistle which must have been written, as we shall see, at a much earlier period (1 Peter, v. 13); and there is every reason to believe that he wrote his Gospel at Rome with the assistance or by the authority of St. Peter. That Rome was the place of publication seems to be a natural inference from the Latin words and phrases which are introduced (vi. 27, xv. 39, xv. 15, xii. 43, xii. 15). He refers incidentally to the Roman law of divorce (x. 2, 3). And his description of Simon the Cyrenian as "the father of Rufus" (xv. 21), who resided at Rome with his mother (Rom. xvi. 13), seems a clear proof that the writer was settled in the same place. Indeed, it has been supposed that the original Gospel of St. Mark was not only published at Rome, but written in Latin, and this view, which is put forward by the Peschito, is maintained by Baronius (*Annal. ad ann. Chr.* 45, No. 41), and supported by the existence of a supposed Latin autograph (Dobrowsky, *Fragm. Prag. Evang. S. Marci, vulgo autographi*); but we should have heard of this from Jerome and Tertullian if it had been a notorious fact. It seems a great deal more likely that as even Hippolytus, who was formally settled at Portus near Rome, wrote in Greek, Mark would use the language of the East from which he came and to which he probably returned; and the introduction of Latin words would only indicate the class of readers to whom he addressed himself. That he wrote for Gentiles and for those to whom Judæa and its usages were not familiarly known, appears from many incidental explanations, which he thinks it necessary to introduce; thus he says "the *river* Jordan" (i. 5); the oriental *corban* is said to mean "a gift" (vii. 21); it is mentioned that the preparation is the day before the Sabbath (xv. 42); "defiled" hands are explained to mean "unwashed" (vii. 2), and the Jewish superstition on that subject is stated more at length than would have been necessary for Jewish readers. At the same time we see traces of a reference to or translations from some Aramaic original. Thus *Bartimæus* is translated "the son of Timæus" (x. 46); and we have shown elsewhere that the unintelligible *Dalmanutha* in viii. 10, has arisen from the Syriac *manutha*, "the parts," so that the complete phrase was "the parts of Magdala, *manutha Magdala*"

(*cf.* Matth. xv. 39). This would be perfectly consistent with the universal tradition that Mark was the ἑρμηνευτὴς or "interpreter" of St. Peter, and would also accord with the view already propounded that the oral teaching of the Apostles had assumed a written form. The statement quoted by Eusebius from Papias, who alleges the authority of John the Presbyter, assumes that Mark was the only writer, and that he relied on his memory for the narratives which he received from Peter. The following is the true rendering of the passage (*H. E.* iii. 39, p. 284, Heinichen): "Marcus, having become the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately all that he remembered, not however in order all that was said or done by Christ. For he neither heard the Lord nor followed him: but, as I have said, he was subsequently a follower of Peter, who used to give his teachings (*i.e.* to narrate portions of our Lord's history), as occasion required (πρὸς τὰς χρείας), but not as though he were composing an orderly arrangement of the Lord's discourses (λόγων or λογίων, 'histories'), so that Mark did not err when he wrote down some things just as he recollected them. In fact, his only object was to leave out nothing that he had heard, and to make no false statements." It is clear from this account that Mark depended upon his recollection of what he had heard. But still there may have been fragmentary memoranda in writing, whether set down by Peter or by Mark, and internal evidence shows that these memoranda were in Aramaic, and that Mark, in accordance with his title of ἑρμηνευτής, or "interpreter," rendered them into Greek. Irenæus (iii. 1, *apud Euseb. H. E.* v. 8, p. 53, Heinichen), states that Matthew wrote his Gospel while Peter and Paul were preaching at Rome, but that Mark committed to writing the things preached by Peter, after the deaths of that Apostle and Paul (μετὰ τὴν τούτων ἔξοδον). Clement of Alexandria (*ap. Euseb.* vi. 14), and Papias (*ap. Euseb.* ii. 15), refer the composition of Mark's Gospel to the life-time of Peter, and tell us that the Evangelist obtained the concurrence and approbation of the Apostle. These discrepancies are easily reconciled by the supposition that an Aramaic sketch of Peter's preaching was drawn up in his life-time, but that the Greek Gospel, in which alone Mark could appear as his ἑρμηνευτὴς or interpreter, was not published until after his death.

The Gospel of St. Mark, being the shortest of the four and most

immediately and implicitly derived from the direct teaching of an Apostle, whose sole object was to detail the facts of the Gospel history, and not, as St. John, to give the discourses and to develope the character of our Lord, ought to serve as the basis of a Gospel harmony, and should be perused first of all by those who wish to learn the mere outlines of the Apostolic tradition respecting the ministry of Jesus Christ. For this purpose, no doubt, it was used by the Western Church; and we may attribute to this cause the uniform accuracy of the text, to which there is only one important exception, namely, the last twelve verses, which seem to have been added by another hand. Professor Norton has suggested that the Neronic persecution, in which St. Peter lost his life (A.D. 64 or 65), may have prevented the Evangelist from completing his work (*Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. p. 221). At any rate, the imperfect state in which Thucydides and other writers have come down to us is quite sufficient to prevent us from wondering at any similar phenomenon in sacred literature.

The authorship of the third Gospel involves some questions of great interest in the literary history of the New Testament. Adopting the conclusion of the English writer, to whom we have already referred, that Luke and Silas were synonymous designations of one and the same person, we are able at once to understand all that is peculiar to the work for which we are indebted to the author of the Acts of the Apostles. We are first introduced to Silas or Silvanus in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts, v. 22, where he is mentioned as a leading man in the Church at Jerusalem, and is specially deputed, along with Judas Barsabas, to accompany Paul and Barnabas to Antioch, from whence he starts with Paul on his second missionary progress; and the use of the first person in subsequent chapters of the Acts indicates the occasions in which he took a part personally. Now Eusebius tells us (*H. E.* iii. 4) that Luke was a native of Antioch; and it is inferred from Col. iv. 14, that he was not of the circumcision. The writer of the Acts was clearly very familiar with all that went on at Antioch, where, as he is careful to tell us (Acts, xi. 26), the disciples of Jesus were first called "Christians"; and his selection to accompany Paul on his anti-judaizing mission would tally well with his own position as a converted Gentile. The fact, too, that he was a physician, shows that he belonged to the class of freedmen; in this case he would have borne his

patron's *nomen*; and the variation between the synonymous *Lucanus* and *Silvanus* may have been occasioned by some change in the cognomen of his patron. As the name *Lucas* nowhere occurs in the Acts, and as the name *Silas* is nowhere given to him in St. Paul's Epistles, it may be inferred that up to a certain period in his life he was known only as *Silvanus*, and this was the cognomen of the *Plautia gens*, though it was borne also by the *Pomponii* (Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 53), *Gavii* (ibid. xv. 60), and *Poppæi* (Id. *Hist.* 86). The name *Lucanus* was not borne by any distinguished Roman except the celebrated poet, and we know not how he got it, for the *cognomina* of his father and his two uncles were *Mella* (a cognomen of *Pomponii*), *Gallio*, and *Seneca*. The name is first given to the beloved physician in those Epistles which St. Paul wrote from Rome in his first imprisonment in A.D. 62. As St. Paul had friends in Cæsar's household (Phil. iv. 22)); as Lucan was at that time in high favour with Nero; and as Paul and Silas might have made acquaintance with his uncle Gallio at Corinth, it is not an unreasonable conjecture that *Silvanus* changed his name to the synonymous *Lucanus* in honour of the courtly poet, just as *Paul* himself took from *Sergius Paulus* the substitute for his former name *Saul*.

There is every reason to believe that Silas stayed at Jerusalem, while Paul, with Timothy, Erastus, and Titus, was making the first stage in his third apostolic progress (*vide* Acts, xviii. 22, and Tate, *Continuous History of St. Paul*, p. 198). But we find him sent by St. Peter with an epistle to the "elect pilgrims of the dispersion in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia" (1 Pet. i. 1), as one who was well known to the converts in those regions (1 Pet. v. 12); and this letter must have been written about the time of St. Paul's third progress. As, then, the first person reappears in Acts, xx. 6, we may fairly conclude that when St. Paul, with his seven companions, was about to return to Asia from Macedonia on that third progress, he met Silas at Philippi, and was accompanied by him to Troas. After the proofs which have been given, that the Babylon of the Apocalypse is Jerusalem (see Desprez, *Apocalypse Fulfilled*, pp. 369 *sqq.*), there can be no doubt that St. Peter also used the phrase ἡ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι συνεκλεκτή (sc. ἐκκλησία) in the same figurative reference. For if we adopt the Neronic date of the Apocalypse,—and this seems to be fully established,—St. John

and St. Peter, who had been so intimately associated, could hardly have used the same term, and at nearly the same time, with a different signification. There is really no evidence for the belief that St. Peter actually wrote from Babylon on the Euphrates; and the arguments brought forward by Wieseler (*Journal of Sacred Literature*, April, 1850, p. 306) seem to us of very little weight. There is no reliable authority for the supposition that St. Peter was ever at Babylon, and it would seem most strange that Silas should take this letter to Asia Minor from that distant city without passing through Palestine, and without any greeting to the Church there. On the contrary, as we know that Peter was a leading man at Jerusalem, nothing could be more natural than that Silas should bear to the Asiatic churches the greeting of one connected with the birthplace of the religion; and as Peter's own journey to Rome, the scene of his martyrdom, must have taken him through the same regions, and must have been in contemplation at that time, it is easy to understand why he should address—by the agency of one well known to them—an apostolic exhortation to the Asiatic churches, which he was about to visit in person.

This view of the matter seems to harmonise all that we know about Luke and Silas on the one hand, and all that we can gather from internal evidence respecting the author of the third Gospel and the Acts. We have here a man of Gentile extraction, and not a native of the land of the Jews, belonging to a profession which would necessarily imply some amount of literary cultivation, and personally connected with some Roman family. This is sufficient to explain all the peculiarities of style and diction which we recognise in St. Luke's works, and will account for the knowledge which he displays of matters far beyond the reach of untravelled Israelites. But we find also that the alleged author, if Silas and Luke are but different names of the same person, went up to Jerusalem in the earliest days of the Church, and there formed an intimate acquaintance with Peter, Mark, and other members of the parent-society of Christians; and that he afterwards joined St. Paul on more than one apostolic progress, and was his companion at Rome at the time of his martyrdom. This entirely accords with the internal evidence of the Acts. The heroes of that narrative are Peter for the first part, and afterwards exclusively Paul. The knowledge which the

writer exhibits of the transactions mentioned in the first half of the book, seems to show that his informant was chiefly Peter. All the rest he may have derived from Paul, or recorded from his own recollections. The preface to his Gospel says distinctly that he had derived his information from those "who had been from the beginning eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word" (*καθὼς παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου*, i. 2), and this, of course, refers to Peter and the other Apostles whom he had known at Jerusalem. The next verse, properly understood, declares that he had been, all along, the associate of those from whose teaching all Christians derived their knowledge of the life and actions of Jesus. The words ought to be rendered: "It seemed good to me also" (opposed to the "many," *πολλοί*, of v. 1), "inasmuch as I have been the companion of all (*scil.* the eye-witnesses mentioned in the preceding verse) from the first, to set them down accurately and in order for you." That *παρηκολουθηκότι πᾶσιν ἄνωθεν* must be understood of an association with persons, and not of a mere attention to things, and that the second adverb *ἀκριβῶς*, like the third, *καθεξῆς*, belongs to *γράψαι*,[1] may be inferred from the following passages; Euseb., *H. E.* iii. 39: *Μάρκος ἀκριβῶς ἔγραψεν οὐ μέντοι τάξει τὰ ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα· οὔτε γὰρ ἤκουσε τοῦ Κυρίου οὔτε παρηκολούθησεν αὐτῷ*, Id. vi. 14: *τοὺς παρόντας παρακαλέσαι τὸν Μάρκον, ὡς ἂν ἀκολουθήσαντα αὐτῷ πόῤῥωθεν, ἀναγράψαι τὰ εἰρημένα. Irenæus*, iii. 1: *Λουκᾶς ὁ ἀκόλουθος Παύλου*. Both the Syriac and Persian versions, though they take *ἀκριβῶς* with the participle, interpret *πᾶσιν* as masculine, and the adverb *ἄνωθεν*, like the *πόῤῥωθεν* applied to Mark's intimacy with Peter, can only be understood of long personal and habitual intercourse; so in Acts, xxvi. 5, 6, we have: *τὴν βίωσίν μου τὴν ἐκ νεότητος, τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένην ἐν τῷ ἔθνει μου ἐν Ἱεροσολυμοῖς, ἴσασι πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι προγινώσκοντές με ἄνωθεν*. If the writer was Silas, he could say with truth that he had associated *ἄνωθεν*

[1] If there is more difficulty in taking the two adverbs *ἀκριβῶς* and *καθεξῆς* with *γράψαι*, than in taking the two, *ἄνωθεν* and *ἀκριβῶς*, with *παρηκ.*, it may be obviated by reading *ἀκριβῶς καὶ καθεξῆς*, or *ἀκρ. καὶ ἑξῆς*; for both *καθεξῆς* and *ἑξῆς*, which appear in no other part of the New Testament, occur with equal frequency in St. Luke's writings.

with all the eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus; but he could not say that he had watched all the facts themselves; otherwise he would have been himself an eye-witness, and would not have needed the παράδοσις of others. Besides, he speaks of compiling from existing accounts, and this is not the process of an eye-witness. There are many traces in St. Luke's works, both of his writing from hearsay, and of his incorporating portions of written documents; and for both sources of information he was indebted to his long residence at Jerusalem.

The time and place of St. Luke's literary activity must be a matter of conjecture. Thus much is certain. Both the Gospel and the Acts are dedicated to the same person, Theophilus; and therefore, in all probability, were written at the same place or in the same district. And although the conclusion of the Gospel seems to indicate that the writer had no intention of continuing the subject, it may easily be conceived that he would, after a short interval, pursue his labours; and the commencement of the Acts refers to the πρῶτος λόγος, just as the second book of the *Anabasis* of Xenophon does to the first book (ὁ ἔμπροσθεν λόγος) of that continuous treatise; and as the writer says not πρότερος λόγος but πρῶτος, one may infer that he did not intend to confine himself to one other book or to stop at St. Paul's first imprisonment at Rome. If so, he had already before his eyes a longer portion of the early history of the Church, and as he was with St. Paul in his last imprisonment, there is no reason to suppose that he commenced the work of historian until he had completed his participation in the actions which he undertook to describe. The use of the word ἄνωθεν in the preface to the Gospel shows that it was not written until a considerable time after the commencement of the writer's intimacy with the eye-witnesses. And since he addresses Theophilus, as one who had been instructed in the Gospel by word of mouth (περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων, v. 4), he seems to point to a time when regular or formal instruction in the truths of Christianity had become pretty common. The attempts which have been made to identify this Theophilus with some individual known to us from other sources rest upon mere guess-work. It is clear from the epithet κράτιστος (*cf.* Acts, xxiii. 26, xxiv. 3, xxvi. 25), that he was a person who held office under the Romans; and whether the place of publication was Corinth, as some suppose, or Alex-

andria, as Bar Bahlul tells us, or Antioch, as seems to us most probable, it is a fair inference that both works were written at the same place, without any long interval between the composition of each, and inscribed to a heathen convert, who occupied a leading position in that particular locality. The arguments, by which Townson and others have proved that St. Luke was acquainted with St. Mark's Gospel, confirm our opinion as to the later date of the two works written by the former. For St. Mark did not write until after the death of Peter and Paul. And this will of course place St. Luke's labours at a still more advanced period, and, by narrowing the limits between the commencement of these works and his own death, furnish a better explanation of the incomplete state in which he has left his history of St. Paul. When St. Luke died cannot be ascertained, but the period before which he must have composed his two extant works is defined by the fact that he nowhere alludes to the destruction of Jerusalem and the downfal of the Jewish nation, as he must have done if these events had already happened. No attentive reader can doubt that the Acts, and of course the previous book, were written while Jerusalem was still standing, and while the Jews still retained their national existence in Palestine.[1] If, then, Mark's Gospel was written after the death of Paul and Peter in A.D. 65 and 66, and Luke's Gospel and the Acts were put forth between this period and the taking of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, we have sufficiently narrow limits for a case in which there is no direct testimony or information. Internal evidence supports the natural assumption that after the death of St. Paul, Luke retired to his native place, Antioch (Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 4), and there, on the confines of the Holy Land and of converted Asia, compiled a history of the events commemorated in the preaching of his Apostolic associates, or incidental to those missionary adventures, in which he had taken an active part. It is easy to conceive that having finished his second book with the first imprisonment of St. Paul, he had meditated a third book on that great Apostle's subsequent career, but was prevented by his own death or other circumstances from completing it. If we are right in the conclusion that his name was originally Silas, and that he did not assume the synonymous

[1] The use of the present tense, in speaking of the Sadducees, is a direct proof of this (see Luke, xx. 27, Acts, xxiii. 8).

designation Lucas until his first visit to Rome, we can understand also, why, if he wrote his history in his native Antioch, he preferred to style himself by the name by which he was known best in the place of his birth, and among those to whom he more immediately addressed his history.

Internal evidence shows that St. Luke was not only acquainted with the teaching of the original Apostles and with that of his associate St. Mark, but had access to written documents, which he has incorporated in his histories, but which were either not known to the other Evangelists or were disregarded by them. The important instance is the account given by St. Luke of the birth of John the Baptist and of our Saviour. With regard to this account it may be sufficient to quote some just observations by Professor Norton (*Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. p. 205): "I agree with many critics in supposing that it existed in a written form in Hebrew previously to the composition of Luke's Gospel, in which he inserted a translation of it, perhaps his own, perhaps one already made. The language differs from that of the rest of his Gospel, as being more conformed to the Hebrew idiom; and the cast of the narrative has something of a poetical, and even fabulous, character, very different from the severe simplicity with which he, in common with the other Evangelists, relates events in his own person. But his adopting this narrative proves that he regarded it as essentially true; and he would not have so regarded it, had not the main fact of the miraculous birth of Jesus been believed to be true by the Apostles and other early Christians with whom he associated. Now considering that two, and probably three, of the Apostles (James, the son of Alphæus, and his brother Jude, and probaby Simon the Canaanite), were relatives of Jesus, and that others of their number, as John, were familiar with his mother and family, there can be no doubt that the belief of the Apostles rested on information derived from them." To this intercourse with James and the other members of the sacred family settled at Jerusalem, we may attribute St. Luke's knowledge of the interesting incident respecting the childhood of Jesus, which he alone commemorates (ii. 41-52); and from the same source he must have derived the account of the walk to Emmäus, which he alone narrates in detail (xxiv. 13 *sqq*). We may trace a similar reference to the authority of the brethren of Jesus in the account which St.

Luke gives of the final journey to Jerusalem, where he is much fuller than the other Evangelists (ix. 15, xviii. 14), and there is something so like the teaching of St. James' Epistle in the Parables, which St. Luke narrates with the minutest accuracy, and which are omitted in the other Gospels,[1] that we cannot help thinking that St. James must have committed to writing a special memoir of Jesus, and that St. Luke has literally incorporated a considerable portion of it. If, as we have suggested above, Cleopas and his son James were the two who met Jesus in the walk to Emmäus, and if St. James was the author of the account incorporated in St. Luke's Gospel, what could be more natural than that he should omit the mention of his own name, as St. John does in i. 35, 40, xx. 2, 3? This view of the case throws an additional light on the preface to St. Luke's Gospel, which mentions more than one source of written information; and if the Evangelist had before him the Hebrew Gospel of St. Matthew, the Greek of St. Mark, and the memoirs of St. James, and added to these the recollections of St. Peter's teaching, and the comprehensive views of St. Paul in regard to the scope and bearing of Christianity, we need nothing more to explain his reference to the teaching of the original eye-witnesses and ministers, to his association with them, and to the existence of more than one arrangement of the history, or his care to preserve the record of Gentile privileges in the Parable of the Prodigal Son, and in other parts of his Gospel. With regard to St. Paul's connexion with the literary labours of St. Luke, it has been observed that the account of the Lord's Supper in 1 Cor. xi. 25, 26, is in close accordance with Luke, xxii. 19, 20, and that

[1] The following comparison between St. James' Epistle and the Parables recorded by St. Luke only, will show what we mean; and it will be recollected that the writers of Christ's history naturally regarded it from their own point of view. St. John indeed wrote with a specific object, which is echoed in his Epistles:—

The Good Samaritan	(Luke, x. 30)	James, i. 27.
The Lost Piece of Silver	(„ xv. 8)	„ v. 19, 20.
The Prodigal Son	(„ xv. 11)	„ iv. 8.
The Unjust Steward / Dives and Lazarus	(„ xvi. 1–19)	„ ii. 2 *sqq.*, v. 1, *sqq.*
The Two Debtors	(„ vii. 41)	„ iv. 6.
The Unjust Judge and the Widow	(„ xviii. 1)	„ ii. 13.
The Pharisee and the Publican	(„ xviii. 9)	„ iv. 10–12.
The Fig-tree in the Vineyard	(„ xiii. 6)	„ iii. 12.
The Rich Man and his Vain Hopes	(„ xii. 16)	„ iv. 13–16.

we have sometimes, as in Luke, x. 7, compared with 1 Tim. v. 18, and Matth. x. 10, indications that the Apostle and the Evangelist used the same books of reference.

There are very few passages in which critical exception can be taken to the existing text of St. Luke. In fact there are only two which can be regarded as probably not genuine (ix. 55, 56, xxii. 43, 44); see Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. pp. 221, 226. But it is to be remarked that, as St. Luke's works are partly compilations from the writings of other men, partly the results of hearsay information, and partly derived from his own personal knowledge, we must regard, in a somewhat different light, the passages which exhibit the strongest traces of this difference of origin. In fact we pass sometimes from a sort of poetical dream-land to the sober and certain testimony of an eye-witness. The angelophanies at the beginning of this Gospel, with the name of Gabriel introduced, and the hymns recorded there, together with similar traditionary marvels in the early chapters of the Acts, stand in bold contrast with the literal minuteness of St. Paul's second progress, with the vivid and graphic account of the tumults at Ephesus and Jerusalem, and with the almost journalistic details of the voyage and shipwreck.

Considering the importance attached to miraculous endowment in the early Church, and St. Paul's mention of the gift of tongues, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, we must make a few passing remarks on the great event of Pentecost, as recorded by St. Paul's tried and trusted associate. That he must have derived his information from St. Peter, who figures as the chief personage in the narrative, seems not only obvious in itself, but harmonises best with what we know of the early intercourse of Silas and that Apostle. But there is some difficulty or obscurity in the account which is given in the Acts, and to which no allusion is made in the Epistles. Bunsen, in his *Hippolytus*, explains the phenomena recorded as arising from a violent storm of wind, accompanied by lightning, and understands the gift of tongues as the result of a sudden impulse on the part of the assembled Christians to praise God, "not in the formularies of their sacred language, but in the profane sounds of their heathenish mother tongues, of which the Greek was foremost, as the Spirit gave them utterance." And a somewhat similar account has been given by Neander. The *glossolalia* has been made the subject of

frequent discussion in theological journals. Perhaps the most satisfactory view is the following, which is proposed by Reuss (*Revue de Théologie par Colani*, iii. 2, 1851). He thinks that the γλωσσαῖς λαλεῖν of the early Church was not a speaking with foreign tongues, but a higher kind of inspiration, which overbalanced the ordinary reason, and gave in various degrees an unintelligible exaltation to the language. In general, all true Christians were supposed to be inspired. But there were three degrees of inspiration, as far as speaking was concerned: (1) when what we should call ordinary knowledge (γνῶσις) led to the power of teaching (διδαχή); (2) when revelation (ἀποκάλυψις) led to prophecy (προφητεία); (3) when spiritual enthusiasm led to *glossolalia*. All these are mentioned together in 1 Cor. xiv. 6. That this *glossolalia* was not speaking a foreign language, is clear from 1 Cor. xiv. 11, where such a speaker is opposed to the βάρβαρος, or foreigner. It was rather a speaking with new sounds unheard of before (καιναὶ γλῶσσαι, Mark, xvi. 17), and in languages different from those which are commonly spoken (ἕτεραι γλῶσσαι, Acts, ii. 4, 1 Cor. xiv. 21). In point of fact, the Apostles are never said to have spoken in any language except those which they learned by human means. And with regard to the miracle of Pentecost, it is clear that they would not have been charged with drunkenness if they had merely spoken in foreign tongues, which some, at least, of their hearers professed to understand. Bunsen does not deny that the disciples at Pentecost began with unintelligible articulations, from which they passed to their native dialects. Circumstances mentioned in Acts ii. are quite incompatible with the ordinary view of the matter, and nothing there mentioned is really inconsistent with the view respecting *glossolalia*, which may be derived from St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians.

Another important incident in the Acts, which creates some difficulty, is the account of the conversion of St. Paul. As the wonderful incident of Pentecost was most probably communicated by St. Peter, the other Apostle must have stated to the historian the circumstances, which formed the turning-point in his religious career. Indeed, besides the account given in the historian's own words in chapter ix., we have two other narratives in chapters xxii. and xxvi., where the same event is represented as told by the Apostle himself. It is clear, not only that St. Paul must

have been the sole authority for the story of his vision, but that the event itself was subjective or at least fully witnessed by himself alone. That he sincerely believed that he had on this occasion seen the risen Jesus, and received from him then and there a commission of Apostleship, is obvious from his own words in Acts xxvi. 16, where he tells us that our Lord spoke to him thus: "I have appeared to thee (ὤφθην σοι) to the end that I may make thee a minister and a witness both of the things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee" (ὧν τε εἶδες ὧν τε ὀφθήσομαί σοι). And again, as he is made to tell the Jews (xxii. 17-21), he saw the Lord in a trance at Jerusalem, and received from him the Apostleship to the Gentiles. He speaks of these appearances as quite equivalent to the Christophanies recorded in the Gospels, in the passage referred to above (p. 271), where he uses the very same verb (ὤφθη) to describe them all. Yet it is clear that his vision was confined to himself. For in Acts ix. 7, we read that his companions "stood speechless, hearing a voice, and seeing no man." And that this voice was St. Paul's, and not that of Jesus, appears from Acts xxii. 9, where we read that those who were with St. Paul "saw indeed the light and were afraid, but they heard not the voice of him that spake to me." If they heard a voice, but not the voice of Jesus, it must have been the voice of the only other speaker, St. Paul. We often meet with cases in which men in dreams or mental confusion carry on their part of the dialogue with an imaginary visitor, and this is clearly presumed in the narrative before us. Besides, the words put into the mouth of Jesus are coloured with the peculiar phraseology of St. Paul, and in one case, the Jewish idea of fighting with God is clothed in the language of those classical poets, with whom the Apostle became acquainted in the schools of Tarsus. Indeed, it is very curious to see how in this instance the pupil of Gamaliel and the scholar of the Greek rhetoricians appear blended in the same person. The Apostle had heard Stephen say at the end of his speech, just before the murderous attack was made upon him (Acts, vii. 51): "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist (ἀντιπίπτετε) the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye." Now here was clearly enough the idea of a θεομαχία, as the Jews understood it. Gamaliel had expressly warned the Sanhedrim (Acts, v. 39):

"If it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God" (*μήποτε καὶ θεομάχοι εὑρεθῆτε*). And similarly the Pharisees say (Acts, xxiii. 9), at least in some of the manuscripts, "let us not fight against God" (*μὴ θεομαχῶμεν*). Now it is remarkable that the only two authors of the strictly classical age, who use the verb *θεομαχῶ*, are Euripides and Menandor, the latter of whom copied from the former, and from one or other of whom St. Paul derived his well-known iambic line in 1 Cor. xv. 33. From one or other of these writers, then, he may have borrowed the word, and, in what he reported to St. Luke, he may have used it in describing the speech of Gamaliel or the words of the Pharisees. The passage quoted from Menander is as follows (*apud Stob.* p. 570):—

μὴ θεομαχοῦ μηδὲ προσάγου τῷ πράγματι
χειμῶνας ἑτέρους· τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φέρε.

Now there is nothing in this passage to explain the phraseology of the Acts, and the change of voice in the verb is not to be neglected. If, however, we turn to the *Bacchæ* of Euripides, the only play in which that tragedian uses the word *θεομαχῶ*, and in which he uses it twice, an entirely new light will flash on the subject. It is the design of that drama to depict the disastrous consequences of attempting to resist the introduction of Dionysian rites and the dreadful fate of the persecutor Pentheus. His grandfather Cadmus, and the high priest Tiresias, exhibit the cautious wisdom of Gamaliel. In the prologue, the god Bacchus describes Pentheus as the person (45):—

ὃς θεομαχεῖ τὰ κατ' ἐμὲ, καὶ σπονδῶν ἄπο
ὠθεῖ μ' ἐν εὐχαῖς τ' οὐδαμοῦ μνείαν ἔχει.
ὧν εἵνεκ' αὐτῷ θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξομαι,
πᾶσίν τε Θηβαίοισιν.

But Tiresias says of himself and Cadmus (322):—

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ Κάδμος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾷς,
κισσῷ τ' ἐρεψόμεσθα, καὶ χορεύσομεν,
πολιὰ ξυνωρίς. ἀλλ' ὅ μως χορευτέον,
κοὐ θεομαχήσω, σῶν λόγων πεισθεὶς ὕπο.

If, then, St. Paul was familiar, as no doubt he was, with this play of the rhetorical dramatist, he could compare his own case, as the young persecutor, with that of Pentheus, and think of the warnings of the martyr, whose death he witnessed, and of the wise doctor, at whose feet he had sat as a learner. And when the moment of conversion came, what could be more natural than

that his thoughts should suggest the words of warning which the god in the play addresses to the infatuated king, just before his stiff-necked obstinacy leads him to his ruin? "I would rather," says Bacchus, "sacrifice to him than in my frenzy *kick against the goads*, a mortal opposing myself to God" (794):—

θύοιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ θυμούμενος
πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζοιμι, θνητὸς ὢν θεῷ.

Although both the ox-goad (מַלְמָד) and its point (דָּרְבָן) are mentioned in the Old Testament, and though the latter is used metaphorically in Eccles. xii. 11, nearly in the same way as it was said of Pericles by Eupolis, that he left the points of his words in the hearts of his hearers (Meinek. *Com. Fr.* ii. pp. 458-460), there is no Jewish use of this proverbial expression; it is entirely classical, and is of frequent occurrence in the Greek and Latin poets. It is always applied as a warning to those who foolishly resist some higher power. Thus Pindar says (*Pyth.* ii. 93 *sqq.*): "It is profitable, when one has got the yoke on one's neck, to bear it without a struggle; but surely to kick against the goads is a slippery course," *i.e.* likely to throw one down. Similarly, Æschylus makes the tyrannical usurper Ægisthus say to the recalcitrant chorus (*Agam.* 1602): "Do not kick against the goads, lest you stumble and suffer"; and Oceanus gives Prometheus, who is vainly contending against the superior power of Zeus, the friendly counsel (*Prom.* 331): "If you take me for your instructor, you will not stretch out your leg against the goads." Chrysostom extends the application of the phrase to any sufferings which we bring upon ourselves (*in Matth.* xlii. p. 454, B): "The plotter first destroys himself; for he that treads on fire first burns himself; and he that smites iron, does but spite himself; and he that kicks against the goads draws blood from himself. He who knows how to suffer wrong and to bear it like a man, is somewhat like the iron, the goads, and the fire; but he who has used himself to do wrong is weaker than any clay." But of all the passages, in which this reference to "kicking against the goads" occurs, there is no one in which it is more applicable directly to the case of St. Paul than that in which it is applied to the similar theomachy of Pentheus; and a persecutor of Christianity converted, as St. Paul was, to a propagator of the religion, could not have made such a reference unconsciously, if he had been acquainted with the *Bacchæ* of

Euripides; and this may be fairly presumed to have been the case with Paul of Tarsus. It is remarkable that in the only passage of the three, in which the mention of "kicking against the goads" is inserted in all the best MSS., it is stated that Jesus spoke to the Apostle *ἑβραΐδι διαλέκτῳ*; but there seems to be good reason for Kuinoel's supposition: "Hæc verba serius addita esse videntur, cum quæstio orta esset, quanam dialecto Jesus locutus esset." And whatever we may think of the references to the language of the *Bacchæ*, there cannot be the least doubt that in Acts, xxvi. 18, we have, in the words attributed to Jesus Christ, that peculiar adaptation of the language of the Gnostics, which marks St. Paul's phraseology: for example, there is precisely the same train of ideas in the *ἐπιστρέψαι ἀπὸ σκότους εἰς φῶς καὶ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ Σατανᾶ ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν*; and in Col. i. 13: *ὃς ἐῤῥύσατο ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ σκότους, καὶ μετέστησεν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ*, where we have one of the most distinct allusions to those ideas, which afterwards blossomed into Manichæism.[1]

These examples will serve to prove that the assumption of literal exactness is not sustained by a searching interpretation of all the narratives in the two treatises of St. Luke.

The most cursory perusal of the four Gospels is sufficient to show that the last is different in plan and character from the other three. Not only does it abstain, with few exceptions, from traversing the same ground in the statement of facts, but it also bears on the face of it a strong colouring, derived from the character of the writer, and the objects, more or less controversial, with which he composed his work. With regard to the difference between St. John's treatise, and the three synoptical gospels, considered as records of the facts of Christ's life and teaching, it is quite clear that the beloved disciple did not intend to furnish his readers with a complete and exhaustive history. He tells us, more than once (xx. 30, 31, xxi. 25), that he has omitted many particulars, and that his object was to recount as much as might suffice to establish the divinity of Jesus. In point of fact, with the exception of the history of the death and resurrection of Jesus, which, as we shall see, forms a distinct part of the work, John does not repeat the other evangelists in more than two sections, namely, the miracle of the loaves and fishes and the walk-

[1] Above, pp. 66, 144.

ing on the sea (vi. 1-21), and the anointing of the feet of Jesus (xii. 1-8). As Ewald has pointed out (*Gesch. Christus*, p. 359, note), there is an obvious principle of selection in the record of miraculous occurrences given by John in the first half of his Gospel. He details seven instances only; and, to say nothing of the sacred and mystical number, to which the detail is limited, they all differ specifically. We have (1) A transformation of substances; ii. 1-10. (2) Cure of a fever; iv. 47-54. (3) Healing of the lame; v. 1-9. (4) Feeding of multitudes; vi. 4-13. (5) Walking on a stormy sea; vi. 16-21. (6) Giving sight to the blind; ix. 1-7. (7) Raising the dead; xi. 1-46. Nor does St. John's Gospel differ more from the other three in this limited selection of particular facts, than in the general impression which the first part of his biography leaves upon our minds. This feature has been well exhibited in an able review of Ewald's *Christus* (*National Review*, No. i., pp. 100 *foll.*), where it is well remarked that, while the synoptical Gospels represent Jesus as teaching only in Galilee, up to the time when he went up to Jerusalem to encounter the fatal opposition of the Sanhedrim, according to John, on the contrary, "Christ's intercourse with Jerusalem begins soon after the opening of his ministry, and is never again interrupted; successive feasts constantly take him up to it; and we should naturally infer, from the order of the narrative, that his time was almost equally divided between Galilee and Jerusalem." With regard to the colouring which St. John's Gospel has received from the peculiar characteristics of the writer, the same reviewer has observed (p. 99): "It was evidently conceived and executed from a point of view, in which the objective precision and certainty of history were less thought of than the subjective development of trains of thought, which, however truly expressing the essential spirit of Christ's mission and character, can hardly have failed to exert some disturbing influence on the apprehension and arrangement of outward events. Ewald allows that St. John has used previous Evangelists; but in such a way that in the free utterance of his own deep feelings respecting Christ, he supposes him to set out continually from some radical idea or characteristic expression of the earlier narratives, and to come back to it again; and to be thus linked, as it were, by memory at ever-recurring points, to the fundamental truth and reality of the primitive

history: and he compares this expansion of certain germs of thought, transmitted from the discourses of Christ, which distinguishes the fourth Gospel, with the variations of a performer of genius on a given musical theme."

In order to appreciate the objects and plan of the fourth Gospel, and the point of view from which the author surveyed his subject, it is necessary that we should inquire into the probable date of its composition, and the circumstances by which the writer was at that time surrounded. This will involve a brief examination of St. John's apostolical and literary career.

There can be litle doubt that St. John had a house at Jerusalem, and that he lived there with the mother of our Lord from the time of the ascension till her death, or till they both left the city. This is the statement of Nicephorus (*H. E.* ii. 42), and it is in strict accordance with all that we read in the Gospel and Acts of the Apostles. The traditions respecting the place and date of Mary's death are very uncertain. Whether, according to one statement, she died in the fifth year of Claudius, or whether, according to another statement, she lived till A.D. 63, or whether her death is to be placed at a still later period, are open questions. The safest inferences would be deducible from the Apocalypse, if it were generally agreed: (1) that St. John was the author of this book; (2) that he wrote it in the reign of Nero. To the first of these propositions we are disposed to assent. The date of the composition involves the question whether it is a prophecy before or after the event to which it refers. That this event was the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, appears to us perfectly certain. The argument for this has been put in a very simple and popular form by Mr. Desprez (*Apocalypse Fulfilled*, Lond. 1854), and we think that his general reasonings are unanswerable. But the book itself states (Rev. i. 9), that it was written, or that the visions were seen, in the island of Patmos, to which, as the title of the Syriac version tells, St. John "was banished by Nero Cæsar." He had, therefore, left Jerusalem, and made acquaintance with the seven churches of Asia Minor, and had, by his exertions, attracted persecution before the end of Nero's reign. Accordingly, we are led to the probable conclusion that he resided at Jerusalem until the outbreak of the Jewish war in A.D. 65, when, in accordance with our Lord's prophetic warnings, the whole Church at Jerusalem, with the

exception of the two witnesses,—namely, as we have suggested above (p. 275), James and Matthias,—migrated to Pella beyond the Jordan (Euseb., *H. E.* iii. 5). That the Virgin Mother shared in this flight, seems to be clearly stated in the Apocalypse (xii. 1-17), where the mother of the man child escapes from the wrath of Jewish persecutors by taking refuge in the wilderness; and where the dragon—or the Jewish enemies of Christianity—makes war with the remnant of her seed, namely, with those Christians who remained within the reach of his power. It is implied in v. 6 that Mary lived at Pella during the whole continuance of the war. If, then, St. John left her when he went on his mission to Asia Minor, after the death of Paul, and if she rejoined him at Ephesus after his liberation from Patmos, and the destruction of Jerusalem, we may very well adopt the tradition, contained in the letter of the general council of Ephesus in the fifth century (*Concil.* ed. Labbé, iii. p. 573), that Mary lived in that city with St. John, and there died and was buried. Whether St. John was again banished to Patmos by Domitian, and whether he was exposed to other persecutions, which earned for him the title of martyr (Polycrates, *apud Euseb. H. E.* v. 24[1]), it is clear, from the consistent tradition, that Ephesus was his principal, if not only residence, to the end of his long life, and that he composed his Gospel there about sixty years after the death of our Lord. Independently of this tradition, it might be concluded, from internal evidence, that Ephesus was the *place*, and the end of St. John's long life the *date*, of the publication of the fourth Gospel. And here the First Epistle of St. John contributes to the establishment of this fact in the literary history of the Church. For there can be little doubt that this Epistle was written as an accompaniment or introduction to the Gospel (1 John, i. 1-4); and while the latter evidently looks back to the events described as though they belonged to time long passed, the Epistle throughout assumes the tone of an aged man addressing a generation younger than those to whom he could appeal as witnesses of the life of Jesus. The term *παίδια* or *τέκνια*, "little children," is of frequent recurrence; and in one passage (1 John, ii. 13) he seems to distinguish three generations, beginning with his own contemporaries. Difficulties have been raised

[1] Origen, *ad Matth.* tom. xvi. (iii. pp. 719 *sqq.*), calls St. John's banishment to Patmos his *μαρτύριον*.

respecting the meaning of the phrase ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστί, "it is the last or final time" (1 John, ii. 18), which, according to some, implies that the destruction of Jerusalem had already taken place, according to others, that it was imminent. Those who entertain the only true view respecting the Apocalypse, namely, that it refers to the approaching close of the Jewish dispensation, will see that St. John's language in speaking of that event while still future, was essentially different from this; for whereas he says, in the passage before us, that "the last hour *is*," namely, that it has arrived, that the period so designated is present, or on its course, his phrases in the Apocalypse are, "the time is near" (i. 3); "behold, he is coming, and every eye *shall see* him" (i. 7); "that which ye have, hold fast, *until I shall have come*" (ii. 25); "he that testifieth these things saith surely *I come quickly*" (xxii. 20); the events predicted are described (i. 1, iv. 1) as "things which must shortly come to pass;" and it is distinctly said (xxii. 10): "seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand." When St. John says, at the end of the First Epistle, "we know that the son of God has come," it may seem doubtful whether he refers to the coming of Christ, as manifested in the flesh, or to his coming to judge the Jews in the downfal of Jerusalem. Still less could we draw any certain conclusion from the conjecture that the title, given to the First Epistle in many Latin MSS., namely *ad Parthos*, is a corruption for *ad sparsos*, *i.e.* πρὸς τοὺς διεσπαρμένους; for the Epistle of Peter, which was certainly written before the destruction of Jerusalem, is addressed to the παρεπιδήμοι διασπορᾶς. These, however, are not necessary additions to the evidence, which assures us that the Gospel and Epistles of John belong to the closing period of his life, and that the place of their composition was Ephesus, or some other city of Asia Minor.

Adopting this, which is the received opinion, we shall have no difficulty in understanding both the special object, which the writer of the fourth Gospel proposed to himself, and the peculiar circumstances under which he undertook his work. That object was, as we have already shown from ch. xx. 31, to establish a true faith in Jesus as the Son of God. The First Epistle indicates plainly enough that, at the time when he wrote, false doctrines on this subject prevailed—there were many Antichrists or deniers

of Christ's real nature (1 John, ii. 18, iv. 3); and in his Second Epistle—a private letter addressed to a lady named Cyria (Lücke, p. 351)—he says (v. 7) that "many deceivers (πλάνοι) are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh; this," he adds, "is the deceiver and the Antichrist." The concluding words of the First Epistle show that he was writing to Christians surrounded by heathen idolatry; but it is clear from the whole tenor and subject-matter of his Gospel and Epistles, that St. John wished to combat some specific form of error respecting the divinity of our Lord. It is a matter of less consequence what this form was; the Cerinthians, Docetæ, and Ebionites seem to be all more or less pointed at; and there is also reason to believe that the disciples of John the Baptist maintained at Ephesus the school from which St. Paul made some converts on his second progress (Acts, xix. 1 *sqq.*). This school consisted, no doubt, of Jews, who opposed the doctrine of baptism by the Holy Ghost. St. John himself had originally been a disciple of the Baptist, and we cannot read the constantly recurring lessons on the Christian sacraments, in the first part of his Gospels, or the long discourse on the Comforter and his office, which we find in the second half of the book, without feeling that it must have been one of his objects to correct erroneous impressions respecting the doctrine of the Baptist, similar to those which St. Paul had found in Asia Minor.

Putting all these things together, we conclude with perfect confidence that St. John, who, during his long residence at Jerusalem, must have become acquainted with the Gospel histories published by the brethren of our Lord, did not wish to repeat or supersede them in the work which he undertook so many years afterwards; but that his object was, while he tacitly referred to them for particulars which he has omitted, to dwell at length on those features in our Lord's teaching which had been made the subject of special misrepresentation. Accordingly, he has written a treatise, which may be divided into two nearly equal portions, and which may be regarded as an authoritative commentary on the life and doctrine of our Lord. In the first half, which extends from his brief preface (i. 1-14), respecting the incarnate Logos, down to the end of the eleventh chapter (xi. 54), when he arrives at the time of the last Passover, an account is given of the teaching of Jesus, with special reference

to the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The second half contains the history of our Lord's death and resurrection, with special reference to the coming of the Holy Ghost the Comforter. This work is distinguished from the other three Gospels, not only by the features which have been mentioned, but also by the form in which our Lord's direct teaching has been recorded. For while in the other Gospels Jesus is introduced as speaking either in parables or in brief and sententious utterances of striking thoughts, not unlike those attributed to the Jewish doctors, of which we have a copious collection (see Duke's *Rabbinische Blumenlese*), St. John gives only a few specimens of this characteristic style, and generally reports the words of Jesus in lengthened discourses, in which we recognise the peculiar language of the writer of St. John's First Epistle. It is impossible, under these circumstances, to resist the impression that the fourth Gospel is strongly coloured by the subjectivity or individual peculiarities of its writer. We must not, however, suppose on this account, that John has not faithfully reported the effect and substance, and often the very words, of the communications made by our Lord to his immediate followers. Although a short sententious saying or a parable may more exactly represent the form and manner of our Lord's public teaching, as addressed to the multitudes in Galilee, St. John may have given us an equally true delineation of the expositions which He delivered to the Apostles, or privately communicated to this Apostle in particular. The conversation with Nicodemus must have been learned by the writer either from Jesus or from Nicodemus, for it appears that no other persons were present at this midnight interview. And the more diffuse discourses which he reports, with their frequent repetitions of the same thought in other words, seem to be the results of an honest attempt to recollect the words used by Jesus a long time after they were uttered. St. John was certain of the meaning conveyed but did not always recal the identical phrases. He would therefore expand the idea, as it was in his own mind, and enforce it sometimes in his own language, sometimes in the very words of our Saviour. Baur has gone so far as to say: "We must not conceal it from ourselves that our conception of Christianity becomes essentially different according as we assume that the four Gospels harmonise throughout, or consider the differences be-

tween St. John's and the three synoptical Gospels as constituting a contradiction which cannot be solved historically" (*das Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*; Tübingen, 1853, p. 23). This contradiction would create serious difficulties if we thought it necessary to maintain the literary infallibility and literal accuracy of the four writers. But if we deal with them as human writers on a divine theme, the mere fact that St. John wrote so long after the others, and with a special object, is sufficient to explain the differences in question. After all, the doctrines taught in St. John's Gospel do not differ from those which are to be found in other parts of the New Testament. Tholuck has shown (Kitto's *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*, ii., p. 132), that the peculiarites of St. John's Gospel consist especially in the four following doctrines:—

I. That of the mystical relation of the Son to the Father.
II. That of the mystical relation of the Redeemer to believers.
III. The announcement of the Holy Ghost as the Comforter.
IV. The peculiar importance ascribed to Love.

And he maintains that all these doctrines may be derived from other writers in the New Testament. Thus Matthew (xi. 27), speaks of the relation of the Son to the Father so entirely in the style of John that persons not sufficiently versed in Holy Writ are apt to search for this passage in the Gospel of John. The mystical union of the Son with believers is expressed in Matth. xxviii. 20. The promise of the effusion of the Holy Ghost in order to perfect the disciples is found in Luke xxiv. 49. The doctrine of Paul with respect to love in 1 Cor. xiii. entirely resembles what, according to John, Christ taught on the same subject. Paul here deserves our particular attention. In the writings of Paul are found Christian truths, which have their points of coalescence only in John, viz., that Christ is εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, the image of the invisible God, by whom all things were created (Col. i. 15, 16).[1] Paul considers the Spirit of God in the Church the Spiritual Christ, as Jesus himself does (John, xiv. 16), frequently using the words εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ. In regard to the doctrines taught, the difference between St. John's and the other Gospels is this—that while the synoptical histories narrate the *facts*, St. John dwells at length on the *ideas* involved in the facts; while they detail what Christ did, it is

[1] See above, p. 62, foll.

John's design rather to develope what Jesus thought and intended. Clement of Alexandria implies this view of the matter when he says (*apud Eusebium, H. E.* vi. 14): that "John, last of all, perceiving that the bodily or substantial facts (*τὰ σωματικά*) had been declared in the Gospels, and being urged by persons of influence and inspired by the Spirit (*πνεύματι θεοφορηθέντα*), composed a spiritual Gospel (*πνευματικὸν εὐαγγέλιον*)." St. John's Gospel, then, does not differ from its predecessors in the doctrines attributed to Christ, but in the distinctness and obvious purpose with which those doctrines are stated and enforced. And it has been a favourite text-book with religious men in all ages, because it places before us so clearly and intelligibly the practical bearing of the Christian dispensation. It is here that we learn the opposition between the flesh and the spirit, between holiness as life and light, and sin as death and darkness; and it is here that we see that sacramental character of our religion which is implied in the expressions "living water" and "bread of life." The same doctrines may be derived from other parts of the New Testament, but here we have them brought together and taught as distinct lessons. Above all, it is here that the law of love is represented as Christ's special commandment, not merely as the fulfilling of the law and the prophets, but as a new commandment, because it assumes under Christianity a new form and value. Hence it has been reasonably inferred that St. John's peculiar phraseology produced an immediate effect on the literature of the early Church; and Valentinus, the heretic, who flourished in the middle of the second century, not more than forty or fifty years after the death of St. John, not only used, in his own sense, the terms *λόγος*, *μονογενής*, *ζωή*, *χάρις*, *ἀλήθεια*, and *παράκλητος*, which are so characteristic of the fourth Gospel, but even built up a main part of his doctrine on the position *ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν*, "God is love" (Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*, p. 185); and when he names the devil *ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, "the prince of this world" (*Philosophumena*, p. 192), he has obviously derived this from John, xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11 (see K. F. T. Schneider, *die Aechtheit des Johanneischen Evangeliums*, p. 36). It seems clear, too, that even Basilides, who flourished in the reign of Hadrian, and was therefore a contemporary of St. John, made direct citations from the fourth Gospel (*Philosophumena*, p. 232, *cit.* John,

i. 9; p. 242, *cit.* John, ii. 4), even if he did review St. John's treatise in a controversial spirit.

When we speak of the peculiar character impressed on St. John's Gospel, we do not refer to that trait which gained for him and his brother James a name imposed by the Saviour himself. It is clear that Jesus called the sons of Zebedee, each of whom was patronymically, and in the Aramaic language, *Bar Zabdi*, by the Hebrew name *Βοανεργές*, *i.e.* בְּנֵי רֶגֶשׁ, with reference to the incident mentioned in Luke, ix. 54, where they are represented as urging Jesus to call down fire from heaven on the Samaritans, who would not receive him. The Gospels, and their Syriac version, render this "sons of thunder;" but the use of the Hebrew בן, instead of the Syriac בר, seems to show that the words must be used in the Hebrew sense, namely, "sons of rage or anger" (Ps. ii. 1, lxiv. 3), and, in accordance with this, he tells them that they knew not the spirit which actuated them (Luke, ix. 55). It was, therefore, a title of reproach, rather than of honour, and John, at least, had learned to view his Master's teaching with very different eyes when he wrote his Gospel, and the accompanying Epistle.

The text of St. John's Gospel does not exhibit many or striking evidences of interpolation. In ch. v. 3, 4, the words describing the descent of the angel are omitted in several MSS. and versions, and are obviously an insertion, foisted in from the marginal note of some early transcriber, who wished to explain the troubling of the water. The interesting narrative of the woman taken in adultery obviously does not belong to the context of c. viii.; for it appears, from v. 11, that Jesus was left alone, and yet we find, in v. 12, that he was still addressing the people in the temple, who came to him in the morning to be instructed (v. 2). We find, too, that this passage is omitted in a great many MSS., and is marked as doubtful or spurious in many others. Although we are glad to retain it on its own account, we cannot consider it as belonging to the genuine text of St. John's Gospel as it stands. It has been suggested by Professor Norton (*Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. p. 232) that the attestation at the end of the treatise cannot have been written by St. John himself. With these exceptions, the text of the fourth Gospel seems to be in the same state as when it was used by Basilides and Valentinus.

From this general survey, we can see that the peculiar character of the Gospels, and their just title to our respect, do not at all presume or require any theory of inspired guidance or literary infallibility. They come down to us as sufficient and satisfactory records of the teaching and preaching of those who had enjoyed personal intercourse with our Lord, or had lived familiarly with his chosen associates, or had, at any rate, access to the lost writings of the early Church. Any difficulties occasioned by their want of perfect congruity in certain details are troublesome to those only who fancy that miraculous history cannot be true unless it is itself miraculously infallible. And though we may be firmly established in the conclusion, that our Greek Gospel of St. Matthew is only the translation of a lost original, though St. Mark's may be an unfinished fragment, though St. Luke's may be only a compilation, and though St. John may have looked back on the long-past events which he describes through a medium of devout speculation and controversial earnestness, we are still convinced that we have in the four Gospels a fresh and true picture of the words and deeds of that Divine Person, whose precepts are the guide of our lives, and whose promises are the sure foundation of our hopes.

APPENDIX V.

(CHAP. III. P. 179).

ON THE DYNAMICAL THEORY OF INSPIRATION.

While M. Gaussen is so anxious to repudiate the supposition that he has attempted to establish a theory of inspiration, most thoughtful persons have been more and more inclined to agree with the late Archdeacon Hare, that "an intelligent theory of inspiration is a most pressing want," and a very elaborate attempt has been recently made to supply this desideratum in theological literature. We have now before us a volume of 540 closely printed pages with the title: "The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, its nature and proof: eight discourses preached before the University of Dublin; by William Lee, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College" (London, 1854). This work is recommended by the outward appearance, at all events, of a calm and dispassionate contemplation of the subject, and by an adequate recognition of what has been written by one class at least of German theologians. There is also a certain formal consistency in the development of the theory adopted by the author, and if his arguments are neither lucid nor convincing, they are imposing from the confidence with which they are advanced and the methodical ponderousness with which they are sustained. On opening the book, we find that the "mechanical" theory of inspiration is abandoned as erroneous and untenable, and we flatter ourselves with the hope that the author is about to give us some substitute for it, which will reconcile the claims of Protestant theology with the demands of scholarship and science. But we are soon disappointed. The preface contains distinct intimations of the fact that the author maintains, after all, the literary infallibility of all the Canonical Scriptures; and he says expressly in his first

lecture (p. 19) that, "although he can by no means accept the system, which ignores the human element of the Bible and fixes its exclusive attention on the divine agency exerted in its composition," it is his object "to establish in the broadest extent all that its supporters desire to maintain, namely, the infallible certainty, the indisputable authority, the perfect and entire truthfulness of all and every the parts of Holy Scripture." This being the case, we cannot see that this bulky treatise tends to relieve Christianity from any of the difficulties and dangers resulting from the consistent and uncompromising maintenance by Bibliolaters of positions universally felt to be untenable. We have a vast amount of verbal machinery, a great parade of methodical investigation; and the result is dangerous Bibliolatry, or, at best, a distinction without a difference.

The theory of "dynamical" inspiration is borrowed by Mr. Lee, without any immediate and adequate reference or acknowledgment (p. 25),[1] from Mr. Westcott (*Elements of Gospel Harmony*, Cambridge, 1851, p. 8), who defines the term as denoting "an influence which employs man's faculties according to their natural laws." The problem to be solved, according to Mr. Lee, involves two conditions: (1) the co-existence, in the Bible, of its human and divine elements; (2) the fact that certain portions of the Bible are not revelations. The first condition is, he conceives, satisfied by the dynamical theory of inspiration; the second condition is satisfied by the distinction between revelation and inspiration. This last distinction, as Mr. Lee tells us in his preface (p. v), forms a chief element in the theory which he proposes, and he thinks that it has never been consistently applied to the contents of Holy Scripture, even by those writers who insist upon its importance. As the book rests mainly upon Mr. Westcott's theory and Mr. Lee's distinction, we will show, before making any remarks on details, that the former is entirely fallacious, and the latter utterly inaccurate and inapplicable.

(1). The object of Mr. Westcott's dynamical theory is to show that the assumed infallibility of the Bible is reconcilable with the known facts and phenomena of its human authorship. "If," he says (pp. 7, 8), "we combine the outward and the

[1] The reference to Mr. Westcott appears in p. 142. We are not aware who first introduced the term "dynamical inspiration;" but the definition adopted by Mr. Lee is due to Mr. Westcott.

inward—God and man—the moving power and the living instrument—we have a great and noble doctrine, to which our inmost nature bears its witness. We have a Bible competent to calm our doubts, and able to speak to our weakness. It is not an utterance in strange tongues, but in the words of wisdom and knowledge: it is authoritative, for it is the voice of God; it is intelligible, for it is the voice of man." Now every one, whose logical faculties are clear and unclouded, must see that this dynamical theory of inspiration implies no *inspiration* at all; it is simply a theory of *providential* teaching; it merely implies that God's providence selected the writers, whose writings, being providentially preserved, would most appropriately, in their substantial contents, convey to the world those lessons, and record for the instruction of the world those facts, which God designed to reveal. And in this sense, that is, in the strictly Aristotelian and scholastic sense of the term, we maintain that the Bible includes *dynamically* a revelation from God to man, that it involves and contains *virtually* the Word of God (see *New Cratylus*, § 341); and in this sense we have said, without any reference to Mr. Westcott's phraseology, which was then unknown to us, that Holy Scripture is to be regarded as the Word of God, "non carnali aut mechanica ratione, sed quia, respectu habito ad librorum argumentum, concentu quodam suo inclusam contineat divinæ voluntatis significationem; quia revelationem, a Deo ipso consignatam, *potentialiter* (*i.e.* δυνάμει), ut scholastici aiunt, implicet atque involvat" (*Jashar*, p. 2). In spite of the confusion of terms introduced by himself, Mr. Westcott cannot travel far without telling us that by *inspiration* he means merely *providential* selection. In the very next page (p. 9) he says: "*Revelation*, which we may view either as the unveiling of mysteries (from without), or the enlarging of human intuition (from within), is not sufficient without the power of expression" *i.e.* the divine is not sufficient without the human element; "where both are combined, we call the result *Inspiration*. Thus, from a Christian point of view, the notion of a perfect *Dynamical Inspiration* is alone simple, sufficient, and natural. It presupposes that the same providential power, which gave the message, selected the messenger, and implies that the traits of individual character, and the peculiarities of manner and purpose, which are displayed in the composition and language of the

sacred writings, are essential to the perfect exhibition of their meaning." But if Inspiration=Revelation+Human Authorship (providentially selected), it follows that Inspiration—Revelation=Human Authorship, and Inspiration—Human Authorship=Revelation; that is, inspiration, according to Mr. Westcott, is nothing more than a revelation communicated and preserved by means of the works of human writers, providentially selected on account of their peculiar (*i.e.* human) qualifications and characteristics. The dynamical theory, therefore, does not go beyond the assertion, stigmatised by Mr. Lee (p 20), that "the Bible contains the Word of God;" and as a theory of inspiration, opposed—as Mr. Lee opposes it—to any such view, it is entirely fallacious. It contradicts and subverts itself; for, professing to recognise a human, as well as a divine element in the Bible, and admitting in the separate writers perceptible differences of "natural capacity and opportunities, as well as traits of individual character" (p. 24), which must presume the free play of the intellect, and therefore the fallibility of such authors, it invests them individually with the spiritual attributes of a power "which stamps its unity, and confers its vital energy upon the whole" (p. 25); so that the divine and human elements are confused, and the theorist is obliged to maintain two inconsistent propositions, or to fall back upon one or the other; and this is just the Scylla and Charybdis of the whole question.

(2). The distinction between Revelation and Inspiration, to which Mr. Lee attaches so much importance, is thus explained by him. "By Revelation I understand a direct communication from God to man, either of such knowledge as man could not, of himself, attain to, or which (although it might have been attained in the ordinary way) was not, in point of fact, from whatever cause, known to the person who received the Revelation. By Inspiration, on the other hand, I understand the actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, in whatever degree or manner it may have been exercised, guided by which the human agents chosen by God have officially proclaimed His will by word of mouth, or have committed to writing the several portions of the Bible. Revelation and Inspiration are also to be distinguished by the sources from which they proceed,—Revelation being the peculiar function of the Eternal Word, Inspiration the result of the agency of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 27-29). This distinction is

utterly erroneous, and scripturally inapplicable. Every manifestation or declaration proceeding directly from God, nay, even his direct and distinctly-cognizable agency in the world, is a Revelation, and in whatever way he makes this Revelation, His Spirit is present, or there is an Inspiration. Thus, at the very beginning of the world, "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters" (Gen. i. 2), when the Creator first uttered the word by which the heavens were made. When the Psalmist speaks of the cognizable omnipresence of God, and of his agency in the works of creation, he asks (Ps. cxxxix. 7): "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" And that this Spirit was the same, whether it was external or internal, whether it was the Revelation to the Prophet, or the Prophet's Inspiration, may be shown by direct statements on the part of the Prophets themselves. Thus Isaiah says (xlviii. 16): "the Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me;" and again: "the Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord has anointed me to preach good tidings" (lxi. 1). Nor is Mr. Lee more correct in his assertion that Revelation belongs to the Word, and Inspiration to the Holy Spirit, as distinct from one another. We have seen that the Spirit was present in the creation, and yet this is expressly assigned to the agency of the Word (John, i. 3, Col. i. 16, Hebr. i. 2). Mr. Lee does not deny, but rather asserts, that all examples of the direct agency of Jehovah are manifestations of the Word; and he is careful to express his acquiescence in the article of the Creed, that the Holy Spirit spoke by the Prophets. And yet every such inspiration is described as a revelation from Jehovah. The phrase is "the word of Jehovah came unto Nathan (*n. c.*) saying;" or, what makes the inspiration more objective, we have the peculiar expression נְאֻם יְהוָה, "an oracle of Jehovah," commonly used to give a higher sanction and a greater emphasis to the declarations of the prophets, in the sense: "thus says the Lord." But the case of our Lord himself, who was emphatically the Word made flesh, is sufficient to show the error which Mr. Lee has committed in distinguishing between Revelation as the function of the Word, and Inspiration as the agency of the Spirit. For not only did the Spirit of God descend on him at his Baptism, but he was conceived by the Holy Ghost; and when he is speaking of the subsequent agency of the Comforter, or, as he says, *the*

other Comforter (John, xiv. 16), he expressly identifies the Spirit, which was *in himself*, with that which was to inspire and actuate *them*: "ye know him," he says (*ibid.* v. 17), "for he dwelleth *with* you (*i.e.* abides by the side of you, παρ' ὑμῖν μένει), and shall be *in* you (ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται)." In fact, there can be no revelation without an inspiration; and there are only two cases which we need distinguish: (1) when God reveals his mind or will to us objectively, and from without, whether by signs, or theophanies, or by the words of prophets—and this is the historical revelation which was antecedent to the establishment of Christianity, and was active in that establishment; (2) when God reveals his mind or will to us subjectively, by his Spirit acting within us individually; and this is the revelation which is promised to all true Christians (John, xiv. 21): and from the coming of the Comforter, to the end of the world, "he that believeth on the Son of God, hath the witness in himself" (1 John, v. 10). The Bible contains that former Revelation, and, so far as it contains it, the Bible is the Word of God: it is inspired, or it is animated with the Spirit of God; and all true believers contain within themselves that latter Revelation; the Spirit of God dwells in them, and thus they, above all other men, if not they alone, recognise and discern the Spirit which speaks to them in the Bible (above, p. 177).

It appears, then, that Mr. Westcott's dynamical theory is fallacious, for it gives an apparent, not a real solution of the problem which it undertakes: it does not explain, as it proposes, how the human authorship of the Bible is compatible with the infallible and sovereign authority which is claimed for it. It appears also that Mr. Lee's distinction of revelation and inspiration is in itself erroneous and unscriptural, and, besides, inconsistent with the theory of his guide, Mr. Westcott, who has told us that inspiration includes and presumes revelation. Since, therefore, Mr. Lee professes to contend for all the results of the mechanical system of inspiration, and yet fails in the establishment of the theory and the distinction by the help of which he hopes to remove the admitted incompatibility of that system with the facts of the case, he has obviously not succeeded in the task which he has undertaken, to propose in its stead a system altogether satisfactory. On the contrary, we can find nothing in the details of his laborious compilation (for the book is nothing

more) than an attempt to bolster up some of the old and worthless arguments for the literary and literal infallibility of the Scriptures. An example or two will show that he has not been more prosperous than his predecessors in this hopeless undertaking.

It is obvious that any inquiry into the inspiration of Scripture must depend upon some attempt at least to settle the Canon: we must first ascertain—what is Scripture? Although Mr. Lee tells us in his first lecture (p. 11), that his investigation is not directly concerned with this question, we find that it is the principal subject of his second lecture, which is headed "the immemorial doctrine of the Church of God," and, according to the table of contents, begins with discussing "the Canon of Scripture." Nor could it be otherwise. For in making the main stress of his argument depend on the opinions which the early Fathers entertained respecting the divine authority of their sacred books, it could not escape Mr. Lee's notice that it was necessary to ascertain what were the sacred books to which they attributed this divine authority. And as Mr. Lee is careful to tell us that the inspiration depends upon the Canonicity, on the fact that "a selection of certain books was made to the exclusion of others" (p. 43), rather than on the character and position of the writers (pp. 44 *sqq.*), it was the more incumbent on him to show that the immemorial testimony to the divine authority of the books, on which he places so much reliance, was accompanied by an equally immemorial testimony to the undoubted reception of the whole Canon of Scripture as at present constituted. He appeals to "that collection of writings, whether of the Old or New Testament, which our Church accepts as Canonical, and which she defines in her Sixth Article" (p. 11). He knows therefore that the Sixth Article speaks thus: "Sacræ Scripturæ nomine, eos canonicos libros veteris et novi Testamenti intelligimus, de quorum auctoritate in Ecclesia nunquam dubitatum est." And he tells us that "the reception of the different parts of the New Testament as Scripture took place without external concert,—from an inward impulse, as it were,—at the same time and in the most different places; and that, with scarcely an exception, each writing which it contains was all at once, and without a word of doubt, placed on a level with the Old Testament, which had hitherto been regarded as exclusively divine" (p. 48). He claims

for the Old Fathers "that unceasing caution and anxious vigilance, which never admitted into the Canon a single book for the rejection of which any valid arguments have ever been shown," and thinks that this enhances "the value of their opinions upon every subject connected with the Scriptures, and, above all, upon the subject of their inspiration" (p. 50). And though he refers to the fact that Theodore of Mopsuestia denied the Canonical authority of the book of Job, and of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, he wishes us to understand that this was a solitary exception, and that the low estimate in which particular books were regarded by him and Luther "arose from the exalted sense in which the divine character of Scripture was felt and recognised" (p. 71, *cf.* p. 34). The whole of the argument from authority, which Mr. Lee places in the van of his battle, depends upon these statements, and we must therefore conclude, that, as they are directly contradicted by facts with which Mr. Lee ought to have been acquainted, he has either attempted to deceive his readers or has been guilty of inexcusable ignorance and carelessness. In his *Catena Patrum*, Mr. Lee does not forget to cite Eusebius Pamphilus (p. 476); and in p. 76 he says, "the critical and unimpassioned Eusebius, alluding to an assertion that in the superscription of the thirty-fourth Psalm, the name Abimelech had been, by an oversight, substituted for Achish, rejects the idea with indignation; 'I hold it,' he observes, 'to be alike rashness and presumption to venture to prove that the divine Scriptures have erred.'" To say nothing of the absurdity of quoting as a "critical" authority a Father who speaks of superscriptions, in which Psalms written after the Captivity are ascribed to David, as divine and infallible Scripture, it is clear that Mr. Lee allows us to assert either that he was, or that he ought to have been, acquainted with Eusebius, and that at least he ought not to be ignorant of the *locus classicus* in the Canon of the New Testament, with which all Biblical students are supposed to be familiar, and which directly contradicts Mr. Lee's statement that "with scarcely a single exception, each writing which the New Testament contains was all at once and without a word of doubt (!!) placed on a level with the Old Testament." It is well known to every student of theology, who has gone through the usual introductions to the Old and New Testament, that Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 25) divided the writings of the New Testa-

ment (τὰς δηλωθείσας τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης γραφάς) into three distinct classes: (1) the acknowledged (ὁμολογούμενα); (2) the doubtful (ἀντιλεγόμενα); (3) the spurious (νόθα). In the first class were placed the Gospels, the Acts, the Pauline Epistles (how many he does not tell us), and the First Epistles of Peter and John; in the second class were placed the Epistles of James and Jude, the Second of Peter, the Second and Third of John, the Epistles of Barnabas and Clemens, and the so-called revelation of Peter (*H. E.* vi. 13, 14); in the third class were placed the book of the Acts of Paul, the Shepherd, the Gospel according to the Hebrews, and the so-called Teachings of the Apostles. The Apocalypse was placed by some in the *first*, by others in the *third* class. The revelation of Peter and the Epistle of Barnabas, which are enumerated above in the *second* class, were placed by some among the spurious books; and the Epistle of Clemens, though still extant, like that of Barnabas, has, like it, failed to obtain a place in the Canon, as it now stands. If from Eusebius at the beginning of the fourth century, we pass to Origen in the first half of the third century, we find the same evidences of critical doubt and discrimination. Origen (*apud Euseb. H. E.* vi. 25) acknowledges the four Gospels, that of St. Matthew in its original Hebrew form, the Pauline Epistles (how many it is not mentioned), and the First Epistles of Peter and John. He doubts about the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistles of James and Jude, the Second Peter, and the Second and Third of John. He also seems to have recognised the possibility of a mixture of the genuine and spurious in a document professing to be Peter's writing (*Comm. in Johann.* iv. 226). Going back to the end of the second or the beginning of the third century, we find the Fathers generally acknowledging or using the Gospels and Acts as history (εὐαγγέλιον), and thirteen Epistles of Paul, First Peter, First John, and the Apocalypse, as Apostolic records (ἀπόστολος). And in the middle of the second century, Marcion had a collection of ten Pauline Epistles and one Gospel, probably that of Luke. Some of these writings were known to Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus at the same epoch. We find, therefore, that the farther we go back the smaller is the collection universally recognised. Whereas, if we go forward, the critical distinctions are more and more broken down, and the greater part of the doubtful books are placed on the same footing as the first class of acknowledged

writings from the fourth century down to our days. With what face, then, can Mr. Lee claim for his string of Fathers that "unceasing caution and anxious vigilance," which he ascribes to them, when it appears that in proportion as the means of forming a judgment were lessened, in the same proportion the caution and vigilance diminished also, until at last we got the translation of St. Matthew instead of the original (as Mr. Lee is obliged to admit, p. 525 *sqq.*), until the Epistle of Barnabas (which he admits to be genuine, p. 461), was denied its place in the collection, and until the Second Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of Jude were placed by the side of the genuine Epistles of the great Missionaries of our religion? To claim the immemorial testimony of the Church of God to the divine authority of the Canon as at present constituted, without stating that the books referred to in that testimony were different at different times, and from a very early period much fewer than those which we now recognise—whether this suppression of the truth results from intentional trickery or from mere ignorance and carelessness, —is neither more nor less than an imposition, which, being easily detected, must bring discredit on the advocate and prove subversive of the cause which he has espoused.

But even supposing that the argument from authority were not liable to this fatal objection, it would still remain to be shown that S. Chrysostom, S. Jerome, S. Gregory, and the other writers whom Mr. Lee decorates with this prefix of veneration, were themselves infallible, and therefore competent to transfer this character to the books, which they quote as divine. For Mr. Lee's theory presumes that a book is inspired, because it is Canonical, *i.e.* recognised by the early Church, not that it is Canonical, *i.e.* so recognised, because it is inspired. Now we are so far from accepting the dictum of a Father of the Church as infallible on this or on any other subject, that we are disposed to question their human judgment and to doubt their criticisms on independent grounds. It is obvious, in fact, that they were extremely unsafe guides in very many particulars. With regard to the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is by no means certain in what sense they understood the term. Both Clement of Alexandria and Origen regarded the divine or spiritual element in Scripture as belonging to the inner meaning, which they often sought by mystical and allegorical interpretation. They could

not, therefore, have asserted that inspiration amounted to literary infallibility. In using the terms *θεόπνευστος*, *θεία ἐπιπνοία*, *ἐμπνεόμενος*, and the like, it must be presumed that these writers referred tacitly to the well-known passage (2 Tim. iii. 16); and Clemens of Alexandria, (A.D. 200), Origen (A.D. 230), Ruffinus (A.D. 390), and one at least of the later Fathers, John of Damascus (A.D. 730), expressly cite that passage so as to imply that *θεόπνευστος* is an epithet and not a predicate (see above, p. 172). But there is nothing to show that they attached any definite and precise meaning to the term; and certainly they did not anticipate the audacity of Mr. Lee, who attributes to St. Paul the substantive *θεοπνευστία* (p. 80: "The word Inspiration, or, as St. Paul terms it, *Theopneustia*.") If St. Paul had used this substantive, instead of a mere epithet, we should have been better able to ascertain what he meant by it: as he did not use it, Mr. Lee's inaccuracy, if intentional, deserves a grave rebuke; for, however easily it may be exposed and corrected, it told Mr. Lee's less attentive hearers, that the text of Scripture contains a word equal at least to inspiration, and therefore that the thing, for which he contends, had received Apostolic recognition. The fact is that neither Apostles nor Fathers have used such a word; and the epithet, which they apply, can only mean that the Bible is the Word of God because it is inbreathed or animated by God, because it contains and records substantially a revelation from God to man.

The book before us presents many examples of the convenient logic, which begs the question, or reasons in a circle, or draws a conclusion *à priori*. Mr. Lee is careful to tell us that "the adducing arguments from Scripture itself, in proof of its own inspiration, is no *petitio principii*. It would only become so," he says, "were we to assume the fact of its inspiration in order to infer therefrom the credibility of its contents" (p. 92). But Mr. Lee does more than this. He cites the sacred writers as infallible testimonies for the fact that they were infallible; and this is "begging the question," or assuming the conclusion which he desires to establish. If it should be said that his *petitio principii* is not confined to a single proposition, but expanded into a lengthened argument, we may refer him to his own Archbishop, Dr. Whately, who will tell him that reasoning in a circle is only a more plausible form of the same fallacy. When

he says (p. 93), "we do not, at starting, believe what is contained in the Bible, because it is inspired; but, having previously established its claims to our belief, we are fully entitled to draw our main argument for its inspiration from its own pages," he endeavours to make a distinction without a difference; for he knows very well that the statement of a writer's belief that he was inspired by God might be erroneous, and yet he might believe so; that his credibility would not be affected by his unintentional error, whatever occasioned it, unless by credibility we mean infallibility, which is the thing to be proved. Mr. Lee's argument, when reduced to its elements, is simply this: the sacred writers claim inspiration; but they were inspired; therefore they are infallible witnesses to their own infallibility. Of Mr. Lee's *à priori* reasoning, we have an example in his sixth lecture, in which he tells us (p. 250) that "there is the highest possible presumption, *à priori*, that a certain degree of divine assistance has been superadded (in the Bible), for the purpose of enabling the authors of this record to compose their narratives with perfect accuracy, and to transmit the Revelation to others in its original purity." He adds (p. 251): "Without such superhuman guidance it is inexplicable, considering the contents of the Bible, that just so much should have been placed on record, and no more. Were we to admit that any portion of Scripture has resulted from the unaided exercise of human judgment, or of human faculties, it would always be possible to argue that the historian has omitted much information which it concerns us to know, or that he has preserved many facts which are trivial or unnecessary; that he has but partially or imperfectly handed down the communication from heaven; that such or such a fact has not been reported with accuracy; or, in fine, that some particular expression or doctrine has not been conveyed to us as God intended:—especially in cases where the subject-matter of the narrative appears strange, or opposed to human preconceptions. If we had never heard of the difficulties which have been urged against Inspiration—if we had never opened the Scriptures themselves—could the suspicion have ever occurred to any fair mind, that God may have thus left to all the chances of human fallibility the history of that Revelation which (it is assumed) He has given to His creatures, instructing them in their duties, and unfolding to them his decrees?" Now it certainly appears to us

that this presumption, to which Mr. Lee attaches so much importance, is in the highest degree presumptuous. For what right have we to argue from our own preconceptions as to what God, in His infinite wisdom, might have been pleased to do or leave undone? And even if we could, with propriety, adopt this argument, the result would be the very reverse of that for which Mr. Lee contends. For if we were entitled to assume that God must have left us an infallible record of His revelations, we should assume, on the same principle, that the record must have been free from ambiguity or contradiction: we should, therefore, *à priori*, conclude that we cannot have such an infallible record in the historical books of the Old Testament, which are confessedly a patch-work compilation from older works, now lost; we should expect that the history of Jesus Christ would be preserved in some single document, and we should be unable to recognise anything but human authorship in four distinct treatises, one of them the translation of a lost original, and all of them presenting discrepancies more or less serious; and the presumption of supernatural guidance would seem to us contradicted by the fact that books, which the early Church regarded with suspicion and doubt, have been invested by the later Church with the attributes of divine authority. But supposing that we were to acquiesce in Mr. Lee's presumption *à priori*, it would be impossible for us to deny its application to any writing which seemed essential to the defence or promotion of Christianity. For example, there are some persons who think that a valid theory of inspiration is the great want of Christianity in these latter days: if so, "there is the highest possible presumption, *à priori*," that God would not leave this want unsupplied. Now the *Christian Remembrancer* told us (October, 1854, p. 506) that Mr. Lee's book was "*the* theological book of the quarter"; and Mr. Lee, perhaps, will not controvert that opinion. Therefore Mr. Lee must have had "a certain degree of divine assistance" to enable him to compose his work "with perfect accuracy;" and "without such superhuman guidance it would be inexplicable that just so much" argument should have been advanced by him "and no more." "Were we to admit that any portion of" Mr. Lee's book "has resulted from the unaided exercise of human judgment, or human faculties, it would always be possible to argue that" he has "omitted much information" respecting the Canon "which it

concerns us to know, that such or such a fact has not been reported with accuracy;" or, in general, that he has done something or other which proves his human fallibility,—not to say, his human disingenuousness. If this argument will not prove that Mr. Lee deserves to be canonized, it is equally worthless in a theory which attempts to tell us "the nature and proof of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture."

Whatever success might have attended Mr. Lee's attempts to reconcile the human with the divine element in the Bible by a theory of dynamical inspiration, to prove the inspiration of the authors by the testimony of the Church or their own declarations, and to reason *à priori* from the presumed exigencies of the case, it is quite clear that he must have failed to establish "the divine authority, the infallible certainty, and the entire truthfulness of every part of Scripture;" that, in fact, he must have left the most important part of his task unperformed, if he had not attempted at least to dispose of the discrepancies "not merely apparent but real," both as between Scripture and Scripture, and as between Scripture and the facts of history and physical science, which the warmest advocates of Christianity have not failed to recognise and admit. Accordingly, he has devoted to this subject his eighth and last lecture. And here his procedure is characterised by all his usual peculiarities of reasoning. He confines himself to three classes of objections: I. that the sacred writers contradict each other; II. that the statements of Scripture contradict those of profane history; III. that the statements of Scripture are often at variance with the results of science. (I). To the first of these objections Mr. Lee opposes a principle started by Augustine (p. 384) and set forth by Mr. Rogers (*Edinb. Rev.* Oct. 1849, p. 352), that "wherever an objection is founded on an apparent contradiction between two statements, it is sufficient to show any possible way in which the statements may be reconciled, whether the true one or not." Mr. Rogers' argument has been well exposed by an able writer in the *Journal of Sacred Literature* (April, 1850, pp. 456 *sqq.*), who has shown that it is pervaded by "the fallacy of attributing objections to the proofs, which do in reality, on the plenary hypothesis, lie against the thing to be proved." Every alleged discrepancy remains as an invincible objection to the doctrine of infallibility until it is removed; and the *onus probandi* rests with the party

who maintains that the discrepancy is not real but apparent only. (II). Mr. Lee tests the second objection by the examination of a particular case, in which it has not been sustained, and argues from this example that the Christian apologist may always deprecate the precipitancy of criticism, and appeal to our ignorance of the whole of the case and to the possible accumulation of further evidence explanatory of the facts (p. 397). If this argument were to be admitted as generally applicable, a prejudice or presumption would always supersede and overrule all evidence; for it would always be argued that we did not know all the facts which might have transpired, if all the possible evidence had been forthcoming; and thus a judgment, whether critical or forensic, resting on evidence before us, would become impossible. The world does not generally act on this principle, and the case of Biblical infallibility will not be remanded to give time for the production of more favourable witnesses. If there were no other reason for refusing to suspend judgment, it would be sufficient to say that increase of knowledge has not hitherto been favourable to Bibliolatry. The discovery of the key to Egyptian hieroglyphics and its consequences have overthrown the supposed Hebrew chronology; and critical investigation tends more and more to weaken our reliance on the Masoretic compilers. On the other hand, partial confirmations only strengthen our general belief in the credibility of ancient history, and do not affect the exclusive claims of Mr. Lee and his school. (III). In dealing with the third objection, Mr. Lee speaks as if it were still possible to doubt that the sacred writers exhibit ignorance and error in regard to the discovered facts of physical science. Assuming the infallibility of the Bible on this as on other subjects, he thinks that in every case of apparent discrepancy we must either suppose that the Biblical text means what science has discovered, or that science in the particular instance is founded on an imperfect or erroneous induction (p. 408). If we beg the question as to the infallibility of Scripture, this must of course be the procedure, with what result to the faith of intelligent and well-informed men it needs no great enlightenment to predict. It seems, however, that Mr. Lee is not very certain as to his own meaning here: while he tells us that Scripture is as infallible in regard to physical science as in regard to other matters, he warns us that "they who seek in the

announcements of Scripture for positive information on matters appertaining to natural science will ever seek in vain" (p. 411). These statements appear to us irreconcilable, except on the supposition that Scripture has never spoken distinctly on matters appertaining to physical science. The mere fact that Scripture speaks of a solid firmament with a mass of water above it and windows through which the rain descended (Gen. vii. 11, viii. 2), to say nothing of the rainbow, which did not appear until after the Flood (ix. 13), would be sufficient to show that the Bible does make positive and at the same time erroneous statements in such matters. A writer in a periodical, which is not supposed to make unnecessary concessions in questions of authority, and which Mr. Lee quotes in support of his own views (p. 408), speaks thus of Sir David Brewster's attempt to prove from Scripture that there are more worlds than one (*Christian Remembrancer*, January, 1855, p. 78): "He retains the antiquated notion that every syllable of the Bible is not only verbally—literally—inspired, but was intended to teach men astronomy and general science as well as godliness. We are loath," adds the writer, "to speak with severity of blunders and prejudices which are based on a devout feeling of reverence for God's Word; but the knowledge of the age is beyond such servile notions as some which our northern philosopher advances, and he may rest assured that the devotion of which ignorance is the parent needs no lamentation over its fall." The union between science and faith, "which ought to be self-sufficient, but which ignorant bigotry is perpetually endeavouring to disturb," does not depend on "mutual concessions or a feigned reconciliation" (*New Cratylus*, § 43), but on the simple fact that their provinces are different, and that the Bible, which contains the substance of an infallible revelation for the latter, is human and fallible in regard to the former. This, however, is inconsistent with Mr. Lee's view of the inspiration of scripture, and he cannot accept this solution of the difficulty without relinquishing all that he contends for, and falling back on the view advocated in the text, and strongly and clearly exhibited by the able author in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, to whom we have already referred. After stating that Mr. Rogers' admission of the existence of real discrepancies may well supply the place of any proof of the position that errors do really exist in the Bible in regard to all secular subjects, and consequently

that there is but one subject (being of a wholly different kind) in reference to which an attempt can be made to maintain within certain limits its absolute immunity from error, and that this one subject is, of course, Religion, that writer proceeds (pp. 455, 456): "It is of this alone—using the term here to denote the grand scheme of salvation as gradually developed through the whole Bible, including the fundamental principles of the Gospel, and the previous dispensations, so far as they were preparatory for, and introductory to, the Gospel,—that we can predicate a worthy end, a superior wisdom, an absolute truth, and a perfect intelligibility. For this only, therefore, do we, or can we, claim Divine Inspiration. And what need we more? If we have in the Bible *a divine rule of faith and practice*, what more can *we* desire, or can it be more fitting in *God* to give? Why should we not rest satisfied with maintaining, to the conviction of intelligent and unprejudiced minds, namely, that the Bible *contains* a Divine Revelation—not that it *is*, as a whole, the Revelation—that the whole inspired Word of God is in that book, though not the whole of that book is the Inspired Word; that the Bible, in respect of *the truth*,—but of this alone,—'has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth, without any admixture of error, for its subject matter;' that 'the Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the medium of historical revelation;' that 'Holy Scripture contains all things necessary to salvation,' and 'was given by Inspiration of God,' though all things contained in it are neither necessary to salvation, nor were given by Inspiration of God." In this sense, and no other, can we understand the proposition, to which Mr. Lee justly attaches so much importance, and which he places at the beginning of his whole inquiry, namely, that the Bible contains a human as well as a divine element, which is the same as saying that, in one respect, it is fallible, in the other respect, not liable to error; for M. Gaussen's paradox (*Theopneustia*, p. 304) that "the Scripture is entirely the word of man, and it is also wholly the Word of God," has been well declared by the author quoted above (*u. s.* p. 463) to be "even more absurd than to affirm that A having written a history abounding with mistakes and inaccuracies, which B had corrected, the work given to the public was wholly the composition of A, and also wholly that of B:" and the same stricture applies to Mr. Lee's statement, that the

human element in the Bible was rendered divine by dynamical inspiration.

Since, therefore, Mr. Lee has contended for results identical with those of the mechanical theory which he begins by abandoning as untenable, since he makes Christianity responsible for these results, and endeavours to establish them by a fallacious theory, by erroneous distinctions, and by nugatory reasonings, which are easily exposed and confuted, his elaborate work must be added to the number of those which, attempting to invest human opinions with the attributes of divine truth, contribute directly to the triumphs of unbelief.

APPENDIX VI.

(CHAP. III. p. 185).

ON THE UNCHRISTIAN SPIRIT OF BIBLIOLATRY.

In addition to the dangers which Christianity incurs from the untenable propositions on which it is made to depend by the advocates of mechanical inspiration, it receives still greater damage from the unchristian spirit in which that theory is maintained and propagated. An Apostle has warned us not to believe every spirit, but to "try the spirits whether they be of God" (1 John, iv. 1), and the only touchstone is that Christian love, which it is the main object of our religion to promote. Whenever, therefore, we discern a spirit of violence or malignity in the conduct of those who advocate particular doctrines as essential to Christianity, we must conclude either that we have to do with a false prophet, or that Christian faith is not that and that only which worketh by love. As long as our religion retains its vital and essential characteristics, the true believer will necessarily adopt the former of these alternatives, and will receive with additional doubt any tenets which are maintained by personal malignity and intolerance.

The dogma of an infallible book, like that of an infallible Church, is felt to be weak and incapable of recommending itself to the calm judgment and reason of man. We find, therefore, that its advocates, like those of the Romanistic system, are obliged to substitute violence for argument, and to attack the person when they cannot grapple with the facts. The examples of Calvin at Geneva, of Knox in Scotland, and of the Puritans in England, are sufficient to show that Bibliolatry would support itself by direct persecution if it had the power. But as Protestantism is generally connected with popular institutions this

interference with the liberty of the subject is generally impossible, and the freedom of the press is therefore abused for the purpose of doing such injury to the character, prospects, and social position of the opponent as may be sufficient to punish or intimidate all gainsayers. How the press is the instrument, and libellous personality the mode, of this Bibliolatrous inquisition and persecution, will be best shown by an examination of the cases mentioned in the text.

We have had in these latter days two self-appointed apostles of Bibliolatry, Robert Haldane and his brother James Alexander. They appear to have been men of limited understanding, harsh temper, and gloomy but enthusiastic disposition. If the tendencies, which they manifested, had been carried a little farther in the same direction, it would have been a case of monomania in at least one of the two brothers. As it was, their persevering energy and unity of purpose made them conspicuous personages in the religious world; and, as men of devotion and courage, they would have deserved a recognition for that greatness which is generally connected with strength of will, if their zeal had been more tempered with discretion, and if their sense of duty had not led them to actions at variance with that gentleness and brotherly kindness which the Gospel enjoins, and without which all other gifts are valueless.

The unchristian harshness of these twin apostles of Bibliolatry has been admitted by the Exeter Hall panegyrist, who has undertaken to exhibit them in a kind of apotheosis for the instruction of "the Young Men's Christian Association." It will illustrate the spirit of Bibliolatry, if we consider the terms in which this orator endeavours to palliate the charge from which he cannot acquit the subjects of his eulogium ("The Haldanes: a Lecture by the Rev. W. Landels, of Birmingham, delivered before the Young Men's Christian Association, in Exeter Hall, Dec. 6, 1853"): "To some," he says (p. 147), "their regard for Scripture will appear to approach, if it do not pass the verge of, Bibliolatry. And it must be confessed that, in contending for the letter, they did not always breathe the spirit of the Word. From dangers, real or imaginary, Robert, in particular, defended it with a degree of asperity, which a more intelligent regard would have sufficed to prevent. Too readily, as we think, he raised the cry of danger, and rushed to the rescue with feelings

proportioned in strength to his estimate of the thing at stake; while the means he employed for its protection were frequently not less inappropriate than the interference was uncalled for. He does not seem to have learned that the character of the Bible is its best defence, and that 'the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.' His connexion with the controversy between Drs. Carson and Pye Smith may be referred to as an illustration of this part of his character; and similar feelings were also manifested in the manner in which both brothers dogmatically censured and virtually unchristianised men who, revering the Bible not less than they, conscientiously objected to their interpretation of its contents." This expression of disapproval leaves nothing to be desired; but the panegyrist unfortunately adds: "On these unamiable manifestations of feeling I am disposed to look lightly. Jealousy for the Word of God is so valuable a virtue, and so much needed now, that we should be slow to quarrel with it when it exists in excess, nor should it be severely censured, though unamiably displayed." And he thinks "we may well make allowance for the severity with which they censured those whose opinions, as they thought, were derogatory to the authority and at variance with the teaching of the Word." However, the lecturer returns to the true view of the case: "But while these considerations may extenuate, they do not justify, censoriousness. To say nothing of the impropriety of deeming ourselves infallible and of the necessity of remembering that the error may be ours, we should ever distinguish between a mistaken judgment and a perverted inclination or an unholy life. He who knew all things, who could not err himself, while he sternly denounced wilful wickedness,—while he consigned the Pharisees, who blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts, to the condemnation of hell, was never severe to the erring. He treated his mistaken followers tenderly, as a nurse her children; bore with their mistakes and forgave their follies; suffered them to lean on his bosom, and gently led them to a full perception of the truth. And is it for man—frail man, full of errors himself, ever needing the Divine forbearance—is it for him sternly to denounce, or harshly to censure his erring brother? Ah me! how slow we are to render to others the forbearance which we so much need ourselves! It is well for us that God's thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor his ways as our ways;

but that high as the heavens are above the earth, so high are his ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts."

It is much to be regretted that a man, who can entertain and so well express these sentiments, should have allowed himself to say that he is "disposed to look lightly" on the unchristian and acrimonious spirit in which the Haldanes dealt with those who differed from them on the subject of literal and verbal inspiration. That we may understand how utterly inexcusable their conduct was, how impossible it must be "to make light" of their sin, if we profess to maintain the duty of obeying the one great command of Jesus Christ, we should examine the case to which our panegyrist more particularly refers.

This case, which is fully detailed in Mr. Medway's "Memoirs of the Life and Writings of John Pye Smith, D.D.," London, 1853, chapter xvii., was, in its general outlines, as follows. In 1826, Dr. Smith addressed a private letter to Mr. Robert Haldane, in which he combated, to a certain extent, Mr. Haldane's views on inspiration. To this letter he received no reply. But, shortly afterwards, a controversy on cognate subjects was carried on in the *Evangelical Magazine* between Dr. Smith and the other brother, Alexander Haldane, in which Dr. Smith had decidedly the advantage, and so withdrew from all further discussion. The Haldanes, however, were not satisfied, and they found a venal advocate to attack Dr. Smith on the two principal points in which he had come into collision with Mr. Robert and Mr. Alexander Haldane respectively. This was one Dr. Carson, pastor of Tubbermore, in the north of Ireland, who, in 1827, published, at Robert Haldane's expense, a pamphlet, entitled: "Review of the Rev. Dr. J. Pye Smith's Defence of Dr. Haffner's Preface to the Bible, and of his Denial of the Divine Authority of Part of the Canon, and of the Full Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures." It appears, from the "Memoirs of the Lives of the Haldanes," by Alexander Haldane, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law (Lond. 1852), that Mr. Robert Haldane was in the habit of paying this Irish pamphleteer for writing books, or, at least, of shielding him from loss. "For many years a large proportion of Dr. Carson's works were, from time to time, sent over to Edinburgh, and published at Mr. Haldane's expense (p. 526); and he distributed gratuitously hundreds of almost every work which the pastor of Tubbermore published" (p. 530). In the par-

ticular case it is clear that Dr. Carson was employed to fight the battle of the Haldanes, not only by taking up the controversy in the *Evangelical Magazine*, but also by referring covertly to the private letter to Robert Haldane: and as he could not quote this, he sought for similar sentiments in Dr. Smith's "Scripture Testimony to the Messiah," and in an article on the Apocrypha controversy, which appeared in the *Eclectic Review* for Nov. 1825, and which was erroneously ascribed to Dr. Smith. The pamphlet, which Dr. Carson wrote at Mr. Haldane's instigation, seems, from the extracts given by Mr. Medway, to have been a coarse, violent, and foul-mouthed libel, at once unchristian and unscrupulous, irreligious and immoral; and Dr. Smith's biographer may well leave his reader "to form his own opinion of the quality of the article which has been produced by the peculiar talents of a Christian minister, and put in circulation with the approval and by the *purse* of a Christian gentleman". (p. 306). It is clear that to support a theory, to which he had publicly committed himself, perhaps to heal a wounded vanity, possibly to gratify an irritated temper, Mr. Robert Haldane forgot the leading precepts of the religion which he professed, and encouraged a stranger to assail and vituperate one of his old friends—one who had, two years before, defended him from an attack ("Memoirs of Dr. Smith," p. 297)—in a spirit and in terms which would have been perfectly unjustifiable, even if the subject had been one of secular interest and personal reference. It is, therefore, most surprising to us that the Lecturer to the Young Men's Christian Association, or any other Christian man, could be "disposed to look lightly" on such conduct. Even if Christianity had really been implicated in the maintenance of Mr. Haldane's peculiar dogmas, it would have been altogether unbecoming and inconsistent to fight the good fight of faith with such weapons. The spirit of the Gospel exclaims: "non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis." And if it were not so, if Christianity could really be appealed to as authorizing the practices and principles of action which these Haldanes exemplified in the case before us, if our religion allowed a man to indulge in calumny and personal detraction, for the sake, and in the name of Jesus, we do not hesitate to affirm that it would not be worth pleading for, it would not deserve the advocacy of reasonable men, it could not proceed from that Being whose chief attribute is universal good-

ness, but must trace its origin to the meanest passions of weak and despicable humanity.

The conduct of the Haldanes, in the case which we have been considering, was limited to a narrow circle of agents and observers, and might have been forgotten except by the readers of Dr. Pye Smith's biography. At any rate, the general public could not be expected to take much cognizance of Dr. Carson's invectives, which failed to elicit any reply from the person against whom they were directed. But the same mode of proceeding in the advocacy of the same opinions has since then been and still is a public phenomenon, to the great detriment of religion and to the signal discredit of the free press in this country. The *Record* newspaper, with the establishment and management of which the Haldane family is not unconnected, and which professes especially to defend their views of inspiration, is a perpetual and flagrant exhibition of the unchristian spirit of Bibliolatry. Writers are employed, just as the poor creature Carson was employed by Robert Haldane, to assail with calumnious personalities any writer who may have signified his dissent from the Haldane dogma of verbal inspiration. And these attacks are so consistently distinguished by all the worst features of Carson's pamphlet,—unwarranted assumptions of authorship, misrepresentations of facts, distortions and garblings of written statements, abusive language, and reference to details derived from private conversations or picked up by domestic spies and retailers of provincial gossip,—that the paper, professing to be a warm advocate of pure religion, has become a by-word in the public mouth, and enjoys a reputation not very different from that of the *Age* and the *Satirist* a few years since. Those who do not feel that such a paper, adequately supported by subscribers and encouraged by anonymous correspondents, is a most lamentable indication of the state of religion in this country, and that it ought to be denounced by all true Christians in terms of grave and sorrowful censure, are still so shocked by its monstrous abuses of the liberty of the press that they cannot refrain from jibes and cutting sarcasms at its expense. A Morning Journal calls it "the bi-weekly organ of religious mendacity";[1] a Sunday paper says that it professes to be *anti-tractarian*, but, from its constant slanders, ought to be called *de-tractarian*, and, from

[1] It is now "tri-weekly."

its cowardly apologies, whenever its statements are challenged, *re-tractarian*; and the able author of the article on "Church Parties," in the *Edinburgh Review* (for October, 1853) makes himself merry with the self-seeking advertisements, which appear from time to time in the columns of the *Record*. But the existence of such a paper, as the avowed and adequately supported organ of a religious party, ought not to be treated with levity. It should be regarded either with the sorrow which the true Christian must feel for his weak and erring brethren, or with that indignation which every lover of truth must express when he sees malignity and falsehood assuming the outward garb of exclusive religiousness. The pitiable weakness and narrow-mindedness, which are among the characteristics of this journal, were well described by Dr. Arnold in a letter to his sister in 1830 (*Life*, i. 260), where he speaks of having seen "a copy of the *Record* newspaper, a true specimen of the party, with their infinitely little minds, disputing about 'anise and cummin,' when heaven and earth are coming together around them; with much of Christian harmlessness, but with nothing of Christian wisdom"; the particular number of the paper being accidentally free from gall. The amount of childishness, the enormous want of reflexion, which the *Record* presumes in its readers, may be inferred from the fact that the editor once adduced as a conclusive testimony to his favourite dogma of verbal inspiration the text in which the Psalmist says: "There is not a word in my tongue but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether!" Really one would have thought that there was not an educated person in England who would fail to see that this passage refers to the omniscience of God, and might be applied to every foolish and wicked word printed in the *Record* no less than to the utterances of a holy and humble Prophet. But the *Record* is not merely weak and foolish. To make a man a genuine Recordite, "he must," says the *Edinburgh Review*, "combine his creed with the proper amount of ignorance and intolerance, and must enforce it in a damnatory spirit." And not only so; he must, if his organ truly represents him, make every difference of opinion the ground of personal animosity, and must pursue his religious opponent with undisguised malice, and even without any regard to honesty and truthfulness. One might have thought indeed that it would be sufficient to gratify the most furious zeal of religious partizans if

their Journal attacked the published and acknowledged sentiments of those who differed from them. And even if the Journalists were not called upon to vindicate their own view by calm and legitimate argumentation, it might seem that they had done enough when they directed attention to the fact that some clergyman or layman had published a book or made a public speech denying the correctness of the Haldane theory of inspiration, or dissenting from some other doctrine of exaggerated Evangelicalism. To be able to point to something, written or said, in which the literary infallibility of Scripture was impugned, and to say "this man is a Rationalist," or to find in print some assertion of baptismal regeneration, and to say "this man is a Tractarian, he has the mark of the beast,—*hic niger est, hunc tu anti-Romane, caveto!*" ought to be enough to stimulate the *odium theologicum* of the most uncompromising Recordites, and to make them exclaim, with their predecessors the Jews, "Away with such a fellow from the earth, for it is not fit that he should live!" (Acts, xxii. 22). But the religious Journalist does not content himself with this. All that appears bad to him must be made a little worse. Opinions never expressed must be ascribed to the supposed offender. If he seems to have been guilty of little, he must be assumed to be guilty of much. Words spoken, printed, acknowledged, must be distorted from their true and obviously intended meaning; garbled extracts, which would be explained by the context, must be taken as conclusive samples of a book, which may have been written avowedly to establish a proposition of directly opposite import; and, if a writer assents incidentally to another, whose general opinions may be totally different, he is at once stigmatized as responsible for all that is wrong in the author whom he quotes. Nor is this all. The strictures are not confined to public and avowed authorship. The rumour of anonymous publication is taken for granted, and treated as fact. And even the materials derived from the social espionage and ill-natured gossip of provincial towns are made available for the purposes of theological detraction.

Lest it should be thought impossible that such nefarious conduct could be practised by a journal professing to represent a section of the Protestant and Evangelical Church, we will adduce three striking instances out of many which might have been exhibited.

The first of these is the case of Dr. J. W. Colenso, Bishop of Natal. This zealous missionary, shortly before his consecration, published a volume of "Village Sermons," which he dedicated to Professor Maurice in a letter which expresses his gratitude to that divine "for inestimable benefits derived from his teaching." Chiefly, it seems, on this account, the "Village Sermons" were made the subject of a review in the *Record* of Nov. 10, 1853, in which Bishop Colenso is not only held responsible for the peculiar opinions of Professor Maurice, which are excluded by express statements in the "Village Sermons," but is represented generally as a plausible but dangerous theologian, as one whose "religious teaching" is "neither in accordance with the Articles of the Church, of which he is to be a chief pastor, nor with the Word of God, which she adopts as her sole and sufficient rule of faith." It was impossible that Dr. Colenso could submit to such accusations. Accordingly, in "a letter to his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury," the Bishop designate, as he then was, conclusively proves that he distinctly disavows, even in the little book of Sermons which is the object of the attack, the doctrine which the *Record* charges him with holding, and he shows that, throughout, the reviewer had been guilty of misquoting his words or misrepresenting their obvious import. In one passage, where the reviewer professes to prove an assertion "by quoting in *full*" two passages, Dr. Colenso shows that he has stopped short in his quotation just where the very next paragraph would have exactly contradicted his own words and proved that "the Bishop did not hold the views ascribed to" him; and he concludes his letter with the following observation: "I shall be surprised, if there be not found, among the readers of the *Record*, many good, and just, and true-hearted men, who will feel themselves aggrieved at the offences it has here committed against the laws of common truth and honesty."

Now here was an instance in which a confessedly pious man was relinquishing the ease and affluence of his position in England, in order to go forth in the name of his Redeemer and preach the Gospel to benighted Africans. There was no quarrel between him and the *Record*. He did not belong to the opposite party in the Church. He was not a theological author, in the general sense of the term. But, because he praised Mr. Maurice, who, with his brother-in-law, the late Archdeacon Hare, was a

stumbling-block to the Bibliolaters, a little volume of Village Sermons is selected for attack, and the reviewer is instructed, or allowed, to cast aside all the obligations of literary fairness and common honesty, in order to make out a case against a Missionary Bishop, and, by injuring his character, to diminish his means of usefulness. Is this serving the cause of religion, or is it gratifying an unchristian spirit at the expense of the Gospel?

A second example of the characteristics of the *Record* is furnished by the style in which the managers of that journal have thought it right to deal with the Rev. H. Alford. As Mr. Alford is not only an editor of the Greek Testament, but also the minister of a chapel frequented by many of the most influential people in London, it was quite natural that the *Record*, which adopts Mr. Alexander Haldane's view, that "skating for amusement on a Sunday is in itself wrong!" should comment on a very different opinion respecting the religious observance of one day in seven, when put forward by a clergyman occupying so important a position. Mr. Alford had said that the Lord's day is only an ordinance of the Christian Church, which has gradually grown up from apostolic usage; that it has absolutely nothing to do with the paradisaical sabbath, and that to maintain their identity is not only indicative of ignorance of the constitution of man in Christ, but absolutely antichristian in its tendency. These opinions led the *Record* into its usual course of personal and libellous insinuation, and the journalist even went so far as to say that Mr. Alford must read the Communion Service in a non-natural sense. In reply to these attacks, Mr. Alford published, with notes, two letters, which he had addressed to his friend Mr. Sperling; and, in his indignation, expressed himself in terms of warm but well-merited censure. He alluded to information, which had reached him, that the proprietors of the *Record* "had come to a deliberate resolution to write him down;" he spoke of the attack upon him as "he would hope, a worse than average specimen of the personal vituperation in that mendacious and unprincipled journal;" and most truly stated that "the *Record* is a greater enemy to Christianity than all the infidel publications of our time put together." In noticing this rejoinder, on the 26th March, 1856, the *Record* says, with sublime affectation of Christian forbearance: "If we were to throw back some of Mr.

Alford's own vocabulary, we should not act without provocation. But we prefer a holier example, the example of Him, who not only forbids 'railing accusations;' but who, 'when He was reviled, reviled not again.' To Him," says the libellous journalist, "and to his righteous judgment, we commit our cause."

The monstrosity of such affectation on the part of the *Record*, and its inconsistency with the whole career of the journal, would have been sufficiently revolting, if the editor could have carried on, for some little while, the outward appearance of acting up to these professions in the particular case of Mr. Alford. But, in the very next number of the journal, the managers insert a letter, probably written at their suggestion by one of their organized gang of slanderers, and add a note, in which Mr. Alford's character as an author is attacked, without any reference to the question at issue between him and the *Record*. The letter, which bears the significant signature of *Vindex*, favours the world with this very applicable statement: "It is only two months since Mr. Alford was betrayed into an insulting, and, I am constrained to add, insolent attack on a venerable and grey-headed divine, to whom the Church at large is deeply indebted. And now," adds the gentle *Vindex*, with an unvindictive selection of epithets, "he has given to the world a diatribe on the *Record* newspaper, which, for concentrated venom and impotent rage, is scarcely to be paralleled." The note states that "another friend" had furnished the editor with an extract from Tischendorf, charging Mr. Alford's Greek Testament with plagiarism and bad faith. To the letter of *Vindex*, Mr. Alford makes no reply; but he shows, in a letter to the editor of the *Record*, which appeared on the 2nd April, that the words of Tischendorf were applied to the first edition of Mr. Alford's work; that the charge of *mala fides* was met at the time; and that the best comment on it is that "Tischendorf and myself are now in friendly correspondence, and interchange of publications."

This attack on Mr. Alford is a good specimen of the manner in which the *Record* endeavours to inflict professional and literary injury on those who venture to differ from the creed of Bibliolatry, even in the most speculative and uncertain matters. For it cannot be denied that the relation between the Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Sunday is merely inferential. The attack is also distinguished by a purely irrelevant libel on Mr.

Alford's literary character, immediately following an unctuous disclaimer of retaliation. But perhaps the most interesting feature in the case, is the incidental glimpse which we gain of the management of this "religious" journal. In answer to the information—no doubt substantially true—which had reached Mr. Alford, that "the proprietors of the *Record* had come to a deliberate resolution to write him down," we are told: "there have been two meetings of the proprietors of the *Record* since Mr. Alford's first attack on the Sabbath. At neither meeting was his name ever mentioned; and we are persuaded that the idea of writing him down never entered into the mind of any one connected with the *Record*." Very likely these proprietors, "consisting," we are told, "of clergymen and laymen, country magistrates and professional gentlemen," only met to consider the pecuniary interest of the journal—how to get the largest dividend from the joint-stock company for the manufacture of cant and slander; but the literary department, the editorship, properly so called, is admitted to have held debate, or to have received communications on the subject of Mr. Alford; and, in an earlier part of the same article, we read the confession that "there were men of high standing, clergymen and others, who complained that, far from exceeding in severity, our rebuke was not proportioned to the magnitude of the offence." It will be observed that the description of "the men of high standing, clergymen and others," exactly corresponds to that of the proprietors of the *Record;* and it would not be an unreasonable inference, that, although the said proprietors did not speak of Mr. Alford at the two business meetings, they came, either together or severally, into the editor's back-parlour, and stimulated the zeal of their hireling by some injunctions, which, at all events, did not mean that he was to write *up* Mr. Alford.

The third case which we shall cite is thus described by the *Guardian* of August 13, 1856:—"The *Record* smarting under the admonition of the Bishop of Lincoln to the religious press, for its unfounded charges of Popery against the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which his Lordship recently denounced so emphatically at Nottingham, has not ceased its attacks on Bishop Jackson, whom it fears may be translated to the See of London. The following paragraph would seem to intimate that the malignity of its attacks were too much for its own readers:

'We have received several letters from clergymen in the diocese of Lincoln, complaining of the allusion made in a recent article to the Bishop of Lincoln's alleged love of state. . . . .[1] The allusion to his Lordship's "love of state" had reference to the state kept up at Rischolm, and some of those, from whom we derive our information, attributed this want of simplicity, not so much to his Lordship's own predilections, as to the novelty of the position to one suddenly elevated to so high a station, and, consequently, more likely to err from a desire to keep up, not so much his personal, as his official dignity. It is no uncommon remark that the son of a nobleman, accustomed from his youth to move in the highest circles, often exhibits as a Bishop far more simplicity in his table, his equipage, and his retinue, than another who has recently sprung from the middle classes of society.'" The Vicar of Nottingham, who was one of the remonstrating clergy of the diocese of Lincoln, and who calls himself a "well-wisher" of the *Record*, writes an indignant letter to the Editor in reply to this base and dastardly avoidance of an apology. "You do not," he says to the Editor, "insert any of those communications [which the Editor admitted were written to him], neither do you, in the slightest degree, modify your aspersions; but you reiterate them, accompanied by an unbecoming and invidious reference to the Bishop's former position in society. . . . With regard to the Bishop's alleged love of state, allow me to repeat, that your assertions are not only without any foundation in truth, but directly at variance with the real state of the case." He adds that he had lately been in company with about a dozen of the clergy of Nottingham, and that "they were unanimous in condemning the attack upon him [the Bishop] which appeared in your paper of the 8th, and in the conviction that he [the Bishop] had notoriously exhibited the very opposite of the character imputed to him." When we add that, even after this, the *Record* did not retract its slanders or offer any apology, but merely evaded the duty by shifting its ground, we shall be justified in expressing our surprise that any gentleman or clergyman in the country can be found to support such a paper. Because a Bishop, in the discharge of his duty, rebukes the *Record*

[1] We omit in this and in the other extract a reference to the Bishop's efficiency as an administrator, which is a matter of opinion only.

for a slanderous imputation directed against a religious Society, the managers of the paper conceive themselves justified, on the strength of the miserable gossip which they studiously collect by their anonymous spies, to bring an irrelevant charge against the Bishop's private and social arrangements; and then endeavour to justify it by an insolent allusion to the fact that this Prelate, like many others, has been promoted to his dignity from a previous position less aristocratic! If the statement had been true, it would have been no answer to the Bishop's admonition. Being, as almost every personality in the *Record* is proved to be on examination, utterly baseless and false, the malignant aspersion is nevertheless maintained in spite of a direct and emphatic contradiction, and merely so transposed into other language as to avert the alternative of a candid confession of wrong-doing or a justification of the statement by the production of competent witnesses.

These three instances may suffice as specimens of the manner in which the *Record* undertakes to vindicate Christianity—to uphold the religion of truth and benevolence. Any amount of similar transgressions might be collected from the pages of this odious journal. But it is quite unnecessary to multiply particular instances in a case where good men of all parties, beyond the limits of a narrow sect, feel themselves compelled to denounce, as mean, mendacious, and malignant,—as combining the venal slanders of the *Age* and the *Satirist* with the unctuous hypocrisy of Exeter Hall, as, in short, a scandal to the religion, and a disgrace to the free press of England,—a newspaper, which is the most prominent champion of Bibliolatry, and the accredited organ of the factious minority which aspires to guide and govern the Church.

The disgust, which has been so generally excited by the outrages of the *Record*, has found its expression in more than one periodical; and the proprietors of this wretched journal have thought it necessary to seek some apology for themselves under an attack from another so-called religious paper (*Record*, May 30, 1856). With affected moderation of tone, they rest their defence against the charges of intolerance, folly, and slanderous violence, on the position that "feeble likes and dislikes, in questions of religious faith and practices, are the sure index of a

feeble moral condition"; and that "those who love and prize the truth, as infinitely precious, must hate the errors which undermine it, and contend warmly against them; and those who embrace any error, believing it to be the truth, must of necessity do the same." This lax plea evades the point at issue. The *Record* is not censured for its zeal, but for its general dishonesty and for its want of Christian charity in dealing with the *persons* whose opinions are at variance with those of the Evangelical party. The faith, which the *Record* professes to be zealous for, teaches us that we ought to love our brethren; and, though "a good hater" may be a fine party-man, he cannot by any possibility be a good Christian. There may be such a thing as *Odium Theologicum*, but *Odium Christianum* is a contradiction in terms. If the conceptions of religious truth which the *Record* represents and endeavours to enforce, not by argument, but by a proscription and denunciation of those who adopt a different view of Christianity, were in themselves perfectly supported by legitimate deductions from Scripture; if, in fact, the religious theory of the Recordites were as Scripturally valid as it is eminently precarious, they would be disqualified for the office of teaching this theory, by the practical manifestations of a spirit at variance with the first principles of the Gospel. If Jesus has declared, and John has repeated, that what we do unto one of the least of these his brethren, we do unto him, and that he who loveth not his brother abideth in death, no good can come from an advocacy of religion which uses zeal as a cloak for maliciousness. And, as Paul has enjoined us, if we wish to be regenerate, to put away lying and to speak every man truth with his neighbour, we cannot recognise the children of light in those whose trade it is to bear false witness against their brethren. But, if the malice and falsehood involved in the *Record's* calumnious vilification of all, who wish and hope to be Christians without pronouncing the shibboleth of the Low Church party, must bring discredit on such a mode of defending the faith; the particular theory, which they would maintain by this mode of action, stands condemned by this substitution of personal denunciation for calm and reasonable arguments. And, if the Christian advocate must fail unless, as we have shown above, he endeavours at least to recommend his cause by his conduct, the literary champion, who has no better weapons than virulent abuse and unscrupulous slander, shows

by his mode of proceeding that he has no confidence in the strength of his cause.

The position of the *Record*, as a professedly religious organ, cannot be better indicated than by the fact that a very able weekly journal has drawn an unfavourable contrast between this paper and one which affects a sort of opposition to Christian orthodoxy. In an article "on the Secular Press," which appeared in the *Saturday Review* for the 5th April, 1856, we find the following remarks: "The *Record* and the *Reasoner* differ in many respects. The *Record* is bitter, false, and malignant. The *Reasoner* is not by any means taxable with these faults—it is written with calmness and admits contradictions with candour. The *Record* is eternally prying into private affairs. The *Reasoner* appear to us to confine itself within the limits of fair criticism. The *Record* and the *Reasoner* are both ignorant, and not over logical; but the *Reasoner* is far the least offensively written of the two. . . . Both of them attach infinite importance to a certain set of opinions—both of them believe that their respective views are the indispensable condition of human progress and happiness—and each of them goes on gyrating in its own small circle, grinding its own small assortment of tunes on the same barrel over and over again, and never showing the smallest result."

It might perhaps be thought that the narrow-minded ignorance of the writers in the *Record*, and their want of literary ability, do not allow us to regard the existence of such a paper as a phenomenon of any significance. No doubt this consideration enables individuals, who are attacked by the *Record*, to treat it with silent contempt, and has probably saved the proprietors from many an action for libel. But the paper, stupid and dastardly as it is, represents or expresses the feelings of a considerable number of readers and purchasers. It is the *foolometer*, in Sydney Smith's phrase, of a distinct party in the Church; and the formidable fact is, that such a low type of theological information and Christian morality should be paraded by any section of a Protestant community. An event, which has recently occurred at Liverpool, shows that the unchristian spirit of Bibliolatry, which is advocated in the *Record* newspaper, has its living representatives in the clergy of the Established Church, and especially in those districts where the middle class, con-

sidered as the rich but uneducated or imperfectly educated class, exercises uncontrolled the authority of prejudiced respectability.[1]

It appears[2] that the Clerical Society of Liverpool, consisting of seventy-seven members, lately expelled one of their body under the following circumstances. This Society, which professedly holds its meetings to enable the clergy of the neighbourhood to interchange their thoughts on scriptural questions, had arranged, through the committee, that a certain Dr. Baylee, and Mr. Macnaught, the clergyman who was eventually expelled, should discuss, on opposite sides, the question of inspiration. The meeting for this purpose took place on the 8th January, 1855. Dr. Baylee "urged that there was no logical resting-place between verbal inspiration and atheism. A man must either believe that every *word* of Scripture was inspired, or he ought (logically) to deny the existence of a God!" On the other side, Mr. Macnaught argued "that the Bible was inspired, but that this did not prevent there being errors in the Bible." This view of the matter was very unfavourably received by the society, and one of the members, a certain Mr. Minton, said "he would not stoop to pick up a Bible, which might lie at his feet, unless he thought it was the Infallible Word of God"!! Fifteen months passed away, however, without any unpleasantness between Mr. Macnaught and his brother members. But, early in 1856, Mr. Macnaught published, "with a quantity of additional matter, but without any alteration of opinion," the article which he had read before the society, as a book entitled: "The Doctrine of Inspiration; being an inquiry concerning the Infallibility, Inspiration, and Authority of Holy Writ:" and, at the April meeting of the society in the same year, Mr. Macnaught had occasion to remark, on the strength of the text in Col. i. 24, that Christ's sufferings were in some sense deficient, a statement which provoked a good deal of opposition; and a certain Mr. Pollock declared "that his dear friend and brother, Mr. Macnaught, was preaching antichrist." This meeting was followed,

[1] We have made some remarks on this section of society in *Classical Scholarship and Classical Learning*, pp. 87 foll.

[2] See "*Free Discussion* versus *Intolerance*, or the Liverpool Clerical Society's mode of expelling a brother clergyman who differed from them and expressed his difference"; a Narrative by the Rev. John Macnaught, M.A., Oxon. London, 1856. That this expulsion is "a most significant fact for the laity" has been shown in an able and temperate article in the *Saturday Review* for 5th July, 1856.

on the 2nd May, by an attempt, on the part of a Dr. Hugh McNeile, who seems to be the leader of the Irish Millennarian party at Liverpool, and who is a sort of Protestant Pope in that great commercial city,[1] to induce Mr. Macnaught to retire from the Clerical Society. And the attempt having failed, Mr. Macnaught was surprised at the next meeting, on the 5th May, to hear the following notice of motion announced, without any previous intimation to himself:—

"The Rev. John Macnaught, having avowed, in meetings of this society, sentiments respecting the inspiration of Scripture, and the atonement of Christ's death, which are contrary to the deepest convictions of its members,

Resolved—

That he be no longer considered a member of this society."

This resolution was undertaken by the Dr. Baylee who had been Mr. Macnaught's opponent in the previous discussion, and Mr. Howson promised to second it. It was not alleged that Mr. Macnaught had offended against any law of the society, the express object of which was the discussion of such subjects. When the meeting took place, Mr. Macnaught was not tried for what he had said before the society, but for his book. The additional question about the Atonement, was eventually dropped, and, by a majority of fifty-five to four—three members having declined to vote, and fifteen being absent—Mr. Macnaught was arbitrarily expelled. The pamphlet, from which we have derived these details, is, of course, an *ex parte* statement, and we do not profess to defend all that Mr. Macnaught has said and done; but the general truth of his statement has not been disputed, and it is adequately guaranteed by documents. The narrative establishes the following significant facts:—

(1). That the members of an evangelical society may think and say anything, provided they do not publish their thoughts;

(2). That the publication of anything opposed to the dogmas of Bibliolatry, obliges a clerical society to discard an unexceptionable brother clergyman, whether their rules permit it or not.

That it was the publication of Mr. Macnaught's views, and

[1] We learn, from a letter published in the *Guardian*, September 17, 1856, that this Dr. McNeile, though a clergyman of the Established Church, has spoken in public of the "soul-destroying doctrine of repentance," and that he once proposed to punish Roman Catholic clergymen with death (!) for the exercise of their office as confessors.

not his communication of them to the Clerical Society, which made it necessary to expel him, appears from the lapse of time between his discussion with Dr. Baylee and that gentleman's motion for his extrusion. Indeed, the Venerable Archdeacon who presided on the latter occasion, seems to admit as much. And if their "deepest convictions" were so wounded by the paper, why did they not demolish the arguments by which it was supported? That, surely, was the proper business of the society, as such. It is needless, however, to make any remark on the cowardice and dishonesty of the whole proceeding. With regard to the book, which furnished the immediate occasion for all this intolerance, it has a certain value, not because it is, but because it is not, a work of original research or learned details. It states, simply and popularly, some of the reasons which prevent us from regarding the Bible as infallible; but, at the same time, it maintains that "although there has, for many centuries, existed a false and superstitious opinion in favour of inspirational infallibility, yet there still is recognised and admitted, among all believers, the ancient, scriptural, and only true idea of Inspiration, according to which the term signifies that action of the Divine Spirit by which, apart from any idea of infallibility, all that is good in man, beast, or matter, is originated and sustained" (p. 196): and the author takes a very high and reverent view of the value of the Bible, and maintains, with perfect justice, that his sentiments are compatible with his position as a minister of the English Church (pp. 290 *sqq.*). In fact, Mr. Macnaught's book on Inspiration is one of the class of works which we most wish to see in the hands of those respectable and serious, but ignorant and narrow-minded citizens of the middle class, who give importance to the Cummings, McNeiles, Baylees, and Mintons; who accept, as exclusive Christianity, their mixture of Judaism and Calvinism; who construe the prohibition of labour on the Jewish Sabbath into a prohibition of innocent recreation on the Christian Sunday; and who enable the proprietors of such journals as the *Record* to count upon that which they probably value more than even the gratification of their arrogance and malignity—a remunerative circulation.

With these, and many like examples before us, we cannot doubt that the spirit of Bibliolatry is eminently unchristian. If we might use the coarse language which one of its most un

scrupulous advocates applied to its opponent, the so-called Neology, we might say with truth that this hypothesis of an infallible literature "begins with befooling the understandings," and that "it is well if it does not end with debauching the consciences of its disciples." The *Record* is the most scandalous example of this atrocious spirit; but other so-called religious journals, in proportion as they are bibliolatrous, in the same proportion exhibit a dereliction from the duty of love and truthfulness. And no one, who is anxious for the promotion of true religion, or zealous for the honour of Christianity, will be disposed, with the panegyrist of the Haldanes, "to look lightly on those unamiable manifestations of feeling," which have led to an organized system of personal calumny and detraction. "Jealousy for the Word of God," which is pleaded in extenuation of these scandalous offences against Christian charity, fair reasoning, and literary honesty, is only another name for the uncompromising maintenance of a theory respecting the Scriptures, which is found to be convenient, if not essential, for the support of a certain form of external religion, and which is at least a watch-word or shibboleth for a faction in the Church. Party spirit, a desire for personal influence, and a love of gain, will be found to be the main motives for all the turbulence of Exeter Hall and all the virulence of the religious press. The same feelings of compromised self-interest, which led Mr. Brooks to his brutal assault on Mr. Sumner, and justified the Southern States in their applause of that felonious act, are at work in the minds of those who call themselves the "religious world"—alas! "more worldly" than "religious," in every point of view. The vindictive slave-owner struck down his brother legislator, because his unchristian and inhuman trade had been boldly exposed; and the bibliolatrous journals, with the full consent and applause of their constituents, boast that they can proscribe and ruin, strike down morally and trample on, all those who differ from them, and have the courage to state the grounds for their dissent. But they stand denounced themselves in words which the Founder of our religion addressed to their prototypes, the scribes and Pharisees of Judæa: "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves" (Matth. xxiii. 15). Who is "a child of hell," if this

awful designation is not applicable to him whose selfishness takes that particular form of malice and falsehood which is personified in the ideal type of the devil? And is not the following sentence, which appears in Julius Müller's classical treatise "on Sin" (vol. i. p. 241, 3rd edition), a most true description of the spirit which animates the so-called religious journalists? "Christ adduces hatred and lying as two main directions of evil, in the domain of the spirit, when he designates the devil as, on the one hand, the murderer from the beginning, and, on the other hand, as the liar and father of lies (John, viii. 44). Lying is the cowardice (*Feigheit*), hatred is the arrogance (*Uebermuth*) of selfishness. Nevertheless they mutually produce each other: from falsehood springs hatred; from disinclination to the truth arises animosity against the person who represents it: and hatred begets lying, because it requires it for the execution of its purposes." Müller adds in a note, that the manner in which hatred flows from falsehoood is taught us by Jesus himself in his conversations with the Jews. We, therefore, maintain that these Bibliolaters, who are so ready in their application of the term Antichrist, are themselves as antichristian as their predecessors who persecuted Christ to the death for disallowing their rigid Judaism.

There is only one consolatory reflection connected with this sad phenomenon. It is that the procedure of Bibliolaters is doing daily damage to their own cause.[1] The ignorant prejudices of the middle classes are very strong, and half-educated respectability will in some form or other require to be told authoritatively what must be believed—or professed. But no amount of prejudice or ignorance will prevent the majority of Englishmen from discovering, sooner or later, that "the insolent folly, unscrupulous detraction, reckless dishonesty, and unchristian violence of the so-called religious periodicals,"[2] are indications of a line of argument which has no intrinsic validity; and that those who condescend to the use of these weapons admit, by the conduct which they adopt, that their whole fabric of intolerant dogmatism rests upon a sandy foundation, and is already beginning to yield to the current of public opinion.

[1] One might almost suppose that the Recordites are, after all, Jesuits in the disguise of Puritans; who, as was the case in the reign of Elizabeth, have taken this method of bringing discredit on Protestantism

[2] *Classical Scholarship and Classical Learning*, p. 169.

It would, indeed, be a result of some importance, if the misconduct of the bibliolatrous press were to awaken the true Protestants of England—the lovers of religious and intellectual freedom—to a due sense of the present need for united action in opposition to a tyranny more overbearing, and, at the same time, more degrading, than that of Rome. When an organized conspiracy, under the name of Bible Christianity, is endeavouring to check and impede the progress of education and enlightenment in all that concerns religion; when an effort is made to circumscribe the English Church within the narrow limits of a Calvinistic sect; when these evangelicals, as they call themselves, are boasting that they can, with the aid of a well-intentioned, but ill-informed and narrow-minded nobleman, send their surpliced puritans to our cathedrals, and promote their shallow rhetoricians to our Bench of Bishops; when they have attempted to deprive us of literary correspondence on the first day of the week, and have succeeded in restraining the public relaxations of the Christian Sunday; when they can venture to denounce modern learning as dangerous impiety, and place in their *Index Expurgatorius* any work which is in accordance with the present state of biblical criticism; when they can openly avow the reasons which induce them to fear an improved version of the Scriptures, and stigmatise, as the influence of Apollyon, every manifestation of independent thought; when, under their inquisitorial discipline, the boasted respectability of the middle classes is becoming more and more a Temple of Untruth,[1] and the artificial faith of the half-educated men of business is more and more dependent on the untenable assumptions of their teachers, —in this state of things we may welcome any extravagance, which, by shocking the good taste and better feelings of the age, will create a reaction, and so contribute to the overthrow of a fanatical or self-seeking dictatorship, or at least provoke a declared and indignant antagonism to the unchristian and illiberal spirit of Bibliolatry.

[1] See a Dialogue on Respectability in *Blackwood's Magazine* for December, 1836, and especially p. 691, where respectability is described as the "British Antichrist."

CHAPTER IV.

INTERMEDIATE INTELLIGENCES.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SUPPOSED EXISTENCE OF INTERMEDIATE INTELLIGENCES.

We now come to the other objection, which has been advanced against the ordinary teaching of our religion, namely, that Christianity has made itself responsible for the truth of a system of angelology and dæmonology, which is clearly traceable to an unsubstantial origin in the human imagination. This dogma, as we have already mentioned, is mainly a result of that hypothesis respecting the literal infallibility of the Scriptures, which has been already tried in the balance, and found wanting. It is upheld chiefly because it has been found convenient to claim an absolute immunity from error for the writings of the Jews who returned from Babylon, and for those of the Christians who adopted the same views, or used the same language; and to admit as divine revelation the conceptions which they entertained, or seem to have entertained, respecting the existence and functions of intermediate intelligences. It is not perceived by those, who so strenuously defend this superstition, that, even on their own hypothesis of an infallible literature, it leads to the most formidable difficulties and contradictions. In the ante-Babylonian books, an angel is not a created intelligence

different from man, but a visible or physical manifestation of Jehovah himself; and Satan is only a name for those harms and hindrances which are attributed to the immediate agency of God, or cannot otherwise be explained. Accordingly, the new notion, that angels were intermediate created intelligences, and that Satan was a person, was either a valuable truth revealed to, or discovered by, an idolatrous nation before the people of God had any conception of it; or it was a false and mischievous doctrine, belonging to the dualism of Zoroaster, so long as it continued to be the exclusive possession of the heathens, but was converted into a supernatural and infallible revelation as soon as it was adopted by the Jews. This alternative was proposed long ago, and the Bibliolaters have found no escape from it. Then, again, both the Old and the New Testament agree in the doctrine, which lies at the basis of our religion, that man consists of a spirit of divine origin, and of a body, made from the dust of the ground; that, while the former is directly derived from the God of the spirits of all flesh, and is capable of direct communion with its source, the latter is the cause of all sin and suffering, the fruitful origin of all temptation to irreligion and immorality, the vehicle and fomes of corruption and death. To assert, therefore, the real existence of a separate class of created intelligences, is not to contradict one or two passages in Scripture, but to run counter to the general tenor of all revealed teaching. For, while the doctrine of good angels is opposed to that of the ministration of the Spirit of God, of the direct operation of the Holy Ghost on the soul of the faithful, the belief in bad angels involves the monstrous fallacy that the pure Spirit of God—for there is no other origin of spiritual existence—is capable of being corrupted without any corporeal or fleshly influences, and not only so, but capable of permanent and incurable depravity and wickedness. To maintain, therefore, a doctrine of intermediate intelligences, as a necessary sup-

plement to that of an infallible literature, is not merely to make the one untenable proposition the result of the other, but to upset all revelation, and, together with the truths of religion, to overthrow the very hypothesis which it was intended to support. It is generally said, by those who have no other argument to adduce, that we cannot disprove the existence of angels, because we do not know enough of the relations of spirit and matter to assert that such existences are impossible. And this was admitted long ago, even by Schleiermacher.[1] But we have an old rule of law: "de non apparentibus et de non exsistentibus eadem est ratio." We have heard nothing of angels since the publication of the Acts of the Apostles, and Schleiermacher himself plainly acknowledges that the Biblical evidences for their appearance are by no means satisfactory, and that they belong to a class of conceptions no longer possible in the world. And, if this belief is insufficiently supported by historical testimony, if it is opposed to the general teaching of revelation, and if its origin can be explained, it is surely disproved as completely as the nature of the subject admits.

This being the case, the only course open to the true advocate of Christianity, is to show that our religion has not, as is commonly supposed, identified itself with the cause of this superstitious mythology; and this we shall endeavour to do by proving that the belief in question, if it can be called one, is reducible to a pictorial representation of ideas more or less fanciful; that it is, in fact, merely the result of an affection of oriental phraseology, which our Saviour and his Apostles adopted along with the language of their country and age, but which has no permanent or essential connection with the Christian religion, any more than the Aramæan idiom in which it was first preached to the world.

We learn, from an accurate survey of the whole domain of

[1] *Der Christliche Glaube*, vol. i. §§ 42, 43, pp. 202 *sqq.* ed. 3

ancient mythology, that the doctrine of intermediate agency springs from the difficulty, which is felt whenever we wish to represent, or indeed to express the manifestation of God's active energy or the existence and effects of spiritual and physical evil. The vivid imagination of an eastern poet will not acquiesce in the abstract idea. He seeks to personify what he scarcely ventures to understand, and eventually an effort of the plastic fancy perpetuates itself in a convenient form of expression. The process, however, of personification, is gradually and slowly completed. At first, the angelophany is merely a visible indication of the special agency of God. No intimation is given that the medium of communication is a separate created intelligence. Where there is no distinction of will, but merely a ministerial act, the hypothesis of such a personality is an unnecessary increase to the machinery. The very form of the Hebrew word, which we translate "angel," shows that no personification was implied in the mode of expression, and every angelophany, recorded in those books which are free from the influence of Babylonian phraseology, expressly signifies that God himself was the only person who spoke or acted. Now the visible agency of God in this world must be by and through the powers of Nature. Consequently, according to the oriental notion, he is "Lord of Hosts," or ruler of the countless stars, which glitter in the canopy of heaven; and, if he descends to earth, he is seen or felt in his messengers or angels, in those natural functions which operate mysteriously for good or mischief. Clouds, winds, rainbows, lightnings, thunderings, voices, visionary forms, and the invisible attacks of pestilence, are all described as *mal'hâkîm*, or missionaries of the divine will. The rapid motion of these messengers soon invests them with wings, and we read of the "wings of the wind," and "the winged dart of God," namely, the thunderbolt. From this, the transition is easy to the winged bird, especially to the bird of prey, which flies fastest

between heaven and earth, and is most truly representative of the destructive power of an offended deity; hence, the eagle, the vulture, and the hawk, are messengers of the gods. Lastly, either a composite symbol, half-bird and half-beast, takes the place of the simple figure, or a winged man, with the head of an eagle, or entirely human, appears as the representative of the divine agency. When the shape of man is assumed, the will of man is easily added, and thus we arrive at the belief, if it can be so called, in created intelligences, intermediate between God and man.

This hieroglyphic process is so natural, that the pure theism of the Hebrews would not have been untainted by it, even if they had not sojourned among the flesh-pots of Egypt or had quite escaped all subsequent contact with Aramæan superstitions. As it is, we find in the Bible an exemplification of every step in this realistic procedure.[1]

That the constant phrase, "Lord God of *Sabaôth*, or Hosts," springs from an elementary conception of the Supreme Being as leader of the fire-breathing stars, which are the army of heaven, does not require any proof. Even the earliest chapters of Genesis speak of the stars as a *tzaba*, or "host," and it would have been remarkable that the Jews should have adopted, so universally, a mode of speaking which identified Jehovah with Ormuzd, the god of light, if criticism had not taught us that many of their books, supposed to be much more ancient, were not composed until after they had been exposed to the influence of Babylonian superstitions. When this phraseology first became common, we have no means of ascertaining; but the designation of Jehovah as "Lord of Hosts," does not occur in any book before the First of Samuel, and it is probable that it was an importation of heathen origin. All the nations, which lived round the Jews, were more or less given to the worship of the

[1] See, on this subject, *Jashar*, pp. 74 *sqq.*

elements. The existence of three cities in the land of Israel, bearing the name *Beth-Shemesh*, or "House of the Sun," shows that the worship of the great luminary was familiar to the Jews, and we know that, at a later period, the Persian worship of the sun, under equestrian symbols, was received even in the Temple at Jerusalem.

The stars, then, are the heavenly host which sings the praises of Jehovah; but, if he descends to earth, his chariot or vehicle is supplied by the clouds, the winds, the lightning, or the thunder. As the clouds, in this reference, are supposed to be in motion, there is frequently an interchange between these floating bodies and the wind which acts upon them. Thus the Psalmist says that Jehovah "maketh the clouds his chariot and walketh on the wings of the wind." The fantastic and ever-changing shapes of the clouds, to which sportive allusions are made by Shakspere and Aristophanes, not unnaturally suggested the idea of intelligent life as well as motion; and an English translation has spread an acquaintance with a Sanscrit poem called the *Megha-dúta, Nephel-angelus,* "or cloud-messenger," in which a banished *Yaksha*, or spirit, conveys an imaginary message to his wife by means of a cloud; "one of those noble masses," says the translator,[1] "which seem almost instinct with life, as they traverse a tropical sky in the commencement of the monsoon, and move with slow and solemn progression from the equatorial ocean to the snows of the Himâlaya." In this poem, the exile addresses the cloud with prayer and sacrifice, as a being of power and benevolence; he says:[2]

> "Hail, friend of Indra, counsellor divine,
> Illustrious offspring of a glorious line,
> Wearer of shapes at will; thy worth I know,
> And bold entrust thee with my fated woe:
> For better far solicitation fail
> With high desert, than with the base prevail."

[1] Wilson's *Megha-dúta*, p. iv. [2] P. 6.

With the earlier Jews, as we have already said, the *mal'hak* or "messenger" was not so much an independent medium of communication as the vehicle or manifestation of God himself; and this is particularly the case in regard to the clouds and winds. In a cloud Jehovah leads his chosen people out of Egypt, in a cloud he sits on the mercy seat, in a cloud he descends on Sinai. An igneous or luminous body is sometimes substituted for the cloud as a manifestation of the Deity. Thus the cloud which leads the way out of Egypt becomes a pillar of fire by night; God appears to Moses in a fiery shape; and the thick cloud on Mount Sinai is accompanied by thunders, lightnings, fire and smoke, and the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud. Of all luminous appearances, however, that which is felt to be most like a sign from God to man, a message from heaven to earth, is the rainbow. Thus the Greeks regarded the Iris, whose name denotes the arch which seems to bridge an access from the celestial regions to this lower world, as a messenger or angel of the gods: and there can be little doubt that this or some similar phenomenon is intended under the form of the ladder which Jacob saw in a dream; for as he called the place *Bethel*, "the house of God," it is clear that the angelic manifestation was regarded, in this as in other cases, as an epiphany of Jehovah himself, who stood above the ladder, of course veiled in a cloud. Similarly in the first mention of the rainbow it is said to be "set in a cloud."

Now the cloud and rainbow are visible forms; but the plastic imagination is necessarily summoned to our aid, if we wish to depict the momentary flash of lightning or the invisible violence of the hurricane. For these two manifestations of divine power the Hebrews adopted and personified the names of *Seraph*, "the burner," and *Cherub*, "the harpy or seizer"; and they are described together in the one hundred and fourth Psalm, where we read that God "makes the winds his messengers and

the flame of fire his ministers."[1] The former appears in Hebrew poetry as a flaming sword; in heathen mythology, as a winged thunderbolt, or as an eagle bearing the thunderbolt. The violent wind has in all mythologies, Oriental as well as Greek, a symbolical form combining the ideas of strength and velocity. Wings typify the rapid motion of the gale; the beak and talons of the eagle, sometimes the claws of the lion, are called in to show how the tornado seizes on and carries off its prey. It is highly interesting to know that in almost all languages this compound symbol was expressed by the root, which enters into the Hebrew *k'rûb* or *cherub*, and which seems to denote the power of seizing or snatching. Thus we have the Greek *harp-ies*, which Homer designates as stormy winds; the Persian *gryf-ons*, which guarded the gold; the Egyptian sphinx, probably termed *k'rabu*, which watched over the sepulchres; and the Greek *kerb-erus*, which barred the entrance to Hades.[2] That the *cherub* was merely a symbol or hieroglyph is admitted by Clement of Alexandria, and that it represented the wind, as one of the manifestations of the power of God, is clear from the words of the Psalmist: "He rode upon a cherub and did

[1] See *Jashar*, pp. 76, 230.

[2] Our previous discussion on this subject, in which we have nothing to alter, and to which we refer our readers, has been, of course, attacked by the Roman Catholic writer in the *Dublin Review*, Sept. 1855, pp. 221–224. It would be a waste of time to answer the sophistical cavils in this criticism, some of which are refuted by anticipation in Rosenmüller's note on Exod. xxv. 18. When, however, the reviewer objects to the etymology itself as extraordinary, and not to be paralleled in German philology, we will ask him to consult Julius Fuerst, who takes his view of the sanctity of the subject, but nevertheless writes thus (*Concordantiæ*, p. 571): "כְּרוּב n. m. sicut γρυπός (*Greif*) prehendens, tenens, custodiens aliquid, velut introitum Paradisi vel sacri fœderis aream. *Gryphi* Græcorum et *Sphinges* Ægyptiorum, quos Alexandrinus Philo comparat, imitatione ex Cherubis Hebræorum expressa esse videntur." And with regard to the possibility of a connexion between Hebrew and Sanscrit, on the one hand, and Hebrew and ancient Egyptian, on the other, we beg him to refresh his memory by reading again a book, with which, no doubt, he is as well acquainted as with any other in the English language, namely, Cardinal Wiseman's "Lectures on the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion," vol. i. pp. 88, 94–101, 372–376. Indeed this was rather a pet subject with his Eminence some twenty years ago, when he had the advantage of instructive intercourse with Bunsen and Lepsius.

fly; yea, he did fly upon the wings of the wind." As the chariot or steed of God, the cherub exemplifies his active power. But there is an easy transition from this idea to that of passive majesty enthroned in a fixed abode: and so we see that the cherubs over the ark represent the seat of Jehovah, when he descended like a cloud upon his sanctuary; and the prophet Isaiah and the Psalmist describe his throne as supported by these symbolical figures.

There is yet one more application of this imaginative machinery. As supporters of the throne of God, the cherubim are not only symbols of the Divine presence, but also, as a necessary consequence, signs of warning to forbid a rash or profane approach to the shrine of inaccessible sanctity. The same feeling, which justified the infliction of instant death on Uzzah for laying his hand on the ark of God, would readily invest the symbols attached to it and other like emblems of present Deity, with a sort of warning or prohibitory power. Hence we find that the cherub and the cognate symbols represent guardians who bar the approaches to that which is forbidden or inaccessible. In the first mention which we have of cherubim, they prohibit all access to the tree of life in the forfeited garden of Eden, and here they are accompanied with a flaming sword, perhaps represented as a breath of fire proceeding from their mouths, but more probably the cognate form of the seraphim.[1] As these emblems deny all return to forbidden happiness, so the *kerb-erus* of heathen mythology blocks the entrance to the unexplorable recesses of the grave. In the midst of the errors caused by his imperfect acquaintance with the language and religion of the Medo-Persian tribes, Herodotus has preserved for us a most interesting fragment of this symbolical mythology in his account of the Arimaspians. This one-eyed equestrian people, who dwell in the hyperborean

[1] See *Jashar*, p. 78.

regions, which are considered as the inaccessible sanctuary of the sun, can only represent the figure of the sun-god himself mounted on his heavenly courser, and with his head surmounted by the circular disk which always typifies his orb, and so often serves as a foundation for the belief in Cyclopian or monophthalmic deities; while the gryfon, which

> Pursues the Arimaspian, who by stealth
> Had from his wakeful custody purloined
> The guarded gold,

represents the cherub, which vainly seeks to prevent the golden light of day from being borne to the southern regions by *arimaspa* or *ahuramasdaçpa*, "the horseman of light."

The transition from the compound figure to one which is human, with the exception of the *cherubic* or *gryphon-head*, and from this again to the merely winged man, is to be seen on the Nineveh marbles. And of course the anthropomorphic messenger of heaven would naturally be invested with distinct personality. There is, however, no evidence to show that the Jews conceived the existence of created intelligences, intermediate to God and man, until after the Babylonian captivity had made them acquainted with the superstitions of their conquerors. And here an entirely new range of mythology was opened to them. The attempt to account for the existence of physical and moral evil, which is natural to all men, presented itself in Mesopotamia and Medo-Persia under the form of an antagonistic dualism. The two opposite empires of light and darkness were placed under the rule of two opposite deities. *Ormuzd* or *Ahura-mazdâo*, "the lord of light," had his host of pure and happy beings, who carried out his beneficent purposes: whereas *Ahriman*, "the king of darkness," worked out his evil designs by the instrumentality of the malignant dæmons, who were obedient to his will. The world lay between these two empires, and was the scene of a perpetual strife between the

rival principles of good and evil, to which the alternations of happiness or misery in this life were a perpetual testimony.[1]

The older and purer theology of the Jews recognised only one supreme ruler of the world, to whose providence, whether for good or evil to his creatures, all events were consistently attributed. In the noble language of the second Isaiah, the opposing functions of Ormuzd and Ahriman are expressly claimed for the God of Israel:[2] "I am the Lord and there is none else, there is no God beside me: I form the light and I create darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all these things." In accordance with this view, we find that the obduracy of Pharaoh is sometimes ascribed to the influence of Jehovah on his heart, and at other times attributed to his own inherent perverseness. When David resolves to number his people, this disastrous act is ascribed in one passage to the anger of the Lord, in another it is said that *Satan*, or "the adversary," stood up against Israel and provoked David to number Israel; and the punishment is referred, not to any external agency, but to the destroying angel of God. We learn from the story of Balaam that Jehovah could assume the character of *Satan*, or "the adversary," to prevent, as well as to provoke, an evil action: for when that mercenary prophet went on his forbidden journey, the angel of the Lord, that is, Jehovah himself, stood in the way for a *Satan* or "adversary" against him.

As Plutarch has shown that the Egyptians had their dualism no less than the Babylonians, we have a strong proof of the overruling sanction with which the religion of Moses was delivered, in these sounder views respecting the unity of divine providence. On the other hand, the degraded Jews, who returned from the captivity and exile, incorporated the dualistic mythology of their conquerors with the half-understood traditions

[1] Above, pp. 129 foll. [2] xlv. 5, 7; above, p. 133.

of their own purer faith. Angels and dæmons were regarded as real inhabitants of the invisible world. Sinful suggestions and influences were placed under the control of *Satan*, "the adversary," who was raised to a personal existence and identified with Ahriman. All diseases and disasters, the origin of which was unknown or misunderstood, were set down to the pernicious agency of dæmons, and the angels of light were considered as engaged in all occurrences of a pleasing or beneficent character. And this fantastic phraseology, for it was nothing more, had so completely incorporated itself with the ordinary language in our Saviour's time, that he was constrained to accommodate his own words to the weakness and ignorance of those whom he had to address. But we must be careful to distinguish between the Babylonian superstitions of the Jews, which were aggravated by the legendary lore of the Rabbis, and to which Jesus necessarily lent a sort of tacit countenance, and that modern system of supernatural machinery, which is partly derived from the theories put forth in the latter half of the third century by the Persian Manes or Manichæus, and partly from the fairies and dæmons of Teutonic mythology, and to which the ignorance of the Western Church in the Middle Ages has given a stamp of ecclesiastical tradition. It is from these later sources, and not from the New Testament, that we have borrowed the ridiculous hobgoblins of the nursery; and the hideous Moloch of Calvinistic preachers, an imaginary being who almost takes from God his attributes of goodness and omnipotence, and shares with him in the attributes of omniscience and omnipresence, is a lively plant of Manichæan growth, a comparatively recent importation from Persia.[1]

[1] Landor, *Imaginary Conversations*, vol. i. p. 179. London, 1846: "The Church of Scotland brings close together the objects of veneration and abhorrence. The evil principle, or devil, was, in my opinion, hardly worth the expense of his voyage from Persia; but since you have him, you seem resolved to treat him nobly, hating him, defying him, and fearing him nevertheless"

In order that we may clearly understand how far Jesus and his Apostles adopted or sanctioned the popular language of the Jews respecting the existence of angels and devils, how far the concession or accommodation was inevitable, and how far it involved important moral or religious considerations, it will be necessary to consider the question from the point of view from which it was presented to our Lord himself. And here we shall waive the question, whether Jesus was or was not, before his resurrection, so informed by his immanent divinity, that he did not think and reason, according to his human nature, like the best and most learned of his countrymen. We will assume his infinite superiority to his age and race even in the unexplored domains of human science and criticism.

Reserve in the communication of knowledge, when the parties are, or may be, on a footing of equality, is mere dissimulation, which might proceed from the most dishonest motives. But when a teacher is infinitely superior to those about him, his mode of speaking must admit of a certain amount of accommodation or condescension. We all act upon this principle in our dealings with children, and a learned clergyman must frequently place himself, by a deliberate effort, on a level with the apprehension of his ignorant congregation. These rules are *à fortiori* applicable to the revelations made by a superior being in any age or country. We believe that Jesus Christ made such a revelation. Whatever might have been the eminence of his knowledge on any subject, it is obvious that his teaching would have been unintelligible, and therefore ineffectual, if it had not assumed the forms of speech, and the habits of mind, of his countrymen and contemporaries.[1] When erroneous conceptions, expressed in words, have infected the phraseology of a

I would not, however, place him so very near the Creator, let his pretensions, from custom and precedent, be what they may."

[1] There are some excellent remarks on this subject in Norton's *Genuineness of the Gospels*, vol. ii. pp. 477 *sqq.*

whole generation of men, the remedy is not to be sought in a mere change of expression. The language of modern science would have been an unknown tongue even one hundred years ago. What would have been the case among the ignorant and illiterate Jews, if an inspired teacher of moral truths had begun by requiring them to correct their ignorance of the nervous system, and of the disorders which are traceable to its pathology? The question which naturally suggested itself to our Lord, supposing him to be possessed of all our present and future acquirements in science, was as to the relation between the errors which he perceived, and the truths which he wished to convey. He would not sanction or continue religious error, but he would not, for speculative reasons, impede the success of his own great undertaking by turning aside to correct mistaken conceptions, which were not immediately concerned in the matter, and which were felt to be connected with the language of his country rather than with the facts of the case. We shall, moreover, see presently, that the more correct view was entertained by an influential sect among the Jews, whose tenets on one important point were vitally opposed to the cardinal fact in the revelation of Jesus.

Let us, in the first place, confine ourselves to the dæmonology of the Hebrews. They spoke as if they believed that Satan, as the ruler of the powers of darkness, or Beelzebub, the prince of devils, was always engaged in mischievous attacks on the body and soul of man. Like the Greeks, they personified *Atë*, or "mischief." In regard to the bodily organs, certain affections of the nervous system were supposed to result from dæmoniacal possession. Thus any one who was liable to idiocy, mania, loss of speech or hearing, and even to fits of epilepsy, was said to be possessed by one or more devils, according to the language used by the patient in his ravings, or by analogy, in the case of those who had what were termed dumb spirits.

Although this spiritual machinery was presumed, the Jews themselves, according to Josephus, regarded dæmoniacal possession as a bodily disease, and employed medicines to cure or alleviate several of these cases;[1] and our use of the word "lunatic" to express similar affections, although no one now believes that the moon has anything to do with diseases of the brain, shows that an erroneous phraseology may be used without deception or dissimulation. Modern physical science will not allow, for a moment, that anything beyond an affection of the brain, *medulla oblongata*, spine, or ganglionic system, is the cause of these diseases, and modern psychology rejects with disdain any such hypothesis as that which the Jews adopted. If the evils, of which we are conscious in this life, result from the combination or juxtaposition of spirit and matter (and this is

[1] All the older opinions are collected by Wetstein in a long note on Matth. iv. 24, pp. 279-284. It is worthy of remark, that Dr. Nathaniel Lardner, the great advocate of historical Christianity, did not believe in dæmoniacal possession. At the end of the first volume of his collected works (Lond. 1838) will be found four discourses "on the case of the dæmoniacs mentioned in the New Testament," in which the whole subject is fully and temperately discussed. Some of his remarks are well worthy of the notice of our modern Manichæans. Among other things he says (p. 483): "The scripture, in agreement with reason, and the general persuasion of mankind, supposes one soul or spirit in a man; and for other spirits to subsist therewith, and to control and actuate all his members, is an incongruity that ought not to be admitted." With regard to the man who thought himself possessed by a legion of evil spirits, he makes the following remarks, p. 494: "Every one should judge for himself; but to me it appears most probable that this (the destruction of the swine) was done by the man himself called Legion . . . When he had conceived the thought of gratifying the evil spirits, by which he imagined himself to be possessed, with the destruction of the swine, he would, without much difficulty, drive them off the precipice. If some few of them were put in motion, the whole herd would follow . . . This appears to me a much more reasonable way of accounting for the loss of the swine, than to suppose that our blessed Lord accepted and granted the petition of evil spirits." Those who maintain that a belief in Christianity requires an implicit adoption of the letter of the New Testament narratives, should recollect that these remarks proceed from the greatest writer on the evidences of our religion, whose epitomiser, Paley, still furnishes the text-book to one of our universities. We may also refer to Lardner's remarks on the scientific ignorance of the sacred writers (p. 479 foll.), and on the countenance given by our Lord to the common and prevailing opinion on the subject of dæmoniacal possession (p. 504 foll.). But the whole discussion is well worth the attention of modern Bibliolaters.

philosophically certain), it is demonstrable that *spirit* does not cause the *evils*, of which spirit is the *unwilling recipient*, and which could not arise except by and through the material adjuncts of the mind. The very diseases, which are referred to demoniacal possession, are affections of the mind, resulting from a morbid condition of the bodily organs, and are therefore, strictly speaking, exemplifications of the antagonism between body and spirit, to which we attribute all evil. It seems, therefore ridiculous to speak of a spiritual possession for the purpose of finally affecting the mind by means of a nervous, that is to say, a corporeal instrumentality.

Now our Lord undertook to prove his divine authority by an exercise of Godlike power in the benevolent cure of all diseases; and he was not likely to neglect the most distressing and hopeless of human maladies. As therefore he restored the blind, the lame, the leper, so he laid his healing hand on the still more unhappy epileptic, idiot, and maniac. But there was no theory about the former cases, whereas the latter were attributed to non-existent spiritual agencies. Could the Jews have understood the correction of their error, if Jesus had thought fit to give it? And if not, what would religion have gained by the attempt? His object clearly was, by one and the same act, to do good and to prove his divine authority, and these objects were equally accomplished, whether his wondering attendants believed in dæmoniac possession or were astonished with anticipations of modern medical science. He might have foreseen the follies and crimes connected with a belief in witchcraft, just as he foresaw other mischiefs immediately springing from his religion. But how could he so far anticipate the enlightenment of after ages, as to wean the ignorant Jews from their deep-seated dæmonology? "That this superstition," says an able writer,[1] "embodied in the Scripture, has been the cause of many evils, is incontrover-

[1] *Prospective Review*, No. xxiii. p. 386.

tible. But causes anterior to Christianity created the superstition: a Bibliolatry, of which Christianity is independent, prolonged it. It is easy to expatiate on the mischiefs of this or any other error left uneradicated by the new religion: but unless we take into comparison the state in which the case had been *before*, or would have been *without* Christianity, we shut out the conditions of all rational judgment. For ourselves, we are convinced that the dualistic belief, expressed in the doctrine of *possession*, is truer and more favourable to moral progress than any theory of unreduced evil accessible under the same condition of the human intellect. To ask for the religious fruits of physical science, before the science exists, appears to us in the highest degree unreasonable."

It is easy to perceive, even in the brief accounts given by the Evangelists, that our Lord, in his dealings with the Jews, rather acquiesced in the established phraseology than sanctioned the prevalent superstition.[1] When the centurion applied to Jesus to heal his paralytic servant, our Lord replied, "I will come and heal him." But the centurion deprecated the personal visit as unnecessary: he thought that, as he gave commands to his inferiors in military rank, so our Lord's simple word would

[1] The Talmudists, who echo the opinions prevalent among the Jews of our Saviour's time, express, by the one term Satan, both the subjective and objective existence of evil, both that which is in the human breast, and that which assails us from without. "They understood by this term the obscure relation which prevails between the fortunate man and external circumstances, where a single instant, often without our concurrence, may introduce many changes. They also understood the daemoniacal in man himself, the self-oblivion of his weakness, and the manifestation of his brutality. Moreover, the word Satan denotes every danger in general. When we read in the Talmud, that 'Satan accuses in the time of danger,' this signifies merely the greater proximity of risk; or still more specially when we read: 'Do not stand in the way of the ox when he comes from the meadow, for Satan leaps up between his horns,' this only means that the ox is then wild, and therefore more dangerous than at other times" (Dukes, *Rabbinische Blumenlese*, pp. 107, 108). And with regard to moral evil: "*Satan* means, in the Talmud, *sensuality*, and *passion* in general, which cause moral death. In this sense we must understand the Talmudic proverb, 'Satan, evil thoughts, and the angel of death, are one and the same thing'" (Id. *Ibid.* p. 145).

exact obedience from the intermediate agents in his miracles, whom he, no doubt, conceived as consisting of many legions of angels. And Jesus accepted his view with an encomium on his faith. The military associations of the moment no doubt suggested the allusion to the twelve legions of angels, whom he might have summoned at the time of his arrest. His acquiescence in the proposal of the Gergesene maniac, that his host of oppressors should be transferred to the herd of swine, appears to us to rest on a similar condescension: though this miracle, as has always been felt, involves some difficulties peculiar to itself. That he regarded the case of dæmoniac possession as only one of those natural irregularities which invited his divine interference, is shown by the fact that he adopted the same prosopopœia in calming a storm or allaying a fever. Thus, while we read of the case of a dæmoniac,[1] "he *rebuked* the foul spirit, saying unto him, thou dumb and deaf spirit, I charge thee come out of him and enter no more into him"; we find that, when he healed Simon's wife's mother, "he stood over her and *rebuked*[2] the fever, and it left her"; and when he rescued his disciples from the storm on the lake, "he arose and *rebuked*[3] the winds and the sea, and there was a great calm." If it is only by a figure of speech that we can be said to *rebuke* a fever or a storm, we cannot deny a figurative meaning to the same word when it expresses the similar injunction addressed to a morbid affection of the nervous centres.

Thus much may suffice for a brief examination of our Lord's mode of dealing with the Hebrew dæmonology, so far as the bodily organs were concerned. But Satan and his emissaries were also represented as acting on the mind and will. Thus seven devils are said to have been expelled from the woman who was a sinner, and Satan is described as entering into the per-

[1] Mark, ix. 25, ἐπετίμησε. [2] Luke, iv. 39, ἐπετίμησε.
[3] Matth. viii. 26, ἐπετίμησε.

fidious Apostle when he resolved to betray his Master. Now either these are merely figures of speech, or they are assertions of the existence of a being or beings who are cognizant of the thoughts of man and capable of setting aside the limitations of space and time. To say nothing of the obvious conclusion that, if so, omniscience and omnipresence are not distinctive attributes of God, but shared also by a host of unclean and malignant spirits in open opposition to Him, we should require to be told how that which is external to the mind can produce conceptions, otherwise than through the senses. Of course, we reject at once any analogy deduced from the operations of the Holy Spirit of God. We are distinctly told, and our own experience confirms the statement, that the nobler part of our nature is an emanation from the Divine Spirit, and that, by virtue of what Jesus did and suffered, the Holy Ghost dwells in the believer, combining itself with those spiritual faculties,—which, though clogged by the corruptions of our lower appetites, are still stamped with the impress of a celestial origin,—and reproducing the divine image, in which the soul of man was from the first created. Hence, as the divine is combined with the human in the person of Christ, so, in a smaller degree, the human and divine must coexist in every true Christian, and the natural soul (ψυχή) becomes exalted into a Godlike spirit (πνεῦμα). All this is perfectly consistent with reason and revelation. But unless we are prepared to concede that Satan shares in the attributes of Deity, it is impossible to conceive that he should insinuate himself into the inner folds of our spiritual nature. If, on the other hand, we say that he takes possession of our bodily organs and sensual appetites, and so acts upon our will, it is obvious that he can only do this by identifying himself with them; and thus he will not only lose his spiritual nature and separate personality, but will become a part of the separate personality of each individual man, which will effectually reduce him to a figure

of speech. In the Apostle's language, "a thorn in the flesh" is "an angel of Satan." Sin is of the flesh and in the flesh. Out of the flesh it has no objective existence, except so far as every abstract idea is supposed to have a sort of logical and conceptional reality; and the mere assumption that Satan is an incorporeal and spiritual personality excludes the possibility of his having that sin which Scripture and reason limit to a corporeal and carnal nature. On this subject, the declarations of Scripture are precise and unmistakeable. Our Lord himself said:[1] "That which cometh out of the man, that defileth the man. For from within, out of the heart of man, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousnesses, wickednesses, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: all these evil things come from within and defile the man." The declaration of the Prophet[2] that: "The heart is deceitful above all things (or "in all persons") and desperately wicked"; and the admission of the Apostle:[3] "I know that in me (that is, in my flesh), dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not: I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members:"—these and many like passages amount to the conclusion of philosophy, that all guilty disturbances of our higher nature are attributable to the concupiscence and other passions generated by the bodily frame in which our divine spirit is encased. Consequently, as the same thing cannot be at the same time both *within* and *without* ourselves, there can be no temptation except that which proceeds from our own fleshly heart, or from men subject to the like criminal liabilities; and thus the phrase, "get thee behind me, Satan," is only a figurative expression by which we reject the sinful suggestion

[1] Mark, vii. 21 23. [2] Jerem. xvii. 9. [3] Rom. vii. 18–22, 23.

held out before us, whether by our own active imagination,[1] or by the fallacious reasonings of a brother man.[2] That the suggestions of our own minds might be placed, as it were, out of ourselves and attributed to some external cause, is shown even by our phrase "the thought struck me," or "presented itself to me"; still more strongly by the Greek expressions, "the thought entered into me," "I was possessed by the belief," "the opinion stood beside me,"[3] which last, in a fragment quoted by Stobæus, appears under the form "an evil dæmon stood beside a person, turning him to injustice."[4]

It would be an idle waste of time to show at length how

[1] Luke, iv. 8.

[2] Matth. xvi. 23. Independently of the theological difficulties occasioned by the belief or hypothesis that the suggestions of sin are not in the *flesh* as opposed to the *spirit*, but in some created being external to both, this doctrine has its prejudicial bearing on general morality. We have known cases in which a convicted criminal has endeavoured to throw the blame of his delinquency on the irresistible influences of the devil. The frequent plea of monomania shows how mischievous it may be to allow the belief in delusions, *ab extra*, to qualify the sense of responsibility, which is the best safeguard of society. Nor must we neglect the question of education. We speak after the results of long experience, when we say that we have never known a case where it would have been desirable to appeal to the personal existence of a malignant being, in order to enforce upon the youthful mind the great duties of morality. Self-denial and self-control are the lessons which we habitually inculcate. We tell our pupils to say "no" to their own inclinations. The very idea of education presumes their capacity for improvement, and our best efforts would be nullified if a boy or child really believed that all his watchfulness would be in vain, if he gave a single loophole to a tempter without himself, whose functions are unconnected with the spiritual functions of the individual, or with his bodily appetites. It is true that we may warn the young against the evil suggestions and the bad examples of their companions, who play the part of Satan to them; but our Lord's rebuke to Peter presumes that the temptations they lay before us are *human*, not *fiendish* (Matth. xvi. 23): "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art my stumbling-block: for thou maintainest not the promptings of God, but the dictates of man." The fact is, as the author of *Yeast* very truly observes, that the world, the flesh, and the devil *walk arm-in-arm*, and man must be regarded as the origin of all those crimes for which man is held responsible. With regard to the moral effects of a belief in dæmoniacal possession, it has been well said (Wetstein, *ad Matth.* iv. 24, p. 281): "Qui hæc temere et sine probatione credit, quo jure condemnabit furem aut latronem habentem excusationem sui ne sciente nec volente factum esse quidquam, sed diabolum callidis artibus corpus suum invasisse, atque membrorum ministerio abusum fuisse? quod summam confusionem pareret, omnemque testimoniorum certitudinem ipsamque sensuum evidentiam eluderet."

[3] δόξα μοι παρεστάθη. Soph. *Œd. T.* 911.

[4] Stob. *Serm.* 42.

natural these expressions are and how unjustly a Manichæan machinery would be extracted from them. For the Christian it is sufficient to know that Jesus did not preach any dualism, by way of explaining the origin of evil; but, on the contrary, that he fell back on the correcter views entertained by the older Jews, and considered God himself as the only cause of whatever is found in this world. As man was created of soul and body, he was created liable to temptation and guilt. While, therefore, we pray to "our Father which is in heaven, that he will not lead us into temptation; but that he will, on the contrary, as often as the temptation occurs, as often as the evil thing presents itself before us, draw us away from its influence, make a way for us to escape, and enable us by the help of his Spirit to reject all the wicked promptings of our own heart or of our sinful brethren": [1] we are expressly cautioned

[1] The concluding petition of the Lord's Prayer is (Matth. vi. 13, Luke, xi. 4): *μὴ εἰσένεγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ.* The aorists show that the prayer does not allude to continued but to incidental temptations. It is also clear that the clause contains only one petition, expressed in two different forms. In some copies of Luke, xi. 4, the latter part of the sentence is omitted as unnecessary. This being the case, *ὁ πονηρὸς* (for *τοῦ πονηροῦ* is masculine: see Matth. xiii. 19, 38, Ephes. vi. 16, and especially 2 Thess., iii. 2, 3: *ἵνα ῥυσθῶμεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόπων καὶ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων . . . . ὁ Κύριος ὃς φυλάξει ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ*) must be equivalent to *ὁ πειράζων* or *ὁ διάβολος cf.* Matth. iv. 1, with 1 Thess. iii. 5. But this personification creates no difficulty, for it is quite clear, from the *locus classicus* in John xvii. 15, that the world, *ὁ κόσμος*, is the only concrete reality which is referred to here. The real question is, how can we pray to God that he will not introduce us to temptation, but, as the converse of this, that he will deliver us from the tempter (2 Pet. ii. 9)? The parallel passage, which gives an answer to this question, is that in Matth. xxvi. 41: *γρηγορεῖτε, καὶ προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς πειρασμόν. τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον, ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής.* From this we see that the temptation is suggested by the flesh, that it attacks the spirit whenever it slumbers and relinquishes its active vigilance, and that the grace by which we overcome our infirmities is to be obtained by constant prayer (*cf.* Ephes. vi. 18). Thus the concluding petition of the Lord's Prayer is really a supplication for grace to enable us to conquer in the daily contest of our *spirit* with our *flesh*, of our higher with our lower nature. God cannot be said to introduce us to temptation, or to act the tempter (James, i. 13, 14), though he has so ordered the conditions of our being, that we are liable to the influences of the flesh. The whole clause must, therefore, be taken together, and pronounced *uno ore*; so that the *μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι* may be taken in the sense suggested by Origen (*in Psalm* xvii. 19): *εἰς πειρασμὸν οὐκ εἰσέρχεται οὐ τῷ μὴ πειρασθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ ἁλῶναι ταῖς παγίσι τοῦ πειρασμοῦ* (*cf.* 2 Tim. ii. 26); and this was also the meaning of the Jewish

by the Apostle James, whose testimony, as we shall soon have occasion to show, is peculiarly valuable, against supposing that the Almighty is the cause of temptation in any other sense than that which is implied in his placing us here, as responsible persons, in a state of probation or trial. His warning is plain and precise:[1] "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed": and after reminding us that strife and brawling come from the lusts that war in our members,[2] he bids us: "Resist the devil and he will flee from you,"[3] clearly implying that our only enemy was our own corrupt nature, to be subdued by the grace which God giveth to the humble.

With regard to the belief in good angels, it is to be remarked that with the exception of a few passages, in which our Lord obviously uses a phraseology intentionally metaphorical or accommodated to the preconceptions of his hearers, there is no mention of angels in the New Testament, which can have any importance as a matter of fact, except in the eyes of those who maintain the hypothesis of the literal and verbal infallibility of the Gospel narratives; and it will be observed by all who have read the controversies on the subject, that angelology is generally maintained as a mere corollary to the doctrine of inspiration.[4] If the angelic appearances rested on the same evidence as the miracles

Prayer (*Berachoth*, f. 60, 62, quoted by Wetstein, *ad Matth.* l. c.): "Ne facias nos intrare in manus peccati, et in manus tentationis, et in manus contemtus, nec in potestatem ejus ac dominium; ne conjiciatis nos in angustias, unde pedem referre non possimus; ne permittamus ut succumbamus oneri." We have a similar explanation in 1 Cor. x. 13: πιστὸς δὲ ὁ Θεὸς, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει ὑμᾶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ δύνασθε, ἀλλὰ ποιήσει σὺν τῷ πειρασμῷ καὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν, τοῦ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς ὑπενεγκεῖν. It is for this ἔκβασις that we pray. And the πονηρὸς, therefore, however personified, resolves itself into its results —the works of sinfulness; whence, with a close reference to the phraseology of our prayer, we read, 2 Tim. iv. 18: ῥύσεταί με ὁ Κύριος ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔργου πονηροῦ.

[1] James, i. 13, 14. [2] iv. 1. [3] iv. 7. [4] See Appendix VII.

and other facts in our Lord's history, we must either receive them as established historical incidents, or give up our faith in the historical evidences of Christianity. It so happens, however, that in no one instance is the appearance of an angel recorded by a person who professes to have seen the celestial visitant with his own waking eyes. We are referred to visions and dreams, to the doubtful chapters at the beginning of St. Matthew, to the poetical introduction to St. Luke, to the wearied and sleepy Apostles in Gethsemane, to terrified women looking into a gloomy cavern, to Peter in the darkness of a dungeon-cell. In these cases something appeared, or was imagined, or has been erroneously recorded. But no Jewish enemies witnessed the wonderful phenomenon, no sceptical Sadducee was converted from his repugnance to Babylonian dualism by a sight which would have convinced his senses. The only narrative which seems to militate against this general assertion is that of the descent of the angel into the sheep-pool at Jerusalem.[1] But it is remarkable that the passage itself is doubtful, if not spurious, as is shown by the wavering evidence of the MSS.; and even supposing that the text were undoubtedly genuine, as it clearly refers to the intermittent spring by which the pool was fed, and as there is not the least reason to suppose that the angel was described as visible, the only effect would be to show us still more clearly with what readiness the Jews ascribed every unexplained occurrence to the imagined tenants of the spiritual world, and so would lead us to doubt every statement which spoke of an angelophany. If the assembled friends of Peter could maintain, in spite of the repeated assurances of Rhoda, that she was mad to recognise him by his voice, and that his angel, not himself, was knocking at their gate, we can readily make allowance for any amount of superstitious error on the part of those whose imaginations were so prone to the construction of

[1] John, v. 1 8.

supernatural machinery. In general, it is the universally admitted canon—that each part of Scripture must be interpreted by the spirit of the whole[1]; and if, which is certain, the mention of angels as separate beings is unconnected with any religious doctrine and unsupported by the usual criteria of historical evidence, it may be safely allowed to sink to its proper level and to rank with other instances of inaccurate or erroneous phraseology.

If, notwithstanding all that has been said, it should be thought that Jesus did not discountenance the angelology and dæmonology of the Jews as he would have done had he considered these dogmas erroneous, we may point to an additional reason for his acquiescence, to which sufficient weight has not been given by any Biblical commentator.

When Jesus taught in Judæa, he found himself opposed by two leading sects, which had ranged under their respective denominations all the educated and intelligent men of the nation, since the days when the Maccabees endeavoured to restore the independent existence of their country. These sects are generally known as the *Pharisees* and *Sadducees*. The former, whose name denotes the "separated," and who were also called the *Kasidim*, or "pious," were distinguished by their regard for the traditions of the elders, by the importance which they attached to ceremonial observances, by their eager proselytism, and by a fatalism and self-reliance which generally belong to those who build their faith on a system of stereotyped bigotry and outward rites.[2] The Sadducees, whose name indicates that they claimed to be the *Tzaddiqim*, or "righteous," rejected all the traditions

[1] Coleridge, *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, p. 73

[2] To what an extent the Pharisaical system was a religion *ab extra*, and, as such, opposed to the spirit of Christianity, may be inferred from their rule that "instead of leaving everything to the free motions of the heart, a man should bind himself to do this or that good by a direct vow; for vows are the enclosures of Pharisaical piety—לִפְרִישׁוֹת נְדָרִים סְיָיג." *Pirke Aboth*, § 13.

by which the text of the sacred books had been overlaid and corrupted. They set aside, therefore, the Babylonian superstitions about hierarchies of spiritual beings, good and bad; they did not recognise a personal resurrection, because they could not find it clearly taught in the books of the Law; they maintained the necessity of the strictest moral rectitude, and consequently asserted the freedom and responsibility of man; they were not given to proselytising, and were tolerant of all doctrines except that of the resurrection, which they considered detrimental to the purity of the moral law.

The attentive reader of the New Testament can hardly fail to observe, that while the Pharisees are made the objects of continual reproach and censure, the Sadducees are in general less frequently mentioned, and their distinctive tenets are not rebuked or confuted, with, of course, the great exception of the vital doctrine of the resurrection. Their disbelief in angels and devils is passed over in guarded silence, as far as any censure is concerned. In many respects, our Lord seems to have approved and recommended their views. Like them, he and his Apostles upheld the payment of tribute, and were for giving to Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's. Like them, Jesus agreed with the *Karaites*, in relying on the letter of the Old Testament, as distinguished from the Rabbinical traditions. "It is written," is his form of citation; and though he spiritualised the Law and the Prophets, and rejected the ceremonial aftergrowths of Leviticism, he found the spirit in the texts which he quoted. Above all, he seems to have acquiesced in their distinctive name as applied to himself. He is known by his friends and by his candid enemies as "the just man," ὁ δίκαιος, *ha-tzaddiq*, in fact, as "the Sadducee," according to the meaning of this term. "Have thou nothing to do with that righteous or just man," says Pilate's wife. "Certainly this was a just man," was the exclamation of the centurion who attended his

execution. "Ye denied the Holy One and the Just," said Peter, "and desired a murderer to be granted to you." And in the same way James writes: "Ye have condemned and killed the Just." We might even go a step farther, and assume that this was the special designation of Jesus at Jerusalem; for, in the language of prophecy, he is described as "the Lord our Righteousness"; and we find that the same name was given to his relative James, who was at the head of the Church in the city of David. "On account of his exceeding righteousness," says Eusebius, "he was called *tzaddiq*, that is, the just man." As this epithet was also borne by Simon, "the Just," the successor of Ezra and the true founder of the Sadducæan sect, it is difficult to resist the impression that Jesus and his brother James, being known by the characteristic title of this sect, openly allowed many of the fundamental doctrines of the Sadducees; and there may be as much truth in the statement of Hegesippus, that James was put to death by the scribes and Pharisees, as in the counter-statement of Josephus, that his martyrdom was effected by the Sadducæan High Priest Ananus. If James the Just was the author of the Epistle attributed to him, these considerations impart an additional interest to his declaration that sin and death spring from the lust inherent in our nature and not from the temptations presented by a superior being.

But whatever conclusion we may come to on the subject, it must be clear that as Jesus agreed with the Sadducees on other points, but was opposed to them in regard to the most vital doctrine of his religion—the resurrection of the dead—he was not likely to have made any express concessions to their denial of the existence of angels and spirits, a denial which rested on materialistic reasoning, and was connected with a disbelief in the immortality of the soul. For although he may have agreed with them as to the fact that there are no created intelligences other than man, he could not openly adopt a

speculative truth, which was saddled with an application diametrically opposed to the cardinal verity of his religion; and though entitled to the epithet "Just," which was their technical appellation, he shrank from all appearance of fellowship with the dogmatic and sectarian Sadducees. If, then, we are disposed to think that Jesus did not sufficiently repudiate the superstitious angelology of his countrymen, we may perhaps conclude that his silence was justified by his peculiar relations to the sect which had made a false application of the true doctrine.[1]

As it has now been proved that a belief in intermediate existences may be traced back to an Oriental mythology, which Christianity cannot adopt except as an affection of phraseology, it will be satisfactory to show that the Anglican Church has not committed itself to any dogmatic teaching on this subject.

The fact is, that not only do the Articles make no mention whatever of angels or devils, as created personalites, but they give an account of the origin and nature of sin, which is quite at variance with the hypothesis of an external agency in its production. It is true that the Church, like the Bible, assumes the existence of good and bad angels, without teaching anything about them. It is true that the Liturgy abounds in allusions to *Satan*, and brings before us *Cherubim*, *Seraphim*, *Michael*, and the whole hierarchy of post-Babylonian angels. But as the sixth Article allows no necessary teaching which is not read in Scripture or may be proved thereby, as the eighth Article makes the Creeds themselves dependent on the warrants of Scripture by which they are established, and as the twentieth

[1] Beausobre has made an approximation to this view; he says (*Remarques sur le N. T.*, p. 14): "D'ailleurs, N. S. n'étoit pas appellé à corriger les fausses idées que les Juifs pouvoient avoir sur la nature de ces maladies. Et s'il leur avoit dit, qu'elles étaient l'effet de quelques causes naturelles, ils en auraient pris un prétexte de l'accuser de nier qu'il y eût de mauvais esprits; et par consequent qu'il y en eût aussi de bons. Les Pharisiens en auraient fait un Sadducéen."

Article tells us that the Church may not so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another, it cannot be said that we are bound, as consistent Churchmen, to prefer the views which the Jews brought back with them after the Exile to those which are propounded in the older books of the Canon. We cannot believe that an angel is a created intelligence without rejecting those passages in the Old Testament which represent every angelophany as a manifestation of Jehovah himself: and this the Church, by its own laws, cannot demand of us. The angelic symbols, which are found in so many churches, show how entirely conventional and phraseological our whole angelology would have become if the Calvinistic preachers had not found their account in this superstition. If the most zealous stickler for personal angels could be convinced of the fact that the figures on Egyptian and Assyrian monuments were truer representations of the cherubs and angels of the tabernacle and the temple, of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the Apocalypse, than those winged figures or winged infant-heads, which we have introduced into our churches and churchyards from the paintings of Italian artists, would he, out of respect to any reality in his own mind, substitute the genuine for the counterfeit symbolism? And if not, is he not a slave to the beggarly elements of a merely syllabic realism? In strictness we are bound to view the matter from both sides. The Church of England predicates nothing more of her Liturgy than that it is in accordance with Scripture. Now it cannot be denied that some parts of Scripture give a *prima facie* sanction to this angelogy. Accordingly, the most enlightened scholar will admit that there is at least an apparent reason for leaving in the Prayer-Book a phraseology derived from Scripture so long as there are members of the Church to whom this language suggests a literal and dogmatic meaning. On the other hand, the advocates for this literal

interpretation must concede to the clergy, to whom our Church gives the right and duty of interpreting the whole Bible, the liberty of interpreting the angelology of the Prayer-Book on the same principles and to the same extent as they interpret the angelology of the Scriptures themselves.[1]

Let us see what results will flow from a separate and detailed examination of the passages in our Liturgy in which angels and devils are mentioned. And to begin with the angelology, our first and most prominent case is the dedication of a special day to the commemoration of the Archangel Michael and all angels. To any objection which might be raised to the doctrine of angels in general, there is the peculiar addition, in the case of this Talmudical Archangel, that he occurs only in three books—in Daniel and Jude, which are least able to satisfy the conditions of Biblical criticism, and in the Apocalypse, which is altogether poetical and visionary. Virtually his functions, since the earliest centuries of the Church, have been absorbed into those of our national patron, St. George. If there are any persons in England by whom either the 23rd April or the 29th September is regarded as a religious commemoration, they should be at full liberty to

[1] There are some sensible remarks on this subject in the introduction to the edition of the Greek Testament by Messrs. Webster and Wilkinson (pp. xxii., xxiii.): "We refer to the Book of Common Prayer as the best practical commentary on the Bible, ascribing a higher authority to the Creeds and Articles as the formal exegesis of our faith as the members of a Christian community. In the prosecution of our labours, we have been forcibly struck with the very wide difference which exists between the views of those who regard all the contents of the Prayer Book as a *dogmatical* commentary on the Bible, which is binding on the faith and consciences of honest churchmen, and of others, like ourselves, who accept it as a *practical* commentary for the purposes of Church membership." The instances which they give—the open questions as to the identity of Bartholomew and Nathaniel, the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the interpretation of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, are of less general importance than others which they might have adduced; but their principle seems to be a sound one. At any rate, it is quite clear that the Church of England has no *dogmatic* teaching on the subject of intermediate intelligences; it only assumes their existence in some sense which it does not determine. And the question is not,—what was the belief of those who framed the prayers? but,—is the Prayer-Book reconcilable with modern biblical learning?

pursue their devotions according to their own ideas. As, however, these days have long ceased to be kept holy, it would be desirable to remove from our Prayer-Book a Collect which seems to recognise the Babylonian mythology of different orders of demi-gods. The *ter-sanctus* of the *Te Deum* and of the Communion Service rests upon a sublime vision of Isaiah, expanded, in the latter case, by a reference to the Talmudical hierarchy. In the highly-wrought language of devotional hymns, we may safely adopt poetical imagery which is fraught with religious truth; and if it is necessary to seek for an accurate explanation of the terms employed, we can fall back upon the statement in the book of Job, that at the Creation "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy"; and upon the nineteenth Psalm, which represents the physical heavens as hymning the praises of Him "whose glory is the fulness of the whole earth." That personification is the natural result of this poetical language, might be shown, if necessary, by citing the Angelic chorus, which Haydn, in his "Creation," and Göthe, in his "Faust," have constructed from these realistic materials. These are the only passages in the Prayer-Book which make a distinct allusion to the existence of angels; and while the Michaelmas service is virtually extinct and inoperative, the allusions in the *Te Deum* and Communion Service may be, and usually are, understood as referring generally to our wish to rival the worship of the invisible world. "Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven," is the key-note of all human devotion.

The dæmonology of the Prayer-book is a more distinct feature than its angelology. References to the Devil, as the chief cause of sin and suffering, occur everywhere. In the Catechism, the child is reminded that his sponsors at his baptism promised that he would "renounce the devil and all his works," as well as the world and the flesh. In accordance with this we pray,

in the Collect for the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity, that we may have grace to withstand the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil. The same prayer is repeated in the Litany, where we also beseech God that it may please Him finally to beat down Satan under our feet. In the prayer for help under adversities, we say: "Graciously hear us, that those evils which the craft and subtilty of the devil or man worketh against us be brought to nought, and by the providence of thy goodness they may be dispersed." And on the First Sunday in Lent we are distinctly reminded of our Lord's temptation by Satan in the wilderness.[1] These are the principal passages: and if we examine them carefully we shall see that, while no idea of separate personality is conveyed by the name of Satan, the word is distinctly used as an abstract term significant of the sin which causes crime and suffering.

If we begin with the Catechism and the other passages which place the world, the flesh, and the devil in the same category, we shall see that the latter represents a particular form of that sinful selfishness which opposes itself to the law of God.[2] On this subject the services for the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity

[1] There is one reference to the devil in the Articles. It is said that "hominibus curiosis, carnalibus, et Spiritu Christi destitutis, ob oculos perpetuo versari prædestinationis Dei sententiam, perniciosissimum est præcipitium, unde illos diabolus protrudit, vel in desperationem vel in æque perniciosam impurissimæ vitæ securitatem" (*Art.* xvii. ad. fin.). Here it is obvious that by "the devil" is meant the condemning voice of the conscience, which is really a voice of God in our hearts (1 John, iii. 20, 21). On this subject Julius Müller has well observed (*von der Sünde*, i p. 189, ed. 3rd): "When Göthe, in his *Faust*, places in the mouth of the evil spirit the reproaches of the awakening conscience, this procedure of the poet, for which parallels might be easily adduced from the writings of the great teachers of the Church, especially Luther, may be justified by this, that, with reference to its effects, a certain amphiboly attaches itself to the consciousness of guilt, although this consciousness is so holy in its origin. As, on the one hand, it promoted salvation in Peter, so, on the other hand, it tended to destruction in the case of Cain and Judas."

[2] See "The Three Treacherous Dealers," Lond. 1854, where it is shown that the language of the Catechism may be most instructively used without inculcating the personality of Satan.

are peculiarly instructive. To the Collect, which we have already cited, and which implies that a purity of heart and mind is the result of a conquest over the world, the flesh, and the devil, is attached a passage from the Gospel of St. Matthew which contains our Lord's answer to the question of the Lawyer, "What is the first and great commandment in the Law?" Jesus said unto him, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." Now, since the Christian is regarded as a warrior, who has engaged manfully to fight under Christ's banner against sin (*i.e.* the flesh), the world, and the devil, and as he best fulfils this engagement by obeying his Master's commands, we should expect, on the one hand, to find in the decalogue the law of love (and for this we have our Saviour's authority); and also, in its negations, to discover the triple antagonism which constitutes the warfare of the Christian soldier. If, then, we set aside the first four commandments which pertain to the love of God, and the fifth, which refers to the love of parents—and all these may be classified under the common head of *pietas*, or dutiful affection—there will remain five other precepts which express our obligation to love our neighbours as ourselves. As the devil is described as a murderer and a liar—the accuser of the brethren,—as the flesh or sin is concupiscence, or sexual indulgence, and as the world represents mammon, or greedy and unprincipled aggrandisement, we may make the last five commandments fall under these heads: "thou shalt do no murder," which is of the devil; "thou shalt not commit adultery," which is of the flesh; "thou shalt not steal," which is of the world; "thou shalt not bear false witness," which

is of the devil; "thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," which is of the world; "thou shall not covet thy neighbour's wife," which is of the flesh. Now the very form of the teaching which places the "devil" by the side of the "flesh," or "sin," and the "world," shows us that the three terms are equally abstract, and that if it is not necessary for any theological purpose to personify the world and the flesh, neither can it be necessary to personify the devil. All three stand on the same footing, as constituents of one and the same whole, namely, the selfishness which places itself in opposition to the Christian's self-denying love.

In the remaining passages, we are invited to regard Satan as the cause of temptations and trials. The phrase in the Litany, where we speak of beating down Satan under our feet is, of course, a mere metaphor; but when the devil and man are put together as producing afflictions by craft and subtilty, there must be some reference to an agency from without, and the passage can only imply a distinction between the explicable and the mysterious causes of human suffering. Otherwise, we must return to a belief in the dæmonology of the Middle Ages, not excluding witchcraft, and all its abominable and hideous consequences.

With regard to the First Sunday in Lent, and Satan's power as a tempter, it is clear from the Collect for that day, and from the account which our ninth Article gives of sin, that the Church, like St. James, regards all provocation to guilty conduct as proceeding from the diseased heart of fallen man. The Collect prays that we may have grace to use such abstinence, that our *flesh* being subdued to the *Spirit*, we may ever obey our Lord's godly motions in righteousness and true holiness. As this prayer is the sequel to a citation of our Lord's abstinence in the wilderness, it implies, or ought to imply, that his fast led to a similar victory of the Spirit over the flesh. Now

a comparison of our Baptismal Service with our Catechism, shows that our Church considers *sin*, the world, and the devil, as equivalent to the *flesh*, the world and the devil; and the ninth Article tells us that sin is presumed in our φρόνημα σαρκός, that is, in the tendencies of our corrupt nature. But the same thing cannot be both *within* and *without*. Therefore, our Church must be regarded as denying the existence of an objective tempter as the cause of sin.

The objections derived from the narrative of our Lord's temptation are easily answered. The internal evidence of the narrative, when it is compared with the scene in the garden of Gethsemane, shows that the conflict described was confined to the mind of our Lord. At the beginning of his ministry, and just before its painful completion, he was, as perfect man, beset with the troublesome thoughts which are described in these two narratives, and by his divine spirit triumphed in both cases. But, it is urged, how could he, who was sinless, have any suggestion to sin in his own nature? This objection, which is sometimes couched in very violent language, as if the contrary view involved positive blasphemy, springs from a confusion of mind which is very deplorable. It points, at any rate, to a most pernicious dogma. For the tendency to deify our Lord's human nature, which has existed since the time of Eutyches, leads inevitably to that deification of the Virgin Mother, which has lately found its ultimate result in the dogma of her immaculate conception! Our Saviour either was perfect man,—that is, man, in the full and proper sense of the term,[1]—or he

[1] The doctrine of Christ's perfect humanity, which it would be the worst of heresies to deny, involves some considerations respecting the limitations of his knowledge and intellectual capacity, which have not received sufficient attention. It is clear that when the divine Word (λόγος) or manifested Deity (John, i. 18) became flesh (σάρξ), he assumed human nature in all its trichotomy (see Olshausen, *de naturæ humanæ trichotomia*, Opuscula Theologica, pp. 143 *sqq.*), namely, he had the πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα, of man.

was not. If he was—and it is the worst of heresies to deny this—he must have had human passions, or a liability to the access of temptation. But he was also perfect God; and therefore his victory over temptation was certain in every case. So

In his agony at Gethsemane, he mentions all three, his πνεῦμα as opposed to his σάρξ (Matth. xxvi. 41), and his ψυχή (v. 38). His whole career shows that in whatever manner, and to whatever extent, his πνεῦμα was influenced and actuated by immanent deity, it was still the spirit of a man, and acted by and through his natural or bodily organs. Thus we find him, at first, a helpless infant (Luke, ii. 16); then, although his progress in mind and acquired knowledge was very remarkable (*ibid.* 47), it is expressly stated that in bodily growth or maturity (ἡλικία), and in intellectual development (σοφία), he improved gradually (προέκοπτε), like other children (*ibid.* 52). He was liable to the passionate emotions of pity (Luke, xix. 41, John. xi. 33, 35) and indignation (Matth. xii. 31 *sqq.*); he groaned in spirit, and wept for sorrow (John, xi. 33, 35). The contemplation of his own sufferings threw him into indescribable anguish of mind, and he seemed to shrink from the task which he had undertaken, even at the moment when it was about to be accomplished (Matth. xxvi. 39). Finally, he died a most painful death, with all the adjuncts of mental prostration (Matth. xxvii. 46). That his illumination in spiritual matters was not immediate and complete—in other words, that it did not flow necessarily from the divinity which resided within him from his birth,—is clearly shown by the statement that the Spirit of God descended upon him at his baptism (Matth. iii. 16). There are, no doubt, many examples of his superhuman knowledge (*e. g.* John, i. 48), especially in regard to that discernment of the thoughts and intentions of men, which may sometimes spring from merely human penetration and sagacity (John, ii. 24, 25, Matth. ix. 4, Mark, ii. 8, Luke, v. 22); and even this penetration seems to have failed him when he selected Judas Iscariot as one of his Apostles. And on the other hand, we are expressly told that his knowledge was limited even in regard to the most momentous of all his own prophecies, the fall of Jerusalem, and the coming of his own kingdom. He foresaw the fact, and knew that it would happen before that generation had passed away (Matth xxiv. 34); but he declared that the day and the hour were unknown even in heaven, save to the Father only (*ibid.* 36, Mark, xiii. 32). The more complete revelation was purchased by his death on the cross, for he was made perfect through sufferings (Hebr. ii. 10, *cf.* v. 9); and this is the meaning of the statement in the Apocalypse, that the Lamb that was slain was alone privileged to open those seals which locked up the precise knowledge of the time when Jerusalem was to fall (Rev. v. 3, 5, 9). If, then, Christ's knowledge was thus limited in regard to a revelation of the utmost importance affecting the results and objects of his mission on earth, it cannot be maintained that his knowledge was unlimited in regard to all other matters, least of all in regard to those matters which belong to the domain of human science and investigation. Accordingly, it must be supposed that what Peter said to him after his resurrection (John, xxi. 17): "Lord, thou knowest all things," could not have been said before his death on the cross: and that his sufferings, which purchased the exaltation of his humanity (Phil. ii. 9), and without which the Spirit could not have taken up its abode with the Church (John, xvi. 7), obtained also for his human intellect that illumination without which it could not have mated in heaven with his antecedent divinity.

that he was, as a fact, without sin either in flesh or spirit, which is the doctrine of our fifteenth Article. "It might be doubted," says Dr. Hey, "whether our Article does in strictness affirm that Christ was not *peccable:* it certainly affirms that he *did not sin*; which seems to amount to much the same. If sin had been in his propensities, he would seemingly have committed it sometimes, as we do, so many are the openings to sin; but this we cannot thoroughly understand." The difficulty here raised, vanishes at once if we remember what Dr. Hey has so strangely overlooked, the double nature of our Lord. He would have been peccable, if he had been man only; but, being God also, the flesh was consistently subdued to the spirit, and sin, as St. John says, was not in him. Wherever there is flesh, there must be passion; wherever there is passion there must be a liability to temptation; and, if the temptation is not resisted, the inevitable result is sin. Now we are expressly told that "the word became flesh";[1] the whole career of Jesus is represented as an antagonism of *flesh* and *spirit*;[2] and, in one of his sorest trials, he declared "that the *spirit* indeed was willing, but the *flesh* weak."[3] That the flesh assumed by Jesus was not, in itself and absolutely, impeccable, or free from the liabilities of human nature, is not only clear from the fact that he was perfect man, but is also distinctly stated by St. Paul, who tells us in one passage,[4] that "God, by sending his Son in the likeness of *sinful flesh*, and as a sacrifice *for sin*, condemned or deprived of its power *the sin in the flesh*"; and, as he intimates that this was impossible under the law, owing *to its carnal weakness* (ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός), he must mean, as he says in the preceding verse, that the divine element in Christ, and the

[1] John, i. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 16. [2] 1 Pet. iii. 18. Matth. xxvi. 41.
[4] Rom. viii. 3; *cf.* Hebr. x. 8, 18.

Spirit of life which he imparted to his true followers, were the only means of conquering this inherent liability of our lower nature. The same opposition between the divine and human elements in the double nature of Christ is distinctly implied in another important statement by the same Apostle, namely, that God "made Him that knew not sin to be sin on our account, in order that we may become the righteousness of God in Him,"[1] where the clear inference is that Christ condescended to combine his impeccable divine nature with our peccable humanity, in order that we, conversely, might obtain in and by Him the divine grace, by which alone we can enjoy it, the means of resisting temptations, and so controlling our lower nature. To say that Jesus was without passions in his human flesh, is simply to confuse between his humanity and his divinity; for, as our first Article distinctly avers, an immunity from passions is an attribute of the Godhead alone.

This participation in the *weakness* and *passion* incident to human *flesh* is immediately connected with the *temptations* of our Lord, in the passage which is especially quoted in proof of his sinlessness:[2] "We have not a high priest unable to sympathize with our weaknesses (*συμπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν*), but tempted in all respects like us, *short of sin*" (*πεπειραμένον κατὰ πάντα καθ' ὁμοιότητα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*), where the last words manifestly imply, not an immunity from the same kind of temptation to which every man is exposed, for this is expressly conceded, but to a victory over this temptation. This shows that the devil, who tempted Jesus, tempts us in the same way, and St. James tells us that if we also resist him he will flee from us. But who is this devil? Simply the evil agency of our unrenewed nature, which produces sin. Thus, St. John tells us that every one who com-

[1] 2 Cor. v. 21. [2] Heb. iv. 15.

mitteth sin is of the devil, and that the devil has been all along the active agency of sin,[1] whereas he that is born of God, or regenerated, commits no sin; and hence, believers and unbelievers are distinguished as children of God and children of the devil respectively. If this mode of viewing the case were less satisfactory than it is, we must perforce accept St. Paul's statement, which has been so long overlooked, that Jesus "put off from *himself* the principalities and powers, and made an open exhibition of his victory, having triumphed over them on his cross."[2] From all this, it appears that the dread reality of temptation is to be sought in the natural tendencies of man, from which the first Adam was not free, otherwise he would not have fallen, and in which the second Adam must have sympathised, otherwise he would not have been perfect man; and that the temptation of Jesus differed from ours only in its intensity, which he had aggravated by his long-continued abstinence, and in the certainty of that spiritual strength, which will, however, be bestowed, in different measures, on all who ask for it in his name.

This inquiry, which has regarded the subject from every available point of view, has brought us to some definite results, which seem to us to reconcile the requirements of modern learning and catholic orthodoxy. We have seen, negatively, that neither Scripture nor the Church has any definite dogmatic teaching on the subject of intermediate existences; that the evidence for alleged angelophanies cannot be regarded as belonging to the same class as that on which we admit the reality of the miraculous occurrences mentioned in the Gospels; and that we cannot harmonize the mention of angels in the Old Testament with that of angels in the New Testament unless we contradict either the one or the other authority. We have

[1] 1 John, iii. 8, 9.

[2] See above, pp. 14, 61 foll.

seen, positively, that the Church doctrines of original sin as a corruption of the flesh, of the perfect humanity of Jesus, and of the Holy Spirit's ministration in the Church, directly forbid us to believe that sin can exist in a purely spiritual being, or that such a being can be the cause of sin in us. In opposition to all this, we find merely the hypothesis that the Jewish and Christian books written after the Captivity are literally infallible, and that the conceptions, which the Israelites borrowed from the dualism of their masters, are a necessary part of revealed religion. We may safely leave the result of the argument to be decided by any man of ordinary candour and competent information; and we think that, if the case is duly weighed, with a fair estimate of the conflicting evidences, it must be admitted, even by the narrowest theologian, that it is incomparably more heterodox and heretical to maintain, than to deny, the existence of created but superhuman intelligences.

APPENDIX VII.

(CHAP. IV. p 369).

ON A RECENT ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE PERSONALITY OF ABSTRACT EVIL.

About five years ago an attempt to prove "the separate and substantive existence of a Spirit of Evil" was made by one whose academical and educational position entitles him to a hearing on this or any other question. A volume of *Sermons, doctrinal and occasional*, by Charles John Vaughan, D.D., "Head Master of Harrow School, Chaplain in Ordinary to Her Majesty, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge," (London, 1851), is headed by one "on the personality of the Tempter," which gives its title to the collection. Independently of other reasons this Sermon deserves notice as showing, in accordance with the statements in our treatise, that the advocates of this opinion respecting the personality of abstract evil make Christianity responsible for it, brand with the name of unbeliever those who do not agree with them, and leave their own faith to stand or fall with an hypothesis, which, they admit, is untenable on grounds of reasonable argument, and dependent entirely on the literal and literary infallibility of the written Word. Dr. Vaughan begins by telling us that "those, who believe in the existence of an evil spirit, cannot view without horror the attempt to deny and disprove it" (p. 5), and that "nowhere surely (if there be such a person) has his presence upon earth been more effectually displayed than in those places (for such there have been) of instruction and even of worship, in which all the ability of professed teachers of truth has been exerted to disprove his personality, and to explain upon an opposite hypothesis the phe-

nomena of man's being" (*ibid.*). Notwithstanding this formidable denunciation, Dr. Vaughan admits the weight of the difficulties by which his hppothesis is beset, and some (not all) of which he states with sufficient fairness. "I do not," he says (p. 11), "deny or disparage them. Urged by an infidel to an infidel, by a disbeliever in Revelation to one who concurred in that disbelief, I think they would be unanswerable. I think, at least, that the man who, on the strength of reason and philosophy alone, should assert the personality of the Spirit of Evil, would be met by more difficulties, on the whole, than he who, on the same ground of natural reason, should represent evil as an abstract principle. In short, the existence of the tempter is a fact, if fact it be, dependent for its proof upon Revelation." This is merely admitting, what we have stated in the text, that the New Testament dæmonology depends upon the hypothesis of the literal infallibility of the Scriptures. But Dr. Vaughan places the issue, which we consider so pernicious to Christian advocacy, in the form of a very grave alternative, when he says that though a figurative meaning might be applied in some passages where the name of Satan occurs, "there are others, neither few nor trivial, in which no such explanation can by possibility find place, and from which consequently we must infer, by the strictest rules of reasoning, either the personality of the tempter, or" (he adds very needlessly, "I speak as a man," for no one suspected that the Master of Harrow School laid claim, like St. Paul, to at least occasional inspiration), "the error and therefore the imposture of Christ" (p. 20). Surely there could not be a stronger proof of the validity of the position from which we start in this treatise, that the maintainers of these untenable assumptions make Christianity responsible for their opinions, and that, as they view the case, religion must stand or fall according to public judgment on the issue which they provoke. Now observe the nature of the postulates which Dr. Vaughan here takes for granted. He not only assumes that Jesus must have been an impostor if his knowledge were in any respect limited; but he assumes also that we have an infallibly accurate record of the very words which he used. We have disposed of the latter assumption in the text.[1] But let us for a moment argue as if the case were even as Dr. Vaughan supposes. He must perforce admit that our record of Christ's

[1] See above, pp. 155, 192.

words is as infallible when he says that "all evil thoughts proceed from within" (Mark, vii. 21 *sqq.*), when he says "watch and pray that ye enter not into *temptation*: the *spirit* indeed is willing, but the *flesh* is weak" (Matth. xxvi. 41), when he says, "I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the *world*, but that thou shouldest keep them from *the evil*" (John, xvii. 15), and in a multitude of other passages in which sin and temptation to sin are referred to the flesh, the heart of man, and the world composed of men,—as it is when he is made to say: "Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat: but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not" (Luke, xxii. 31, 32), or when he is made to say: "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven" (Luke, x. 18). As we cannot concede to Dr. Vaughan the prerogative, which the Church abjures, of interpreting the latter class of passages in contradiction to the former, and in declaring that temptation comes from a personal spirit *without* us, when Christ so plainly declares that it comes from *within* us, and from the world composed of men like ourselves, we must have recourse to the established rules of criticism in determining which of the two views we are to take as conveying the meaning of our Lord. Now we find that the view of the case involved in those passages which speak of sin as inherent in man, and as resulting from the opposition of *flesh* and *spirit*, of the *world* and *Christianity*, is supported by the general tenor of the whole Bible, and expressly maintained by the Apostolic writers themselves (see *Jashar*, pp. 66 *sqq.* above Appendix I.). We have, also, Dr. Vaughan's own admission, that, on philosophical grounds, the other view is beset with insuperable difficulties. If, then, both reason and the general tenor of Scripture are in favour of the opinion that sin and temptation belong to the conditions of our nature, and if this fact has been stated in distinct words by our Lord himself and his Apostles, without any possibility of metaphorical or figurative language, surely we are on the safe side, at all events, when we adopt this view of the matter. And as the passages in which our Lord, as Dr. Vaughan says (p. 18), "asserts again and again the personal existence of the spirit of evil," or, as he ought to have said, speaks as if there were a personal spirit of evil not only might, but in some cases must, be interpreted as involving a mere personification of abstractions, accommodated, if not to the opinions,

at least to the popular phraseology of the Jews, they must, if Christ was infallible, and his words have been infallibly reported, conform themselves to the signification of those direct statements which involve no metaphor. Dr. Vaughan's criterion is utterly fallacious. "I ask you," he says (p. 20), "to test each example by this simple inquiry: will the substitution of the word *sin* or *evil*, for the name of *the devil* or *Satan*, affect injuriously the force or sense of the passage? If not, I waive that proof: but if otherwise, I urge it as an argument—each one by itself a conclusive argument—that God's revelation has spoken on this subject, spoken audibly, and, if audibly, decisively." He might as well argue that no fable, parable, or apologue, could convey truth figuratively, because the substitution of the thing signified for the figurative expression would spoil the fable. For example, if we substitute *envy* for *viper*, in the fable of the *viper* and the *file*, it would, we presume, spoil the fable; but it is not the less true that the viper in that fable means envy. Apply the same rule to the first of the examples which Dr. Vaughan quotes in p. 24, and which we have already cited (Luke, xxii. 31, 32). Does it prove that this passage is not figurative, because if we substitute *sin* for *Satan* the result is nothing but "confusion and trifling?" What other result could ensue from the partial translation of a figure of speech? Will Dr. Vaughan deny, what every body must see, that our Saviour is here alluding to the beginning of the book of Job; and does he suppose that the very dramatic scene, which commences that poetical book, represents a real occurrence? Does he imagine that the author of the book of Job was an eye-and-ear-witness of the dialogue which he assigns to the denizens of heaven? And if not, what an absurdity it must be to insist on a literal interpretation of phraseology borrowed from such a fanciful picture! Still the statement must be true, if Jesus said these words, and was himself infallible. But the truth lies within the figure, and the express declaration of our Lord, that all evil thoughts emanate from the heart of man, sufficiently shows that he perceived in Peter the struggle between carnal doubt and spiritual faith, which was going on within that impetuous disciple, and indicated the help from above which he promises to all his true followers in the hour of temptation. That Satan was in Peter, and was human sin, we happen to know from another passage, in which Jesus is

made to address him thus: "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men" (Matth. xvi. 41). Will Dr. Vaughan maintain that in this passage the word Satan means a personal spirit? or if, on the contrary, it is certain that Jesus used the word as an abstraction in this passage, and with reference to merely human tendencies, why is it necessarily concrete and *extra hominem* in other passages?

The Scripture proof of the personality of the tempter, on which Dr. Vaughan makes so much to depend, is derived: 1. from the narrative of our Lord's temptation; 2. from the miracle of the legion of devils sent into the herd of swine; 3. from passages in which the tempter is spoken of as affecting the mind and conduct, the safety and happiness of man; 4. from passages which contain glimpses of the personal history, character, and destiny of the tempter.

1. Dr. Vaughan thinks (p. 21) that the narrative of the temptation necessarily implies "a person who comes, speaks, shows, argues, is answered, and departs"; and he rejects the interpretation which sees in this narrative the record of "a train of imaginations succeeding each other in a single mind, which revolves various forms of moral evil, and repels the inclination to each." He asks: "Is not such language either substantially accurate or practically deceptive? and which?" Surely, the *substantial accuracy* would not be affected, if the language were figurative or parabolical. As nobody was present on the occasion, the conflict described was entirely confined to Jesus himself, whether he wrestled with his own thoughts, or argued with an unseen spiritual visitant; and, as *Philoleutherus Anglicanus* has observed (*Vindication of Protestant Principles*, p. 168), the details of the temptation could only have been communicated by our Lord himself. Now we are told, on canonical authority, which we do not regard as inferior to that of the Gospels, that Jesus was touched with the feeling of our infirmities, and was in all points tempted like as we are (Heb. iv. 15); and that he put off the principalities and powers *from himself* (Col. ii. 15). If so, the narrative of the temptation *must* be figurative or parabolical; in the words of *Philoleutherus*, it was "a true recital, coloured by the peculiar phraseology of the narrator, of a mental struggle which he really underwent"

(*Vindication of Protestant Principles*, p. 170). This was the view taken by the most learned of the early Christian Fathers (Clemens Alex. *Cohort. ad Gentes*, xi. p. 86, Potter), and it has been enforced most eloquently by an advocate of Christianity, whom a staunch anti-rationalist has edited in English. The following are the words in which Edgar Quinet answers Strauss on the subject of the temptation (*Revue des deux Mondes*, xvi. p. 613 *sqq*, published in English by the Rev. A. McCaul, D.D., in *Thoughts on Rationalism*, etc.: London, 1850, pp. 127, 8): "Jesus has just been baptized. He makes his mission known for the first time. At the point of completing this revelation, he withdraws into the desert. Who can know the agony, the strife, the enemies within, which, in the solitude, assailed this new Jacob, wrestling with the unknown angel? Before declaring war with the whole of visible nature, before throwing humanity into the future, as a world in a new orbit, who knows whether he did not hesitate in his mind; whether the whole of the past did not rise up before him like an ambuscade; whether the mute universe, clothed with its borrowed splendour, did not with an hundred voices call on him to prostrate himself, and adore, instead of opposing it; whether his thoughts did not carry him on their wings to the summit of the temple and of the Holy Mount; whether he did not thence see at his feet, on one side the kingdoms of the world, with their people bowing down in submission, and on the other, the immeasurable empire of thought, with the passion and the cross, instead of the sceptre of Judah? Who knows whether he did not, at this moment, feel, in anticipation, the bloody sweat of Gethsemane, and whether, in the extremity of suffering, he had not already cried out, in the prospect of the world risen up against him: 'My Father! my Father! why hast thou forsaken me?' Now, if doubt could approach him, assuredly Satan then reigned amidst the gloom. This history then would not be so visionary as is pretended. On the contrary, it would concern what was most intimate, that is to say, most real, in the life of Jesus. Raised up from that mental depression, internal life reappears to him. The heavens re-open. In that moment, Christ recovers himself until Calvary. The legions of immaculate angels descend into his heart. They complete, with celestial nourishment, the restoration of his spirit wearied with the combat. What is

there impossible in all this? where is the imitation? what part is fabulous? and how can we form any idea of the Gospels, without seeing in them a continual representation of the interior life and thoughts of Christ?" If such is the view of temptation taken by Apostles and Fathers, and the most recent and eloquent defenders of the faith, what are we to say to Dr. Vaughan for perilling even the moral character of Christ, on the support or downfal of the contrary opinion?

(2.) Of the extraordinary destruction of the herd of swine, Dr. Vaughan asks (p. 23): "What amount of ingenuity, short of absolute unbelief, can explain away the testimony of this miracle?" and adds (p. 24): "So long as that record remains amongst the Scriptures of truth, we retain an unanswerable proof of the personality of the power of evil, of its independent existence, of its distinctness and separability from man." To this confident dogmatism we will only oppose the fact, mentioned above (note to p. 361), that Dr. Lardner, who, far from inculcating "absolute unbelief," has done more to establish the evidences of Christianity than any other man that ever lived, suggested an explanation, utterly inconsistent with that view, without which Dr. Vaughan will not allow us to be Christians at all. Nothing, as it appears to us, was more likely to assist in the cure of the poor maniac of Gadara, than to allow him to suppose, as our Lord did with gracious and condescending kindness, that the malady, which his monomania had invested with so formidable a name, was transferred to the legion of unclean beasts which were feeding before his eyes, especially if the delusion were completed by allowing the maniac to drive them into the water, so that they played the same part for him, as the scape-goat did for the ancient Israelites. We have seen such accommodations to the humour of the patient, practised with success by the skilful managers of modern lunatic asylums.

(3). In addition to the words of our Lord, which we have already considered (Luke, xxii. 31, 32), Dr. Vaughan quotes three passages from St. Paul (2 Cor. ii. 10, 11; Eph. vi. 12, 16; 1 Thess. iii. 5), and one from St. Peter (1 Peter, v. 8, 9), which he considers as indicating the existence of the tempter, "not as a matter of speculation or curiosity (when indeed" he asks, "do the Scriptures descend to such topics?), but as affecting, in every possible way, the mind and the conduct, the safety and happi-

ness of man" (p. 24). The same remark, which applies to our Lord's figurative language, applies also to the figurative language of the Apostles. For as they constantly speak of the temptation to sin as springing from the lusts of the flesh and from the corruptions of the world (see the passages quoted in *Jashar*, p. 67, above, Appendix I.), their figurative language must be explained by these direct and categorical statements. Besides, the very passages which Dr. Vaughan quotes as most emphatically indicating a personification are explained away by the writers themselves. Thus in 2 Cor. ii. 11, the meaning is that we ought not to give the unchristian spirit of anger an undue advantage. The Apostle says: *ἵνα μὴ πλεονεκτηθῶμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ νοήματα ἀγνοοῦμεν*, "in order that we may not be overcome (so Plutarch, *πλεονεκτούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων*) by Satan, for we are well aware of the thoughts which he suggests" (*cf.* 2 Cor. x. 5: *αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα*. Similarly, Clemens Alexandrinus says that the Saviour came *εἰς τοὺς πεπλανημένους τὰ νοήματα*, *Strom.* iii. p. 554, Potter). That the thought suggested by Satan is neither more nor less than carnal, worldly, and unchristian asperity, is clear from Eph. iv. 26, 27: *ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε· ὁ ἥλιος μὴ ἐπιδυέτω ἐπὶ τῷ παροργισμῷ ὑμῶν, μήτε δίδοτε τόπον τῷ διαβόλῳ*, where the whole turn of the phraseology shows that "giving place to the devil," *i.e.* not resisting him, is equivalent to "yielding to uncontrolled anger." This passage and the usage of the later Greek writers (especially Plutarch, *de ira cohibenda*, vii. p. 811, Reiske: *δεῖ δὲ μήτε παίζοντας τῇ ὀργῇ διδόναι τόπον*), convince us that Rom. xii. 19, ought to be written: *μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικοῦντες, ἀγαπητοι, δίδοτε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ* instead of *ἀλλὰ δότε*. Besides, the opposition of the participle to the imperative is needlessly harsh, and the construction, "do not by avenging yourselves give full scope to your anger," is strictly in accordance with the intended sense of the passage. The present *δίδοτε* is supported both by Plutarch and by the passage in the Epistle to the Ephesians: and the change in ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΙ[ΑΛΛΑ]ΔΟΤΕ [ΑΛΛΑ] ΔΙ is very trifling. The description of the Christian contest in Eph. vi. 11-16, must derive its explanation from the important parallel passage in Col. iii. 15; and as this speaks of an internal struggle even in the case of Christ, the ordinary Christian's struggle must be internal

also. This is also the view of Clemens Alexandrinus (*Strom.* vii. p. 839; see above, pp. 15, 69). The phrase *μή πως ἐπείρασεν ὑμᾶς ὁ πειράζων* in 1 Thess. iii. 5, is quite general, and proves nothing either way. The reference of this to the *faith* of his readers, and the passage in the Second Epistle (iii. 2): *ἵνα ῥυσθῶμεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόπων καὶ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἡ πίστις*, compared with the last petition of the Lord's Prayer, show clearly enough that the Apostle is speaking of the temptation which is suggested and enforced by the unbelieving world; and he says elsewhere that this is the only source of temptation (1 Cor. x. 13: *πειρασμὸς ὑμᾶς οὐκ εἴληφεν εἰ μὴ ἀνθρώπινος*, "no temptation has taken you, except a human one, or one of human origin.") When St. Peter says (1, v. 8): "Be sober and *watch*, because the devil, who pleads against you, walks about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom resist (*ᾧ ἀντίστητε*) by being confirmed in your faith, knowing that the same sufferings are accomplished for all Christians in this *world*" (*τῇ ἐν κόσμῳ ὑμῶν ἀδελφότητι*), he obviously refers, as our Saviour did in his warning to Peter himself, to the poetic machinery of the book of Job: and his simile, "as a roaring lion," shows how figuratively he is speaking. But the recommendation of sobriety and watchfulness carries us back to the passage (Matth. xxvi. 41), where our Saviour, with the same warning, opposes the *spirit* to the *flesh*, and the mention of the *world* shows that the trials referred to belong to the persecution which Christians must expect from unbelievers. The phrase *ᾧ ἀντίστητε* refers us at once to St. James' caution (iv. 7): *ἀντίστητε τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν*, and here at least the personification must be figurative, for St. James recognises no tempter except the lusts of the man who is tempted (i. 14).

(4). For "the personal history, character, and destiny" of the tempter, Dr. Vaughan quotes 1 John, iii. 8, 2 Pet. ii. 4, Jude, 6, and, above all, the text of his sermon, John, viii. 44. With regard to the first of these, no one can read St. John's First Epistle without seeing that with him the world—sin-causing, brother-hating, Christ-denying—is the great anti-christ, the opposite and enemy of Christ: see especially ii. 13, *cf.* v. 4, 17, iii. 12, 13, iv. 3, 4, 5, v. 18, 19. It is, therefore, in express terms, *ὁ πονηρός*, *ὁ διάβολος*, and, according to this, the personification of evil is merely an abstraction. In citing 2 Pet. ii.

4, Jude, 6, as separate and independent testimonies to a mysterious and infallible revelation, Dr. Vaughan has been strangely inconsiderate. He ought to have known that these two epistles belong to the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, or doubtful books of the New Testament Canon; that they were either derived from the same source, or the one copied from the other; and that the passages in question are direct allusions to Rabbinical traditions. If he had not had a latent consciousness of this, he would not have shrunk from citing a most distinct reference to the personal biography of Satan in the 9th verse of Jude, which adopts allusively a fragment of very absurd tradition. The reference to the apocryphal book of Enoch (v. 14) is sufficient to show that the place, which the Epistle of Jude ultimately obtained in the Canon, does not impart a divine sanction to all its quotations; and the same remark applies to the second epistle attributed to Peter, if it was an imitation of Jude's short epistle. Lastly, every one, except Dr. Vaughan, must see, that the text of his sermon (John, viii. 44), taken with the context, clearly implies a figurative and abstract signification of the word *διάβολος*. That this is the true interpretation of the passage, which is, in every way, one of the most important of those referring to the opposition between the devil and God, was shown long ago by the most logical of all the writers on theology, who have appeared in the present century. Speaking of the passage in which the tares are called "the children of the wicked one" (*οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ*, Matth. xiii. 38), Schleiermacher says (*Christl. Glaube*, vol. i., p. 214, 3rd edit.): "This passage reminds us of one of the most important texts, where Christ says to the hostile Jews—Ye are of your father, the devil; where manifestly, according to the peculiarities of the Hebrew idiom, these expressions are used only with reference to the relation of similarity and correspondence. For no one can take this text literally, because the Jews could neither be derived from the devil in the same sense as they boasted to be derived from Abraham, nor in the same sense in which Christ, whose words they merely echoed, had asserted that God was his Father. So that we cannot strictly interpret this passage on the supposition of the reality of the devil, without either opposing the devil to God in a completely Manichæan application, or, on the other side, calling Christ the son of God only in the wider sense in which the Jews might really be called sons of the devil.

Allusion is undoubtedly made to a history of the devil, but only as to something already known, and this also, like that which has preceded, derives its explanation entirely from the literal expression (v. 47) that they were not of God." To these remarks of the truly logical theologian, who did not hesitate to assert that "a belief in the devil could not be exhibited as a condition of our belief in God or Christ, and that no one could, for a moment, speak of the devil's influence within the kingdom of God" (*ibid.* p. 212), we need only add the following considerations: that in v. 34 we have the figure δοῦλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, "a slave of sin"; in *y*. 40, we have the works of faithful Abraham opposed to the works of their father, whom, in v. 41, they call "God"; and in v. 44, their father is called the devil, and they are said to do his *lusts* (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν), which are farther defined as malice and falsehood. What, then, can be clearer than that we have here an abstraction of the worldly spirit, which stands in constant opposition to the gentle love and truth of Christ's religion? The merest novice in Hebrew phraseology must see that the sonship here predicated is as much a metaphor or figure of speech, as when Jesus says to Nicodemus "that which is born (γεγεννημένον) of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit" (John, iii. 6); or when John the Baptist addresses the Pharisees and Sadducees as "generations of vipers"—γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν—(Matth. iii. 7). And yet Dr. Vaughan can venture to say, on the strength of these citations, "What room is here left for the substitution of an abstract quality in place of a personal agent? Indeed, indeed, my brethren, with such words before us, the only question is, whether Christ, the Christ of the Scriptures, was a deceiver or true. If true, the doctrine of the existence of a tempter is irrefragably established: if a deceiver, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins; and they who have fallen asleep in him are perished." If we thought it necessary to borrow strong words from Dr. Vaughan, we might say that we cannot read "without horror" such a passage as this. Not contented with the proper issue, whether the canonical books are or are not to be invested with literal infallibility, he would actually stake on such an inquiry as that which he has instituted,—an inquiry which, at the best, could lead to very trifling results,[1]—the

[1] The most learned advocates of a personal tempter admit that the practical

whole substance of Christianity, and the personal morality of Christ himself. There either was a personal tempter, as the heathen Medes and Persians believed, or the blessed Jesus (*horrescas referens*) was an impostor!

We must not, however, omit to warn Dr. Vaughan, that in thus peremptorily dogmatizing on figurative expressions, opposed not only to the general tenor of Scripture, but to express and literal statements on the subject of temptation, he has incurred the censure directed by our Church in its twenty-eighth Article against the similar procedure of those who maintain the doctrine of transubstantiation. This doctrine, says our Article: "apertis scripturæ verbis adversatur et multarum superstitionum dedit occasionem." But transubstantiation is proved by a literal rendering of our Lord's figurative expressions in John vi. 53. Our Church maintains, that this interpretation is inconsistent with the words of our Lord, when he said of a mere piece of bread, "this is my body" (Matth. xxvi. 26), which shows that the other language must be figurative. Dr. Vaughan falls under the same imputation, when he neglects the literal statements in order to literalize the figurative expressions of the same fact.

We have thus submitted Dr. Vaughan's views to a formal examination, not because they are supported by any valid, or even plausible arguments, but because he is the ablest, and perhaps most candid and dispassionate maintainer of the hideous creed of modern Manichæism: "I believe in the devil!" The ease with which such a man may be refuted, when he ostentatiously attempts to prove this doctrine of the personality of abstract evil, is the best evidence of the worthlessness of the theory which he supports. And when we find that he makes not only Christian faith, but the personal character of the Redeemer, dependent on the hypothesis, which, he admits, is inconsistent with philosophical reasoning, his sermon must be taken as an example of that false or destructive conservatism, which it is the object of this treatise to expose. With every wish to be an advocate of Christianity, Dr. Vaughan belongs to the number of those who, in ignorant and foolish wilfulness, risk the safety of the citadel for the sake of an untenable outwork.

results would be the same if we considered evil as inherent in the lower nature of man.

CHAPTER V.

THE NATIONAL CHURCH.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE ORTHODOXY OF A NATIONAL CHURCH.

In the preceding discussions, we have shown that, in the particular instances, neither Christianity in general, nor the Church of England, as its national exponent in this country, has made itself responsible for those dogmas, which the opponents of Christianity have denounced as erroneous, and which Christian scholars have relinquished as untenable. In other words, it has appeared that neither Christian orthodoxy in general, nor our national orthodoxy in particular, is interested in maintaining the hypothesis of an infallible literature, or the belief in intermediate intelligences. And thus, while we have endeavoured to prove that the true conservatism of Christianity is best promoted by the abandonment of these speculative opinions, which are felt to be false and indefensible by those who are most capable of forming a judgment, we have sought to strengthen our position by arguing that the Church of England is not implicated in any recognition of these erroneous statements. If we have been successful, the Christian advocate is left to the use of his proper weapons;

and he does not find himself, even in this country, fettered by the acceptance of conditions more favorable to his opponents than to himself and his cause.

It seems desirable, however, that, before we bring this essay to a conclusion, we should take a larger and wider view of the relations which connect the orthodoxy of all Christians with that of the Church of England, and that we should inquire whether there is anything in the distinctive position of our National Establishment, which need prevent any good citizen and good Christian from entering into communion with us. If we can show that there is no such limitation, it will follow that Christian orthodoxy and Anglican or national orthodoxy are co-extensive terms.

The word "orthodoxy," both in its origin and in its ordinary acceptation, denotes a particular class of opinions regulated by some authority or standard of appeal; and its opposite, "heterodoxy," or, more generally, "allodoxy," implies opinions which, tried by the same standard, are different, and therefore wrong or erroneous. In theological matters, it unfortunately happens that the standard of appeal, even where it is commonly recognised, becomes itself a ground for differences of opinion, and at last, especially among Protestants, every party, section, or even individual, limits orthodoxy to some inner circle of opinions, till at last every man is to himself the judge of what is right opinion and what is wrong. Plato, in his *Theætetus*,[1] takes some pains to show that even true opinion is not real knowledge or science; and a learned Father of the Church, as we have seen already,[2] expressly distinguishes between science, as constituting the true Church, and opinion, as the mother of heresies. Milton would go even farther; for he says that "a

[1] Pp. 187, *sqq.*

[2] Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. vii. p. 894, above, p. 35.

man may be a heretic even in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy." Accordingly, in comparing the national orthodoxy of England with that which is common to all Christians, nay, to the whole Communion of Saints, we do not for a moment intend to test the former by the opinions of any party or individuals in the Church. We shall take the formularies according to their obvious meaning, and their general spirit and intention: and, on the other hand, in defining Christian orthodoxy in general, we shall be careful to exclude from our outline all false drawing and all adscititious colours.

Reserving for a special discussion the injunction to the Apostles "to make disciples of all nations by baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," we may derive a full and explicit definition of Christian orthodoxy from the confession of St. Peter compared with St. John's description of Antichrist. The former tells us what orthodoxy is, the latter warns us against that which it is not. With this statement and warning combined, we can hardly fail to lay down for ourselves those limits of orthodoxy,

Quos intra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

On the one hand, we are told[1] that Jesus, having come to the coasts of Cæsarea Philippi, asked his disciples two questions: (1) "Whom do men say that I am?" and (2) "Whom say *ye* that I am?" To the former question they replied, that people in general regarded him as some eminent prophet restored to life, and made once more a teacher of Israel; but in respect to the other question, "Whom say *ye*—not one of you, but one and all of you, the Apostles—whom say ye that I am?" Peter

[1] Matthew xvi. 13, *sqq.*

returned the following answer in the name of the other Apostles: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." That this reply was intended to convey the sentiments of the other Apostles, and not St. Peter's only, is clear, not merely from the form of the question, but from the words put into St. Peter's mouth by St. John:[1] "Then Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life; and *we* believe and are sure, that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God." To this confession of faith our Lord made the following reply: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father, which is in heaven. And I say also unto thee, that thou art a stone, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." It is worth while to remark, for the sake of those who have not noticed the fact, that not only do the two Greek words opposed in this passage, namely, πέτρος, "a stone," and πέτρα, "a rock,"[2] stand related as the part to the whole, but that, in the language actually used by Jesus, *kêpha* denotes "a single stone," whereas the plural *kêphîm*, which alone is used in Biblical Hebrew, denotes not "a stone," but "a rock." So that Jesus must have said: "Thou art a stone, and on these stones I will build my eternal Church." That the other Apostles understood the statement in this way, is clear from the description of the heavenly Jerusalem in the Apocalypse, where, among other circumstances of minute allegorical detail, it is stated of that type of the Church, that "the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb."[3] And

[1] ... 68, 69.

[2] πέτρος is "an individual or single stone," but πέτρα "a collection of stones"; there is the same distinction between χῶρος and χώρα. See *New Cratylus*, § 229; *cf.* § 15.

[3] *Apoc.* xxi. 14.

now, what was the effect of that confession, which St. Peter made in the name of the first disciples of Jesus, and which our Lord declared, with a blessing, to be the inspired orthodoxy, whereon, as on a rock, the Church would be built up so firmly that all the powers of evil would vainly strive to overthrow it? It was clearly a declaration of our Lord's divinity, involving a belief in that atonement, which it was his work on earth to effect. Other men had come to the conclusion that Jesus was a wonderful prophet, a man sent from God to warn and teach; but those who had the persuasion of Peter recognised in him both a character and functions far higher than this. He was greater than man, and came to do more than lay within the power of any human being. The confession of Peter, in fact, included a belief in redemption; a recognition of the fact that a divine and sinless mediator between God and man was needed to break down the wall of separation, and to silence the accusing voice of the conscience. If sin consists in carnal selfishness, it is clear that there can be no atonement in any act which encourages a feeling of self-satisfaction. Selfish man cannot become righteous, that is, unselfish, by any form of self-justification. The true atonement must consist in self-abnegation, and in a genuine and humble dependence on God as the only agent in redemption, as the only giver of grace. It is well-remarked by Julius Müller,[1] that "the forgiveness of sins has for its objective foundation the *atonement by the death of the Redeemer*. The necessity for this expiation is not yet really recognised, so long as we allow the moral agency of man to be resolved into its external or temporal form, so that we make the interruption of the communion between God and man depend only on the evil now *happening*, not on that which has already *happened*. The natural result of this would be, that the sinner,

[1] *Von der Sünde*, vol. i., p. 347, 3rd edition.

in order to resume his filial relationship with God, would require no atonement, repentance, or forgiveness, but only a relinquishment of sin, and a conversion to God. This mode of viewing the subject concerns itself so little with the old saying—'what is done cannot be undone'—that it regards committed evil, just because it is committed, and is past and gone, as though it had not been committed." As it is clear that this view of sin is not in due antagonism to that selfishness in which all sin consists, it is impossible that it can lead to any true reconciliation with God, and therefore the doctrine of the atonement, flowing as it does from that of a divine mediation and redemption, is the foundation of all catholic orthodoxy; and it is this which has stamped itself on the outward and visible Church by the perpetual commemoration of the Eucharist. Besides, it is only this idea of the work of God in our salvation that can explain the consequent functions of the Holy Spirit. "If," says Müller,[1] "the human race is ever to be restored to communion with God, it needs an atonement, which Christ alone is able to make, because he alone among men is perfectly sinless, and he alone, as the incarnate Son of God and as the founder of a new kingdom of absolutely universal significance, stands in an all-embracing relation to humanity. Uniting himself by the power of his love with the race that needed expiation, he becomes qualified, as the representative of man, to suffer the death to which he was not liable on his own account. And not until after the withdrawal of this side of the connexion between our present state and our sinfulness in past time—we may call it the *ideal* side—can the other side of this connexion —which we may term the *real* or actual—be taken away. For the Holy Spirit, as the principle of new life, could not communicate himself to the human race so long as unexpiated sin

[1] *Von der Sünde*, i. pp. 348, 349.

lay upon it, so long as Christ had not yet entered into his glory by and through his expiating death."[1]

We see, then, that the foundations of Christian orthodoxy are really contained in that confession which Peter made, in the name of the Apostles, and in contrast to the common opinion of men, for which confession he was blessed by our Lord, and told that his name was a type of his position, as one of those true believers on whom, as on a rock, or a collection of stones, the fabric of the Church would rest throughout all ages.

But it may be said that although this confession was the foundation of orthodoxy, it does not include all that is essential to a sound faith, and that a man might hold this and yet be an opponent of Christianity. And here St. John meets us, on the other hand, with a definition of "antichrist" or "the unchristian," which is the exact counterpart of St. Peter's confession. For he says:[2] "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God: and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come: and even now already is it in the world." In a former passage St. John had said:[3] "Who is a liar, but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? He is antichrist that denieth the Father and the Son. Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father." And in the Second Epistle we read:[4] "Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh; this is the deceiver and the antichrist." As, then, St. Peter's profession is the foundation of all Christianity, because it contains the recognition of the Divine nature in Jesus Christ, so St. John's definition of antichrist, or of that which is the founda-

[1] John, vii. 39. [2] 1 John, iv. 2, 3. [3] 1 John, ii. 22, 23. [4] 2 John, 7

tion of all heterodoxy, is a declaration of the fact that we cannot live together as Christians if we fail to grasp the practical consequences of the doctrine that this Divine Jesus was also man as we are man, flesh as we are flesh; if in any way we fall into the error of those Docetes and Phantasiasts, and strip this Incarnation of the Godhead of its real and solid humanity. Though St. Peter's confession and St. John's warning point to necessarily co-ordinate propositions respecting the double nature of Christ, it is easy to see why they stand as separate statements, and as supplementary to one another in the New Testament. When our Lord was living in the midst of his brethren and his countrymen, when they heard and saw and handled every day the Word of life, there was little fear that they should deprive him of his tangible humanity, and there was much more ground for the apprehension that he would be regarded as a mere man. Hence the recognition of his divinity by Peter and the other Apostles was really the first foundation of the Church which was to be built up in this belief. But after he had risen from the dead, after he had spent forty days of a very different and much less material life in the midst of his immediate disciples, after they had seen him appear and disappear at their meetings, until at last he was taken away from their longing and wondering eyes, it was not at all unnatural that they should think more of that which distinguished him from all men than of that common nature which they shared with him, and that they should look back with dreamy thoughts to their latest recollections of what he had been to them. That some at least of the five hundred brethren to whom he appeared in Galilee may have fallen into such reveries is not at all impossible. And it is quite certain that Docetism very soon began to manifest itself in the Church. When St. John wrote his Epistle this may have been a prominent form of error, and he did well to

meet it with a definition of antichrist, which included all impugners of our Lord's real humanity.

Here, then, we have a complete criterion of Christian orthodoxy. Positively, and as the starting-point in our acceptance of Jesus Christ as our Redeemer, we must declare with Peter, that he is the Son of the living God, and therefore a Divine Person. Negatively, and as a safeguard against the prevalent error of professing Christians, we must stigmatize as antichrist all those who will not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, all those who do not fully admit his absolute humanity.

Whether we look back to the earliest days of the Church or take the developments of Christianity which we now see around us, we shall find that all heresies and schisms are traceable to some direct or indirect rejection of the true Apostolic doctrine respecting the Person of our Lord.

It has been well remarked[1] that all the older heresies are but variations of four original forms of heterodoxy—that of the *Ebionites*, who denied the divinity of Christ — that of the *Gnostics*, who controverted his true humanity — that of the *Pelagians*, who would not allow the need of salvation—and that of the *Manichæans*, who denied man's capacity to be saved. Now, as Pelagianism falls back on Ebionitism, while Manichæism makes common cause with Gnosticism, it is clear that all this old heterodoxy resolves itself into a denial of the truth that Jesus was very God and very man, and of its corollary, that man's salvation by him was both possible and necessary. For these cardinal points of orthodoxy are equally set aside, whether, with the Jewish Ebionite, we reduce Christ to the rank of a mere man, distinguished indeed by the highest gifts of virtue and intellect, but still a mere man; or, with the

[1] See *Studien und Kritiken* for 1849, pp. 997 *sqq.*

heathen Gnostic, strip him of his actual humanity, and leave nothing but a supernaturally fantastic and dreamlike manifestation of the Deity: whether, with the Manichæan, who approximates to the latter, we establish an irreconcileable dualism between spirit and matter, and regard human nature as substantially and irredeemably base; or with the Pelagian, who adheres to the former, deny that there is any disease or depravation in the heart of man, which should stand in need of a special intervention for its cure, and thus despise the Redeemer, while we are willing to accept the Teacher.

If from those old heresies which gave a speculative and dogmatic expression to these erroneous views, we turn to the practical manifestations of the spirit of antichrist, we shall see that wherever men have set up in the name of Christianity something which leads to religious and moral results directly opposed to the tendency and intentions of the Gospel dispensation, the cause of all the mischief is the loss of an ever-living and ever-present conviction that Jesus was God as well as man, and that what he did and suffered was done and suffered once for all. It was the Redeemer's promise that there should be a divine life in the Church, wherever there was a real union of believers in his name. Where even two or three were so gathered together, there he would be in the midst of them. And thus not only the Church, as a gathering of faithful men, must have a sacramental character, and show forth the divine nature of him who inspires it, but this recognition of a divine life in the world will contribute to the vital union of Christians among themselves: for a full conviction of the fact, that the Son of God took our nature in order that the Spirit of God might dwell with the sons of men, necessarily leads to a feeling of communion and brotherhood. It is thus that we are enabled to appreciate the one source of our spiritual life, and really come

to the practical belief, that, "being many, we are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." Not only are we bound, as the disciples of Jesus, to recognise him in our afflicted brethren, and to be convinced that what we do or leave undone unto the least of them, we do or leave undone unto Him;[1] not only are we thus to do for Christ's sake what we might do from the promptings of natural benevolence, but we are to seek and find Him everywhere by making ourselves at one with all those who call upon His name. In this true fellowship consists the solemn mystery of our Church militant upon earth. "Mystical," says one of our great modern writers, "mystical, more than magical, is that communing of soul with soul, both looking heavenward: here, properly, soul first speaks with soul; for only in looking heavenwards, take it in what sense you may, not in looking earthward, does what we call union, mutual love, or society, begin to be possible." All loving communion with our brethren, because they are Christians, and on the strength of our common faith, is, by the nature of the case, a channel of divine grace,—in other words, it is sacramental. It is true that there are only two sacraments of incorporation—those which were instituted by Christ himself—the Sacrament of Baptism, by which we are received into the fold, and which makes the blood of Christ available to the washing away of sin, and the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, by which we formally keep up our membership in the mystical body of the Son of God, which is the blessed company of all faithful people. But all religious communion with our brethren is, by its nature, sacramental, and every act of charity "out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience and faith unfeigned,"[2] is a fresh baptism of that love which covers the multitude of sins. The spirit of antichrist cannot perceive

[1] Matth. xxv. 34 40. [2] 1 Tim. i. 5

this, because it cannot, or will not, allow the reality and everlasting significance of Christ's Incarnation. Hence it gives us, instead of a real life in the Church, sustained by the personal godliness and mutual love of believers, some outward form of dogmatic authority—an infallible Church, or an infallible literature—which must be maintained, if need be, by the sacrifice of all that is beautiful and lovely in the communion of Christian men. Hence it is that, instead of opening her arms as a mother to invite and welcome all her children, the Church is too often represented as a system of exclusive ordinances, calculated, if not designed, to irritate the selfishness of men, and to awaken the slumbering antagonism of discrepant opinions. And all this, because, with the ancient heretics, we forsake the one foundation of orthodoxy, that Jesus Christ did personally come in the flesh, as a union of God and man, that he is really present with his Church when even two or three are gathered together in his name, and that this world is blessed with the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace in all true communions of true Christian men.

We have thus seen that Christian orthodoxy in general rests and must rest on the broad basis of St. Peter's confession, and that antichrist must always be sought among those who, in some form, contravene that confession; in other words, that this alone is necessary to everlasting salvation — that we believe rightly the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, and live in accordance with that belief.[1]

[1] In support of this limitation of orthodoxy, it is worthy of remark that the word "theology," according to its original meaning, and its use by the Fathers, strictly denotes the study of the divine nature, that is, in Christianity, the doctrine of the Trinity, and especially the assertion of the divinity of Christ. Chrysostom has in this sense the expression *θεολογία τοῦ υἱοῦ*, Cyril of Alexandria the phrase *θεολογίαν προσάγειν τῷ Χριστῷ*, and the Fathers actually oppose *οἰκονομία*, as denoting the human nature of Christ, to his *θεολογία*, or divinity; thus Chrysostom says: *οἱ μὲν ἥσταψαν τὴν οἰκονομίαν, ὁ δὲ* (John) *βροντῇ τὴν θεολογίαν.*

If that which constitutes the orthodoxy of an English churchman, in particular, depends upon something better than a merely conventional dogmatism, it must approximate, at all events, to this general standard of Christian faith. And it will do this in proportion as it leans upon and encourages the personal religiousness of Englishmen. As we have endeavoured to show, at the beginning of this essay, we cannot diffuse religious faith unless we both wear it in our hearts and exhibit it in our conduct. Personal godliness is the best advocacy of religion. But if, where purity and benevolence are the recognised touchstones of the faith of Jesus, we see the most clamorous of his nominal disciples violating, in many actions of their lives, and especially in those which are most closely connected with their religious dogmatism, the principles of the faith which they profess to recommend, we cannot hope that such an example will produce an effect favourable to the reception of their creed by those who are unsatisfied of its truth. Christianity is the abnegation of self. Whenever, then, the professed Christian connects practical selfishness with his creed, he, as far as in him lies, saps the foundations of his own stronghold. But mere immorality will eventually meet with its proper rebuke from the approving and disapproving faculty which is inherent in man: the sensual and dishonest Christian discredits and damages his faith; but he does not inflict an irremediable wound. The greatest injuries, which have been done to our religion, have proceeded from selfish dogmatism. This is one of the most fully-developed forms of antichrist. For while it substitutes for religion itself, the opinions or dictates of men respecting religion, it unseats Christ from his rightful throne, and, instead of his law of mutual forbearance and consideration, sets up the most domineering form of absolute tyranny. The compliances required by religious dogmatism are possible only in the case of

these who are insincere, cowardly, or stupid. To hold any opinions on religious matters, except those which are suggested by conscience and reason, is a vain attempt when the heart is pure, and the intellect unclouded. We learn, from the most hackneyed proverb, that the differences of opinion are neither more nor less than the number of human beings in the world. And yet we are told, by the advocates of external religion, that in regard to the best means of securing our eternal salvation, an object personally interesting to each separate man, we are bound to shape our opinions or thoughts by some stereotyped and permanent formula! Easy as this may appear to the merely indifferent professor of a creed, who, like the well-known student at Oxford, is willing to sign an indefinite number of Articles, it is clear that the true and earnest believer can only be religious according to his own convictions. It would, therefore, be the height of absurdity, if a national church, which professes to be coextensive with the secular government, did not open its doors to all true Christians in the nation. But as it could not do this without allowing sufficient elbow-room in regard to those merely speculative dogmas which vary with the minds of individuals, it follows that a State Church, which is conscious of its proper functions, will make no attempt to prescribe the course by which its members must severally and individually work out their own salvation. In regard to outward forms, there will be an appearance of definite precision in each national system. But the case of our United Kingdom shows that these polychrome varieties result from accident, are maintained by convention and habit, and regarded as really unessential. For the inhabitants of England, Scotland, and Ireland live under the same central government; they have the same laws, the same language, the same political, social, and domestic habits, and regard one another as essentially members of the same faith—for this never throws

an obstacle in the way of the *jus connubii*—and yet they are distinguished by the greatest possible opposition of outward Church system: for while the English are by law and in fact Episcopalian Lutherans, and the Scots Presbyterian Calvinists, the majority of the Irish are as openly Roman Catholics. Now the same principle, which enables these professors of different forms of Christianity to live side by side with all the fellow-feeling of good citizens, ought *à fortiori* to regulate the intercourse of those who are professedly members of the same national Church. If it fails to produce this harmony, the fault is not in the Church or in the majority of its members; for the Church of England has been well described as "a system of pacified discrepancies," and the majority of its members adopt views which are called, whether rightly or not, both Latitudinarian and Erastian.[1] The cause of the dissensions which have produced so much discomfort and scandal among

[1] See above, p. 32. It may seem rather surprising that, considering the great number of clergymen in the Church of England, who are both liberal and moderate, the extreme parties, and especially the bibliolatrous Low Church, should be allowed to dictate, as they do, to men wiser and better than themselves, and so in effect to narrow the basis of the Church and circumscribe the liberty of its ministers. Indolence and timidity in some cases, and generally that love of a quiet life, which belongs to moderate men, are the chief causes of this tacit acquiescence in dogmatism, which is felt to be as mischievous as it is offensive. The Bishops, and especially those of them who are men of learning, incur a grave responsibility by their real or seeming encouragement of narrow and ignorant bigotry—none perhaps more than the late occupant of the Metropolitan See. Bishop Blomfield, as a professed scholar, might have been expected to take a firm stand on the side of reason and learning; but he lent his influence, with wavering and doubtful consistency, to the religion of authority and convention. There is scarcely a worse instance of dealing deceitfully with Scripture, on the part of a Protestant divine, than that to which Philelcutherus has directed attention (*Vind. of Prot. Principles*, p. 133). Mr. Rowland Williams has well remarked (*Rational Godliness*, p. 308): "One would make large allowance for the conscientious anxiety of those eminent persons, whose position makes them responsible as bulwarks of the Faith, and who are ever dreading the consequences to which the first outlet of the waters of freedom may tend. But may God in his mercy teach them, that nothing can be so dangerous as to build on a false foundation. The question, *how far we would go*, will best be answered by experience. Only it never will be safe to stop short of the Truth."

us, is to be sought in the selfishness of the two factions who hang on by the skirts of our particoloured garment, and who, though differing in all other respects, agree in the wish to enslave the consciences of men, and bind them down in the trammels of something outward, formal, and tangible. Sacerdotal infallibility for the one extreme, and a translated Bible, to be consulted *ad aperturam*, as an infallible text-book, by the ignorant, for the other extreme, are to take the place of all the free workings of the enlightened heart. And instead of discerning the inspiration which resides in every communion of true believers, it is sought either in the clerical machinery of the visible Church, or in the documents which record the foundation and early history of revealed religion. Hence it is, that with either party it is accounted blasphemy to dispute the opinions of men. And what sort of opinions are those which are thus invested with more than divine sanctity? On the one hand, the childish traditions of an age when the teachers of an ignorant laity had forgotten their Lord's command:[1] "Be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren. And call no man father (or Pope): for one is your Father, which is in heaven." And on the other hand, the doctrine of the arrogant Puritans, who, in the re-action against the assumption of superior knowledge, placed the limit of inquiry at the low-water mark of their own abilities and attainments. Accordingly, the dogmatism which is the chief enemy of Christianity, the parent of intolerance, and the instigator of infidelity, is on either side a system of limitation and exclusion. The persons to be persecuted or expelled are those who are wiser or more candid than their self-constituted teachers. If a man listens to the voice of God, which speaks in his reason and his conscience, the sacerdotal Christian calls

[1] Matth. xxiii. 8.

him a *heretic*; the Bible Christian scouts him as a *rationalist*; and both together charge him with a Titanic autonomy, springing from a contempt of all authority, divine and human! And this, not on the grounds of science and conviction, but in spite of the law of love dictated by Christianity, and with no arguments except those which are derived from the very dregs and scum of transmitted opinions. If dogmatism were the result of sincere religion, its effect would be to make us pity our brethren, who thought erroneously: we should endeavour to point out their errors, but should leave the consequences in the hand of God. The dogmatism, which has always prevailed in the Church, refuses to enter upon any argument: it denounces a difference of opinion as *ipso facto* wrong; and proceeds, by all available means, to inflict personal injury on those whom it is unwilling or unable to convert.

Men would better understand the worthlessness of the arbitrary doctrines which oblige them to neglect all that is beautiful in the human soul, if they would only compare these thoughts with their own position and prospects as responsible and immortal beings. Let us look forth into this wonderful universe: let us reflect that we are but shortlived specks on the surface of a planet which revolves, with many other like bodies, round the central sun: let us remember that this enormous luminary is but one of millions of similar bodies, which, for all that we know, are respectively surrounded by a corresponding number of circling satellites, and the nearest of which is so distant that its parallax is scarcely estimable by the minutest calculation: indeed, it seems possible that even these suns may be moving in infinite space and dragging their systems behind them. And when we have thus impressed ourselves with a due sense of our personal insignificance in space, let us turn our thoughts to our heavenly hopes, to our eternal destiny; let us reflect on the full conviction which assures us that our being is not

doomed to perish with the frail case of animal life which we bear about with us; that the lofty aspirations of our reason carry us far beyond even the immensity of space which human genius has explored; that God himself, the creator of all that we see or can imagine, has revealed himself to us in his personal character, has assumed our bodily frame, has triumphed over its passions, and borne it glorified to another state of existence, having left us a law in harmony with our true nature, by obedience to which each man, as long as the world lasts, may become Godlike here and live with God for ever. If we would only do our best to grasp these grand but simple ideas, and then compare them with the beggarly elements of that dogmatism which makes our everlasting happiness or misery dependent on the adoption or rejection of some unalterable yet capricious form of words or ceremonial, we should feel ashamed of the childish littleness of those objects on which religious men fritter away the brief and precious hours of this fleeting life of probation, and we should endeavour to exhibit some correspondence between our present conduct and the objects at which we aim. That this petty spirit should be displayed by individuals who profess that their hearts are set on the great things of eternity is sufficiently pitiable and distressing. But it would be infinitely more deplorable if the same narrow-minded prejudices guided and controlled the religious system of our great nation at this advanced period of its intellectual, moral, and social development.

In accordance with these general principles, we venture to maintain that a national Church ought not to be saddled with any obsolete provisions or local enactments, which would close its doors against a good Christian and a good citizen, enlightened by the civilization of the age, but that national orthodoxy must be as wide a word as personal religiousness, and that the national communion must be prepared to receive every subject of this realm, who "confesses that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh."

How far the Church of England has adopted this criterion of orthodoxy, will be seen if we examine the structure of the formularies by which it is governed. The Thirty-nine Articles may be divided into four sections or classes :—

§ I. Art. 1—5. Of the nature of God.

§ II. Art. 6—8. Of the rule of faith.

§ III. Art. 9—18. Of the sinfulness and salvation of man as an individual.

§ IV. Art. 19—39. Of the Church, as a collection of Christians; of its power, its functions, and its relations to the State.

Now it is clear, from the arrangement of these Articles, that the only objects of faith, precisely prescribed, are those which are indicated in the first section; and this contains an explicit profession of belief in the Holy Trinity. The second section begins by referring to the Scripture as the sole rule or authority for this faith; and here it places the Old and New Testaments on an equal footing; and it ends by maintaining the three Creeds as expressions of this faith, on the ground that they admit of being "proved by most certain warrants (*firmissimis testimoniis*) of Scripture," and for no other reason. The intention of the third section is to show that man is, by nature, sinful, and that his salvation depends on faith, of course, in the doctrine of the Trinity, which is set forth in the Creeds, and recognised in the first section of the Articles as the only object of faith. The fourth section begins by indicating the fallibility of the Church, and by limiting its authority, as well as that of the general Councils, to those deductions from Scripture which depend upon a perfect consent of the whole Canon, and then proceeds to discuss matters in detail, with a controversial reference to the Church of Rome, and more by way of explanation than as propounding doctrines for special adoption.

On the whole, then, as the object of faith is stated before

any mention is made of the rule of faith, or of the means of ascertaining what is to be believed; as the doctrine of the Trinity, which is the only subject of the Creeds, is the only one which is stated before the proviso referring all other matters to the free judgment of the Scriptural student; it seems perfectly certain that the Church of England, in the Articles, has no precise and definite dogmatism beyond that belief in the Holy Trinity which our Lord prescribed as the watchword or pass of admission into his general Church. In other words, the Articles are presumed to be addressed to baptized Christians, who have already received and admitted the faith in the Trinity; and, with this exception, the Church of England leaves the Bible, as the sole rule of faith, to the conscientious study of all its members.

This view receives a complete confirmation, if we turn from the Articles to the Catechism, which contains the authorised instruction of all young members of our Church.[1] In the beginning of this summary of Christian teaching, the child is reminded that his sponsors had promised three things on his behalf: (1) that he should renounce the devil, the world, and the flesh (and this is *repentance*, whereby we forsake sin); (2) that he should believe all the articles of the Christian faith (which is *faith*); (3) that he should walk according to the commandments of God (which is *obedience*). We find, then, that the original Catechism, independently of Bishop Overall's appendix respecting the Sacraments, is confined to instruction on the subjects of faith and obedience; for repentance is retrospective, and the baptized child is supposed to have turned his back on the world, the flesh, and the devil. Now faith is taught merely by the Apostle's Creed, and obedience by a Christianized expo-

[1] We have discussed the Church Catechism in a little tract entitled the *Three Treacherous Dealers*, Lond. 1854.

sition of the Decalogue. With the latter, we are not now concerned; but it is important for the English Churchman to observe how the Creed is explained for the benefit of children. "What dost thou chiefly learn," says the questioner, "in these Articles of thy belief?" The child is taught to answer: "First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world. Secondly, in God the Son, who hath redeemed me and mankind. Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God." Thus we see that, according to the Catechism, expressly designed for the rudimental instruction of our children, the Creed, as furnishing the materials of our faith, is described as teaching chiefly—that is, as its main object—the doctrine of the Trinity; and we find nothing else in the summary, except the true and anti-Calvinistic statement, that all baptized children are elect, and therefore predestinated.

Taking, then, the Catechism in conjunction with the Articles, Mr. Maskell was justified in saying to the Archbishop of Canterbury,[1] that the Church of England has no precise teaching

[1] Mr. Maskell, in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, dated April 23, 1850, remarked: "It seems to me that, *excepting the doctrine of the ever-blessed Trinity*, I have no doctrines and no faith to teach as certainly the faith and doctrines of the Church of England. I may perhaps teach what I believe to be true; but—as it seems—it is quite open to me, if I thought it to be right, and that I should be no less justified, to teach the opposite." The Archbishop answered (April 26): "Your Bishop justly states that there are many subjects connected with our holy religion upon which we have no reason to expect the dogmatic teaching of the Church. Indeed, your second published letter complains of matters left undetermined, upon which the Church could not possibly pronounce a decision, unless it were her office to reveal what is to be believed, rather than to teach what has been revealed." And in another letter he says (April 27): "Whether the doctrines, concerning which you inquire, are contained in the Word of God, and can be proved thereby, *you have the same means of discovering as myself, and I have no special authority to declare.*" From this Mr. Maskell concludes, in his last letter (April 27): "I consent entirely to your Grace's opinion that I am not authorized by the reformed Church of England to teach these doctrines in the terms stated as being certainly true; I mean, authorised in such a manner as would forbid and condemn my teaching the contrary. In saying I take this to be your Grace's opinion, I venture to conclude it to be so, because if I were authorised to teach distinctly a particular and defined statement of the

except on the doctrine of the Trinity. This declaration was intended as a reproach by the sacerdotal enthusiast who was on the eve of deserting the National Church in which he held a ministerial office. But we accept the rebuke as an admission of our truly Protestant character, and we should fear for our safety, if we sought to assemble the majority of this great, enlightened, and free nation on any narrower basis than that which is supplied by the confession of St. Peter. We have seen that on his declaration of the divine nature of Jesus, he was told that he was an individual *stone* (πέτρος), and that on the *rock* (πέτρα) of which he was a fragment, on

truth as to these doctrines, I cannot doubt but that your Grace would readily have told me. So that it seems to be as I had supposed; and that I have no faith and no doctrines to teach on any subject—except, perhaps, regarding the ever-blessed Trinity—as certainly the doctrines and the faith of the Church in which I am a minister. In other words, if there is anything which I ought to teach it is this, that the Church of England has no distinct doctrine except on a single subject." (See *Times* of 1st May, 1850). Mr. Maskell's premises are not the less correct because he draws an erroneous conclusion from them; and the Archbishop's concession is not the less inevitable, because he has since tried Archdeacon Denison by another standard. There Dr. Lushington, as the Archbishop's assessor, laid down the position that he could not permit any appeal to be made to the Holy Scriptures, in defence of the inculpated doctrines. The only question, he said, which his Grace had to try was, whether the Archdeacon's doctrines are or are not opposed to the doctrines of the Thirty-nine Articles, for "the authority of Parliament has established the Thirty-nine Articles to be taken to be the true expression of Scripture upon every subject to which those Articles relate." Now, as it is one of the doctrines—in fact, the most frequently repeated doctrine—of the Thirty-nine Articles, that the Scriptures are the only rule of faith; as they state that the Church, of which the Articles are the exponent, cannot interpret a text of Scripture so as to make it inconsistent with another text; and as the doctrine of consubstantiation held by the Archdeacon is just one of those for which special texts are cited; whatever confirms the authority of the Articles on any point must confirm their general doctrine of a free appeal to Scripture. That the opinions of Mr. Denison are erroneous in themselves and directly at variance with the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth Articles we cannot for a moment doubt; but if, he sincerely believes that he can derive his doctrine from Scripture, and that he can reconcile it with the Articles in question, the Church of England has renounced the right to oblige him either to think or to teach otherwise. His great fault, and that which has involved him in all this trouble, is his obtrusive intolerance, his denial to others of the liberty which he claims for himself. For he was really the aggressor when he endeavoured, as a Bishop's chaplain, to force upon candidates for ordination a view respecting the holy Eucharist, which, to most members of the Church, must seem as inconsistent with the general rule of faith as it is with the national exposition of the doctrine.

the collective unity of all those who should hold the same faith, Jesus would build his everlasting Church, against which the powers of evil would strive in vain. And this must always be the case. The Church, and every branch, must stand on the personal faith of individual believers. Accordingly the Catholic Church needs no precise teaching, except that which Christ has prescribed as a concomitant of baptism — the doctrine of the Trinity; and it is a strange charge to bring against a national establishment, which does not, and cannot, include all Christians—that it does not refuse the privileges of religious communion to those who, according to the laws of our Divine Founder, would be true Christians in any part of the world.

The object of a State religion is the maintenance of outward worship for the benefit of the community at large. As such, the State is not interested in any development of theology. It regards religion as beneficial or expedient in a political or social point of view: and if Christianity is supported it is on these accounts. Such being the case, every one who is a good Christian and a good citizen must be entitled to admission into a communion which is naturally comprehensive wherever the State is not exclusive. If, therefore, a belief in the Trinity is a sufficient passport of admission to the Catholic Church as such, it must still more meet the requirements of a territorial Church, which counts as its members all inhabitants of the realm who do not openly dissent from it.[1]

The fact is, that there is no doctrine except that of the Holy Trinity which is entitled to be called at once catholic and distinctive; it is the only declaration of belief which, while it furnishes a bond of union to the great majority of professing Christians, also constitutes the greatest mark of difference between those who reject and those who assume this name. That, in this country at least, we have always regarded a faith in the

[1] Powell, *The State Church*, p. 16.

Three Persons as the one essential characteristic of our communion, is clear from the hold which it has taken in our most solemn associations, and from the manner in which it pervades and, as it were, threads together the different elements of our public Liturgy. The Holy Trinity is the sign on our banners; the watchword on our lips; our token of reception into the Church at baptism; the topic of the Creeds which we recite then and from thenceforth; it is the key-note of our Prayer-Book; it is the theme of the final clause with which we appropriate and, as it were, consecrate to our use as Christians every Psalm or Hymn of the Jewish Church employed in our services; it furnishes the solemn address with which we begin our Litany; and it suggests the terms of the blessing which concludes every public act of devotion. We delight in the name itself. It is borne by our noblest Institutions and by our most stately churches; and nearly one half of the Sundays in the year are counted from the day on which we especially commemorate the revelation respecting the Divine Nature. And yet, in spite of all this, there is no doctrine which has caused so much uneasiness to individual believers in our own days, or has introduced into the Church at large such early, such extensive, and such various manifestations of heresy and schism. It is surely an inevitable conclusion, from an examination of this state of things, that the doctrine itself, which was intended to be as universal as the religion which is built upon it, must have been in the first instance a practical result of each individual adoption of Christianity, and that all differences respecting it must have arisen from our converting a fact revealed to our moral nature into a speculative opinion, varying with the judgments of men, deduced in the first instance and subsequently defined by processes of logical reasoning.

If we look into the history of the Church, we shall see that while Arius was dividing the substance, and Sabellius confus-

ing the persons; while Macedonius maintained that the Holy Ghost was a creature, while Nestorius denied the real union of the two natures in Christ, while Eutyches and Dioscorus taught that the human nature of Jesus was absorbed or swallowed up in the divine—while all these heresies were being broached and condemned, we shall see that no one dreamt of considering the question as other than a speculative or logical proposition, to be argued on rational grounds, or despotically overruled by ecclesiastical authority.

And yet it would appear that these presumptions are excluded by the very nature of the case. A belief in the Trinity was, from the first, the indispensable preliminary to a man's admission into the Church of Christ; and unless this was the mere repetition of a mystical formula, it must have been capable of approving itself to the heart which was prepared for the reception of true religion. For if no one could be a Christian without entertaining this belief, it seems to follow that the belief itself would increase with the growth of Christian graces in the soul; so that the doctrine would be one of those which are *felt* rather than *proved* to be true; and instead of admitting of subtle distinctions to be settled, or at least authoritatively laid down, by the precise dogmatism of a School of Divinity, the truth that there is a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead must rather be one of those which contain their own illumination and entwine themselves with the spiritual improvement of our moral nature. Intended as a bond of union among Christians, it could not have become the cause of differences, if it had been rightly apprehended; but here, as in other cases, we see the fatal effects of that carnal spirit which so eagerly sets up the opinions of parties and individuals as a substitute for the practical truths revealed by God; and instead of allowing all men to live as Christians in unity and brotherly love, that part of the world which we call Christendom is split up into

rival sects, occupied with endeavours to stereotype some form of discordant dogmatism even on the subject which was intended to form the starting-point of all practical and individual Christianity.

That this was the intention of a belief in the Trinity may be gathered from the words of our Lord, as recorded at the end of the first Gospel. "And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth: go ye therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." These words are, as far as this Evangelist has told us, the last which the Lord addressed to his followers. But whether we are or are not to understand that they were actually his parting address, we may be sure that they at least contained the substance of those injunctions which he left for the final guidance of his chosen followers, and of all who should afterwards profess his religion. If we examine the passage accurately we shall see that it contains, what we might expect under such circumstances—(1) a statement, (2) a command, and (3) a promise, respecting the Christian Church; in other words, respecting the kingdom of God which Jesus established upon earth. The *statement* refers to the authority of Him who was the Head of the Church, and without whose will and power it could never have existed: "All power is given unto me," *i.e.* I am authorised to found this Church—this communion of saints—as well the visible and militant Church on earth as the unseen and triumphant Church in heaven. Then follows the *injunction*: "Go ye *therefore*"—ye who first accepted my invitation and have entered into my fealty—"go ye and make disciples or Christians of all nations, baptizing them in each case and as one act in the name of the

Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and then continuing to teach them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." This is the *injunction* which is perpetually binding on all Christians, for it contains the outward conditions without which the visible Church could not continue to exist. The original strictly implies, as we have expressed it, that the baptism is to be a single act in each particular case, but that the lessons of obedience are to be unceasingly repeated: and thus by baptism we become Christians, and by observing and keeping the commandments of our Lord, which he communicated to his first followers, we abide in the discipleship which we have professed. Lastly, we come to the *promise*: "And lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." With *you*—with *whom*? Not the Apostles only, but all those who, like them, believed and obeyed: for all those who, like Peter, profess the truth, are, like him, component parts of that Rock of Ages against which no storms will prevail, and members of that congregation to which it is said: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them."

Lest we should imagine for a moment that this baptism in the name of the Three Persons was some magical or mysterious rite which operated like a charm and opened the door to the Church and to the promises of Christ without any corresponding act on our own part, we have the necessary explanation in the parallel passage of St. Mark: "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned." Here we have it plainly stated that belief comes before baptism. But belief in what? Of course belief in that unto which we are baptised—in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. From the earliest days the Church had no doubt upon this point: for the simplest Creed, which

was required of the candidates for baptism, was, as we have seen, a profession of faith in the Three Holy Persons. But there is an inevitable connexion between the faith which is the condition of baptism and the obedience to God's law as revealed by Jesus Christ. The one necessarily precedes the other; but faith and baptism are vain and nugatory without the obedience to which they lead, and which proves their reality. It follows, therefore, that as baptism in the name of the Trinity presumes faith in the Trinity, and as this faith is a commencement and pledge of obedience, it must be something very different from a speculative assent to dogmas; it must be a practical and moral principle which confirms and establishes itself. When we speak of faith, we are speaking of an act which is to serve as a means of bringing man nearer to God—we are speaking of an act of religion which must, by the nature of the case, be a religious act. The plain conclusions of our reason, when we are willing to use it, show us that religious faith must find its seat in the heart, and exhibit its vitality by the outward conduct of the believer. This, too, is the consistent and unvarying language of our Lord, and of those of his Apostles who have most definitely recorded his words. St. John has told us: "He that believeth in the Son of God hath the witness in himself:" and that this evidence extends to a revelation of the divine essence, as exhibited in the Trinity, is clear from the words of our Lord, recorded by the same Apostle: "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and manifest myself unto him." And again, in answer to the question: "How is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?" he said: "If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." Now here we have

the revelation of all three Persons of the Godhead, promised to him who has the real faith which worketh by love. The Holy Ghost, as a witness, for ever dwells in his heart; the Father loves him; and the Son manifests himself by the perpetual presence of his grace. For such a one the whole economy of that heavenly revelation is realised, and, as it were, appropriated. "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." He knows and feels that God is in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, and not imputing trespass unto them that believe: his secret convictions tell him that the union of the two natures in the Son of God, is not a mere form of words, or a high-flown allegory; but that as Jesus, in his glorified human nature, sits for ever at the right hand of God, pleading his atonement, and making intercession for his brethren, so does the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, for ever dwell with those that love him, whispering the sweet assurances of sonship and adoption to all those, whose aspirations of dutiful affection and gratitude to a heavenly Father are shown by their abnegation of the world's selfishness, and by that bright halo of purity and holiness which marks the children of light in their passage through this valley of the shadow of death. To believe in—to know—the Three Persons, is not a matter of difficulty or doubt with such a Christian as is worthy of the name. On the contrary, when once persuaded that the mission of Jesus is a fact historically established, he cannot conceive that it should be otherwise. A craving of his very nature would be unsatisfied, if he could not feel that it were so. A loving Father, an incarnate Redeemer, an ever-present, ever-influencing Comforter, are numbered among the pre-requisites of his spiritual existence—of that new life which he has pledged himself to lead. To worship one God in Trinity, and the Trinity in unity, is with him to show the hopes of the future in the actions of the present life. The faith which has

taken possession of his soul, not in words to be repeated as a lesson, but in thoughts which actuate his conduct, is, that as God dwells for ever with man in the person of the Holy Ghost, so man dwells for ever with God in the person of Jesus; and he is for ever reminded of his happy state by the apostolic benediction, which prays that the *love* of God the Father, manifested in the scheme of redemption, the *grace* of our Lord Jesus Christ, which his faith has appropriated, and the *fellowship* of the Holy Ghost, which his life of obedience has secured, may for ever dwell with him, and all like him. Thus, then, we understand the precept to baptize all believers in the name of the Trinity, as a recognition, not of speculative acquiescence, but of moral allegiance; and we see in the Trinitarian faith not a variable dogma, but a self-realizing principle, which will keep pace with the obedience of love.

The intimate connexion between this faith in the Holy Trinity, and the obedience to which it leads, is not only presumed in the texts of Scripture which have been adduced, but also distinctly implied in the liturgical formularies of our own Church.

And, to begin with that part of the Prayer Book which has been so often interpreted in a very different way, if we look to the objections which have been raised against the Athanasian Creed, we shall see that they generally resolve themselves into the complaint, that a document saddled with damnatory clauses requires, as the only condition of salvation, the precise adoption of a dogmatic and incomprehensible belief. But there is something both of ignorance and oversight in these cavils, and the misconception has been kept up by those who are anxious to resolve religion into an external and objective existence. It is an indication of theological ignorance to suppose that the terms "salvation" and "being saved" are tantamount in meaning to those which promise "eternal life" and "everlasting

felicity." All those who belong to the Church of Christ, which is the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, are in a state of salvation —they are all, so far, the *chosen*, the *elect*, the *saved*, the *sanctified*. It is needless to multiply texts in proof of this. St. Paul's Epistles, which are addressed to whole congregations or churches, apply these terms, without distinction or limitation, to all professing disciples of Christ; and every one is acquainted with the passage in the Acts, which describes the first increase of the Church. "Save yourselves," says the Apostle, "from this untoward generation"—that is, "be baptized, leave the world, join the body of the faithful." And the consequence is given in corresponding terms: "The Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved"—more literally—"those who were trying to save themselves."[1] To speak of those who are brought into a special covenant with God as at once in a saving state or condition, because this is the natural tendency of what has already taken place, is a species of anticipation common to all languages: and as a religious phrase it is by no means confined to Christianity. The disciples of Mohammed call themselves *Mussulmans*, which means "the saved"—namely, "those who have committed their affairs to God, who are safe because they are at peace with Him"; though they conceive the possibility, as we do, of a falling off from God even on the part of those who have entered upon his covenanted mercies. But *final* salvation, or eternal life after death, is not promised by Jesus to all those who enter his Church by baptism, but to those who observe all things whatsoever he commanded. "He that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved," are his words of promise; and the straight gate and narrow way are significant terms, indicating the difficulty of thus consummating the objects proposed by our earthly pilgrimage. The Athanasian Creed, when properly examined, speaks in accordance with

[1] Acts, ii. 47: τοὺς σωζομένους.

this practical teaching. "Whosoever wishes to be saved, before all things (*i.e.* as an essential *preliminary*), it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith"—the one distinctive and influential belief of all Christians. This is only what our Lord himself had said: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved": that is, he, who adopts the faith in the Trinity and is received into the Church by baptism, is *ipso facto* in a state of salvation, or has the means of grace placed within his reach: "but he that believeth not, shall be damned" or "condemned"; that is, he, who refuses to hear the teacher of Christianity, must remain in the state of condemnation from which Christ came to save him: for if justification or deliverance from the *reatus* or guilt of original sin depends on the atonement of Jesus, and if the effects of that atonement are made applicable only by the faith of the individual, it follows that we must continue to be "children of wrath" if we reject the only means of becoming "children of grace." That the Creed means nothing more nor less than this—that it does not substitute profession for practice, or prefer mere words and thoughts to the deeds of a holy life, is clear from its emphatic conclusion—namely, that at the coming of Jesus Christ to judge the quick and the dead, "All men shall rise again to give account *for their own works*. And they that have *done good* shall go into life everlasting; and they that have *done evil* shall go into everlasting fire. This," says the Creed, "is the Catholic faith: which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved." No candid person can deny that a document which terminates with this distinct and unequivocal declaration in favour of practical holiness is most unjustly accused by those who represent it as nothing more than an uncharitable condemnation of certain forms of speculative opinion. It is quite clear, on the contrary, that while it echoes the statement of our Lord, that a belief in the Trinity is the only door of approach to His Church, it makes all the final consequences

to depend on that obedience and purity which are the legitimate fruits of a sincere and religious faith.[1]

Those who are well acquainted with their Prayer Book will have no difficulty in recognising a practical application of Trinitarian doctrine in the Collects, Epistles, and Gospels which are appointed for the series of Sundays following the day on which we particularly announce our faith in the Trinity in Unity. It would not only occupy too much space, but it would be doing what every reader can do for himself, if we were to point out at length how this train of thought is encouraged in the prayers and Scripture extracts which occupy us on nearly half the Sundays in the year. But let us take the first Sunday as a sample. Here we have a Collect or prayer for God's grace to enable us to serve Him, followed by a passage from St. John's Epistle, in which the great practical proof of our love to God is enforced; and by the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, which declares the fate of those selfish stewards of God's bounties who do not recognise Christ in their poorer brethren. What can be the intention of this but to tell us that no orthodoxy, however precise, is sufficient for us as Christians or as Churchmen if we do not add to it the enduring sanction of a holy life?—that it is useless to say that we put our trust in Him who came to redeem us from condemnation, unless we prove that we are disciples of Him who came to purchase unto Himself a peculiar people zealous of good works?

This is the teaching of the Church; this is the voice of Him who crieth in the wilderness of this world, bidding men prepare for the coming of their Judge, by repentance and good works. We are especially told to remember that this life is only an incomplete and preparatory state in regard to religion as well as to other functions of our nature. Here the soul is bound to a corruptible body, and enthralled by all the influences of sense,

[1] For a further discussion of the Athanasian Creed, see Appendix VIII.

which blunt and, to a certain extent, nullify its higher and spiritual perceptions. But even here we can show by deeds our belief in that name unto which we are baptized. We can indicate that the cry of *Abba*, "Father," is ever in our hearts, by the purity of our devotions and the gentleness of our zeal; we can recognise the Lord in our brethren; and we can exhibit the graces of the Spirit in the harmony by which we are actuated. And if this is better even now than any mere profession of faith in unseen mysteries, what will it be when we no longer see through a glass darkly, when faith is turned into sight, and hope into fruition? Then the greatest proof which we can now give of our Christianity will still be our living requisite and the chief element in the happiness which it has prepared for us. *Love* will never fail, but will remain or abide when all other gifts have ceased, because they have become needless; and *holiness*, which is the proof of faith here, will be its surviving result in that everlasting state of bliss, which could not be obtained or enjoyed without it: for, when we recollect that "without faith it is impossible to please God," we must be careful to remember that "without holiness no man can see the Lord." The prophet Isaiah has left us the record of a vision, in which this truth stands before us in palpable reality. He says, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim, and one cried unto another and said, 'Holy, holy, holy Lord of Hosts: his glory is the fulness of the whole earth.' Then said I, woe is me! for I am undone: because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts." Here it is plainly intimated to us that we can never be numbered among the spirits of just men made perfect, to whom the Trinity is no longer an unseen mystery, and who with threefold acclamations for ever proclaim the holy nature of the Three Divine Persons,

unless we are holy ourselves: for the men of unclean lips will behold in God only their indignant judge and their offended King.

In all that we have said thus far in our attempt to define the national conception of orthodoxy, we have spoken of the English Church as a whole. We have made no distinction between the Clergy and the Laity. Before, however, we bring this inquiry to a close, it will be necessary to consider more particularly the position of the Anglican minister, and to ask whether he too has the Protestant's liberty of private judgment, whether he too may claim to be orthodox and conformist on the broad basis of individual religiousness, or whether he is bound down by precise formularies which deny to him, at least, the privilege, and relieve him, at least, from the duty of thinking for himself. An adequate investigation will convince us that, while the clergyman has just the same freedom of judgment as the layman, he has incurred, by his ordination vow, the special obligation of qualifying himself to judge rightly, and of teaching only according to his own convictions. After what we have said above, it is unnecessary that we should insist on the universal priesthood of Christians, or that we should renounce, for the Protestant minister at least, the distinctive claims of a sacerdotal caste. It is true that a different opinion is maintained by many clergymen of the English Church, and Wheatly, whose book is received as an authority by many of the bishops, does not hesitate to say that: "The ministers of religion are to publish the laws of God, to pass his pardons, and to preside in his worship. God hath committed to them the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and 'whose soever sins they remit, they are remitted unto them, and whose soever sins they retain, they are retained.' They are the stewards of the mysteries of God, and the dispensers of his holy word and sacraments; and, on their ministration, the assist-

ance of the Holy Spirit, and all the graces of a good life, depend." These extreme views are not sanctioned by the New Testament. In the passage referred to, and in others like it, our Saviour's commission is given to the Apostles as representatives of a collective Church. He is the only Mediator, the only High Priest, the only means of access to God the Father. And the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, is his advocate in every heart, the pervading influence in every society, however small, which is met together in his name. The minister, then, is, what his name denotes—one who occupies a position of inferiority in reference to the Church at large,[1] one who is a διάκονος,[2] or servant, with certain definite work to do; one whose superiority, if he is superior, is entirely professional, or dependent on the degree and manner in which he is acquainted with his business. The word, which we still use to signify the public service of the Church, or that business which constitutes the proper employment of the Christian minister, namely, the term *liturgy*, recalls classical associations, illustrating in a striking manner the relations which connect the clergyman with the community on behalf of which he is commissioned to act. A work, which some one citizen undertook on behalf of the State, was called a *liturgy*, λειτουργία, and the official who performed it was termed the λειτουργός, or "state's workman," a name which eventually superseded its older synonym δημιουργός, "the people's workman." This latter term had its use, as a general designation of professional or skilled workmen, even in the days of Homer, who says:[3]—

[1] *Minis-ter*, from *minus*, is the correlative of *magis-ter*, from *magis*; see *Varronianus*, p. 123.

[2] The proper meaning of διάκονος, from διήκω or διώκω, is "an active messenger or go-between."

[3] Hom. *Od.* xvii. 385:—

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἄλλον γ' εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασιν. κ. τ. λ.

> "What man to another's house
> Repairs to invite him to a feast, unless
> He be of those, *who by profession serve*
> *The public*,—prophet, healer of disease,
> Ingenious artist, or some bard divine
> Whose music may exhilarate the guests?"

And the distinction was particularly applicable to those who took the lead in public worship. At one time the collective chorus of the whole population in a Greek city discharged the duties of prayer and thanksgiving. But at last the professional poet and musician came forward as "state's workman," with his trained band of singers and dancers, and performed, for the whole body of citizens, what they were formerly content to do in ruder style for themselves. From this habit of delegation, the state's workman, or minister, is regarded as the personification of greater skill or knowledge, as well as the representative of the population at large. He becomes an object of respect, by virtue of the public functions committed to him, and all the rest of the citizens, his constituents in fact, are, as compared with him, "common rabble" (λαός) and "private men" (ἰδιῶται), from whose Greek designations we derive our modern "lay-man," as opposed to "clergyman," and "idiot," as opposed to any possessor of common-sense and even ordinary information.[1] From all this we see that the Christian minister, in his official or public capacity, is but the appointed servant and functionary of the society to which he belongs; but that, as an individual, he must stand on precisely the same religious footing as the other members of his Church, must enjoy all their liberty,

[1] In reference to one of the old meanings of δημιουργός, it is interesting to know that ἰδιώτης denotes even "a prose-writer," as opposed to a poet; Plat. *Phædr.* 258 D., *Symp.* 178 B., *Legcs*, 890 A. In old English, "lay" means "ignorant" or "unlearned," as a translation of ἰδιώτης; thus in the Bible of 1551, Acts, iv. 13, ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται is rendered "unlearned men and lay people," where the German version also has "ungelehrte Leute und Laien"; and, "ich bin darin ein Laie," is still common German for "I am not acquainted with the matter."

and incur all their obligations; or, if there is a difference between him and other individuals, it must consist in his special devotion to a righteous and godly life, and in the professional superiority which he derives from his prosecution of a particular branch of study.

That this is a correct view of the matter, as regards the Christian minister in general, appears from the direct and explicit language of the Apostle Paul. That it is also in accordance with the position which the National Church assigns to her ordained ministers, and with the functions and privileges which she commits to them, may be shown by an examination of the authorised formularies.

The passage, in which St. Paul most clearly defines the position of a Christian minister, is that in which he appeals to the effects of his preaching, as the best voucher for his commission to preach.[1] The existence of the Church at Corinth was the proof of his effectual ministration or sufficient authority. "Not," he adds, "that we are competent (*ἱκανοί*) of ourselves to claim[2] anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, who also has made us competent (*ἱκάνωσεν*) as ministers[3] of the New Testament, not of the letter but of the spirit, for the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life." It is obviously the intention of the Apostle to say that the sufficiency or competency of the minister depends not upon himself, but upon the message which he delivers, and the divine authority which he has received to deliver that message—an authority which, in modern times, is bestowed by the collective body of the Church

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 1 foll.

[2] The word *λογίζομαι*, like the Latin *imputo*, means "to make a charge," "to debit another person with an item," as in the *τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀναλώσας λογίσασθαι δώδεκα* of Arist. *Plut.* 381.

[3] *Cf.* iii. 6. That he understands *διάκονος* in its servile sense, is clear from the word *δούλους* in iv. 5.

in any district. But the context also tells us that no one is a proper minister of the New Testament, which brought life and immortality to light, unless he can distinguish between the *letter* and the *spirit* of revelation, for the *letter* killeth but the *spirit* giveth life. In an age, therefore, when our appeal lies to the written records of revelation, we must seek the test or criterion of a true ministration or preachership, in the manner in which the expounders of Scripture escape from the beggarly elements, the deadening influence of the letter, and enjoy the true liberty of the sons of God: for "where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty."[1] And this the Christian minister will do, if, on the one hand and generally, he cultivates the spirit of Christianity in himself, and if, on the other hand, and specially, he endeavours, by the aid of human industry and human reason, to penetrate through the outer crust of language, in which all written revelation is enveloped, to the real meaning and positive intent of the writers, and of the Spirit by which they were actuated.

Now the first and most essential condition for a proper use of the records of revelation is the possession of a true spiritual sympathy with the spiritual truths communicated to us. This is the spiritual discernment which the Apostle in his First Epistle to the Corinthians declares to be absolutely necessary for those who would understand the things of the Spirit. "What man," he asks,[1] "knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. But we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit that proceeds from God, that we may know the things which God has imparted to us." In communications even from man to man there is misunderstanding, if there is not some congeniality of principle

[1] v. 17. [2] 1 Cor. ii. 11, 14.

and sentiment. Even words are understood in different senses, and the whole statement is distorted by the medium through which it passes, if the writer and the reader do not look from the same point of view. But all men resemble one another much more than the unregenerate and carnal man resembles the mind and spirit of God. And, if the greatest of heathen philosophers could say that[1]: "Every discourse, when once written, is tossed about from hand to hand, equally among those who understand it and those for whom it is not fitted, and does not know to whom it ought and to whom it ought not to speak, and when misunderstood or unjustly attacked, always needs its father, that is, its author, to interpret it"—if this can be said of ordinary and human communications, it must be much more true of a revelation, which has for its only design to convert and save men from the sinfulness of the world to which they are all naturally inclined, and to bring them over to a way of thinking and acting which is naturally at variance with all their habits of thought and action. In fact, in regard to our dealings with all purely spiritual communications, we are like the magnet, which has two poles, one of which attracts, while the other repels, religious and moral truth. If the carnal mind is predominant in us, we either reject and loathe the spiritual food, or we are unable to appropriate it and derive nourishment from it. On the other hand, the spiritual mind is more than half prepared for the reception of divine truth—it is already gravitating in that direction, and receives the gracious lessons with eager longing and instinctive sympathy. There can be no difficulty in finding a practical definition of the carnal as contrasted with the spiritual mind. The fulfilment of the divine law rests upon love or unselfishness. If we approach the truths of revelation in this spirit, we can understand and receive them.

[1] Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 275, *ad fin.*

But if we seek to combine with religion any form of human selfishness—whether it be the selfishness of pride, or of malice, or of avarice, or of indolent self-gratification, spiritual truth shrinks from the repelling influence of that counter-pole, and the cup of life is emptied before we can raise it to our lips. This remark will of course apply to all cases,—to the layman as well as to the clergyman, to the ignorant as well as to the learned. But it is most applicable to the case of those who claim to be able, competent, and sufficient ministers of the New Testament. If the Spirit of Christ has no seat in their hearts, they may indeed preach to others, but they will be but the more conspicuous castaways themselves. It is true that no deficiency on the part of the ministers can affect the validity and efficacy of divine ordinances; but, just in proportion as the spiritually minded and loving preacher is able in the spirit of love to serve and edify his brethren, in the same proportion must the self-seeking, vain, worldly, indolent, or ill-tempered steward of God's Word falsify the treasures committed to him, and dispense them with a large admixture of his own base coinage.

The other essential condition for an able and sufficient ministration of the New Testament may, indeed, be fulfilled by all who are qualified by leisure and education for the prosecution of the necessary studies; but it is the imperative duty of every minister of a Christian Church to endeavour, according to his opportunities and abilities, to become a learned and competent interpreter of the records of revelation. There are indeed some among the ministers of our own Church, and there are many dissenting ministers, who not only undervalue learning, but represent it, even in their public discourses, as a dangerous, if not unholy thing. And it is a favourite saying with them that the poor pious man, with ever so little learning,

is not only *often*, but *generally*, a better Christian than the scholar. To put aside the case of those who make such statements from selfish motives,—namely, to excuse themselves from the charge of having neglected the studies proper to their profession,—and to confine ourselves to the many who are really sincere in their belief that no special learning is required for a full appreciation of all that can be learned from the pages of the Scriptures, we must remark that we have here one of those confusions of thought which are at the bottom of all the unconscious sophistries of ordinary conversation. It is true that no learning is required in order that we may be able to read the Bible so as to live by it. The great broad doctrines of practical holiness are equally plain in the translation and in the original; and those who approach the well of life with a soul thirsty for spiritual truth and with a congenial sympathy of religious instinct, with a wish to be good and to do good, these persons will grasp at once the essential and simple truths, and will not disturb themselves with speculations at once incoherent and incongruous. If, to this spirit, the student of Scripture adds perfect learning and competent ability, he will indeed arrive at the same practical results as the ignorant but really pious believer, but he will do this in a manner suited to his own knowledge and capacity, and will be enabled to express the truths of revelation in the language most intelligible to those whose educational advantages are the same as his own. And it may sometimes be necessary for the Christian clergyman to preach to those who are neither pious nor ignorant, and whose hearts must be reached through the avenues of a cultivated understanding. For ministering in a civilized and refined society, for keeping abreast of the van of scientific and literary progress, it will always be necessary that some at least of the stewards of God's mysteries should be as learned and as able as

the foremost men in the congregations which they have to address. Theology must keep pace with the advance of other branches of science; for "every scribe who is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like the man of property, who from his well-filled storehouse dispenses as occasion serves things new and old,"[1] neither offending prejudices by a startling parade of novelties, nor insulting educated manhood with childish anachronisms. No one, who has been permitted to form such a store, has any excuse in the eyes of God, if he locks it up and makes it as profitless as a miser's hoard. We all know the parable which warns us that our talents must at least bear interest. And the Fathers of the Church have repeatedly quoted a saying of our Lord's, which intimates, distinctly enough, that we are as much bound to use our critical faculties as we are to employ ourselves in the laborious acquisition of knowledge: "Be ye approved money-changers, rejecting on the one hand base coinage and on the other hand holding fast to that which is good."[2] In accordance with this we must sift to the bottom and test to the uttermost the doctrines to which we give currency, and the authorities on which they rest; and we must not be deterred from the necessary investigations by the appellations of *neologian* and *rationalist,* which are so emphatically bestowed by the indolent and superstitious on all who bring to sacred literature a rigorous judgment and fearless spirit of research. To those who dreaded Greek philosophy, which was the rationalism of

[1] Matth. xiii. 52; *cf.* above, p. 93.

[2] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. p. 425, Potter: γίνεσθε δόκιμοι τραπεζῖται, τὰ μὲν ἀποδοκιμάζοντες, τὸ δὲ καλὸν κατέχοντες. Niceph. *Hist.* x. 26: "Spectatos nummularios nos esse divinum oraculum jubet, et ut pulcherrimum quodque ex rebus omnibus deligentes, quod malum est abjiciamus, quod bonum autem disquiramus et inventum retineamus." Similarly Basil and Ambrose, as quoted by Potter, *ad Clem. loc.* This significant injunction is not attributed to Christ by any of the evangelists, but it seems to be tacitly referred to by St. Paul and St. John in the following passages: πάντα δὲ δοκιμάζετε· τὸ καλὸν κατέχετε (1 Thess. v. 21); μὴ παντὶ πνεύματι πιστεύετε ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζετε τὰ πνεύματα, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν.

the early Church, Clement of Alexandria addressed some observations which are very applicable to the present day: "Most persons," he said,[1] "dread Greek philosophy, as children dread hobgoblins, fearing lest it should run away with them. But if their faith—I will not say their knowledge—is such as to be overcome by a specious and plausible argument, let the philosophers above all others gain this victory and reduce them to the confession that they will not have the truth. For truth they say is invincible, but false opinion is liable to overthrow. For example, we choose even our purple silks by putting two pieces together. So that, if one confesses that his heart has not the power of discrimination, he assuredly has not the money-changer's table, still less has he the true criterion—the reason. And how is he any longer a money-changer, if he is not able to prove or distinguish the unalloyed coin and its counterfeit?"[2] At the time when Clement wrote these words there was a discrimination with regard to the constituent parts of the Canon of Scripture, and a searching inquiry into the meaning of that which was accepted as a valid authority for the truth of revelation. And if we rest on the indolent and uncritical acquiescence of a later age; if we pass off as good coin whatever happens to be in circulation, without allowing ourselves to examine the superscription or to test the metal; if we even accept as a seamless texture that which is variegated with purple patches; we not only undervalue our privileges, but we neglect a positive duty, and set at nought the gravest of our responsibilities. For by this negligence we not only do not act like the approved money-changers,

[1] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi., p. 780, Potter.

[2] Mr. Wilson has well remarked (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 185) that, as far as the heathen world is concerned, the philosophers of Greece "were more truly the precursors of the Christian ministry, than were the priests of the pagan temples; and though not, in this case, by evident design, nor in express imitation of a model, the Christian teachers replaced the philosophers, and not the priests among the heathen, as they represented the doctors of the Sanhedrim, and not the Levitical priesthood among the Jews."

but we degrade our high calling to that of the retailer who vends adulterated provisions,[1] and falsify the Word of God,[2] which we profess to deliver in its primitive simplicity. But independently of the preacher's duty to his congregation, an enlightened study of Scripture produces its proper results for all those who prosecute it in the proper spirit. The Christian scholar can see far better than the uneducated man that the Old and New Testament are bound together by a real concent and harmony; that one statement of consistent doctrine runs through all the written records of revelation. He can understand the insignificance of apparent discrepancies, and he can often penetrate, like the gold-seeker in our days, through the valueless quartz or loam to the pure metal, which sometimes shows glistening particles on the surface, and sometimes is entirely hidden within. It is in the wide interval between complete ignorance and perfect knowledge or learning that all the mischievous elements of theological speculation are to be found. Here, if anywhere, "a little learning is a dangerous thing." It is from the little learning, uncontrolled by a Christian temper, that we get the letter which killeth, instead of the Spirit which giveth life. It is from the little learning that we get the silly cavils of captious unbelief, which is always nibbling at the unimportant accessories of religion, and endeavouring to persuade us that it is delivering home-thrusts at the body and heart of our faith. It is from the little learning that we get the minute and positive dogmatism, which spins a whole fabric of heresy and schism from the fine threads of verbal subtleties. Nay, it is sometimes from the little learning that we hear the wholesale disparagement of learning, or those boastful predications of the difference

[1] 2 Cor. ii. 17: καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, where the allusion is to the adulteration of wine by the κάπηλοι.

[2] 2 Cor. iv. 2: δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ.

between the learning which is, and the learning which is not, sanctified. It may require a deeper insight into the human heart than man can claim, to say what learning is truly sanctified by the indwelling Spirit of God, though here also we have the criterion given us by our Lord—that the tree is known by its fruits[1]—but it requires no illumination beyond that of human reason and human ability to tell the difference between learning and ignorance, between genius and dulness, and we can find out for ourselves that those, who disallow the necessity of learning and critical judgment to the able ministers of a Christian Church, are generally deficient in those accomplishments which they affect to disparage.

Whatever may be the principles or practice of other communities, the Church of England, at all events, expects in her ministers both spirituality and learning. The means of giving full effect to her requirements may be practically defective, and the negligence of the Bishops has often acquiesced in a minimum of piety and attainments. But it is impossible to read the ordination service, without seeing that no man can conscientiously become a minister of the Church of England without a true spirit of devotion, and without resolving to obtain, by the best exertion of his abilities, a complete and independent garniture of theological information. Whoever seeks holy orders in our Church, whether as deacon, priest, or bishop, is always asked, first of all, whether he "thinks," or "thinks in his heart," or "is persuaded" that he is "truly called" to that particular ministration; and the Anglican priest, at his ordination, solemnly pledges himself, the Lord being his helper, that he "will be diligent in prayer, and in reading of the Holy Scriptures, and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same, laying aside the study of the world and of the flesh." That the qualification

[1] Matth. vii., 16—20.

of competent learning is a leading characteristic of the English clergyman, is shown by the fact that the ministry of the Church is, in theory at least, subordinate to the theological schools at the great Universities, which are still legally entitled to take an independent part in the discussion and determination of religious doctrine.[1] The academical character of the Church is openly exhibited to the eyes of the congregation by the very attire of the minister. Instead of the tippet, which marks the equality of priesthood in the Romish Church, our clergy are directed by the Canons to wear "such hoods as by the orders of the Universities are agreeable to their degrees;" and the intention of this must be to indicate that they have the guarantee of academical standing, whatever may be the value of that distinction at the present day. It may also be shown that the social rank of clergymen is regulated by the academic prescription, which is also maintained in their relative precedence among themselves.[2]

But although it may be sufficiently clear that the English minister incurs the obligation of being, as far as he can, a godly and well-learned divine, it has not been generally observed that his liberty of private judgment is maintained even by his ordination vow, and that he accepts the rule of faith with that latitude of interpretation which is always presumed in the professional study of a document. The Deacon, who receives the New Testament only, with "authority to read the Gospel in the Church of God, and to preach the same, if he be thereto licensed by the Bishop himself," is merely asked: "Do you unfeignedly believe all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments?" The meaning of this question is explained

[1] The importance, or rather the necessity, of making the Universities independent of the Church, has been strikingly shown by the question which has recently been agitated between the Bishops and the Universities of Belgium.

[2] See *Classical Scholarship and Classical Learning*, pp. 171–174.

by the corresponding demand addressed to the Priest and Bishop respectively: "Are you persuaded that the Holy Scriptures contain sufficiently all doctrine required of necessity for eternal salvation through faith in Jesus Christ?" As it would be absurd to suppose that the Priest and Bishop, who receive not the New Testament only, but the whole Bible, are expected to entertain a different opinion respecting the Scriptures from that which is required of the Deacon; and as their profession, which is definite and in verbal accordance with the sixth Article, ought to explain the more vague and general declaration, which they had previously made, it must be manifest that the Deacon too is merely understood to say that he receives the Canonical Scriptures as his one rule of faith, as containing and including all that is required of necessity to eternal salvation. He is not called upon to profess any theory of inspirational infallibility; he is not asked whether Moses was really the writer of the Pentateuch; he may or may not have his own opinions about the great fish of Jonah or "the five hundred thousand chosen men," who were slain in a single battle; his scholarship may or may not be sufficient to raise or alleviate critical difficulties; still, if he can make his declaration in the same sense as he subscribes the sixth Article; if he can say, in the words of the great Scaliger, when speaking of the doubtful Epistles, *ego credo iis quæ intus, quia nihil contra nos*,[1] he will, at all events, accept the question *ex animo imponentis*, and will express the unfeigned belief, which the English Church considers applicable to the whole body of Scripture—the belief that necessary doctrine is not to be sought elsewhere. Now the Priest and Bishop not only accept the Scriptures as the exclusive rule of faith, but bind themselves by a promise that they will exercise an independent judgment in regard to the doctrines

[1] Above, p. 183.

which they derive from the Canonical Books. They are both of them required to declare that they are determined by God's grace, "out of the said Scriptures to instruct the people committed to their charge, and to teach nothing, as required of necessity to salvation, but *that which they shall be persuaded* may be concluded and proved by the Scripture." We have already seen that the Articles refer every doctrine to Scripture, with the exception of that belief in the Trinity, which is the foundation of the Catholic Faith. If, then, the Church does not tell us what doctrines we must find in Scripture, if she expressly relinquishes the privilege of affixing arbitrary interpretations to isolated texts, if she requires from her ordained Priests and consecrated Bishops that they will be guided by their own convictions in their conclusions from the text of Scripture, it is clear that the Anglican minister is not only not precluded from the enjoyment of that liberty which is an indication of the Spirit's presence, but that he is bound on all occasions both to exercise and assert his freedom. The late Bishop Marsh stated the fact when he said:[1] "As our Liturgy and Articles are avowedly founded on the Bible, it is the special duty of those who are set apart for the ministry to compare them with the Bible, and see that their pretensions are well founded. But then our interpretation of the Bible must be conducted independently of that, of which the truth is to be ascertained by it. Our interpretation of the Bible, therefore, must not be determined by religious system; and we must follow the example of our Reformers, who supplied the place of tradition by reason and learning." The academical character of our Church, taken in connexion with the fact that there are still schools for theological disputation in the two great Universities, may convince us that, as long as we confine ourselves to

[1] Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, etc., p. 487.

Scripture as the rule of faith, there is no doctrine or speculation of religious import which the Anglican divine is forbidden to test by the laws of reason and the canons of criticism; that his only peril is the risk of confutation, when he brings forward a proposition which he cannot sustain; and that the most erroneous conclusions, at which he can arrive by an honest process of argumentation, are less opposed to the terms of his ordination than any attempt to be outwardly orthodox in despite of his own convictions.

That these are the principles of the Church of England, as deduced from a candid examination of her formularies, cannot be denied by any one who has examined them according to the plain meaning of the words and the obvious intentions of the Reformers who composed or sanctioned them. And yet it must be allowed that a very different opinion is entertained by the majority of Nonconformists, and by a considerable number of persons within the Church itself. It is a prevalent belief that the English clergyman is not allowed to call his soul his own—that he had the right to think for himself before he assumed the clerical character, but that, having done so, he has relinquished his spontaneity, and has become a mere cog-wheel in the ecclesiastical machine. At any rate, it is quite certain that if any Anglican divine exercises the privilege which the Articles presume, and performs the duty which his ordination vow enjoins, the Dissenters cannot understand how he can conscientiously remain in communion with the Church, to which they attribute such stringent bondage, and his brother clergymen, or at least the most noisy and tumultuous among them, scout him as heterodox and heretical, because he will not accept their additions to the national rule of faith. That the Dissenters should be unable to comprehend the latitude and toleration of a Church which is always represented to them by its extreme

parties on either side, as eminently narrow and exclusive, is very pardonable... And there are some expressions in our Liturgy and Articles which, though capable of a liberal interpretation, seem to countenance this mistaken idea. Before a Nonconformist can understand that the Church of England is liberal and comprehensive, the members of the national communion must relinquish all attempts to narrow our door-ways, and, if possible, must remove those ambiguous passages from our formularies which interpose needless stumbling-blocks to sincere believers in the Catholic Faith. And, independently of the more general attacks which the Anglican divine has to expect from his brethren, when he brings common sense and modern learning to bear upon the records of revelation, we think it necessary that we should emphatically expose the suicidal fallacy which leads to this sectional intolerance within the national Church.

The primary consideration which we would impress upon those who would confine Anglican orthodoxy to their own specific opinions is this: that if either of the extreme parties is right, they must exclude from our communion, not only the other extreme party, but also the great majority of Churchmen who will not accept the dogmatic teaching of either of them. The consequence of this would be a complete schism, with the probability of infinite subdivisions. The fact, however, is that the two extreme parties do not really adopt the essential principles of the national Church; they are heterodox, in the proper sense of the word; they only hold on by the skirts of our garment, and are permitted to do so by that toleration which they would gladly deny, not only to one another, but to every liberal and enlightened man within the Church itself. Although the Articles, as the later and more authoritative document, must be supposed to regulate and explain the rubrics of the Prayer Book and the prayers themselves, we find the extreme High

Church party engaged in supporting their partial adoption of Romish tenets, by an appeal to the Liturgy, which is distinctly contradicted by the plainest declarations of the Articles of Religion. And the extreme Low Church party obtained some few years ago, from a guarded sentence of the Privy Council, a toleration for their Calvinistic dogmas, which neither the Prayer Book nor the Articles can be made to countenance. We have no particular affection for the views either of Archdeacon Denison or of Mr. Gorham; we think both of them equally wrong and equally mischievous; but we are convinced that a national Church ought to be wide enough to hold even these litigious ministers, if they can conscientiously subscribe to the Articles; and we would most distinctly maintain for them the right of examining the Scriptures and ascertaining for themselves whether their doctrines are in accordance with the only rule of faith which is prescribed to the English theologian.

But the outcry against that application of common sense and modern learning to the uses of biblical study, which we consider to be connected with the most obvious duty of the ordained minister, is by no means confined to the extreme parties in the Church. It proceeds, no doubt, in the first instance from those who take up the hypothesis of an infallible literature as the counterpoise to the dogma of an infallible Church; and it is certain that, in proportion as Bibliolatry is adopted, in the same proportion party-spirit becomes more rancorous, and the partizans more malignant and dishonest. The unchristian spirit which we have described, and proved to exist,[1] is much more flagrant in the Low Church than in the High. Whether we recall to mind individual instances, or look to the public examples afforded by periodical and occasional literature, we shall find that the violent and unscrupulous personality of religious invective always

[1] Above, pp. 323 foll.

depends on the *furor biblicus* of the assailant. Those who lean only on the infallible book are the worst offenders. Those who have another, and a stronger cord for their bow,—an infallible Church,—can afford to argue with some amount of Christian calmness on the validity of the other assumption.[1] But all parties, in proportion as they cling to any form of the religion *ab extra*, are maintainers of prescriptive authority. They abhor novelty, and deprecate the free use of the reason. Hence it comes to pass, that a considerable number, even of those who are not party men, are either afraid of receiving themselves, or ready to impose on others, the names of *neologian* and *rationalist*. Now it appears to us that these names do not, in themselves, convey any very formidable imputations, and we should be quite willing to receive them, if our opponents would accept from us the converse and correlative designations of *anachronists* and *irrational bigots*. When our Lord described the true expounder of religion as one who brought forth from his treasure *new* things as well as *old*, and warned us not to put *new* wine into *old* bottles, or *new* cloth into our *old* garments, he indicated, as we conceive, that *anachronism* might be more dangerous than *neology*.[2] We know what results have flowed from Mr. Rose's maxim that "whatever is new in theology, is *eo nomine* false."[3] On the other hand, it

[1] The High Church party are not only preserved from bibliolatrous extravagance by their general superiority to the opposite party in educational culture and refinement of mind, but they have a warning in the pages of the great English theologian, to whom they make frequent appeals. "Whatsoever," says Hooker (*Eccles. Polity*, Book II., ch. viii. § 7, p. 423, ed. Keble), "is spoken of God, or things appertaining to God, otherwise than as the truth is; though it seem an honour, it is an injury. And as incredible praises given unto men do often abate and impair the credit of their deserved commendation, so we must likewise take great care, lest in attributing unto Scripture more than it can have, the incredibility of that do cause even those things, which indeed it hath most abundantly, to be less reverently esteemed."

[2] See above, pp. 93, 443.

[3] Mr Faber (*Doctrine of Primitive Regeneration*, pp. 182, 183) says that "a confession of *doctrinal novelty* is a confession of *doctrinal falsehood*," and that "the acquisition of doctrinal truth must always be strictly a *re-discovery* as contradistinguished from a *new discovery*."

has been well remarked by an English clergyman, that "novelty may be considered as an indication of the genuine Protestant feeling" with which a Divine investigates the meaning of Scripture; for "to affirm that progress may be made in mental, moral, physical, but not in spiritual science, is a thought worthy of the dark ages."[1] Complaints have been frequently made of late that sermons are becoming insufferably dull, dreary, and uninstructive. How can it be otherwise, so long as clergymen imagine that it is sinful and dangerous to preach except according to the conventions of thought and language which suited the calibre of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Compare the piously thoughtful discourses of the neologian Schleiermacher with the effusions of the most accomplished London preacher, whose only anxiety is not to compromise himself, and then consider what results might be expected, if English clergymen allowed themselves to fulfil their ordination vow, by really studying the Sacred Records, and teaching the people, in a fresh and original manner, according to their own persuasions, and the conclusions of modern learning. With regard to the imputation of rationalism, we may fairly inquire, when the term is applied to us, what is meant by the word. If it is used, as in technical accuracy it ought to be used, to denote the effete and superannuated system of Paulus and the other German writers who wished to give a rational account of miracles, we reply, that we build up our faith in historical Christianity on a conviction of its miraculous origin, and that we have no part in the teaching of a school, which has come to an early end in the land of its birth. But if by rationalism is meant the free use of our reason in all that regards revelation, we answer that, as Protestants, and as human beings, we claim this as our indispensable, as our inalienable privilege. Reason and faith are functions of the same

[1] Desprez, *Apocalypse Fulfilled*, Pref. p. 14.

spiritual nature; they can have no rivalry, for their objects are the same; they can have no antagonism, for their mode of action is parallel and harmonious. If revelation does not appeal to our reason, neither does it invite our faith. He, who believes at all, believes as *man*, that is, as a being who enjoys the attributes of *reason* and *will*. "For man," says Richard Hooker, "to be tied and led by authority, as it were with a kind of captivity of judgment, and though there be reason to the contrary, not to listen unto it, but to follow, like beasts, the first in the herd, they know not nor care not whither, this were brutish." "Philosophy," says Sir W. Drummond, "wisdom, and liberty, support each other. He who *will* not reason is a *bigot;* he who *cannot*, is a *fool;* he who *dares not*, is a *slave*." With regard to our own Church in particular, the great majority of our professing members have agreed to maintain the privileges of *reason* and *freedom;* and in this they are most orthodox, for they most agree with the principles of those Articles which prescribe the terms of our national communion, and with the tendency of those solemn vows to which our ordained ministers pledge themselves. What, then, shall we say to one of our clergy, who, professing to be a Protestant, has ventured to raise the question whether "a man can be a Rationalist, a minister of a Christian Church, and yet an honest man?" Those, who know how often the so-called Rationalists have sacrificed their worldly prospects by the honest openness of their avowals, may, perhaps, be a little curious to learn how any one could return the intended answer to such a question. The writer, to whom we refer, has had the kindness to tell us[1] that the rationalist view of revelation "is especially opposed to the teaching of the Church of England, which, in her

[1] *Thoughts on Rationalism, Revelation, and the Divine Authority of the Old Testament*, by the Rev. A. McCaul, D.D., Professor of Divinity, King's College, London, 1850, p. 29.

Lessons, as well as the Epistles and Gospels, propounds, as the Word of God, the narratives of all the most remarkable revelations, which God has made of himself in appearances, in miracles, and in prophecies. No man of common integrity could possibly read to the people in the public service of God, as God's Word, that which he himself regards as nothing but a portion of the mythology of an ignorant people, and rejects not only as incredible and impossible, but unworthy of the Divine Being, and injurious to the spiritual welfare of man. The great question, however, it may be said, is, whether this doctrine be true or false. Undoubtedly; and on this point every conscientious man is bound to make up his mind. But this is a question for those without, not for those within, the Church. He must have thought but little of Christianity, and know next to nothing of the grounds of his faith, and have but little honesty or conscience in his profession of Church membership, who has not made up his mind upon a subject first in order, as well as importance." Again he writes, at the end of his short essay:[1] whatever may be the origin of rationalism, "the deadliness of its influence is the same. By whatever name it may be called, its effect is to annihilate the authority of God's Word; to infidelize the whole mass, or to make the teachers of Christianity mere deceivers, whose theological scheme is totally different from the religion of the people; having one doctrine for the cathedral and the study, and another for the pulpit—talking of the Word of God, and the Son of God, and the Spirit of God, with their lips, and, in their hearts, rejecting all faith in them as popular error; having a non-natural sense for the fundamental articles of the Christian faith, as others have for the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism. Far better to renounce the Christian faith at once, and to get rid of Theologians as well as Priests. Wretched will be the

[1] p. 66.

supremacy and glory of intellect and science, if it leave us destitute of good faith, integrity, and common honesty." On reading these words, we are positively astounded by the effrontery of the writer. That a charge of dishonesty should be brought by a Bibliolater, whose vocation it is to maintain conscious error,[1] against those who would sacrifice all their worldly interests rather than relinquish the fearless love of truth and liberty and plainness of speech, which is their distinguishing characteristic, must seem audacious beyond the usual daring of unscrupulous partizans, to any one who has considered the flagrant mendacity and disingenuousness of Bibliolaters in general, even as shown by a few examples in these pages.[2] And the very writer, whose presumptuous words we have just quoted, has, in his essay of less than seventy pages, exhibited all the worst qualities of his school. For throughout he assumes the points which he ought to prove, both with regard to the rationalism he attacks, and the theory of infallibility which he maintains. Nay, in the very words which we have quoted, there is either a strange confusion of ideas or the grossest misrepresentation. Where does the Church of England put forward any theory of inspiration, either with regard to the Scriptures in general, or with regard to the select passages, which are read in the course of divine service? What is there to hinder any minister of the Church from taking his text from the Lessons, Epistles, or Gospels, and expounding it, and the passage in which it occurs, according to his own persuasions of their value and meaning? How can this writer know that the enlightened minister, whom he calls a Rationalist, agrees entirely with Wegscheider, or, if he does, that he could not find profitable instruction, conducive to "the spiritual welfare of man," in any one of these biblical extracts? On what principle can he maintain that all English clergymen have come

[1] Above, p. 184. [2] Above, pp. 73, 209, 312, 318, 331, etc.

to the end of their theological improvement, and have nothing more to learn, when they take holy orders at the early age of twenty-three or twenty-four; that their ordination vow to devote themselves to Scriptural studies is a mockery; that their promise to teach only according to their persuasion is a farce; that any new learning, which might lead to the correction of crude and immature notions, would involve them in sin; that, in fact, there is no honesty or conscience except for those who either retain in manhood the childish things of their early years, or resolutely shut their eyes that they may not see the truth? This might be possible enough if we were still in the sixteenth century, when the clergy were so ignorant that they were often unable to compose sermons, and were obliged to avail themselves of Homilies, in which the Apocryphal writings are described as the inspired Word of God. But now it must happen, as a matter of course, that every clergyman, who does his duty, will become better informed as he grows older; and it is therefore an absurdity to speak of the liberty of judgment with regard to questions of Biblical authority and interpretation as belonging only to those without the Church. For the clergyman as well as for the layman, Protestantism is an active principle, not a lifeless tradition. The defalcations in good faith, integrity, and common honesty, of which this writer speaks, and the evil consequences which he attributes to them, must be laid to the charge of the school of Bibliolaters, to which he belongs. They it is who are the enemies, while they profess to be the friends, of revelation; they it is who shake the faith of humble Christians by making our religion responsible for fallacies which the increasing intelligence of the age cannot fail to detect; they it is who disgust the educated classes by self-conscious sophistries, which at once betray themselves, and involve the religion of light and love

in the discredit which attaches to a creed of darkness and malignity.

With this parting rebuke to the insolent bigotry which presumes to surround the national orthodoxy with narrow limitations unknown to the formularies of our Church, we will bring our whole discussion to a close. A general, but not inaccurate, survey of the entire field of Christian theology has enabled us to see that neither our religion itself, nor the Church of England as its national exponent, nor the Anglican divine, as an ordained minister, is committed to any maintenance of those untenable opinions, which have furnished the unbeliever with the only materials for his successful warfare. We have shown that the historical evidences of Christianity are altogether untouched by the cavils of our adversaries, and that we can afford to resign to the sceptic all the apparent advantages which the ignorant dogmatism of our teachers has allowed him to gain. The true advocate of Christianity finds the object and fulfils the laws of his conservatism by relinquishing the scenic outworks of preposterous opinions and unsupported assumptions, and by falling back on the impregnable fortress of religion itself. His strength consists in the solid texture of the historical testimony, by which he is enabled to account for the origin of his faith, and in the sincerity and holiness of each individual believer, which show that the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation. To the former he fearlessly invites the strictest scrutiny, while he appeals with equal confidence to the living miracle of the existence of his religion in the hearts of its sincere professors; for, as St. Paul said, every man who draws near to the Lord's table renews the evidence of his creed, by commemorating the actual death of Him who rose from the dead and is to come again. Considered in this way, Christianity becomes independent of the literary remains which

have preserved the history of our faith and of the antecedent Judaism. And though modern Biblical learning has brought us to some conclusions respecting the canonical books and their interpretation, which are at variance with the notions formerly entertained by an ill-informed and uncritical age, it has not in the slightest degree interfered with the historical fact that a revelation has been given, or with the truths, which characterize that revelation. In proportion as we have been successful in our endeavour to prove this proposition, in the same proportion have we reconciled Christian orthodoxy, as it was in the beginning, with the Biblical learning which distinguishes our own age. With regard to the orthodoxy of the English Church, we have seen that, even by the admission of men representing the most opposite opinions, the dogmatic teaching of our national establishment is confined to an explicit declaration of the Trinitarian Faith. And as the vitality of a religion must depend on the religiousness of its professors, it is consolatory to be able to assure ourselves that the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity is not a speculative statement, but the record of a great fact, inevitably recognised by those whose conduct proves its reality—the great fact that God became man in order that man might become like God in his attribute of love. Hence it is that the Athanasian Creed, the most precise of all our Trinitarian formularies, is also most emphatic in insisting on the necessity of a righteous and godly life. It may, therefore, be concluded that no correctness of speculative opinion is safe in itself, or conducive to the salvation of others, when it is propagated by unchristian acts; and as all Christian righteousness is summed up in that love which is the fulfilling of the law, there can be no sound doctrine in those who are, by their doctrine, induced to hate their brethren. Whatever may be the case with other nations, we, who are Christian

Englishmen, enlightened by the culture of modern civilization, science, and freedom, and to whom Providence has committed the work of teaching our religion to millions of unconverted heathens in our distant possessions, we, at least, are bound so to form and so to interpret our canons of orthodoxy that we may not exclude any good Christian from a participation in that faith which ought to be a bond of union rather than a stimulant of contention. We, at least, must not imitate the insane multitude in the circus at Byzantium, to whom the Ever Blessed Trinity was but the badge of a party, a tenet *ab extra*, fostered by frantic zeal and propagated by cruel persecution. With us, at least, that name, under which we were regenerated or born again, must be associated with the gentle graces of a new life, foreshadowing the love and holiness which alone are admitted to gaze on the splendours of the heavenly throne. For us, at least, there is especial significance in that short sentence which our Redeemer addressed to those who were to be the first agents in the propagation of his religion: "Have salt in yourselves, and have peace one with another."[1] As the Christian must justify his cause by his conduct, and win souls to God by exhibiting the effect of his convictions in his own absolute and individual religiousness, the world will not be seasoned if the salt has lost its saltness in this metropolis of rational liberty and refined intelligence; and as the heavenly Jerusalem, the communion of saints on earth, is indicated only by a constant endeavour to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace,[2] we can have but little hope of the universal brotherhood of Christians, if those, who dwell together as fellow citizens and fellow subjects in this world-ruling island, can find nothing in their religion except the fuel and fomentation of perpetual discord.

[1] Mark, ix. 50. [2] Eph. v. 3.

APPENDIX VIII.

(CHAP. V. P 433).

ON THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

THE vindication of the *Symbolum quicunque vult*, which finds a place in the text, expresses only a partial sense of the value which we attach to this record of the faith of Latin Christianity. It has been the custom even with those who are most contented with the so-called Apostles' Creed, and who do not find fault with that of Nicæa, to raise the most grave objections against the monthly recitation of the confession which bears the orthodox name of St. Athanasius. The liberal Archbishop Tillotson wished that the English Church was well rid of it; and we have heard that it is regularly omitted in the Episcopalian Chapels of Edinburgh, even in that in which the Bishop himself officiates, because a majority of votes in the managing vestry has so determined it. Now, without pressing the fact that the Nicene Creed, in its original form, had damnatory clauses not less stringent than those of the *quicunque vult*, and without calling the latter, with Bishop Beveridge, "this incomparable creed" (*Works*, vol. vii. p. 260, Anglo-Catholic Library), we do not hesitate to express our conviction that, if there is any advantage in having an explicit declaration of the particulars which constitute orthodoxy, the Athanasian symbol is in every respect preferable to either of the other two which our Church places by the side of it. For while it is most explicit in regard to that Trinitarian doctrine, which is the key-stone of orthodoxy, it carefully avoids those points of interpretation which are opposed to the results of Biblical learning; it lays the principal stress on an abnegation of that Tritheism which is the worst and most natural abuse of

Trinitarian teaching; and it subordinates, in the most emphatic manner, the *credenda* of orthodoxy to the *agenda* of religion and morality.

In order to understand fully the theological importance of the Athanasian creed, it is desirable that we should, as far as possible, realize to ourselves the position of the writer, and the circumstances by which he was surrounded. The complete investigation of the question more than a century ago, by Dr. Daniel Waterland, has fully established the fact that this Creed was composed about the year 430 A.D., by Hilary, Bishop of Arles, in the South of France. At this time the Visigoth monarchy was firmly established in that province, and, under its influence, the Arian heresy was introduced into Gaul with fresh sanction and support. "Whatever," says Gibbon (iv. p. 327, ed. W. Smith), "might be the early sentiments of Ulphilas, his connexions with the empire and the Church were formed during the reign of Arianism. The Apostle of the Goths subscribed the Creed of Rimini; professed with freedom, and perhaps with sincerity, that the Son was not equal or consubstantial to the Father; communicated these errors to the clergy and people, and infected the barbaric world with an heresy which the great Theodosius proscribed and extinguished among the Romans." In the province of Gaul, on the other hand, the cultivated clergy and the Latinized laity had long exhibited an active zeal on behalf of the doctrines of Athanasius. The eminent namesake of the Bishop of Arles, Hilary of Poitiers, had, one hundred years before, devoted his best energies to the maintenance of those doctrines to which the Nicene council had recently affixed the stamp of orthodoxy, and opposed himself so zealously to the spread of Arianism in the west, that he incurred the displeasure of the Emperor Constantius II., and he was one of the prelates who were banished in consequence of the reactionary Councils of Arles and Milan in 355 A.D. The interval between the ages of the two Hilary's, was partly filled up by the literary activity of Augustine, who was an eminent advocate of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. And as Waterland has observed, "Hilary of Arles was a great admirer and follower of St. Austin." When, therefore, the establishment of the gallant dynasty of Wallia, on the throne of Southern Gaul, gave a greater encouragement to the Arian tenets of the Gothic and other barbarian tribes

settled in that district, it was not unnatural that the newly-elected Bishop of Arles should endeavour to recommend the doctrines, for which the greatest of his Gallic predecessors had testified under the frowns of imperial power, which his teacher Augustine had maintained in the midst of a Vandal invasion, and which his own convictions declared to be most in accordance with the original teaching of the Church. At the same time, Hilary could not but be aware that the professors of the orthodox faith were by no means equal in real religion and morality to the Arians, whom they stigmatized as barbarous heretics. Dr. Newman has remarked (*Essay on Development*, p. 272, 2nd edition) that "whatever was their cruelty or tyranny, both Goths and Vandals were a moral people, and put to shame the Catholics, whom they dispossessed. 'What can the prerogative of a religious name profit us,' says Salvian, 'that we call ourselves Catholic, boast of being the faithful, taunt Goths and Vandals with the reproach of an heretical appellation, while we live in heretical wickedness?' The barbarians were chaste, temperate, just, and devout; the Visigoth Theodoric repaired every morning with his domestic officers to his chapel, where service was performed by the Arian priests; and one singular instance is recorded of the defeat of a Visigoth force by the imperial troops on a Sunday, when, instead of preparing for battle, they were engaged in the religious services of the day." With this contrast before his eyes, Hilary of Arles could not but feel that Christianity required something more than a precise form of sound doctrine; and he has left to the Church a Symbol or Creed not less distinguished from other documents of the same class by the logical accuracy of its theological statements, than by the earnestness with which it insists on the necessity of a sober, righteous, and godly life.

In examining the Athanasian Creed, or any other compendium of Christian doctrine, we must remember that it is, after all, only a commentary on Scripture in a very abridged form, and that its merit depends on the accuracy of the instruction which it conveys. No such exposition can take from a Protestant the right of examining Scripture for himself. And he must either interpret the Creed according to the best lights which he can bring to bear on the interpretation of Scripture, or, if it does not admit of such an interpretation, he must prefer the text to

the commentary. Our eighth Article declares that the three Creeds are "by all means to be received and believed, for they may be proved by the surest warranties of Scripture." If this were not so, if it could be shown that the Creeds, or any one of them, lacked this support, it must follow that the ground of reception would *ipso facto* fail. Mr. Maurice, we believe, has remarked that "a Creed needs a Bible, to show that it has something to rest upon; a Bible needs a Creed to show that it has done what it proposed to do." We recognise as true the former, but not the latter, part of this axiom. The correct statement is contained in a proposed new edition of our Articles, which has come into our hands with the following title: "Reformata Fidei Confessio sive communia religionis Christianæ principia in articulos duodetriginta digesta: opera Presbyteri Anglicani. Londini, 1855." In the fourth of these Articles we read: "Fidei Symbolis et Confessionibus, cujus generis sunt etiam Expositiones pueris ediscendæ, modice uti licet tanquam doctrinæ compendiis atque initiis, et tanquam communionis pacisque vinculis; non quasi aliquid in iis sit auctoritatis divinæ. Hæc omnia hominum opuscula eatenus valent, quoad ostendi perspicue possint e sacris literis undique inter se collatis et consonantibus esse desumpta. Neque eadem aut forma aut numero sint ubique necesse est; fuerunt enimvero jam pridem diversa diversis locis ac temporibus; quæ quemadmodum ascita sunt, ita pro re nata vel deponi vel mutari ab ecclesia rite possunt, data semper opera ne quid præter Dei verbum velut ex necessitate salutis credendum hominibus obtrudatur, atque ut omnia cum caritate fiant, ad ædificationem et ad gloriam Dei." The truth of this statement is excellently developed in the first of Mr. Wilson's *Bampton Lectures* (pp. 23 *sqq.*). He has well remarked that "there are processes inevitably going on, whereby the peculiar circumstances and education of each successive generation varies the conceptions which it is capable of forming;" that there is "no divine promise that these processes should not affect theological conceptions, or language, when it expresses theological conceptions;" that, notwithstanding this, "Creeds and other like formularies may be retained, and have been retained by Churches, as Symbols of union and membership, or as instruments of instruction," though a Creed or formula may be "retained or adopted in a sense different, more or less, from that which it bore at its framing, or in

some previous period of its history;" and that the liberty of so settling the meaning of a Creed may "be claimed especially for a Church which refers to Scripture as the authority for its credenda, if the sense, in which a Creed or Article of Faith was framed, or has at some time been received, should now turn out, to her present mind, unscriptural." To the question, if Creeds and Articles are not to be considered as interpretations of Scripture and we must go to Scripture for the interpretation of forms of that kind, where is to be found the interpretation of Scripture?"—Mr. Wilson replies by referring to the sense of Scripture, "as it *shall* be interpreted, under the best lights of the present and future times." He says that "as in this matter the responsibilities of all men are their own and present, their judgment must be their own, and not that of others—a present judgment, and not one that is past, although past judgments supply a portion of the materials for it." And he adds that "a wider application of this principle or rule, beyond what occurs as probable at its first enunciation, may ensue upon the defining of what has not yet been defined, namely, what is meant by the Inspiration of Scripture; a definition which must itself be referred to the common consent of those to whom the Scripture shall come."

Admitting these principles as generally coincident with that view of Protestant theology which we have taken in the text, and as directly applicable to the case of a Creed, we proceed to show that the Symbol of Hilarius Arelatensis, though more distinct and elaborate than the other two Creeds, contains less that requires to be accommodated by the imposition of a new or corrected meaning to the modern interpretation of the texts on which it rests.

It is a mistake to suppose that a Creed, at the time when it is put forth, is intended to narrow the basis of the Church. The obvious purpose of such a Symbol or passport of admission into a Church must be to include as many as possible, and this not so much by precise and logical statements of what the believer must profess, as by negativing certain propositions which tended to break up the Church into a number of sects. As we have shown in the text, the Church Catholic, and even a national Church, is necessarily more comprehensive than any community of men who dissent on particular grounds. It has been well remarked, that

even the orthodox settlements of the Creed "were in fact expressions of dogma, which did act as comprehensions in their time. As, for instance, even the final expression of the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father comprehended as many as could possibly be comprehended within the terms of one and the same profession, considering the antagonistic theories between which that declaration placed itself"; so that "the heterodox parties commenced the war of limitations," and "sought by definitions to narrow the Church of Christ," whereas the orthodox party merely swept away these specialties (Wilson, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 55.)

In asserting the doctrine of the Trinity, the Athanasian Creed is much more engaged in contradicting erroneous views than in binding down the professors of Christianity to any particular theory on the subject. In asserting generally both an Unity of Godhead and a Trinity of Persons, this Creed meets with a contradiction all the mischievous theories which had originated from that doctrine. The heresies specially combated are the Arian, Sabellian, Nestorian, Eutychian, and Apollinarian. We have seen[1] that false religion generally assumes one of three forms—*polytheism*, *dualism*, or *pantheism*. The *polytheistic* view of the doctrine of the Trinity would convert the three persons into three Gods, or establish a tritheism instead of an unity of Godhead. To this the Athanasian Creed opposes itself by a series of repeated contradictions from the seventh verse to the nineteenth, both inclusive. In passing from the crudest form of false religion to the antagonistic monotheism, the advocate of the orthodox faith in the Trinity had to combat two erroneous applications of that true belief. Monotheism sometimes represented itself as a recognition of one Supreme Deity, with certain ministerial agents subordinated to him, who constituted a class of secondary gods. This view was applied to the Trinity by Arius, who was thus guilty of a division of the divine Substance or entity. On the other hand, monotheism appeared as a recognition of only one God, who, however, acted upon or in the world by a merely temporary personification of Himself. This was the view applied to the explanation of the Trinity by Sabellius, who thus fell into the error of confusing the Persons. It will be seen that the Arian

[1] Above, p. 101.

theory verged towards polytheism, and represented the views of the Greeks; *καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι*, says Athanasius (*c. Arian.* iii. 16, p. 423, Newman's translation), *ὥσπερ καὶ οὗτος, τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα θεόν*; and he he adds that this is really a kind of polytheism: "the Arians are greater traitors than the Jews in denying the Christ, and they wallow (*συγκυλίονται*) with the Gentiles, hateful as they are to God (*θεοστυγεῖς*), worshipping the creature and many deities." On the other hand, Sabellianism inclined to the Judaism of the times before the Exile, when God appeared among men by his angels or *mal'hakîm*, and so Basil said that Sabellianism was merely Judaism under the form of Christianity (*Ep.* 210, 3: *Ἰουδαϊσμός ἐστιν ὁ Σαβελλισμὸς ἐν προσχήματι Χριστιανισμοῦ*; *cf.* Euseb. *c. Marcellum*, i. 8). These two antagonistic theories are contradicted together in the *Symbolum Quicunque*, vv. 3-6. As the *polytheistic* view was represented in greater or less degrees by Tritheism and Arianism, so the *dualistic* error found its approximation in the doctrines of Nestorius, who asserted that in Christ there were not only two natures but two persons; and *pantheism* asserted itself in the hypothesis of Eutyches, who denied the two natures in Christ, and maintained that the human was swallowed up in the divine. This latter doctrine, that of the Monophysites, as it is called, seems to have originated in the views of Apollinaris in the previous century, who held that Christ could not have had a human soul; that the *Word* dwelling in him must have been his only source of reasoning and information; and this was of course a denial of the two perfect natures, and an approximation to *pantheism*. Opposed as they were in other respects, it seems that the *pantheism* of Apollinaris inclined to the *polytheism* of Arius, and the *dualism* of Nestorius to the *monotheism* of Sabellius. "If," says Dr. Newman (*on Athanas.* ii. p. 292), "the opposites of connected heresies are connected together, then the doctrinal connexion of Arianism and Apollinarianism is shown in their respective opposition to the heresies of Sabellius and Nestorius. Salij (*Eutych. aut Eut.* 10) denies the connexion, but with very little show of reason. La Croze calls Apollinarianism *Arianismi tradux* (*Thes. Ep. Lacroz.* t. 3, p. 276)." The Athanasian Creed stands in no direct antagonism to the Eutychians, whose views were not published till a later part of the same century, but their positions are fully denied by anticipation in vv. 27-35. Apollinaris, however,

is referred to and contradicted in v. 30, where it is stated that "Jesus Christ was perfect God and perfect man of *a reasonable soul* and human flesh subsisting"; and there is an equally immediate rebuke to Nestorius in v. 32, where it is added that although Jesus "be God and man, yet He is *not two but one* Christ."

In thus putting a veto on the precise limitations of belief, which would have narrowed the Catholic Church to the dimensions of a dogmatic sect, the *Symbolum Quicunque* does not itself advance any theory respecting the Trinity. Its doctrine is given in vv. 20-26, and these statements are followed by the assertion of a real incarnation, of the fact that Christ, whose divinity had been previously maintained, was in every sense a human being also—"God, of the substance of his Father, begotten before the world; and man, of the substance of his mother, born in the world"—and therefore "equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead, and inferior to the Father, as touching his manhood." The doctrine of the Trinity, thus generally conceived, is, as we have shown in the text, not speculative but practical, and capable of leading directly to holiness of heart and life. It has been objected that "the doctrine of the Trinity, as stated in the Athanasian Creed, and held by the Catholic Church, however it may be expressed in words, in *reality* does not differ from Sabellianism or Unitarianism, which consists in holding God to be one mind only or one philosophical person" (*Brief Remarks on some of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church by a Graduate of Oxford*; London, Cradock and Co., 48, Paternoster Row, 1844). And we have heard it asserted by men of ability that it is impossible to find any mean between Tritheism and Sabellianism, which is in fact Unitarianism. That the Athanasian Creed most strenuously asserts the Unity of the Godhead—that, in fact, all true Trinitarians are Unitarians also, no one will for a moment deny. It is also clear, as we have mentioned above, that Sabellianism connects itself with the monotheism of the Jews, which was not only true religion, but the only true religion until the coming of Christ: for it seems absurd to say that the Jews had any idea of a Trinity of Persons. The use of the plural *Elohim* with a singular verb, in the history of the Creation, is generally cited to prove that the Jews had this conception. But the Christian doctrine is that the Word alone was the instrument of creation. And it has been well remarked by M.

Archinard (*Le Catechisme de l'église de Genève defendu contre la requête de deux pères de famille*; Gen. 1853, p. 47): "Si l'on admet que ce Verbe divin a créé le monde, les choses visibles et les invisibles, comme cela est dit, *Jean*, i. 10, *Coloss.* i. 16, il n'y a pas moyen alors de voir une pluralité de personnes dans les mots (*Gen.* i. 26): *faisons l'homme*, etc. Dieu le Père n'y a été pour rien; c'est le Fils qui a tout fait. Cette difficulté est incontestable, et ne cesse d'en être une que du moment où l'on voit dans le pluriel un pluriel d'excellence, comme dans le nom hébreu de Jérusalem et dans *Esdras*, iv. 18; 1 *Maccab.* x. 19, xi. 31, xv. 9." The distinction between Sabellians or Unitarians, and those who "worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity," may be established by the following considerations. It seems to us that there are three means or intervening propositions between that kind of Unitarianism which we call Deism, and the Tritheism which is a kind of Polytheism. The following arrangement will show the transition in its natural development:—

Tritheism.—A belief in three Gods: *i.e.* in three minds or Substances all equal.

Arianism.—A division of the Substance of God, without a recognition of more than one equal God.

Sabellianism.—A confusion of the Persons in the one substance of God.

Trinitarianism.—A recognition of the unity of Substance, which insists on a separation or diversity of Persons.

Unitarianism or *Deism.*—A denial of any sub-manifestations in the unity of the Godhead.

The difference between the Deist and the Sabellian is more apparent than real; it consists in the fact that the latter admits, at least in name, that there are *persons* in the Godhead, though he virtually confuses them, whereas the former makes no attempt at such a subdivision. With regard to the Trinitarian, everything depends on the meaning of the word *person*. It is a mere truism to say that, if a Trinity of Persons implies a Trinity of minds, there cannot be a unity of the Godhead. And it is begging the question to assert that whoever does not take "person" in this sense, confuses the Persons, and so becomes a Sabellian. We, who profess the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, believe in one divine mind or Godhead; and in this one Godhead

we declare that there are three Persons or manifestations—the *Father*, or Goodness, the *Son*, or Wisdom, and the *Holy Ghost*, or Power—existing side by side before all worlds. In the likeness of these three Persons man was created; in their name he is regenerated by baptism. The Father is manifested to this lower world only through the Son, and in Him creates and redeems mankind; or through the Son in the Holy Ghost, in whom he sanctifies and sustains His chosen people. But, as attributes or agencies, the three Divine Persons are anterior to the world, and independent of it. If any one, refusing to examine Scripture on the subject, insists upon telling us that this is Sabellianism, we may be well content to reply that, if so, the great authorities with the two parties in the Church were Sabellians also. Hooker, to whom High Churchmen will not be unwilling to defer as a sound guide, says, very distinctly (*Eccles. Pol.* v., clv., 5, p. 317, Keble): "The Father as Goodness, the Son as Wisdom, and the Holy Ghost as Power, do all concur in every outward particular issuing from that one only glorious Deity which they all are. For that which moveth God to work is Goodness, and that which ordereth his work is Wisdom, and that which perfecteth his work is Power." Calvin, whom the Low Churchmen reverence as a sort of oracle, and who has expressly combated Sabellianism in his *Institutio*, writes thus in his Catechism (quoted by Archinard, *u. s.*): "*M.* Veu qu'il n'y a qu'un Dieu, qui te meut de réciter le Père, le Fils, et le Saint Esprit, qui sont trois? *E.* Parce qu'en une seule Essence divine nous avons a considérer le Père, comme le commencement et l'origine ou la cause première de toutes choses: puis après son Fils, qui est la Sagesse éternelle: le Saint Esprit, qui est sa Vertu et Puissance, laquelle est épandue sur toutes créatures, et néanmoins réside toujours en lui." The same view is implied in St. Paul's benediction (2 Cor. xiii. 14), and in Justin Martyr's statement that the three Divine Persons are οὐκ οὐσίας ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ τρόποι τῆς ὑπάρξεως (p. 373); and it is most distinctly asserted by the orthodox Dr. South, in his *Animadversions on Dr. Sherlock* (p. 240), and in his dedication to Aretius; see *Vindication of Protestant Principles*, by Phileleutherus Anglicanus, London, 1847, pp. 184-186. When Dr. South says that the current doctrine both of the fathers and the schools is that "every Person of the Blessed Trinity, by virtue of its proper

mode of subsistence, includes in it the Godhead itself, and is properly the Godhead as subsisting with and under such a certain mode or relation," he virtually distinguishes between substance and subsistence, between οὐσία and ὕπαρξις, and suggests an interpretation of Phil. ii. 6: ὑπάρχων ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, which would make the divine ὑπόστασις the eternal form of the Divine Person, whereas its manifestation in the world is its χαρακτὴρ or εἰκών (Hebr. i. 3, Col. i. 15). And this we believe to be both Scriptural and Catholic. But in whatever sense Churchmen in general may agree to understand the words "substance" and "persons," and in whatever sense they may say that "the Son is not made nor created, but begotten," and that "the Holy Ghost is neither made nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding," it is clear that the Athanasian Creed lays down no narrow rule on this point, but contents itself with contradicting the precise and speculative dogmatism of the early heretics.

That this symbol distinguishes between that state of salvation, which is common to all Christians, and to which alone a profession of faith can serve as an access, and that eternal felicity, which is promised only to those who work out their salvation by patient continuance in well doing; and that it plainly declares that the judgment of Christ will try the works of men, and not their orthodoxy; this has been sufficiently indicated in the text. One critical objection might be raised to this interpretation of the Athanasian Creed. There is no doubt that the language of the second verse has led many persons to overlook the statements at the end of the Creed, and to suppose that an assent to some speculative doctrine is, after all, made the indispensable prerequisite of eternal happiness. But a more accurate examination of that verse, as interpreted by the context, will relieve us from this misapprehension. The Latin text, as given by Waterland, is as follows: "Quam nisi quisque (or "quis") integram inviolatamque (or "inviolabilemque") servaverit absque dubio in æternum peribit." If we take these words in connexion with the previous verse, they can only have this meaning: "The Catholic Faith is a necessary preliminary (*ante omnia*) for a saving communion with the Church, and the keeping that faith to the end in a corresponding life is the necessary condition of everlasting salvation." That this is the meaning of the writer, appears from the conclusion of the Creed;—that it is the sense of the

words themselves, we will endeavour to show. All depends, of course, on the meaning of the phrase "to keep the faith," *servare fidem*. Now it is clear that this phrase is taken from the vulgate of 2 Tim. iv. 7: *fidem servavi*, *τὴν πίστιν τετήρηκα*. And there is no doubt that St. Paul used that phrase as signifying the completion of a life of obedience to the precepts of the Gospel. He says: "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, *I have kept the faith;* henceforth is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day, and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing." In the very passage, then, in which Hilary found his *servare fidem*, he found it connected with the day of judgment and the crown of righteousness; and his own doctrine shows that he could not have awarded eternal life to any other way of "keeping the faith." Nor is this all. The word *τηρεῖν*, which is here rendered *servare*, is especially applied in the New Testament to the practical observance of the commands of Christ: we have *τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον* (John, viii. 51, 52), *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολάς* (Matth. xix. 17), *τηρεῖν τὸν νόμον* (James, ii. 10), *τηρεῖν ἄχρι τέλους τὰ ἔργα* (Apoc. ii. 26). The tertiary predicates, *integram inviolatamque*, must be understood of the manner in which the faith was to be carried out into obedience. The same verb *τηρεῖν* is used similarlarly with negative predications in the following passages; 2 Cor. xi. 9: *ἐν παντὶ ἀβαρῆ ἐμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἐτήρησα καὶ τηρήσω*, "in omnibus *sine-onere* me vobis *servavi* et *servabo;* James, i. 27: *ἄσπιλον ἑαυτὸν τηρεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου*, "*immaculatum se servare* ab hoc sæculo." We think it not improbable that the particular adjectives selected by Hilary to express that immunity from mundane influences, with which the faith was to be maintained and kept to the end, may have been suggested by Phil. ii. 15: *ἵνα ἦτε ἄμεμπτοι καὶ ἀκέραιοι* (*integri inviolatique?*), *τέκνα θεοῦ ἄμωμα μέσον γενεᾶς σκολιᾶς καὶ διεστραμμένης*. At any rate, we have here a direct reference to the other passage, where *servare fidem* occurs; for, in v. 17, the Apostle says: "I joy and rejoice with you all, if I be offered (*σπένδομαι*) upon the sacrifice and service of *your faith*." Classically, we have the same collocation, with a similar moral reference, in Cicero, *pro Cælio*, c. v. § 11: "qui prima illa

initia ætatis *integra* atque *inviolata* præstitisset, de ejus fama ac pudicitia, quum is jam se corroboravisset, nemo loquebatur." And the "integer vitæ scelerisque purus" of Horace (1 *Carm.* xxi. 1) sufficiently expresses the meaning of the combination. From this examination we see that there is no inconsistency between the second verse and the general tenor of the Athanasian Creed.

It only remains that we should call attention to the more ambiguous statements, which are incorporated in the other Creeds, but entirely omitted in the *Quicunque vult*. For here, also, we have a proof of the greater comprehensiveness of this much maligned formulary.

In the Apostles' Creed, it is well known that the fifth article: "He descended into hell," and the latter part of the ninth: "I believe in the communion of saints," are not only of later date and of less general adoption than the rest of the Creed, but also involve some ambiguities of interpretation. With regard to the former, the second edition of our Thirty-nine Articles abandoned the reference to the passage in St. Peter's First Epistle (1 Peter, iii. 19), on which the doctrine was supposed to depend, and some of our most learned divines at the time of the Reformation and afterwards have entertained very different opinions as to the meaning of this Article and the signification of the text in St. Peter's First Epistle. It is clearly an advantage to the Athanasian Creed that it makes no reference to these doubtful matters. Considering, too, how much a sort of Docetism is more or less consciously maintained by the two extremes in the Christian Church, what a tendency there is to ignore the absolute humanity of Jesus, and to consider only his superhuman character, and how this contributes to the formation of such doctrines as that of the immaculate conception of his mother, it is satisfactory to know that in the Athanasian Creed at all events there is no statement which encourages these extravagent opinions. Here, at least, the doctrine of the Incarnation is not set forth in a partial and one-sided formula. Here, at least, we have no grounds for the antichristian assertion that Jesus Christ did not really come in the flesh. We are told that he was not only God but "man of the substance of his mother born in the world; perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting"; and so "inferior to the Father as touching his manhood." There is a less distinct

assertion of this absolute humanity in the Nicene Creed, which merely states that Jesus Christ "for us men and our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate out of the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was included in man" (*κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐκ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*); and even in the Apostles' Creed, which tells us very briefly that our Lord was "conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary" (*συλληφθέντα ἐκ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου, γεννηθέντα ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου*); for in both of these descriptions there is an opening for Docetism, to say nothing of the difficulty suggested by the mention of the Virgin Mary to all those who either entertain critical objections to the introductory chapters in the first and third Gospels,[1] or who think that, as express reference is made in the former to the prophecy in Isaiah, we are bound to understand that Mary was not בְּתוּלָה, but merely עַלְמָה.[2] Every one who is acquainted with the meaning of the Hebrew words, and also thinks that "all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet,"[3] will be obliged to admit that the designation in question cannot mean anything more than a young or newly married woman; but very different views are generally suggested by the adjunct; and it would be well if we avoided whatever contributes, however indirectly, to Mariolatry, and tends, however remotely, to weaken the great doctrine that Jesus was not only very God but also very man, even as we are very men.

On the whole, then, we are prepared to maintain that, as a formulary, the Athanasian Creed is not only excellent in itself, but that it is even preferable to the other two Creeds, because it confines its doctrinal statements to the true province of theology,[4] and because it subordinates the profession of faith to that personal godliness, without which Christian Orthodoxy is but a delusive name.

[1] Above, pp. 277, 287. [2] See Gesenius, *on Isaiah*, vii. 14, pp. 297 302.
[3] Matthew, i. 22. [4] Above, p. 412.

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